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These are my essays on some of the central products of the German 
Classical Era. The topics they explore are key to the literature and 
thought of that period. All the essays have previously been published 
in journals or collections, dating from 1979 to 2010, and therefore span 
a considerable portion of my research into the German Enlightenment. 
I have selected them as the most important items in connection with 
problems presented by the major thinkers and writers working at that 
time.
In so doing, I wished to provide as wide a coverage as possible of 
topics and authors within the German classical period. The essays 
consequently deal with literature (including lyric poetry, the verse epic, 
the novel, drama and prose dialogue), philosophy, history, history of 
science, history of ideas, art history, theology and religion, and with 
writers and thinkers including Lucretius, Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, 
Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Hegel, and many others. I have in addition tried 
to include only those items the main conclusions of which have not, to 
the best of my knowledge, been superseded or substantially qualified 
by later research. In re-editing the work, I have confined myself largely 
to minor corrections, essential updating, and deletion of some passages 
which I no longer consider strictly relevant.
I would not have assembled this collection of essays without the 
encouragement and wisdom of Professor Roger Paulin. Bringing 
together a selection of my key research in a single volume provides 
an opportunity to review some of the most important developments 
in western thought. I hope that this book will help to shed light on 
the historical and philosophical context in which ideas that are of 
fundamental significance to the world in which we live were originally 
developed. I am therefore most grateful to Roger for his foresight in 
identifying the value of such an initiative. Equally, I wish to thank him 
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for his kindness in supporting the arrangements for preparing and 
editing the manuscript of these essays.
I would also like to thank Karl Guthke, a colleague of many decades 
and a great support to me, who has been instrumental in the approval 
of this collection for publication. My thanks extend to Alessandra Tosi 
of Open Book Publishers for her professional guidance and forbearance 
as I have gone through the time-consuming process of revisiting my 
past research and preparing this volume for publication. I am also 
greatly indebted to Dr John Williams of the University of St. Andrews. 
John is an old friend and colleague as well as a leading authority on 
the German Enlightenment. He has generously spared a considerable 
amount of his time to assist me in compiling a detailed index to this 
collection. I wish to thank him for his tireless and meticulous work 
and for accomplishing the task with impressive resolve. My colleagues 
at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, have provided friendship and 
kindness to me for many years. I am particularly grateful to the College 
for organising funding for the work necessary to finalise the manuscript 
of these essays. I also wish to thank my son, Marcus, who has assisted 
me in co-ordinating many of the practical steps necessary to bring this 
project to fruition.
Finally, I would like to pay tribute to my late wife, Angela, who was 
a dear companion to me for nearly thirty years and a devoted supporter 
of my endeavours. I duly dedicate this volume to her.
H. B. Nisbet 
December 2020
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1. Lucretius in Eighteenth-
Century Germany:  
With a Commentary on Goethe’s Poem 
‘Metamorphosis of Animals’1
John Ruskin, who had read Lucretius’s De rerum natura in his student 
days as a set book at Oxford, commented in later years: ‘I have ever 
since held it the most hopeless sign of a man’s mind being made of flint-
shingle if he liked Lucretius’.2 Such antipathy to the Roman poet was 
nothing new, of course, particularly towards his philosophy. Though his 
poetry was admired from when it first appeared around the middle of 
the first century BC, his Epicureanism was unacceptable to the Stoics 
who so often dominated Roman philosophy. And his materialism was 
obnoxious to the Christians—so much so that his work was fortunate 
to survive the Middle Ages. But it is not just that many people have 
admired his poetry and rejected his philosophy. His reception is more 
complex than that—more complex, in fact, than that of any other poet 
I am familiar with. For De rerum natura contains so many and disparate 
strands that it has of necessity appealed in part to many, but as a whole 
to few. It incorporates a metaphysics of nature and a system of physical 
science; a moral philosophy with practical guidance on living; numerous 
observations on natural history; a conjectural history of human society; 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘Lucretius in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany. With a Commentary on Goethe’s “Metamorphose 
der Tiere”’, Modern Language Review, 81 (1986), 97–115.
2  Ruskin, Works, ed. by E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, 39 vols (London and 
New York, NY: George Allen and Longmans Green & Co., 1903–12), XXXV, 613.
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and a powerful statement on religion, culminating in a denial of human 
immortality and, to all intents and purposes, of the gods. As poetry, it 
is almost as varied: it contains superb lyrical passages in a descriptive, 
idyllic, or hymnic vein, along with tracts of abstract—and at times 
arid—philosophical verse, and there are fiercely satirical and polemical 
passages as well. Consequently, this unique composition has tended 
to be used over the centuries as a quarry by poets, philosophers, and 
scientists, rather than endorsed as a whole or imitated directly in the 
way that more homogeneous forms such as the elegy, epigram, satire, 
or ode have been.
Nevertheless, Lucretius had a particular appeal to the eighteenth 
century,3 and the reasons are not hard to identify. His uncompromising 
intellectualism, his belief that knowledge alone—especially knowledge 
obtained through causal, scientific explanation—is the path to human 
salvation, was congenial to the post-Newtonian age. The Enlightenment’s 
increasing preoccupation with nature to the detriment of theology, and 
the immense popularity of didactic poetry as a means of disseminating 
the new knowledge, made his work more accessible than ever before. 
In Germany, however, which was generally more conservative than 
France or England in the century of the Enlightenment, there were 
greater obstacles than elsewhere to his reception—above all in religious 
quarters. This no doubt explains why the first complete translation of 
De rerum natura to appear in German was not published until 1784,4 
over a century after that of Thomas Creech had appeared in England5 
and that of Michel de Marolles in France.6 In fact, interest in the poem 
in Germany did not reach its height until the last two decades of the 
century, when the heyday of didactic poetry was already over.
3  See, for example, Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, I, The Rise of Modern 
Paganism (New York, NY: Knopf Doubleday, 1967), pp. 98–105.
4  Titus Lukretius Carus, Von der Natur der Dinge, translated, with notes, by Franz Xaver 
Mayr, 2 vols (Leipzig and Vienna: Johann Georg Mössle, 1784); Mayr’s translation is 
in prose. For comprehensive details of German translations of Lucretius, see Cosmo 
Alexander Gordon, A Bibliography of Lucretius (London: Hart-Davis, 1962), pp. 
212–14, 260–69.
5  Titus Lucretius Carus. The Epicurean Philosopher: His Six Books, De Natura Rerum, 
done into English Verse with Notes by Thomas Creech (Oxford: Anthony Stephens, 
1682); see also Gordon, p. 170 (who gives the date as 1683). 
6  Michel de Marolles, Le Poète Lucrèce, latin et français (Paris: T. Quinet, 1650); see also 
Gordon, p. 154. The first Italian translation was published in 1717 (Gordon, p. 147). 
 51. Lucretius in Eighteenth-Century Germany
The reception of Lucretius in France and England has been fairly fully 
documented.7 But there is not, so far as I am aware, a detailed study of 
his reception in Germany during that (or indeed any other) period.8 
Such a study would have to take account of responses to Lucretius on the 
part of Brockes, Haller, and many lesser didactic poets such as Kästner, 
Creuz, and Dusch; of Frederick the Great, Lessing, Nicolai, Lichtenberg, 
Wieland, Thümmel, Kant, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, Heinse, Schelling, 
and Steffens; and, if it extended further into the nineteenth century, of 
Hegel, Schopenhauer, Büchner, Marx, Nietzsche, and many others. The 
aim of this essay, which is intended as a preliminary survey, is altogether 
more modest. (It appears to me in any case that a chronological survey 
of individual responses to Lucretius would be of limited value, precisely 
because, as I said before, his reception is so piecemeal and diversified.) 
The first priority, I believe, is to identify the main areas in which his 
influence made itself felt, and the pattern of individual responses should 
7  On the reception of Lucretius in France, see C.-A. Fusil, ‘Lucrèce et les philosophes 
du XVIIIe siècle’, Revue d’histoire littéraire de la France, 35 (1928), 194–210; C.-A. Fusil, 
‘Lucrèce et les littérateurs, poètes et artistes du XVIIIe siècle’, in the same journal, 
37 (1930), 161–76; Gustav René Hocke, Lukrez in Frankreich von der Renaissance bis 
zur Revolution (Cologne: Kerschgens, 1935); and the very full account in Johan 
Werner Schmidt, ‘Diderot and Lucretius: The De rerum natura and Lucretius’s 
Legacy in Diderot’s Scientific, Aesthetic, and Ethical Thought’, Studies on Voltaire 
and the Eighteenth Century, 208 (1982), 183–294. On England, see Wolfgang Bernard 
Fleischmann, Lucretius and English Literature 1680–1740 (Paris: Nizet, 1964); T. J. 
B. Spencer, ‘Lucretius and the Scientific Poem in English’, in Lucretius, ed. by D. 
R. Dudley (London: Routledge, 1965), pp. 131–64; Bernhard Fabian, ‘Lucrez 
in England im siebzehnten und achtzehnten Jahrhundert’, in Aufklärung und 
Humanismus, ed. by Richard Toellner (Heidelberg: Schneider, 1980), pp. 107–29; of 
Fabian’s various studies of Lucretius and individual English poets, I will mention 
only his ‘Pope and Lucretius: Observations on An Essay on Man’, Modern Language 
Review, 74 (1979), 524–37. On the influence of Lucretius on the Enlightenment as 
a whole, see Wolfgang Bernard Fleischmann, ‘The Debt of the Enlightenment to 
Lucretius’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 25 (1963), 631–43, and the 
discussion by Peter Gay already referred to (see note 3 above). On his influence 
throughout history, see George Depue Hadzsits, Lucretius and his Influence (New 
York, NY: Cooper Square Publishers, 1963).
8  Even the last three works referred to in the previous note have relatively little to 
say on Germany. More useful in this connection is Wolfgang Schmidt, ‘Lucrez und 
der Wandel seines Bildes’, Antike und Abendland, 2 (1946), 193–219, which, despite 
its general title, has more material on Germany than on other countries. Gerhard 
Sauder, Der reisende Epikuräer: Studien zu Moritz August von Thümmels ‘Reise in 
die Mittäglichen Provinzen von Frankreich’ (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1968) contains 
an informative account of the revival of Epicurean ethics in eighteenth-century 
Germany (pp. 181–94).
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then become more intelligible. I shall accordingly try to define the main 
strands of Lucretius’s influence in eighteenth-century Germany, and 
then, with reference to representative individuals, to examine one or 
two of the more important of them more closely.
There is firstly the scientific legacy—less obvious, perhaps, in the 
Enlightenment than in the seventeenth century with the revival of 
atomism by Gassendi, Boyle, and others, but still discernible.9 Then 
there is the impact on metaphysics and religion, in which Lucretius is 
hotly refuted by Christian apologists and at the same time continues to 
act as a subversive influence and a stimulus to freethinking. In moral 
philosophy, he plays a part in the revival of Epicurean ethics (for 
example, in the hedonism of the Rococo) as a reaction to the Stoicism 
of the Baroque era.10 In the poetic sphere, there is a wave of Lucretian—
or more often, anti-Lucretian—poetry in the early to mid-eighteenth 
century.11 Then there is a protracted debate in Germany on the whole 
status and legitimacy of didactic poetry, a debate which stretches from 
Gottsched and Lessing to Weimar Classicism and on to the Romantics 
and Hegel, and in which Lucretius is frequently cited as a cardinal 
instance.12 And in the closing decades of the century, the question is 
finally faced as to whether a new De rerum natura, incorporating a unified 
9  It is clearly visible, for example, in Kant’s Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des 
Himmels of 1755, and in much of Herder’s thinking on scientific matters: see my 
Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science (Cambridge: MHRA, 1970) (hereafter 
‘Nisbet’), pp. 98–100, 107, and further references under ‘Lucretius’ in the index to 
that work.
10  For further comments on this reaction, see Gerhard Sauder, Empfindsamkeit, Vol. 
I, Voraussetzungen und Elemente (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1974), pp. 98–99 and 104–05, 
and Thomas P. Saine, ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’, in Aufklärung, Absolutismus und 
Bürgertum in Deutschland, ed. by Franklin Kopitzsch (Munich: Nymphenburger 
Verlagshandlung, 1976), p. 331. See also Sauder (1968), pp. 181–94.
11  A good deal of groundwork on this area has been done by Walter Schatzberg, 
Scientific Themes in the Popular Literature of the German Enlightenment, 1720–1760 
(Berne: Herbert Lang, 1973). Schatzberg comments on many Lucretian and anti-
Lucretian poems in the period (see references under ‘Lucretius’ in his index), and 
he remarks on the need for a study of Lucretius in eighteenth-century Germany. 
See also Leif Ludwig Albertsen, Das Lehrgedicht. Eine Geschichte der antikisierenden 
Sachepik in der neueren deutschen Literatur (Aarhus: Akademisk Boghandel, 1967), 
especially pp. 316–28 (‘Das große antimaterialistische Lehrgedicht’). Christoph 
Siegrist, Das Lehrgedicht der Aufklärung (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1974) contains little, 
however, on Lucretius and his influence.
12  See, in particular, Bernhard Fabian, ‘Das Lehrgedicht als Problem der Poetik’, in Die 
nicht mehr schönen Künste, ed. by H. R. Jauss (Munich: Fink, 1968), pp. 67–89; also 
Albertsen, pp. 339–48.
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view of the cosmos and the findings of post-Newtonian science, can be 
written, and if so, by whom.13 It would further be instructive to consider 
which passages from Lucretius are most frequently quoted by German 
writers of the period (for example, the opening lines of Books I and 
II), and to examine the function of such quotations. Lastly, there is the 
history of the first German translation of Lucretius’s poem,14 particularly 
the hexameter version by Karl Ludwig von Knebel, in the preparation 
of which Goethe and Herder were intensively involved; this translation, 
although it was begun in the 1790s, was not published in its completed 
form until 1821.15 (There are also, of course, various Latin editions of De 
rerum natura and philological commentaries on it during the period in 
question; but these belong to the history of classical scholarship rather 
than to that of the poem’s reception.)
Work has been done in several of the above areas (as I have indicated in the 
footnotes), but rarely from the perspective of the reception of Lucretius, 
which is usually treated only incidentally. It is from this perspective that 
I propose now to look at two major areas, one philosophical, the other 
poetic: briefly and selectively, at the effects of Lucretius’s materialism as 
a threat to traditional religious values in Germany; and in more detail, 
at the ambitious plan, in which Goethe played a leading part, to write a 
neo-Lucretian epic of nature for the modern age. 
Along with Spinoza, Lucretius provided the eighteenth century with 
one of its main models for a rigorously naturalistic explanation of all 
reality, and the radical Enlightenment with one of its weapons against 
teleological and providential views of nature and human history.16 
13  This episode is discussed, in relation to the development of science, by Alexander 
Gode-von Aesch, Natural Science in German Romanticism (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1941), pp. 240–66. See also Albertsen, Das Lehrgedicht, pp. 349–69, 
and Margarete Plath, ‘Der Goethe-Schellingsche Plan eines philosophischen 
Naturgedichts: Eine Studie zu Goethes “Gott und Welt”’, Preußische Jahrbücher, 106 
(1901), 44–74. 
14  For bibliographical details of these, see the reference to Gordon in note 4 above.
15  See H. B. Nisbet, ‘Karl Ludwig von Knebel’s Hexameter Translation of Lucretius’, 
German Life and Letters, 41 (1988), 413–25; also ibid., ‘Herder und Lukrez’, in Johann 
Gottfried Herder 1744–1803, ed. by Gerhard Sauder (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), 77–87.
16  The ideas of Spinoza are explicitly coupled with the materialism of Lucretius and 
Epicurus in one of the most notorious anti-religious tracts of the early Enlightenment, 
the anonymous Traité des trois imposteurs, first published in 1719 and later reissued 
by the Baron d’Holbach (see Pierre Retat’s edition of the Traité (Lyons: Universités 
de la Région Rhone-Alpes, 1973), pp. 12 and 81). La Mettrie also couples the two, 
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Lucretius’s arguments against religion, immortality, and the fear of 
death are continually cited by the philosophes: the line tantum religio potuit 
suadere malorum (‘so powerful was religion in persuading [people to 
perform] evil deeds’),17 with which Lucretius deplores the superstitions 
that led to the sacrifice of Iphigenia, is perhaps the most frequently cited. 
Such radicalism is, of course, extremely rare in Germany, at least in the 
first half of the century. But in 1729. in his poem ‘Thoughts on Reason, 
Superstition, and Unbelief ‘, Albrecht von Haller does echo Lucretius’s 
anti-clerical sentiments and his theory that religion is a product of fear, 
and quotes the famous tantum religio… as a footnote to his own line 
‘What evil has occurred that was not the work of a priest?’18 He directs 
these sentiments not, however, at the Protestant faith he grew up in but 
at false religion (by which he means Roman Catholicism). Frederick 
the Great, on the other hand, had no such reservations. He described 
De rerum natura as his breviary, to which he resorted in moments of 
despondency and which he carried with him on the battlefield; his 
own ‘Épître au Maréchal Keith’ (‘Epistle to Marshal Keith’) is closely 
modelled on Book III of Lucretius’s poem, and consists of a polemic 
against the fear of death and the belief in immortality.19 Those didactic 
poets of the time who wrote poems on the natural universe in imitation 
of Lucretius usually took care to distance themselves from his views on 
providence and religion.20 Nevertheless, some of these compositions, 
such as the young Wieland’s long didactic poem (his first major work) 
Die Natur der Dinge (The Nature of Things) of 1751 and Friedrich Carl 
Casimir von Creuz’s Lucrezische Gedanken (Lucretian Thoughts) of 1763–
and is fond of citing Lucretius in support of his own materialism: see Julien Offray 
de la Mettrie, Œuvres philosophiques, 2 vols (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1970), 
I, 214, 219, 224 and II, 203. On Lucretius and Hume, see Gay, I, 356–57.
17  De rerum natura, I, 101; subsequent otherwise unidentified references in the text by 
Roman and Arabic numbers are to book and line of Lucretius’s poem. 
18  Haller, Gedichte, ed. by Ludwig Hirzel, 2 vols (Frauenfeld and Leipzig: Huber, 
1917), II, 53; this poem is full of Lucretian sentiments, which are countered towards 
the end by an appeal to Christian faith.
19  See Henri de Catt, Frederick the Great. The Memoirs of his Reader, translated by F. S. 
Flint, 2 vols (London: Constable & Co., 1916), I, pp. xv, 198, and 390; also Die Werke 
Friedrichs des Großen in deutscher Übersetzung, 10 vols (Berlin: R. Hobbing, 1913–14), 
IX, 124–32 (the epistle to Keith) and VII, 264 (endorsement of Lucretius’s denial of 
immortality). See also Gay, I, 102 and Fleischmann (1963), pp. 631–32.
20  See, for example, Albertsen, pp. 152, 242–43 and Schatzberg, pp. 206, 244, and 
266–67.
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64, make substantial concessions to the independent creative power of 
nature.21 The young philosopher Kant, in his epoch-making work on 
cosmogony, the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens of 
1755 (the earliest statement of what later became known as the Kant-
Laplace theory of stellar evolution), attempts in his preface to dissociate 
himself from Lucretian materialism and to uphold the doctrine of divine 
providence.22 Nevertheless, he proceeds to explain the evolution of the 
solar system by combining Newtonian mechanics with the Epicurean 
theory of a random concourse of atoms (Kant, II, 266). His pupil Herder 
made copious notes from De rerum natura in 1766, and his posthumous 
papers suggest that he was seriously preoccupied with philosophical 
materialism around this time.23 In Wieland’s novel The History of Agathon 
of 1766–67, Epicureanism has become a central theme: the hero Agathon 
is plagued by doubts concerning providence, doubts which are reinforced 
by the arguments of the Sophist Hippias, who adopts a Mephistophelean 
role in undermining the young hero’s Platonic idealism. Hippias is an 
Epicurean; his doctrines of the soul’s mortality, of random creation by 
the movement of atoms in space, his contention that religion is based 
solely on fear and that the gods, if they exist at all, are indifferent to 
human affairs—all this is Epicurean philosophy, taken for the most part 
from Lucretius (who is mentioned or alluded to on several occasions).24 
21  As Gode-von Aesch (pp. 39–40) observes, Wieland’s poem incorporates two distinct 
conceptions of God, one transcendent, the other immanent; see also Wieland’s 
preface to the poem, where he speaks of God as the ‘Seele der Welt’ (‘soul of 
the world’), in Wieland, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by the Königlich-Preußische 
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Weidmann, 1909–), Erste Abteilung, I, 7. 
Creuz’s poem envisages the creation of living creatures other than man by purely 
natural processes, and parts company with Lucretius only when it comes to the 
human soul: see C. C. von Creuz, Oden und andere Gedichte, 2 vols (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Varrentrapp, 1769), II, 199–226 (p. 217): ‘Lucretius, I can no longer be your pupil!’
22  Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by the Königlich-Preußische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Berlin: Reimer, 1902–), I, 221–28; but even in the preface, Kant 
admits: ‘I shall not deny that the theory of Lucretius or his forerunners Epicurus, 
Leucippus and Democritus has much similarity with mine.’ Compare Hermann 
Hettner, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im achtzehnten Jahrhundert, ed. by Georg 
Witkowski, 4 vols (Leipzig: Paul List Verlag, 1928), II, 160: ‘At school, Lucretius was 
his [Kant’s] favourite object of study, and at university, Newton.’
23  See Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science, pp. 48, 100, and 126–27.
24  Wieland, Geschichte des Agathon (first version), ed. by Fritz Martini (Stuttgart: Reclam, 
1979), p. 36 (doubts on providence), pp. 58–60 and 89 (Hippias’s Epicureanism), 
and pp. 183 and 405 (references to Lucretius and to De rerum natura, II, 14). The 
narrator’s description of Hippias’s calm on seeing Agathon’s passions boil over 
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Hippias’s philosophical position is never properly refuted either by 
Agathon or by the narrator; it is only his thorough-going hedonism, 
that dedication to sensual pleasure which has been popularly known 
for centuries as ‘Epicureanism’ (and which goes far beyond anything 
to be found in Lucretius), that is decisively rejected. In an age in which 
Christian doctrine was being steadily eroded, it is the moral rather 
than the theological position which, as in so many other writers of the 
time, remains firm. Agathon’s philosophical and religious uncertainty, 
however, suggests that Wieland’s earlier efforts to refute Lucretius in his 
poem The Nature of Things had by no means silenced his own doubts on 
such matters. It is also worthy of note that, in Wieland’s later novel The 
Abderites of the 1770s, the only positive character described at length 
in a society of fools is the atomistic philosopher Democritus, the direct 
intellectual ancestor of both Epicurus and Lucretius.
It seems that nearly all the major writers in Germany around this 
time had their crises of faith and doubts concerning providence. When 
such crises occur, it is often either Lucretius or Spinoza who provides 
the unsettling influence. Schiller is no exception. His early poem ‘The 
Plague’, published in 1782, describes the horrors of the plague in a way 
which recalls the vivid account of the plague in Athens with which 
Lucretius (VI, 1138–1286) concludes his work.25 Schiller’s poem ends 
with the bitterly ironic comment on providence: ‘In terrible fashion the 
plague gives praise to God’. The young Goethe’s most famous outburst 
against the gods, his poem ‘Prometheus’, is full of the Lucretian spirit 
of religious defiance; its opening challenge to Zeus to practise his 
thunderbolts on oaks and mountain-tops like a boy beheading thistles 
is, plainly an allusion to those lines in Book VI of De rerum natura in 
which the gods are ridiculed, and thereby denied, for wasting their 
projectiles on obviously random targets: ‘Why [...] do they [the gods] 
aim at deserts and waste their labour? Or are they then practising their 
arms and strengthening their muscles? [...] And why does he [Jupiter] 
(‘The Sophist observed this storm as calmly as someone who, from the safety of 
the shore, observes the wild turmoil of the waves from which he has fortunately 
escaped’ (p. 339)) is a paraphrase of the celebrated passage in De rerum natura, II, 
1–4.
25  Friedrich Schiller, Anthologie auf das Jahr 1782, ed. by Katharina Mommsen (Stuttgart: 
J. B. Metzler, 1973). As the editor, who also notices the influence of Spinoza on the 
early poems, remarks, ‘his model was Lucretius’ (pp. 18–19).
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generally attack high places, why do we see most traces of his fire on the 
mountain tops?’26 And in 1789, Goethe declares in a letter to Stolberg, 
‘that I personally adhere more or less to the doctrine of Lucretius and 
confine all my pretensions to the sphere of life’.27
Lucretius, along with Spinoza, is one of the chief inspirations of that 
consistent naturalism which Goethe professes in his classical period at 
the time when his scientific studies were at their height. He constantly 
discussed Lucretius with his friend Knebel, who was translating 
the poem, and himself planned to write a long essay on the subject 
(Grumach, I, 348–49), but, since he became increasingly attached in his 
later years to a belief in some kind of personal immortality, he now felt 
obliged to distance himself from Lucretius’s polemics against the fear of 
death. He did so in a humorous manner, likening them to Frederick the 
Great’s outburst at the Battle of Kolin to a group of his grenadiers who 
hesitated to mount a frontal assault on an enemy battery: ‘You dogs, do 
you then want to live for ever!’ (p. 348).
Even from these few scattered examples, it is apparent that Lucretius 
provided a constant encouragement to secular ways of thinking in the 
second half of the eighteenth century in Germany. None of the major 
thinkers of the time adopted his philosophy as a whole, of course; it 
simply helped to undermine the Christian beliefs they had inherited. 
There are, however, at least two lesser-known figures who became 
thorough-going philosophical materialists, and both were members 
of the Weimar circle. One is Knebel, the translator of Lucretius, whose 
posthumous essays ‘On Immortality’, ‘Reflections on Lucretius’, and 
‘Atheism’ fully endorse the Epicurean philosophy.28 The other is August 
26  De rerum natura, VI, 396–97 and 421–22. The translation is from the bilingual edition 
of Lucretius, De rerum natura, with an English translation by W. H. D. Rouse, ed. 
by Martin Ferguson Smith, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London: Harvard University Press and William Heinemann, 1975), pp. 523–25.
27  Goethe to F. L. von Stolberg, 2 February 1789, in Ernst Grumach, Goethe und die 
Antike. Eine Sammlung, 2 vols (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1949), I, 348–49. All of Goethe’s 
explicit comments on Lucretius are assembled in Grumach, I, 335–52. Karl Bapp, 
‘Goethe und Lucrez’, Jahrbuch der Goethe-Gesellschaft, 12 (1926), 47–67 is largely a list 
of Goethe’s references to Lucretius, but some of the Lucretian allusions in Goethe’s 
writings are also noted.
28  See Knebels Litterarischer Nachlaß und Briefwechsel, ed. by K. A. Varnhagen von Ense 
and Theodor Mundt, 3 vols, 2nd edn (Leipzig: Gebrüder Reichenbach, 1840), III, 
352–56, 455–56, and 489–90; compare Knebel to Herder, July 1793, in Von und an 
Herder, ed. by Heinrich Düntzer and F. G. von Herder, 3 vols (Leipzig: Dyk’sche 
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von Einsiedel, an eccentric figure whose unpublished reflections on 
atoms and the struggle for existence Herder copied out for his private 
use.29 And when, in the nineteenth century, materialism finally came 
out into the open in Germany, its classical origins were still evident. The 
young Karl Marx wrote his doctoral dissertation on Democritus and 
Epicurus and their philosophies of nature. His strong sympathy with 
Epicurus, and with his most eloquent disciple, Lucretius, is evident 
throughout.30 
So much for Lucretius as a subversive philosophical influence. I want 
to consider now the poetic issue of neo-Lucretian experiments and the 
plan for a new ‘De rerum natura’ for the modern age.
The philosophico-scientific poem is one of the most characteristic 
poetic genres of the eighteenth century.31 The aim of such poetry, 
especially in the first half of the century, is to reconcile the findings 
of modern science and natural philosophy with Christian theology, 
usually by means of the argument from design. All such poems, from 
Richard Blackmore’s ‘Creation’ of 1712 to Charles Claude Genest’s 
‘Principes de Philosophie’ of 1716 and Barthold Hinrich Brockes’s nine-
volume collection Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott (Earthly Delight in God) of 
1721–48, are anti-Lucretian works, whether or not Lucretius is explicitly 
mentioned in them (as he frequently is). Of those which are specifically 
directed against Lucretius’s poem, and consciously modelled on it as 
their formal archetype, the most celebrated at the time was Cardinal 
de Polignac’s Latin Anti-Lucretius published posthumously in 1747. 
Buchhandlung, 1862), III, 91–92: ‘For it nevertheless remains true for me at least 
that the Lucretian principles are based on nature, that is, on truth.’ For further 
information on Knebel’s Lucretian studies, including fifteen previously unpublished 
letters of Knebel to Goethe, see Regine Otto, ‘”Lukrez bleibt immer in seiner Art 
der Einzige”: Karl Ludwig von Knebel an Goethe. Ungedruckte Briefe aus den 
Jahren 1821 und 1822’, in Impulse. Aufsätze, Quellen, Berichte zur deutschen Klassik und 
Romantik, Folge 5, ed. by Walter Dietze and Peter Goldammer (Berlin and Weimar: 
Aufbau-Verlag, 1982), pp. 229–63. 
29  See August von Einsiedel, Ideen, ed. by Wilhelm Dobbek (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 
1957); as Dobbek observes, ‘Fundamental for August von Einsiedel is his allegiance 
to Democritus, the most significant representative of materialistic philosophy in 
ancient Greece’ (p. 11). 
30  See ‘Über die Differenz der Demokritischen und Epikureischen Naturphilosophie’, 
in Karl Marx, Frühe Schriften, ed. by Hans-Joachim Lieber and Peter Fürth (Stuttgart: 
Cotta, 1962), I, 18–106; also S. S. Prawer, Karl Marx and World Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1976), who observes that Epicurus and Lucretius were for 
Marx a lever that might help to dislodge simplistic religious beliefs (p. 27). 
31  See Spencer, ‘Lucretius and the Scientific Poem in English’ p. 137.
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Polignac conceived the idea of his poem around the beginning of the 
century, possibly after an argument about providence with the French 
sceptic Pierre Bayle.32 Despite its title, it is directed mainly against 
modern thinkers such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Gassendi, and 
(unfortunately for the later reputation of Polignac who was a Cartesian 
in scientific matters) Isaac Newton. It is probable that Polignac’s poem 
gave Wieland the idea of writing his own The Nature of Things of 1751, for 
Polignac is extravagantly praised in that work.33 These poems, despite 
their Lucretian trappings (Wieland, for example, invokes Minerva and 
Clio, in parallel to Lucretius’s invocations of Venus and Calliope), are 
little more than versified philosophy. Mercifully, Wieland’s poem (of 
which he was later ashamed) contains a mere 4,177 lines, as against the 
7,415 lines of Lucretius himself and the 11,931 lines of Polignac’s (albeit 
unfinished) poem.
Such versified treatises and rhyming encyclopaedias of natural 
history helped to bring the long didactic poem into disrepute. It was 
condemned by Lessing,34 and by others down to the time of Hegel,35 
as unpoetic. Even Goethe and Schiller, although they wrote didactic 
poems themselves, joined in the criticism;36 they did, however, leave the 
way open for a didactic poetry which might overcome the defects of 
past attempts.37 The ultimate authority behind all such condemnations 
32  This anecdote is reported in, for example, Johann Jakob Dusch, Briefe zur Bildung des 
Geschmacks, 6 vols, rev. edn (Leipzig: Meyer, 1773), II, 118. The first two volumes of 
this work deal solely with didactic poetry, and the long section on Lucretius (Vol. 
II, Letters 1–5) translates substantial parts of De rerum natura into German prose. 
For further details on Polignac, see Wolfgang Bernard Fleischmann, ‘Zum Anti-
Lucretius des Kardinals de Polignac’, in Romanische Forschungen, 77 (1965), 42–63.
33  Wieland, Gesammelte Schriften, I, 21: ‘You, great Polignac, you crown of our age,/ 
Have long since consigned his [Epicurus’s] host of atoms to the void.’
34  Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, ed. by Karl Lachmann and Franz Muncker, 23 
vols (Stuttgart, Leipzig and Berlin: Göschen, 1886–1924), VI, 409–45 (Pope a 
Metaphysician!): ‘Lucretius and his like are versifiers, but not poets’ (p. 415).
35  Hegel, Theorie-Werkausgabe, ed. by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 
vols (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), XIII, 541 (Lectures on Aesthetics): ‘Didactic 
poetry cannot be included among the true forms of art.’ Hegel includes Lucretius in 
his condemnation.
36  See Goethe, Weimar edition (henceforth WA), 133 vols (Weimar: Böhlau, 
1887–1919), I. Abteilung, XLI/2, 225–27 (On Didactic Poetry) and Schiller, Werke, 
Nationalausgabe (Weimar: Böhlau, 1943–), XX, 453 (On Naïve and Sentimental 
Poetry).
37  Goethe’s criticisms of the genre in On Didactic Poetry (1825) are by no means 
unqualified, and his own plan of 1799 to write a great epic of nature shows 
considerable faith in its possibilities (Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Knebel 
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was, of course, Aristotle, who had denied that the philosophical verse 
of Empedocles was poetry (Poetics, Chapter I). Herder, however, had a 
more favourable opinion of the genre, and he took issue directly with 
Aristotle in its defence: characteristically, he employed the historical 
argument that poetry has evolved further since Aristotle’s time, so 
that Aristotle’s strictures are not applicable to more recent forms. The 
latter include the work of Lucretius himself, who is always for Herder 
the supreme example of the didactic poet.38 In his early years, he even 
planned himself to write what he called ‘a philosophical epic on the 
human soul’ (that is, on psychology).39 But he soon abandoned this 
scheme—Herder’s poetic talents were modest—and began to call on 
others to make the discoveries of modern science the subject of a new 
Lucretian poem (SW I, 470; V, 295, 320; XXIII, 247; etc.). In 1801, he put 
forward the suggestion, which Schelling soon afterwards developed at 
length, that scientific systems have an inherently poetic quality which 
makes them especially suitable for poetic treatment: ‘every system is 
itself a poem in so far as it is independent, whole and pure’ (SW XXIII, 
243; see also XI, 293 and XXIV, 299).
It is indeed remarkable how often terms such as ‘Dichtung’, ‘Poesie’, 
and even ‘Roman’ are applied to scientific theories in eighteenth-
century Germany—often, but by no means always, pejoratively. But 
the idea that scientific systems may have an inherently poetic quality 
is perhaps more comprehensible in relation to the sciences of those 
days than to the exact sciences of today. Those which attempted to 
explain the history of the earth or the universe, for example, are often 
vivid, imaginative reconstructions of cosmic events and processes, 
comparable in some respects to the science fiction of today. This is 
(1774–1832), ed. by G. E. Guhrauer, 2 vols (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1851), I, 210, Goethe 
to Knebel, 22 January 1799). Similarly, Schiller, in condemning Erasmus Darwin’s 
Botanic Garden (Schiller to Goethe, 30 January 1798), adds ‘I don’t believe that 
the material is impermissible and completely unsuited to poetry’, and goes on to 
suggest how such a poem might be successfully accomplished: Briefwechsel zwischen 
Schiller und Goethe, ed. by Franz Muncker, 4 vols (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1892), III, 29.
38  Herder, Sämtliche Werke (SW) ed. by Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 
1877–1913), IV, 282 and 290. For further details, see Nisbet, ‘Herder und Lukrez’ 
(note 15 above).
39  See Herder to Merck, March 1771, in Herder, Briefe. Gesamtausgabe 1763–1803, ed. by 
Karl-Heinz Hahn and others (Weimar: Böhlau, 1977–), I, 319. For Bernard Suphan’s 
comments on this project see SW I, 547–48.
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true of such works as William Whiston’s New Theory of the Earth, in 
which the earth’s origin and Noah’s Flood are explained as the effects 
of a comet passing close to the sun, and of later versions such as the 
cosmogony of Buffon, whose Époques de la nature (1778) contains 
equally bold speculations on earth history which seemed fantastic to 
many of his contemporaries. It was perhaps in France that the word 
‘roman’ (‘novel’) was first applied to imaginative theories of the 
universe. Meusnier de Querlon, in 1777, applied it to ‘De rerum natura’ 
itself, which he described as ‘le roman physique de Lucrèce (Fusil 
(1930), p. 163). In 1780, Goethe finds the word entirely appropriate 
to Buffon’s Époques, which he praises for its comprehensiveness: ‘for 
which reason also Frenchmen, and Franco-Germans and Germans say 
that he wrote a novel, which is very well put, because the honourable 
public knows everything extraordinary only through the novel’.40 This 
use of the word Roman to denote an imaginative, systematic account 
of the world’s origins explains what Goethe must have had in mind 
when he planned, in the early 1780s, to write a ‘novel on the universe’; 
it seems to have been conceived as an imaginative account of earth 
history, possibly in letter form,41 and the highly poetic essay On Granite 
of 1784 may have been connected with it. It was never written, of 
course. But it is possible that the novel The Elective Affinities of 1808, in 
which fundamental human relationships are likened to basic chemical 
reactions so as to suggest that all of nature is a single, unitary whole, 
is, in its conception, a late echo of the earlier project.
By the 1790s, after repeated promptings by Herder, Knebel had 
begun to translate Lucretius. Goethe in turn began, with Knebel’s 
encouragement, to consider ways of expressing his own scientific ideas 
in poetry. One of his earlier attempts is probably the curious poetic 
40  Goethe to Merck, 11 October 1780, in WA, IV. Abteilung, IV, 311; but see also his 
letter to Merck of 7 April 1780 (IV, 202), in which he objects to others dismissing 
Buffon’s work as ‘a hypothesis or a novel’. Compare Herder’s pejorative use of the 
term a few years earlier (SW, VII, 17), when he speaks of ‘Buffon’s novels of the 
origin of animals’ (see also Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science, p. 
306). 
41  The surviving evidence on Goethe’s plan is assembled in H. G. Gräf, Goethe über 
seine Dichtungen, 9 vols (Frankfurt a. M.: Rütten & Loening, 1901–14:), I/1, pp. 285–
95. For a useful discussion of this and Goethe’s subsequent plan for a neo-Lucretian 
poem, see Erich Trunz’s remarks in Goethes Werke, Hamburg edition (HA), 14 vols 
(Hamburg: Wegner, 1948–64), I, 569–73.
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fragment entitled ‘Jussieu’s Classes of Plants’, a kind of mnemonic 
which, before breaking off in the middle of the fourteenth line, classifies 
the main families of plants as defined in Antoine Laurent de Jussieu’s 
botanical system of 1789. The first seven lines set the pattern for the rest:
For a handy reminder of the 15 natural classes
As given to us by Jussieu, I attempted the following verses.
Without bearing seeds, the sponges, the algae and liverwort
Grow with the rest of the mosses, the ferns and naiadaceae.
The core of the seed is simple, and all the stamina
Are placed on top of the fruit in simple blossoming flowers,
As in araceae and typha, the cyperaceae and grasses.
(WA, I. Abteilung, V (2), 405)
No date is given for this fragment in the Weimar edition, but it may 
well have been written in 1793, when Goethe acquired a copy of 
Jussieu’s work,42 or in 1794, when he laid out his garden in flowerbeds 
corresponding to Jussieu’s classification.43 The metre is that of Lucretius, 
the hexameter, and the subject is natural history. But the enumerative 
presentation recalls the encyclopaedic verse of the first half of the 
century rather than the ‘De rerum natura’. The next step comes with 
the elegy ‘The Metamorphosis of Plants’, written in June 1798, which 
expresses Goethe’s botanical theories in poetic form. But although it has 
some Lucretian touches, it is for several reasons (apart from its brevity) 
not a Lucretian poem. The ideas in it, especially the central idea of plant 
growth as the successive transformation of an archetypal, leaf-like 
organ, are very much Goethe’s own;44 its metre is the elegiac couplet, 
not the Lucretian hexameter; and it has the quality of a personal love 
lyric. It is addressed to the poet’s beloved, and the climactic moment 
of plant growth, the moment of reproduction (lines 55–58), becomes a 
symbol and reaffirmation of their love (lines 71–80). Besides, its poetic 
42  See Goethes Bibliothek. Katalog, ed. by Hans Ruppert (Weimar: Arion Verlag, 1958), 
p. 679, no. 4734; edition of Jussieu’s Genera plantarum (Zurich: Ziegler, 1791; first 
published Paris, 1789), acquired September 1793.
43  See Goethe, Begegnungen und Gespräche, ed. by Ernst and Renate Grumach (Berlin: 
De Gruyter, 1965–), IV, 107: the botanist F. G. Dietrich reports on the work done in 
1794.
44  See Gertrud Overbeck, ‘Goethes Lehre von der Metamorphose der Pflanzen und 
ihre Widerspiegelung in seiner Dichtung’, Publications of the English Goethe Society, 
31 (1961), 38–59, for a detailed correlation (pp. 41–46) of the poem with Goethe’s 
botanical theories.
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affinities are modern rather than classical. A few months before he wrote 
it, Goethe, in a letter to Schiller, had strongly criticised another botanical 
poem, Erasmus Darwin’s ‘The Botanic Garden’, whose second section, 
‘The Loves of the Plants’, was published in 1789. He found it poetically 
inadequate and overloaded with prosaic factual detail. Schiller agreed, 
calling it ‘versified erudition’, but added that he considered the material 
capable of genuinely poetic treatment.45 The elegy ‘The Metamorphosis 
of Plants’, with its erotic associations and nuptial imagery, looks much 
more like a poetic response by Goethe to Darwin’s ‘The Loves of the 
Plants’ than an attempt to write Lucretian poetry. To cite only one 
example, the climax of Darwin’s poem, as of Goethe’s, is a multiple 
wedding, in which the stamens and pistils within the flower unite to 
produce the seed. But whereas Goethe’s version, though poetically 
heightened, bears a clear relation to the botanical process it describes, 
Darwin’s (characteristically lubricious) lines require a learned footnote 
to remind the reader that it is floral reproduction rather than human 
promiscuity that is referred to. The German text reads like a corrective 
to the English: 
And it quickly furls, contracts; the most delicate structures
Twofold venture forth, destined to meet and unite.
Wedded now they stand, those delighted couples, together.
Round the high altar they form multiple, ordered arrays.
Hymen, hovering, nears, and pungent perfumes, exquisite, 
Fill with fragrance and life all the environing air.
(lines 51–56, transl. Christopher Middleton)
Pair after pair, along his sacred groves
To Hymen’s fane the bright procession moves;
[…] On wings of gossamer soft Whispers fly,
And the sly Glance steals side-long from the eye.
—As round his shrine the gaudy circles bow,
And seal with muttering lips the faithless vow, 
Licentious Hymen joins their mingled hands, 
And loosely twines the meretricious bands.—46
45  See Goethe to Schiller, 26 January 1798, and Schiller to Goethe, 30 January 1798, 
in Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, III, 26–30; see also the quotation from 
Schiller’s letter in note 37 above.
46  Erasmus Darwin, The Botanic Garden, 2 vols (London: Jones & Co., 1789–91), II, 
164–65 (‘The Loves of the Plants’, Canto IV, lines 389–90 and 397–402).
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Encouraged by the warm reception which ‘The Metamorphosis of 
Plants’ received among his friends, Goethe began to consider the much 
vaster project of a Lucretian poem for the modern age. Knebel urged 
him to use the hexameter, and Goethe declared that he hoped to use 
Knebel’s translation of Lucretius, which was now well advanced, as 
the basis of his own poem.47 He did not write it, of course. Nor did he 
write the poem on magnetism he planned in the same context.48 But 
he did write the poem ‘Metamorphosis of Animals’, traditionally dated 
1806, but probably written by 1800 at the latest. As Erich Trunz points 
out, Goethe abandoned his plan for a Lucretian poem in 1800, and he 
was also turned against using the hexameter around this time by the 
carpings of metrical purists such as Johann Heinrich Voss and August 
Wilhelm Schlegel; hence it is improbable that he would have written 
the poem after that date (HA, I, 546–47, 573, and 585–86). (Besides, the 
editors of the Weimar edition comment that a surviving draft of the 
poem ‘perhaps belongs, to judge by the handwriting and character of 
the paper, to the 1790s’ (WA, I. Abteilung, LIII, 549–50)).
Metamorphosis of Animals
1 Now if your mind is prepared to venture upon the final
Step to this summit, give me your hand and view with an 
open 
Gaze the abundance of Nature before you. Everywhere richly
Gifts she has lavished around, the Goddess, but never she 
worries
5 After the manner or mortal women, regarding the nurture
Offspring need in a steady supply, that isn’t her wont, for
Doubly she has determined the ultimate law: with a limit,
Set to each life and need in its measure, and then without 
measure
Gifts she has scattered, easy to find, and she quietly favours
10 Motley toils for her children, seeing their needs are so many;
So they will flock and yearn, untrained, for the ends that are 
set them.
47  See Knebel to Goethe, 18 July 1798 and Goethe to Knebel, 22 January 1799, in 
Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Knebel (1774–1832), I, 182 and 201. 
48  See Goethe to Knebel, 16 July 1798, in Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Knebel, I, 181.
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Every animal is an end in itself, it issues
Perfect from Nature’s womb and its offspring are equally 
perfect.
All its organs are formed according to laws that are timeless, 
15 Even a form very rare will hold to its type, though in secret.
Every mouth is designed to admit particular foodstuffs,
Such as befit the body; an animal feeble and toothless,
One with jaws that are toothed and massive—a suitable organ
Each will possess for channelling food to the rest of its body.
20 Also the feet, whether long or short, will always be moving
Tuned to the animal’s every need and every intention.
Thus has the Mother ordained the health complete and 
unbroken
Each of her children enjoys, and the limbs of each, being vital, 
Never conflicting the one with the other, have life as their 
function.
25 So the shape of an animal patterns the manner of living, 
Likewise their manner of living, again, exerts on the animals’ 
Shapes a massive effect: all organised structures are solid, 
Thus, which are prone to change under pressure from 
outward conditions.
Deep within the more noble creatures, indeed, a power
30 Dwells enclosed in the holy ring of vital formation.
Here are the limits no god can alter, honoured by Nature:
Only a limit enables a form to rise to perfection.
Deep within, however, a spirit may seem to be wrestling: 
How shall he rupture the ring and cause the forms to be 
random,
35 Random the will? Yet all his efforts they come to nothing; 
For, if he burrows his way right through to this organ or that 
one,
Making it grander by far, then other organs will dwindle,
Disproportionate weight and excess of it quickly destroying
All the beauty of form and all pure litheness of movement.
40 So if you see that a creature possesses a certain advantage, 
Put the question at once: What is the fault that afflicts it
Elsewhere?—and seek to discover the defect, always 
inquiring;
Then at once you will find the key to the world of formation.
For there has never existed an animal into whose jawbone
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45 Teeth are pegged that had a horn sprout out of its forehead; 
Therefore a lion with a horn the Eternal Mother could never
Possibly make, though she drew on all her potent resources; 
For she has not measures sufficient to plant in a being
 Rows of teeth, complete, together with horns or with antlers.
50 May this beautiful concept of power and limit, of random
Venture and law, freedom and measure, of order in motion,
Defect and benefit, bring you high pleasure; gently 
instructive,
Thus, the sacred Muse in her teaching tells you of harmonies.
 Moral philosophers never attained to a concept sublimer, 
55 Nor did men of affairs, nor artists imagining; rulers,
Worthy of power, enjoy their crowns on this account only.
So be glad of it, Nature’s loftiest creature, now feeling
Able to follow her loftiest thought on her wings of Creation.
Stand where you are, be still, and looking behind you, 
backward,
60 All things consider, compare, and take from the lips of the 
Muse then,
So that you’ll see, not dream it, a truth that is sweet and is 
certain.
(HA, I, 201–03; transl. Christopher Middleton)
The ‘Metamorphosis of Animals’ is Goethe’s closest approximation to 
Lucretian poetry—a good deal closer, I believe, than has hitherto been 
realised. It is complete in itself, but its opening lines suggest that it was 
intended to form part of a longer poem, for they seem to presuppose 
an earlier consideration of lower forms of nature before the animal 
kingdom is dealt with:
Now if your mind is prepared to venture upon the final
Step to this summit, give me your hand and view with an open
Gaze the abundance of nature before you.
(lines 1–3)
The following lines personify nature as a mother goddess, herself 
immortal, who has lavished her gifts of life in profusion (lines 3–4). This 
brief evocation of nature is, in fact, a shorter equivalent of the apostrophe 
to Venus as the procreator of all things at the beginning of ‘De rerum 
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natura’ (I, 1–20). The mother goddess, Goethe continues, has no reason 
to worry over the needs of her creatures, for which she has amply 
provided (lines 4–9); Lucretius similarly declares: ‘for them all the earth 
herself brings forth all they want in abundance, and nature the cunning 
fashioner of things’ (V, 233–34). Goethe’s manner, after this preamble, 
is expository: there follows a poetic account of some of his theories of 
animal form. The first of these—‘Every animal is an end in itself’ (line 
12) and ‘So the shape of an animal patterns its manner of living’ (line 
25)—is a restatement of Lucretius’s repudiation of teleology: animals 
are not created for a purpose; their purpose is a natural consequence 
of their shape. As Lucretius expresses it: ‘Nothing is born in us simply 
in order that we may use it, but that which is born creates the use’ (IV, 
834–35). Constant laws, Goethe adds, govern the development of all 
natural forms, and these naturally imposed limits are inviolable (lines 
14–15 and 31–32): 
All its organs are formed according to laws that are timeless, 
Even a form very rare will hold to its type, though in secret.
… Here are the limits no god can alter, honoured by Nature:
Only a limit enables a form to rise to perfection.49
(The term ‘type’ clearly alludes to Goethe’s theory of an osteological 
‘type’ to which all vertebrates conform, but no technical details are 
supplied here concerning the number and disposition of bones; the 
formulation remains general, and the emphasis is simply on the law-
governed nature of animal growth.) Again, there are comparable 
passages in Lucretius: ‘A limit has been fixed for the growth of things 
after their kind and for their tenure of life and… it stands decreed what 
each can do by the ordinances of nature, and also what each cannot do’ 
(I, 584–88; see also V, 923–24 and VI, 65–66). After citing a few examples 
of harmonious animal organisation, Goethe concludes that the limbs of 
a given animal are never mutually incompatible (lines 23–24):
       … and the limbs of each, being vital,
Never conflicting the one with the other, have life as their function.
49  The closeness of these lines (and of lines 50–52) to the sentiments expressed in the 
sonnet ‘Nature and Art’ of 1800 (HA, I, 245) provides further evidence for dating 
the poem to around the turn of the century, rather than to 1806.
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He subsequently reinforces this point, declaring that monstrous hybrids 
such as horned lions are impossible (lines 46–47). For these observations, 
there are again precedents in Lucretius (V, 878–80 and 918–19): ‘But 
centaurs never existed, nor at any time can there be creatures of double 
nature and twofold body combined together of incompatible limbs 
[...] there is no proof that creatures of mixed growth could be made, 
and limbs of various creatures joined into one.’ In the ceaseless battle 
between forces of destruction and preservation, the latter succeed in 
holding their own (lines 33–35); for this point too, there are parallels in 
Lucretius (for example, lines 569–70).
There is indeed scarcely a sentiment in the first three-quarters of 
Goethe’s poem that does not have its counterpart in ‘De rerum natura’ 
(although the examples used to illustrate the matching principles are 
often different). There is also, in the ‘Metamorphosis of Animals’, that 
same sense of confidence and certainty which Lucretius derives from 
the universal rule of natural law. But no less significant than what 
Goethe includes in his poem is what he excludes from it. For whereas 
‘The Metamorphosis of Plants’ had closely followed the doctrines in 
Goethe’s botanical treatise of the same title, even presenting them in 
the same sequence (see note 44 above), one of Goethe’s most important 
zoological theories (the vertebral theory of the skull, according to which 
the vertebrate skull is composed of modified vertebrae) finds no place 
at all in the zoological poem or in its original draft; and another (that of 
the osteological ‘type’ for all vertebrates) is alluded to only in the most 
general terms (line 15). They are also absent, of course, in Lucretius’s 
poem. But the two principal theories which Goethe does include 
(that animals and their organs are not teleologically determined, and 
that specialism in one function rules out specialism in others) both 
have parallels in Lucretius. The second of these theories, sometimes 
referred to as the law of ‘compensation’ or of the ‘correlation of parts’,50 
is regularly enunciated in Goethe’s scientific writings with the help of 
commercial metaphors: a limited ‘budget’ (estate, budget, household) of 
resources available to each animal species, within which ‘no part can 
be added to without something being taken from another’ (HA, XII, 
176). And indeed, such metaphors (saved, balance, expenditure) are also 
50  See, for example, Rudolf Magnus, Goethe as a Scientist, new edition (New York, NY: 
Henry Schuman, 1949), p. 84.
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present in the first draft of the ‘Metamorphosis of Animals’ (WA, I. 
Abteilung, LIII, 549–52). But significantly, they are absent from the final 
version of the poem. It would therefore seem that Goethe modelled his 
poem, at least up to line 49, very closely indeed on Lucretius—so much 
so that only such ideas and formulations as are compatible with ‘De 
rerum natura’ are included, and the rest either omitted or expressed in 
the most general of terms. And even if it were objected that the poem 
is, in a sense, a fragment, and that we cannot therefore decide what 
Goethe might have added to it, there is no evidence to suggest that he 
at any time planned to include in it any further zoological doctrines: the 
first draft contains no theories which are not also present in the final 
version; the opening lines suggest that whatever might have preceded 
them would have concerned natural forms of a lower order than the 
vertebrates (‘to venture upon the final step’); and the conclusion, as 
I shall shortly argue, precludes a return to the specifics of zoology. In 
short, from the initial evocation of the goddess (line 4) to the rejection of 
monstrous hybrids (lines 44–49), the idiom and substance of Goethe’s 
poem are eminently Lucretian. It is, indeed, a Lucretian poem on modern 
(Goethean) science—but only in so far as modern science can be made 
to resemble the science of Lucretius himself. 
Yet despite these close affinities, the differences between the two 
poems are profound. Where Lucretius is expansive and discursive, 
Goethe is selective and concentrated. He deals not with the entire 
natural world, as Lucretius had done, but only with zoology; and 
even his own zoological theories are not comprehensively covered. 
Nevertheless, his ‘Metamorphosis of Animals’ is a complete poem—no 
less complete than that on ‘The Metamorphosis of Plants’. For in both 
of these poems, the function of the main, descriptive section is not to 
provide a comprehensive account of botany or of zoology, but merely to 
lay the basis for a broader concluding statement on nature and man—a 
personal statement of love as a creative principle in the first poem, and 
a more general statement on law and freedom throughout nature in the 
second (lines 50–52): 
May this beautiful concept of power and limit, of random
Venture and law, freedom and measure, of order in motion, 
Defect and benefit, bring you high pleasur…
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The first part of the poem contains all that is necessary to support 
this conclusion, so that further zoological detail would have been 
superfluous. Goethe then widens the scope of his conclusion even 
further, to encompass human morality, practical activity, art, and politics 
(lines 54–56):
Moral philosophers never attained to a concept sublimer,
Nor did men of affairs, nor artists imagining; rulers, 
Worthy of power, enjoy their crowns on this account only.
In other words, from his observations on zoology, Goethe has moved at 
once to the highest level of generalisation on humanity and the universe. 
But there is no such climactic summation in ‘De rerum natura’. Lucretius 
moves continually to and fro between general principles and empirical 
illustrations, so that his work attains an epic breadth which is foreign 
to Goethe’s concentrated didacticism. There is also, in the next lines of 
Goethe’s poem, a degree of optimism and jubilant faith in humanity that 
is absent from Lucretius’s sombre reflections on the universal struggle 
for existence (lines 57–58):
So be glad of it, Nature’s loftiest creature, now feeling
Able to follow her loftiest thought on her wings of Creation.
The beginning of Goethe’s poem certainly seemed to presuppose an 
earlier section within a longer poem on nature. But the ending, in which 
the reader is invited to look backwards, not forwards, makes it difficult 
to imagine how it could have continued beyond this point (lines 59–61):51 
Stand where you are, be still, and looking behind you, backward, 
All things consider, compare, and take from the lips of the Muse 
then,
So that you’ll see, not dream it, a truth that is sweet and is certain.
The first part of this poem (up to line 49) represents Goethe’s only 
sustained attempt at writing Lucretian verse. But in concluding it 
51  For this reason, I find it difficult to agree with Erich Trunz’s remark (HA, I, 585): 
‘Both the beginning as well as the end [my italics] point to connections within a larger 
work.’ The only natural continuation would be further reflections on the place of 
human beings in the universe. Besides, the reference to the Muse at the end refers 
back to that in lines 52–53 rather than forward to what the Muse might say in the 
future.
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in the way he did, he denied himself the possibility of developing it 
into a truly Lucretian work. He opted instead for a shorter analogue of 
the Lucretian poem, whose structure is foreshadowed in that of ‘The 
Metamorphosis of Plants’: a few, largely concrete, observations on the 
natural world are invested, in an abstract and general conclusion, with 
symbolic and universal significance. He already shows that predilection 
for the shorter didactic statement, dealing with a few representative 
phenomena, which becomes characteristic of his later poetry on nature 
and science. There are, admittedly, further echoes of Lucretius in his 
later poems;52 but they never approximate so closely to the Lucretian 
model as does the first part of ‘Metamorphosis of Animals’. The scientific 
poems in the sixth book of Tame Xenia (1826), for example, are dense, 
gnomic, and epigrammatic. And most of the philosophical poems in the 
collection God and the World, published in 1827, are far closer in character 
to the concluding lines of ‘Metamorphosis of Animals’ than to its earlier, 
Lucretian section: they are the concentrated utterances of a sage rather 
than the systematic teachings of a scientific didacticist, and their tone 
is more often lyrical than expository. Nevertheless, Goethe remains 
closer in his attitudes to Lucretius than to Brockes, Haller, and the other 
didactic poets of the earlier eighteenth century in Germany: his world, 
like that of the Roman poet, is a unitary whole, in which nature and man 
are one. But as he told Sulpiz Boisserée in 1815,53 he now believed that 
a single long poem on nature was impracticable, and contented himself 
with assembling various of his shorter poems on nature and science into 
the balanced collection God and the World. Thus, although his later ideas 
on the natural universe did go into his poetry, it was not the poetry of a 
new Lucretius.
52  For example, as Bapp (‘Goethe und Lucrez’, p. 66) notices, the poem ‘In Howard’s 
Honoured Memory’, published in 1820, echoes Lucretius’s description of cloud 
shapes (IV, 129–42), and its eulogy of Luke Howard recalls Lucretius’s eulogies 
of Epicurus. T. J. Reed’s description, in The Classical Centre: Goethe and Weimar 
1775–1832 (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 238, of the ‘Classical Walpurgis Night’ 
in Faust as ‘a new De rerum natura’ applies to the scope and spirit of the dramatic 
pageant rather than to its form; the refutation of Anaxagoras by Thales recalls, 
however, Lucretius’s refutation of Anaxagoras in ‘De rerum natura’, I, 830–920 (see 
Bapp, p. 66). 
53  Conversation with Boisserée, 3 October 1815, in Goethes Gespräche, ed. by Wolfgang 
Herwig, 4 vols (Zurich and Stuttgart: Artemis Verlag, 1965–72), II, 1103.
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In 1800, Goethe gave up his plan for a great epic of nature, and 
made it over to the young philosopher Schelling. He doubtless knew 
what he was doing: Schelling’s poetic gifts were minimal, and what 
little survives of his neo-Lucretian efforts is eminently undistinguished. 
This is the case with the poem ‘Animal and Plant’, probably written in 
1800; it is a lame take-off, in elegiac couplets, of Goethe’s poem ‘The 
Metamorphosis of Plants’, attempting as it does to associate natural 
history with the relations between man and woman. It is also, as the 
following lines show, a crass example of male chauvinism, associating 
woman with vegetable passivity and man with animal freedom:
And she [nature] gave vegetable nature to woman, whom I call the 
plant-like
One among animals, and man among them the animal one.
More tender is womanly love, more imperative, quiet, and briefer;
More animal, freer, but also more durable is love in the man.54 
Further studies of Dante and his verse-form petered out in translations 
and fragments, and Schelling in turn abandoned the plan (as did the 
Danish philosopher Henrich Steffens, who also appears to have picked 
up the idea of an epic on the universe in Weimar in 1799 or early in 
1800).55 
Schelling did attempt, however, to discuss the philosophical and 
aesthetic implications of the project, and to explain why past initiatives 
had invariably failed. He does so in his Philosophie der Kunst of 1802–03, 
in the section on the didactic poem.56 His argument is complicated, but 
it runs in essence as follows. The didactic poem, which has a specific 
end, namely to impart knowledge, is not properly an art-form, since art 
must have universality and not be tied to any particular purpose. But 
knowledge itself possesses universality if it is total knowledge—that 
is, if it is a complete reflection of the universe. Thus the only didactic 
poem which will be truly artistic in this sense will be one, as Schelling 
54  F. W. J. von Schelling, Werke, ed. by Manfred Schröter, 6 vols (Munich: Beck Verlag, 
1927), 4. Ergänzungsband (1959), p. 523.
55  On Schelling’s plan and its failure, see Rudolf Haym, Die romantische Schule, 4th edn 
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1920), pp. 695–96; Fritz Strich, Die Mythologie in der deutschen 
Literatur von Klopstock bis Wagner, 2 vols (Halle: Niemeyer, 1910), II, 29–37; Aesch, 
pp. 261–63; and Plath, p. 48. On Steffens, see Plath, p. 45 and Steffens, Was ich erlebte, 
10 vols (Breslau: Max, 1840–44), IV, 401–02 (‘The subject was always too formidable 
for me’).
56  Werke, Ergänzungsband (1959), pp. 309–18.
 271. Lucretius in Eighteenth-Century Germany
puts it, ‘in which directly or indirectly, the universe, as reflected in 
knowledge, is the object’. He continues: ‘Since the universe, in its form 
and essence, is only One, there can ideally be only One absolute didactic 
poem, of which all individual examples are mere fragments, namely the 
poem on the nature of things’ (p. 315). All didactic poems of the past, 
including that of Lucretius, are of necessity only partial, since they are 
based on partial knowledge. Lucretius, for example, reduces the world 
to material particles, thereby ignoring the dimension of spirit. Schelling 
then concludes (echoing Schiller’s essay On Naïve and Sentimental 
Poetry):57 ‘That didactic poem, then, in which […] the object represented 
is itself poetic, is still to be written’ (p. 317). In other words, the absolute 
didactic poem, the modern ‘De rerum natura’, still lies in the future, for 
our knowledge of the universe is as yet incomplete.
Schelling now builds into his argument the observation which 
Herder had made shortly before (see p. 14 above) when he maintained 
that a complete system of knowledge is itself inherently poetic. Once 
human knowledge is complete (that is, once it has achieved identity 
with the universe), the world-spirit will, as it were, itself generate 
the absolute didactic poem, and a new mythology to go along with 
it. Schelling concludes (p, 318): ‘The origin of the absolute didactic 
poem or speculative epic therefore coincides as a single whole with 
the completion of science, and just as science originally emerged from 
poetry, it is also its most beautiful and final destiny to flow back into this 
ocean.’ Art is thus both the original source and ultimate destination of 
knowledge (a view which Schiller had already expressed in his didactic 
poem ‘The Artists’ of 1789).58 But what the new mythology which the 
progress of knowledge will eventually generate will look like, Schelling 
does not say.
Schelling’s argument no doubt made him feel better about his failure 
to carry out the project that Goethe had handed over to him. But what 
he says is more than just a personal apology. Whereas Goethe settled for 
57  See Schiller, Werke, Nationalausgabe, XX, 453: ‘That didactic poem in which the 
thought itself were and would remain poetic, is still to be written.’
58  See Schiller’s comments on this poem in his letter to Körner of 9 February 1789 
in Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Körner, ed. by Klaus L. Berghahn (Munich: 
Winkler, 1973), pp. 100–01: ‘Thus after the thought […] that art prepared the way 
for scientific and ethical culture has been articulated […] only then may it be said 
[…] that the perfection of humanity is realised when scientific and ethical culture 
are resolved into beauty.’ 
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less than the original plan—for a collection of shorter poems on nature 
and science—Schelling claims that the plan is in principle impossible to 
fulfil, at least for the foreseeable future. He prices it, so to speak, right out 
of the market. History, of course, has so far proved him right. The closest 
approximation to the modern epic of nature is perhaps Alexander von 
Humboldt’s Cosmos, which reviews all of nature as an organic whole, 
and pays tribute to Goethe’s aspiration to integrate poetry, philosophy, 
and science.59 But Cosmos is written in prose, not verse, and its formal 
ancestor is not Lucretius’s ‘De rerum natura’ but Herder’s Ideas on the 
Philosophy of History, which tried to present an integral vision of the 
natural world and human history.
Nevertheless, Schelling’s explanation of why the ‘absolute didactic 
poem’ has never been written is not, to my mind, either complete or 
satisfactory. Nor is his secondary argument—of which the Romantics 
were particularly fond—that it was the lack of a new mythology that 
hampered modern scientific poets.60 In the most successful didactic 
poem of the past, ‘De rerum natura’, mythology is in fact used quite 
sparingly, and it is clear that Lucretius regards the classical myths only as 
poetic figures: he specifically denies that the gods perform any function 
whatsoever in the natural universe (II, 1090–92). His main subject is 
the dynamic process of nature itself. (Schelling simply betrays his own 
failure to appreciate ‘De rerum natura’ when he declares (p. 316) that 
only the opening hymn to Venus and the eulogies of Epicurus, which 
display ‘personal enthusiasm’, are truly poetic.) One of the nearest 
things we have to a modern myth of the universe as a self-contained, 
natural system is that of the ‘earth-spirit’ (Erdgeist) in Goethe’s Faust, 
Part I; and some critics have regretted that Goethe did not develop 
this further, but overlaid it instead with the old dualistic Christian 
framework of a transcendental God in the ‘Prologue in Heaven’ (see, 
for example, Reed, p. 136). It may well be that Faust would have been an 
even more impressive play, more in tune with modern sensibilities, if he 
had stuck to his original myth. But didactic poetry on scientific themes 
is a different matter. For good mythology tends to make for bad science, 
59  See Humboldt, Kosmos. Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung, 5 vols (Stuttgart 
and Tübingen: Cotta, 1845–62), II, 75; also Plath, p. 74.
60  Some modern critics, in the wake of Fritz Strich (see note 55 above), have continued 
to adduce this as a major reason for the failure of the scientific epic in modern times: 
see, for example, Aesch, pp. 250–60.
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as Lucretius well realised when he banished his gods from the universe 
as we know it to remote and inaccessible regions. The reasons for the 
failure of the modern epic of nature are more complex than this.
Part of the explanation lies in literary history, of course. In so far as 
the Lucretian poem is a specific case of the didactic poem in general, 
it was bound to share in that general decline in popularity of didactic 
poetry which is apparent in the later eighteenth century as the lyrical 
poetry of personal experience came to the forefront and prose became 
the main didactic medium. But the failure of the epic of nature also 
had a lot to do with the way in which science had developed. It is 
significant that most of the scientific poetry of the eighteenth century 
deals with natural history rather than with, for example, chemistry 
or physics. As the exact sciences grew more mathematical and hence 
more abstract, they became increasingly resistant to poetic expression. 
Wordsworth, in the preface to his Lyrical Ballads, hoped that science 
might eventually become more accessible to the ordinary run of 
people, and said: ‘If the time should ever come when what is now 
called science, thus familiarised to men, shall be ready to put on, as it 
were, a form of flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to 
aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the Being thus produced, as 
a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man.’61 This, of course, 
was not to be. Science has since grown more abstract still. But it is not 
just the abstraction of modern science that eludes Lucretian treatment. 
Its sheer extent and complexity are another insuperable obstacle. 
Admittedly, Lucretius himself had maintained that the universe 
is infinite (I, 958–67);62 the difference is that the known contents of 
his infinite universe were vastly fewer and simpler than those of the 
infinite universe of today. Even by 1800, scientific knowledge had 
developed too far for the Lucretian poem to accommodate it. In fact, 
such poetry had degenerated into encyclopaedism over fifty years 
earlier (which casts an ironic light on Schelling’s claim that science 
had not yet developed far enough for the ‘absolute didactic poem’ to 
be written).
61  William Wordsworth, Poetical Works, ed. by Thomas Hutchinson, new edition, 
revised by Ernest de Selincourt (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 738.
62  Aesch, pp. 253–66, sees the infinity of the modern universe as the other principal 
reason why the neo-Lucretian epic failed. He seems unaware that Lucretius’s 
universe was infinite too.
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But there is more to it than that. The aim of Lucretius himself was 
not primarily to communicate the particulars of the scientific knowledge 
of his day; he uses these only to illustrate the underlying principles, 
or rather principle, on which this knowledge is based: namely, the 
principle that all things are susceptible to explanation in terms of natural 
causes, without the aid of religion (see Fabian (1968), p. 89). This 
principle is in turn the basis of his, and Epicurus’s, moral philosophy, 
which promises the deliverance of human beings from fear, and the 
serenity of philosophical detachment. We are to attain this end not by 
denying the existence of death, suffering, and evil, but by accepting 
them as inevitable, and by learning to live with them as best we can 
through control of the passions, enjoyment of pleasure, and avoidance 
of pain. The link between Lucretius’s view of the universe and his 
moral philosophy is thus a firm one. Newtonian science offered no 
such moral reassurance.63 There were, it is true, systems of thought in 
the eighteenth century which claimed to encompass both the universe 
of science and the whole of moral and metaphysical reality: above all, 
that of Leibniz, which supplied the philosophical foundation of most 
didactic poems in Germany up to the middle of the century. But the link 
between Newtonian science and Leibniz’s philosophical optimism was 
neither a close nor a necessary one; his optimism was based not on the 
progress of physics but on a priori reasoning on the nature of possible 
worlds. So long as the Leibniz-Wolffian system remained the popular 
philosophical orthodoxy in Germany, it seemed to go along quite happily 
with science: teleological reasoning from the wise design of creation 
helped to preserve the association. But ironically, the very work which 
the optimists took as their model for the scientific poem, Lucretius’s 
‘De rerum natura’, itself contained one of the greatest threats to their 
optimism in the whole of world literature. For Lucretius’s universe is the 
product of random movements of atoms, which is incompatible with that 
benevolent providence in which the eighteenth century so much wanted 
to believe. As a result, much neo-Lucretian poetry was simultaneously 
anti-Lucretian poetry. Its faith in science drew it towards Lucretius, and 
its faith in providence drew it away from him. This ambivalent posture 
merely underlined its internal weakness and its inferiority to its model.
63  Even in the eighteenth century, regrets were sometimes expressed that it did not 
encompass the moral and spiritual world (see Schatzberg, p. 271).
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It is no coincidence that the most successful didactic poem of 
the eighteenth century, Pope’s Essay on Man, sticks largely to moral 
philosophy, says little about science (despite its tributes to Newton), 
and, for all its optimism, is full of caveats on the ability of the human 
intellect to comprehend the universal purpose: ‘Know then thyself, 
presume not God to scan.’ Pope did not expound an integrated 
philosophical system;64 his aims were more modest. He simply stated 
some of the tenets of popular optimism as it was then current, and 
devoted most of his poem to moral questions. His optimism was 
associated with, but not demonstrated from, the findings of modern 
science, and by the end of the century, this association had become even 
more tenuous. Science simply could not furnish the basis for a moral 
philosophy on the Leibnizian pattern. Goethe took the logical step of 
creating a new, anti-Newtonian science of his own in order to preserve 
the unity between nature as he understood it and individual moral 
existence.65 To him and to many of his German contemporaries, the 
philosophy of Spinoza, which dispensed with a transcendental God, 
appeared increasingly attractive, supplementing, or even supplanting, 
the philosophy of Leibniz.
The development of modern science thus goes a long way towards 
explaining why the eighteenth century never produced a De rerum 
natura to rival the poem of Lucretius. But there is a further reason why it 
could not have succeeded: Lucretius, as a poet, had certain advantages 
over his modern successors which it was not in their power to share. In 
the age of Newton, science made great discoveries. But Lucretius made 
an even greater one: he discovered science itself. The teachings of the 
Greek philosopher Epicurus struck the Roman poet with the force 
of a revelation, and in his poem, he sets out with evangelical fervour 
to convert his friend Memmius, and by extension all his readers, to 
the new gospel. His disadvantage as an early Roman poet, operating 
with a Latin which, as he himself says in apology (I, 136–45), was ill 
equipped to render the abstractions of Greek philosophical theory, 
64  As Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn pointed out in their treatise Pope a Metaphysician! 
(see note 34 above); see also Fabian (1979), p. 536, and Peter Michelsen, ‘Ist alles 
gut? Pope, Mendelssohn und Lessing. Zur Schrift Pope ein Metaphysiker!’, in 
Mendelssohn-Studien, ed. by Cécile Lowenthal-Hensel and Rudolf Elvers (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1979), pp. 81–109. 
65  For further examination of this endeavour, see the essay ‘The Ethical Foundation of 
Goethe’s Scientific Thought’ later in this volume.
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became in fact one of his strongest assets: he was compelled to become 
a linguistic innovator, to deploy in new ways all the resources of 
archaism, colloquialism, and the down-to-earth concrete vocabulary 
he had at his disposal, and they lent his verse a vitality and exuberance 
which an established philosophical terminology could never have 
achieved.66 The force of his poetry, what Statius called the docti furor 
arduus Lucreti (‘the high passion of the learned Lucretius’),67 was 
the force of triumphant assurance. As Herder shrewdly observed, 
‘Never will a didactic poet write more ardently and forcefully than 
Lucretius wrote: for he believed what he taught’ (SW XIV, 194). Bertolt 
Brecht, in his remarkable unfinished attempt to render the doctrines 
of The Communist Manifesto in hexameters, shared at least one quality 
of Lucretius which few of his other imitators possessed, namely his 
tone of impassioned conviction.68 That was precisely what Polignac, 
Wieland, and the eighteenth-century anti-Lucretians lacked. They 
were dealing in the already well-worn currency of Cartesian and 
Leibnizian metaphysics, and they were fighting a rearguard action on 
behalf of a declining faith. In fact, they were themselves already half 
seduced by the scientific gospel of their Roman predecessor, whose 
naturalistic tendency was ultimately more in keeping with the spirit 
of their age than were their own half-hearted compromises between 
science and religion. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
those who talked of a future epic of the universe had no new wisdom 
with which to replace the faith they had lost—hence their constant 
references to an indeterminate future, and to a new mythology yet to 
come. The Spinozism which some of them espoused was admittedly 
more consistent with modern science than Leibniz’s metaphysical 
theories had been—not in its legacy of pantheism (which was already 
archaic), but in its affirmation of the universal rule of natural law. But 
this could no longer be presented as a new gospel. Europe already 
took it for granted.
66  See Alexander Dalzell’s chapter on Lucretius in The Cambridge History of Classical 
Literature, Vol. II, Part 2, ‘The Late Republic’, ed. by E. J. Kenney (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 33–55 (p. 46).
67  P. Papinius Statius, Silvae, II, 7, line 76.
68  Brecht, Das Manifest, in Gesammelte Werke, 20 vols (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 
1967), X, 911–30.
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Although the new Lucretius never made his appearance, the whole 
episode had at least two positive results: the poems on nature and science 
by Goethe, who wisely settled for less than the original over-ambitious 
plan; and the splendid hexameter translation of De rerum natura by Karl 
Ludwig von Knebel, who abandoned his own project of a neo-Lucretian 
poem69 in order to restore the original to his German contemporaries.
69  On Knebel’s early project and his reasons for abandoning it, see his letter to Goethe 
of 2 February 1825, in Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Knebel, II, 362.
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan the wise. A dramatic poem in five acts ([no place or 
publisher information], 1779). © Foto H.-P. Haack, https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Lessing_Nathan_der_Weise_1779.jpg
2. On the Rise of  
Toleration in Europe:  
Lessing and the German Contribution1
If we examine the rise of toleration in Europe, the most prominent 
documents are easily identified. In Britain, there is John Locke’s 
Letter concerning Toleration; in France, Voltaire’s Treatise on Toleration; 
and in Germany, Lessing’s drama Nathan the Wise. The last of these 
is anomalous: why should a drama acquire such significance for 
so fundamental a problem in European history?2 No doubt this is 
partly because Germany, a disunited country until the second half of 
the nineteenth century, has traditionally looked to its cultural—and 
especially literary—achievements to define its national identity, and 
still habitually consults its classical authors for guidance on present-day 
problems. But it is also, I think, because Lessing’s play, with its parable 
of the three indistinguishable rings which represent the rival claims 
of the three monotheistic religions, exemplifies a distinctively German 
approach to the problem of toleration. Before I look at a selection of 
German writers to substantiate this claim, I would like to comment 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘On the Rise of 
Toleration in Europe. Lessing and the German Contribution’, in Modern Language 
Review, 105 (2010) xxviii–xliv (Presidential Address of the Modern Humanities 
Research Association, delivered on 21 May 2010). 
2  See Wolf Dietrich Otto, ‘Toleranzkultur und Pädagogik oder: Wie reden deutsche 
Pädagogen über Toleranz?’, in Kulturthema Toleranz. Zur Grundlegung einer 
interdisziplinären und interkulturellen Toleranzforschung, ed. by Alois Wierlacher 
(Munich: Iudicium, 1996), pp. 565–631 (p. 626): ‘It is striking that Lessing figures 
as the unique point of reference in the German tradition of tolerance.’ For Lessing’s 
play, see Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, ed. by Karl Lachmann and 
Franz Muncker, 23 vols (Stuttgart, Leipzig and Berlin: Göschen, 1886–1924), III, 
1–177 (parable of the rings, pp. 90–95). 
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briefly on the two works just mentioned by Locke and Voltaire, in 
order to highlight some crucial differences between Britain, France, and 
Germany in their pursuit of toleration. 
But first, a note on the word ‘toleration’ itself. Although I shall 
shortly refer to some of the edicts and legislative measures governing 
the practice of toleration in Europe, I shall be chiefly concerned with 
the theoretical pronouncements of the writers and thinkers who sought 
to promote it. The link between the theory and practice of toleration is 
often indirect,3 for governments are of course influenced by political, 
economic, and other factors apart from the opinions of theorists.4 
But although practice often lags behind theory, most of the measures 
demanded by the theorists did eventually find their way into the statute 
books of the modern western democracies. It should also be noted that, 
until fairly recent times, toleration meant primarily religious toleration, 
whereas today, it more often applies to the toleration of cultural and 
ethnic differences. 
John Locke published the first and most important of his four Letters 
concerning Toleration in 1689. He had written it in response to Louis XIV’s 
revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, the edict which, for nearly 
a century, had granted toleration to the Protestant minority in France. 
Locke advocates freedom of conscience as a natural right, for which 
even Jews, Muslims, pagans, and Unitarians are eligible.5 To that extent, 
his Letter is liberal and rational in spirit. But in denying toleration to 
atheists (on the ground that they cannot take credible oaths in a court of 
law) and to Roman Catholics (on the ground that they owe allegiance 
to a foreign power),6 he introduces ad hoc political considerations 
influenced more by his wish to secure the established Church of England 
and the Protestant succession to the British throne than by any rational 
principle. Together with the Act of Toleration of 1689, Locke’s work 
helped to secure religious peace in Britain by affirming the supremacy 
of the established church, and at the same time supporting freedom 
3  See Hans R. Guggisberg, Religiöse Toleranz. Dokumente zur Geschichte einer Forderung 
(Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1984), pp. 9–11.
4  See Joachim Whaley, ‘A Tolerant Society? Toleration in the Holy Roman Empire, 
1648–1806’, in Toleration in Enlightenment Europe, ed. by Ole Peter Grell and Roy 
Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 175–95 (p. 184).
5  John Locke, ‘A Letter concerning Toleration’ in Focus, ed. by John Horton and Susan 
Mendus (London and New York: Routledge, 1991); text of Letter, pp. 12–56 (p. 51). 
6  Ibid., pp. 45–47 and 84–85.
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of worship on the part of the Protestant non-conformists. In their 
characteristically British pragmatism and spirit of compromise, Locke’s 
Letter and the act of parliament with which it coincided contrast sharply 
with their nearest continental equivalents. 
In France, appeals for toleration, after the revocation of the Edict 
of Nantes and the end of toleration for Protestants, have much greater 
urgency and radicality than Locke’s Letter, for they were directed 
both at France’s established religion and at the French state itself for 
encouraging religious persecution. The classic protest is that of Voltaire 
in his Treatise on Toleration of 1763, in which he deploys all his skill 
in satire and eloquence to denounce the torture and execution of the 
Protestant Jean Calas, falsely accused of murdering his son to prevent 
his conversion to Catholicism. Voltaire is fond of citing, as he does 
here, the example of other countries in which numerous religions and 
nationalities coexist and work together in harmony, as in the Ottoman 
empire and the London stock exchange.7 He does so, however, not 
because he respects the religions in question, but because he believes 
that the more of them are allowed to coexist, the more likely they are to 
neutralise each other and lose the power which a monopolistic religion 
is able to exercise in France. The logic of his views, and of those of most 
of his allies in the French Enlightenment, is to require a secular state, 
tolerant of but indifferent to the diverse religious beliefs and practices of 
its subjects. Such a requirement was eventually enshrined in Article 10 of 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man as approved by the French National 
Assembly in 1789: ‘No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, 
including his religious views, provided that their manifestation does not 
disturb the public order established by law.’
I shall return later to Lessing’s drama and its parable of the three 
rings, but I must point out in advance that, although it is based on 
an Italian model—namely the story of the three rings in Boccaccio’s 
Decameron—Lessing changes the latter in fundamental respects. In 
particular, although Boccaccio’s story leaves it in doubt which of the 
three rings—or the religions they represent—is the true one, it does not 
question the basic assumption that only one of them can be exclusively 
7  Voltaire, Treatise on Tolerance, translated by Brian Masters, ed. by Simon Harvey 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 19–22 (Ch. 4); also Voltaire, 
Letters on England, translated by Leonard Tancock (London: Penguin Books, 1980), 
p. 41 (Letter 6).
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true. But in Lessing’s case, the claims of all three remain indefinitely 
open: all three religions have the option of demonstrating, if not their 
exclusive truth, then at least their relative moral worth, by the conduct 
of their adherents. In short, Lessing’s parable has an inbuilt pluralism 
which, as I shall attempt to show, is characteristic of a distinctive 
German tradition. Unlike British pragmatism and French secularism, 
this pluralistic tradition holds that, since we have no means of knowing 
whether or not one of the rival religions has an exclusive claim to truth, 
they should all be tolerated and respected.8
So far as I can determine, this pluralistic tradition first emerges in 
Germany in the late Middle Ages, with Nicholas of Cusa, who took 
his name from his birthplace of Kues on the River Moselle. He taught 
at the university of Cologne, and became a Cardinal and diplomat in 
the service of Rome. In this capacity, he travelled to Constantinople in 
1437 and arranged for the Byzantine emperor John VIII Palaeologus to 
attend a conference in Florence, at which a union of the Greek Orthodox 
and Roman Catholic confessions was provisionally agreed. Inspired 
by this ecumenical initiative, Cusa went on to claim that, despite 
all differences in religious rites and doctrines, religion is ultimately 
one, for all contradictions are resolved in God, whose divine truth 
is inaccessible to finite mortals.9 On receiving the news in 1453 that 
Constantinople had fallen to the Turks, he at once proceeded to write 
On Religious Peace (De pace fidei), which incorporates a dialogue between 
seventeen representatives of different faiths, all of which embody partial 
manifestations of divinity.10 Cusa was probably the first Christian thinker 
to call for inter-religious harmony and to teach what later became known 
as ‘perspectivism’: that is, the doctrine that each religion offers a distinct 
and partial perspective on the one ineffable truth.11
8  On the meaning of the term ‘pluralism’ as used in this essay, see Michael Salewski, 
‘Europa, der tolerante Kontinent?’, in Religiöser Pluralismus und Toleranz in Europa, 
ed. by Christian Augustin, Johannes Wienand and Christiane Winkler (Wiesbaden: 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), pp. 12–27 and passim.
9  Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance [De docta ignorantia, 1440], ed. by Jasper 
Hopkins (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981). See also the article ‘Toleranz’ 
in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, ed. by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart 
Koselleck, 8 vols (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972–97), V, 445–605 (pp. 459–61).
10  Nicholas of Cusa on Interreligious Harmony [De pace fidei, 1453], edited and translated 
by James E. Biechler and H. Lawrence Bond (Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1990). 
11  Ibid., p. xxv; also Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance pp. 28–29 and 182. 
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The problem of religious differences became acute in Germany 
with the coming of the Reformation some sixty years later. Christianity 
now faced new, internal divisions, with Catholicism, Lutheranism, and 
subsequently Calvinism all claiming exclusive truth for their doctrines. 
Their conflict had serious political consequences as the hundreds of 
German rulers and their states divided their allegiance between the 
rival confessions. When successive attempts in the 1540s failed to heal 
the breach between Catholicism and Lutheranism, war broke out and 
agreement was not reached until the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, which 
bound the subjects of German states to adopt the confession of their 
ruler.12 This was the same disastrous principle of cuius regio, eius religio 
which ended the Thirty Years War nearly a century later, aggravating 
rather than terminating religious controversy by making the religious 
faith of millions of people dependent on the whim of their particular 
head of state.
Not surprisingly, these conflicts inspired many attempts in Germany 
to eliminate or minimise religious differences. The reformer Martin 
Bucer, for example, worked tirelessly to unite the warring parties,13 
and the Catholic theologians Georg Witzel and Georg Cassander, 
with the encouragement of the Habsburg emperors Ferdinand I and 
Maximilian II, sought to establish common ground between the 
warring confessions.14 Several German humanists, including Philipp 
Melanchthon and Johannes Reuchlin, strove to heal the breach with 
Rome (and in Reuchlin’s case, to secure equal rights for the Jews).15 The 
independent theologian Sebastian Franck went further still, declaring—
uniquely in the first half of the sixteenth century—’I have my brothers 
among the Turks, Papists, Jews and all peoples’; Franck also called for 
universal tolerance, to include even heretics of every description.16 
In due course, various German rulers began to adopt more tolerant 
measures, with Brandenburg-Prussia (whose Hohenzollern rulers 
were not otherwise renowned for their liberal sympathies) leading 
12  See Francesco Ruffini, Religious Liberty, translated by J. Parker Heyes, with a preface 
by J. B. Bury (London and New York, NY: Williams & Newgate, 1912), pp. 209–10.
13  See Henry Kamen, The Rise of Toleration (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), 
pp. 66–68.
14  Ibid., p. 97.
15  Guggisberg, Religiöse Toleranz, pp. 47–48; Kamen, Rise of Toleration, pp. 86–92.
16  Guggisberg, Religiöse Toleranz, pp. 80–82; Kamen, Rise of Toleration, pp. 77–78.
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the way. In 1611, the Elector Johann Sigismund granted freedom of 
worship to the Catholics of East Prussia who had until recently been 
citizens of Poland;17 and when he himself converted from Lutheran to 
Calvinist observance two years later, he refrained from requiring his 
country to convert along with him. His grandson, the ‘Great Elector’ 
Friedrich Wilhelm, recognised all three major confessions in his realm 
and also tolerated Baptists, Socinians, and Jews.18 Like their more 
famous successor Frederick the Great, these rulers were motivated 
as much by political and commercial considerations as by their own 
religious convictions (or lack of them); in order to keep the peace in 
Prussia’s widely dispersed territories and to increase its population by 
immigration and territorial expansion, it made sense to keep religious 
restrictions to a minimum. Similarly, more than one confession was 
tolerated, at least on a de facto basis, in several imperial cities such as 
Augsburg, Biberach, and Kaufbeuren, no doubt for commercial reasons. 
These practical examples, plus the fact that, after the Peace of Westphalia 
of 1648, three Christian confessions were allowed to coexist within the 
Holy Roman Empire, could only encourage the advocates of religious 
pluralism and toleration to continue their efforts.19 
I am, of course, aware that pluralistic attitudes and ecumenical 
initiatives were not confined to the German territories in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, for 
example, the French philosopher Jean Bodin, in his clandestine treatise 
Colloquium Heptaplomeres, constructed an open-ended dialogue between 
seven representatives of diverse religions and Christian confessions, in 
which it remains unclear which of them, if any, is the true one.20 In the 
1640s in England, the independent theologians Henry Robinson and 
John Goodwin argued that no one can possess the whole of truth, so that 
error is always possible and divergent opinions should be tolerated.21 
17  Ruffini, Religious Liberty, p. 241.
18  See Klaus Deppermann, ‘Die Kirchenpolitik des Großen Kurfürsten’, Pietismus und 
Neuzeit, 6 (1981), 99–114 (pp. 99, 101, 104 and 113–14).
19  See Wolfgang Wüst, ‘An der Toleranzgrenze. Der frühmoderne “Ernstfall” für 
Aufklärung, Toleranz und Pluralismus’, in Religiöser Pluralismus, pp. 53–68 (pp. 
56–58); also Ursula Goldenbaum, ‘Einleitung’, in Appell an das Publikum. Die 
öffentliche Debatte in der deutschen Aufklärung 1687–1796, ed. by Ursula Goldenbaum 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), pp. 1–118 (pp. 8–9 and 81–84).
20  Guggisberg, Religiöse Toleranz, pp. 112–121.
21  Kamen, Rise of Toleration, pp. 177–78.
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And in 1670, the French Huguenot Isaac d’Huisseau published a work 
entitled The Reunion of Christianity, in which he sought common ground 
between the confessions in a few basic principles conducive to moral 
rectitude.22 With the coming of the Enlightenment, the cause of religious 
tolerance was widely supported in France, for example in the two main 
works of Montesquieu.23 But the point I wish to make is that, in countries 
other than Germany, there is not the same long and continuous tradition 
of religious pluralism and attempts to reconcile the warring religions; 
this pluralism was, after all, a response to the political as well as religious 
diversity of the Holy Roman Empire with its multitude of virtually 
independent states. The strength of this tradition becomes especially 
clear in the eighteenth century, above all through the work of Leibniz 
and his enormous influence on German thought.
Leibniz has the distinction of putting both religious and cultural 
pluralism on a metaphysical foundation. Already in his Discourse on 
Metaphysics of 1686, he declares:24 
Every substance is like a complete world and like a mirror of God, or 
indeed of the whole universe, which each expresses in its own way, 
much as one and the same town is represented differently according to 
the different positions from which it is viewed. Thus the universe is in a 
sense multiplied as many times as there are substances, and the glory of 
God is likewise multiplied by as many different representations as there 
are of his works.
In other words, all simple substances—or what Leibniz would later 
describe as ‘monads’—view the universe from different perspectives; 
and in his subsequent works, he repeatedly uses this optical image to 
denote the uniqueness and relativity of all human insights.25 In keeping 
with this perspectivism, Leibniz discerns some truth and value in all 
religious confessions, maintaining that ‘it is possible to be saved in every 
religion, provided that one truly loves God above all things’ [Leibniz’s 
22  La Réunion du Christianisme, ou la manière de rejoindre tous les chrétiens sous une seule 
confession de foy (Saumur: René Pean, 1670); see also Ruffini, Religious Liberty, pp. 
116–17.
23  Lettres persanes (1721) and De l’Esprit des lois (1748); see also Guggisberg, Religiöse 
Toleranz, pp. 237 and 241.
24  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophische Schriften, ed. by Hans Heinz Holz, 4 vols 
in 6 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1965–92), I, 76–78.
25  Ibid., II/1, 459–61 and II/2, 174 (Théodicée, Pt. II, Para. 147 and Pt. III, Para. 357); IV, 
464 and 466 (Monadologie, Paras. 57 and 60).
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italics],26 and on another occasion, ‘I have found that most sects are right 
in a good part of what they affirm, but not so much in what they deny’.27 
These convictions underlie his protracted but ultimately unsuccessful 
negotiations, supported by both Protestant and Catholic German rulers, 
to reunite the Christian confessions.28
Leibniz’s perspectivism is not entirely original: it is foreshadowed to 
some extent by Nicholas of Cusa.29 But Leibniz is original in the way in 
which he extends it beyond religious differences to different civilisations, 
notably those of Europe and the Far East, as expressions of the universe 
from different perspectives.30 Before the end of the seventeenth 
century, he made personal contact in Italy with several members of 
the Jesuit mission to China and corresponded regularly with them in 
subsequent years. In 1697, he published a series of documents which 
he had obtained through these exchanges, with the aim of showing that 
European culture had as much to gain from China as China had from 
Europe, declaring in his editorial preface: ‘they [the Chinese] surpass us 
[...] in practical philosophy, that is, in the precepts of ethics and politics 
adapted to the present life and use of mortals’; he also added ‘we need 
missionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice 
of natural religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed 
theology’.31 Leibniz particularly admired the enlightened emperor Kang 
Xi, a contemporary of Louis XIV, who, unlike the French monarch, 
promulgated an edict of toleration in which Buddhism, Christianity, 
and Islam were granted equal rights.32 When the Christian missionaries 
26  Leibniz to Duchess Sophie of Hanover, August 1699, cited in Maria Rosa Antognazza, 
Leibniz. An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 
340.
27  Leibniz to Nicolas Rémond, 10 January 1714, cited in Antognazza, Leibniz, p. 500.
28  See Kamen, Rise of Toleration, p. 229; also Antognazza, Leibniz, pp. 47, 361, 366, 399 
and 404–06. 
29  See Robert Zimmermann, ‘Der Cardinal Nicolas Cusanus als Vorläufer Leibnizens’, 
Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 8 (Vienna, 1852), 306–
28; also Kiyoshi Sakai, ‘Leibnizens Chinologie und das Prinzip der Analogie’, in Das 
Neueste über China. G. W. Leibnizens “Nova Sinica” von 1697, ed. by Wenchao Li and 
Hans Poser (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000), pp. 275–93 (p. 267).
30  See Antognazza, Leibniz, p. 360.
31  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Writings on China, ed. by Daniel J. Cook and Henry 
Rosemont Jr. (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court 1994), pp. 46–47; also Franklin 
Perkins, Leibniz and China. A Commerce of Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 154.
32  Antognazza, Leibniz, p. 361; Leibniz, Writings on China, p. 53.
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were eventually expelled by Kang Xi’s son, it was because of their own 
intolerance: they disagreed among themselves on doctrinal principles 
and refused, on the Vatican’s insistence, to accommodate Christian 
liturgy to Chinese rites and terminology.33
Leibniz’s cultural perspectivism thus accorded equal status to 
Chinese and European culture: Chinese ethics was superior to European 
ethics; European science was superior to Chinese science; and while 
Chinese natural religion was superior to that of Europe, the revealed 
Christianity of Europe was superior to Chinese religion, which had no 
transcendental revelation. But while Leibniz’s cultural perspectivism 
confined itself to differences between contemporary cultures, it had 
nothing to say on historical differences, and so did nothing to counteract 
the increasingly prevalent view that the modern age was in many ways 
superior to the earlier phases of history. This omission was made good 
in 1752 by Johann Martin Chladenius (or Chladni), who argued in a 
work on the theory of history (Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft) that 
our perception of history is relative to the position or point of view 
(Sehepunkt or Standpunkt) that we occupy within it.34 With this insight, 
Leibniz’s metaphysical, religious, and cultural perspectivism was 
complemented in Germany by a new historical perspectivism. 
Another example of religious pluralism, more radical than that of 
Leibniz, is that of Gottfried Arnold, author of a monumental history of 
the Christian church with particular reference to heretics (Unparteiische 
Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie, 1699–1700). Arnold’s closest affinity as 
a thinker is to Sebastian Franck, by whose radical individualism 
he seems to have been influenced.35 His rebellion against orthodox 
Lutheranism—he was himself a Lutheran pastor—becomes an attack on 
33  Perkins, Leibniz and China, p. 199.
34  See Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time, translated 
by Keith Tribe (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 136 and 140; 
also Hinrich C. Seeba, ‘”Der wahre Standort einer jeden Person”. Lessings Beitrag 
zum historischen Perspektivismus’, in Nation und Gelehrtenrepublik. Lessing im 
europäischen Zusammenhang, ed. by Wilfried Barner and Albert M. Reh (Detroit, 
MI and Munich: Wayne State University Press and edition text + kritik, 1984), pp. 
193–214 (p. 210), 
35  See Siegfried Wollgast, ‘Zu den philosophischen Quellen von Gottfried Arnold und 
zu Aspekten seines philosophischen Systems’, in Gottfried Arnold (1666–1714). Mit 
einer Bibliographie der Arnold-Literatur ab 1714, ed. by Dietrich Blaufuss and Friedrich 
Niewöhner (Wiesbaden: Harrossowitz, 1995), pp. 301–35 (p. 332).
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church authority in general. He teaches a kind of theological anarchism, 
in which Christ himself figures as the first persecuted heretic.36 It 
follows from these premises that religious truth is not to be found in 
any one place or society, but disseminated among many nations and 
communities. The lesson which runs throughout Arnold’s work is that 
the only acceptable attitude on the part of religious authority is to allow 
complete liberty of conscience and to practise universal toleration. 
Arnold’s vast compilation had considerable influence in its time, and 
was read and respected by Herder, Lessing, and Goethe among others.
Some fifty years after Leibniz’s death, there was a sudden revival of 
interest in his philosophy with the posthumous publication of his New 
Essays on Human Understanding in 176537 and the six-volume edition of his 
works by Louis Dutens in 1768;38 Herder and Lessing both studied him 
intensively during the following years. In his notes on Leibniz, Herder 
twice refers to Leibniz’s metaphor of optical perspectives and seeks to 
develop it further. On the first occasion, in the draft of a letter probably 
written in 1768 and only recently published, he applies the optical 
metaphor to history in order to highlight the necessary incompleteness 
of each individual’s historical vision, saying:39
Every human eye has always had its own angle of vision: each projects the 
object before it in its own way; and at all events, just as little as a complete 
body can appear as it really is on a flat surface, so perhaps, despite all the 
abundance of circumstantial memoirs, is it in an ideal sense impossible to 
construct a complete history of even a single thing or event.
And on the second occasion, Herder points to the inadequacy of 
Leibniz’s optical metaphor of the individual monad or soul as a ‘mirror’ 
of the universe, arguing that the perceiving subject must add a subjective 
element of its own in the process of perception:40
So if our soul is a living mirror of the universe, it must not reflect this 
universe out of itself so that it is not in itself but outside itself with no 
36  See Guggisberg, Religiöse Toleranz, pp. 226–27.
37  In Oeuvres philosophiques latines et françoises de feu M. de Leibnitz, ed. by Rudolf Erich 
Raspe (Amsterdam and Leipzig: Schreuder, 1765). 
38  Leibniz, Opera omnia, nunc primum collecta, ed. by Louis Dutens, 6 vols (Geneva: De 
Tournes, 1768).
39  Johann Gottfried Herder, Ausgewählte Werke in Einzelausgaben. Schriften zur Literatur, 
2 vols (Berlin and Weimar, Aufbau Verlag, 1985–90), II/1, 685.
40  Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols (Berlin: 
Weidmann, 1877–1913), XXXII, 226.
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communicability between the two [...]. On the contrary, there must 
be in each soul an internal basis for the presence of that part of the 
universe which it surveys, and which should not be sought in some 
third being as the basis of both [as in Leibniz’s theory of pre-established 
harmony—HBN]. 
Like the individual subject itself, what that subject perceives in history—
for example, a particular nation or age—will likewise be unique, or as 
Herder puts it, ‘the genius of human and natural history lives in and 
with each nation as if the latter were the only one on earth’,41 or again, 
‘each nation has its centre of happiness within itself, just as every sphere 
has its own centre of gravity.’42
Thus Herder’s well known cultural relativism or pluralism has its 
roots in Leibniz’s metaphysics, and he endows each nation or society 
with a dynamic, organic quality akin to that of Leibniz’s monads, each of 
which has its own sufficient reason within it.43 As already noted, Herder 
develops these ideas further. For example, since each nation has its own 
inherent value, he deplores colonialism with its destruction of indigenous 
cultures, and the activities of European missionaries in suppressing 
non-Christian systems of belief.44 He is, of course, also influenced by 
Rousseau and other contemporary opponents of Eurocentrism;45 but 
Leibniz’s cultural perspectivism and the metaphysical pluralism which 
underpinned it certainly pointed him in the same direction.
A word now about Lessing. I have yet to discuss his play Nathan the 
Wise, but at this point, it should be noted that he was well acquainted 
with the theory of perspective, both in its literal sense as a branch of 
optics and in its metaphorical application to denote limited degrees of 
insight in metaphysics, epistemology, religion, and other areas. Thus, in 
the ongoing debate in Germany as to whether or not the ancients fully 
understood the laws of perspective in visual art, he correctly argued 
that linear perspective was a Renaissance discovery and refuted those 
who thought otherwise.46 He also applied the metaphors of perspective 
41  Ibid., XVIII, 249.
42  Ibid., V, 509; see also V, 455.
43  See H. B. Nisbet, ‘Herder. The Nation in History’, in National History and Identity, ed. 
by Michael Branch (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999), pp. 78–96 (p. 79).
44  Herder, Sämtliche Werke, V, 550; also IV, 472, XVIII, 221–24, and 249.
45  See Robert Wokler, ‘Multiculturalism and Ethnic Cleansing in the Enlightenment’, 
in Toleration in Enlightenment Europe, ed. by Grell and Porter, pp. 69–85 (p. 82).
46  Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, X, 255–56; also Seeba, ‘Der wahre Standort‘, pp. 205–09.
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to dramatic theory, declaring that the dramatist must project himself 
into the points of view of the characters he creates, and at the same time 
unify these limited viewpoints in a comprehensive view of the action 
which the reader or spectator is allowed to share.47 Besides, he knew at 
least some of the works of Nicholas of Cusa, and there is evidence that 
he prevailed upon one of his learned associates to translate Cusa’s On 
Religious Peace, with its interreligious dialogue, from Latin into German; 
the manuscript of this translation unfortunately disappeared after 
Lessing’s death.48 More significantly, his admiration for Leibniz and his 
major indebtedness to Leibniz’s thought are amply documented. In the 
present context, the main point to note is that, in one of two essays on 
Leibniz which Lessing published in 1773 after intensive study of his 
works, he speaks approvingly of Leibniz’s ability to discern an element 
of truth, though never the whole truth, in the most divergent opinions—
that is, his perspectivism. In Lessing’s own words:49 
In his quest for truth, Leibniz never took any notice of accepted opinions; 
but in the firm belief that no opinion can be accepted unless it is in a 
certain respect, or in a certain sense true, he was often so accommodating 
as to turn the opinion over and over until he was able to bring that certain 
respect to light, and to make that certain sense comprehensible. [...] He 
willingly set his own system aside, and tried to lead each individual 
along the path to truth on which he found him.
The main difference between Lessing’s perspectivism and that of Leibniz 
is that Lessing’s version incorporates a higher degree of scepticism with 
regard to obtaining certainty on the truths we believe we possess, not 
least those of religion. Lessing inherited this scepticism from Leibniz’s 
adversary Pierre Bayle, one of the writers he most admired in his early 
years and one of the most important progenitors of toleration. Bayle’s 
47  Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, IX, 185 and 371; also Seeba, ‘Der wahre Standort’, pp. 
200–03.
48  See Markus Schmitz, ‘Die eine Religion in der Mannigfaltigkeit der Riten. 
Zur Erkenntnistheorie von Cusanus’ De pace fidei sowie Lessings Nathan als 
Ausgangspunkt einer Konzeption des friedlichen Miteinanders verschiedener 
Religionen’, in Lessings Grenzen, ed. by Ulrike Zeuch (Wiesbaden; Harrassowitz, 
2005), pp. 181–95; also Konrad Arnold Schmid to Lessing, 8 and 18 December 1779, 
in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Werke und Briefe, ed. by Wilfried Barner and other 
hands, 12 vols (Frankfurt a. M.: 1985–2003), XII, 293–94 and 298.
49  Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writings, ed. by H. B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); also in Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, 
XI, 470.
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scepticism had the effect, in Lessing’s case, of reinforcing Leibniz’s 
perspectivism by further stressing that all truth is relative, so that no 
religion can claim exclusive access to it. I have examined these questions 
in greater detail elsewhere,50 and I shall simply add here that, once we 
realise that Lessing’s perspectival theory of truth underlies his view of 
the three monotheistic religions—and of the three rings which represent 
their rival claims in Nathan the Wise—some common misunderstandings 
of that play and its relation to religious toleration can be avoided.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, a subtle change took place 
in the discourse of toleration, and Lessing is among the first to exhibit it. 
What changes is the use and significance of the word ‘toleration’ (German 
Toleranz) itself, as well as the adjective ‘tolerant’, which begins to go out 
of fashion and even to take on negative associations. For example, the 
word Toleranz occurs only twice in all of Lessing’s works, in both cases 
with reference to past ages (the Reformation and the medieval period); 
and on both occasions, Lessing’s aim is not to recommend toleration as 
a positive value for the present, but to deplore its absence as a minimum 
requirement in past ages—that is, to condemn intolerance.51 Similarly, 
Herder speaks with heavy sarcasm in 1774 of the ‘universal international 
benevolence [Völkerliebe] full of tolerant subjugation, extortion, and 
enlightenment’ which characterises the present age;52 and Kant, in 1784, 
praises Frederick the Great for declining to accept ‘the presumptuous 
title of tolerant’.53 What has happened here is that the concept of 
toleration, in its then accepted sense of ‘sufferance’ or ‘putting up with’, 
was seen to imply an act of indulgence by a condescending authority 
which might at any time withdraw the concession in question. At a time 
when at least some western governments (the USA in 1776 and 1787 and 
France in 1789) began to frame legislation guaranteeing basic freedoms 
to their subjects, the relevant declarations speak not of universal 
toleration, but of universal and inalienable rights.54 This terminology is 
50  See H. B. Nisbet, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. His Life, Works, and Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 123–24 and 511–13.
51  Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, V, 45 and IX, 210.
52  Herder, Sämtliche Werke, V, 486.
53  Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. by Hans Reiss, 2nd edn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 58; also in Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte 
Schriften (Berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1900–), VIII, 40.
54  Thus, in the era of the French Revolution, Mirabeau rejects the concept of toleration 
in favour of an unrestricted right to religious freedom (Guggisberg, Religiöse 
Toleranz, p. 289), as does Tom Paine (Toleration in Enlightenment Europe, ed. Grell 
and Porter, pp. 16, 46, and 115). 
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derived from the ancient tradition of natural law, revived and codified 
in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries by such writers as the 
Dutch theorist Hugo Grotius and the Germans Samuel von Pufendorf 
and Christian Thomasius (the last of whom recommended toleration 
of all religions).55 This revival of natural law also marks a step in the 
direction of secularisation, inasmuch as natural rights extend not just 
to religion, but to all forms of belief, so long as their observance does 
not disturb the public peace; and unlike the pluralistic and perspectivist 
attitudes already mentioned, natural law makes no judgement as to the 
truth or value of the religious and cultural attitudes to which the right of 
free expression is granted. The same is true of Kant’s theory of freedom: 
it makes no mention of religion other than as a possible support for 
morality, and it defines the right to freedom of conscience in purely 
secular terms as an inherent aspect of individual moral autonomy.56 
As for the word ‘toleration’, it has in present-day usage acquired a 
more positive meaning (often denoted in English by the variant noun 
‘tolerance’) to denote respectful recognition of the legitimate beliefs of 
others which we ourselves do not happen to share.
But where does this leave the German tradition of pluralism and 
perspectivism as the recognition of religious, cultural, and historical 
differences? This tradition lives on in various guises, one of which is 
nineteenth-century historicism, the historical method pioneered by 
Herder whereby each historical age and culture is seen as a unique and 
valuable whole, reconstructed by the historian in an act of empathetic 
understanding.57 This is what Leopold von Ranke had in mind when he 
famously declared of the historical process: ‘Every epoch has a direct 
relationship to God, and its value consists not in what it gives rise to, but 
in its existence itself.’58 
Closely related to this is another development in German thought, 
more far-reaching and longer-lived than nineteenth-century historicism, 
namely hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is a quintessentially German 
55  See Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, V, 503; also Ruffini, Religious Liberty, pp. 218 and 
223–27.
56  Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, VI, 237.
57  See Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, 2 vols (Munich and Berlin: 
R. Oldenbourg, 1936).
58  Leopold von Ranke, Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte, ed. by Theodor Schieder 
and Helmut Berding (Munich: Historische Kommission der Bayerischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, 1971), p. 60.
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discipline, associated with such names as Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. From 
its theological beginnings as a guide to interpreting scriptural texts and 
discovering their supposedly true meaning, it was gradually secularised 
in the eighteenth century to become a means of discovering the multiple 
meanings of literary and other texts (Chladenius, already referred to 
above, was one of those involved).59 For Schleiermacher and others, the 
meaning of the Bible becomes progressively enlarged as knowledge 
of its historical context and the psychology of its writers increases.60 
For Dilthey, such divinatory psychology becomes the basic means of 
comprehension for the humanities in general.61 In the hermeneutic 
enterprise, feeling and imagination play an important part, and for 
Gadamer, their conclusions are always subject to enlargement and 
modification. Hermeneutics no longer claims to discover any ‘objective’ 
meaning, but rather the individuality of the text and its author as the 
interpreter’s ‘horizon’ merges with that of the writer under scrutiny.62 
There is no universal viewpoint, only individual perspectives; and since 
we can never exclude our own preconceptions—or even know how far 
these are involved in our interpretation—our conclusions must always 
be provisional.63 Thus, hermeneutic understanding is an ongoing, open-
ended process, in which new experience modifies or negates previous 
expectations; and as we learn to perceive the historicity of the text or 
writer studied, we simultaneously become aware of our own historicity.64 
Gadamer’s aim and achievement is to distinguish clearly between the 
objective knowledge provided by science, which is purged of human 
59  See Johann Martin Chladenius (Chladni), Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung 
vernünftiger Reden und Schriften (Leipzig: Lankisch, 1742): also Koselleck, Futures 
Past, pp. 136 and 306 and Seeba, ‘Der wahre Standort…‘, p. 210.
60  See Odo Marquard, ‘Frage nach der Frage, auf die die Hermeneutik die Antwort ist’, 
in Marquard, Abschied vom Prinzipiellen. Philosophische Studien (Stuttgart: Reclam, 
1981), pp. 117–46 (pp. 128–31).
61  See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen 
Hermeneutik, 4th edn (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975), pp. 173–74; also the article 
‘Hermeneutik’ in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 13 vols (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971–2007), III, 1061–73 (p. 1064).
62  Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 177–80 and 356–59; see also Charles Taylor, 
‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Multiculturalism. A Critical Reader, ed. by David Theo 
Goldberg (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 75–106 (pp. 98 and 
101).
63  Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 374–75.
64  Ibid., pp. 338–40.
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values and purposes, and the bilateral understanding of human 
phenomena furnished by hermeneutics and by every discipline based 
on hermeneutic principles.65 In short, modern hermeneutics is another 
product of the pluralistic, perspectivist tradition from which it first 
emerged in eighteenth-century Germany.
But while hermeneutic understanding may well be conducive to 
toleration (in the modern sense of respectful recognition of the Other), 
the link with toleration is no longer a necessary one as it had been in 
the religious and cultural pluralism of, for example, Leibniz, Lessing, 
and Herder. Several factors subsequently intervened to render this link 
more tenuous. Herder’s stress on the uniqueness of national cultures 
was already capable of two constructions: on the one hand, it could 
help to foster pluralism and international tolerance, as Herder certainly 
intended; but on the other, it could encourage nationalism, not always 
of a tolerant variety. The famous chapter on Slavonic culture in Herder’s 
Ideas on the Philosophy of History became a sacred text of pan-Slavism, 
and his praise of folk culture in his anthology On German Character and 
Art became grist to the mill of German nationalism in the following 
centuries.66 At the same time, internal conflicts and differences which 
had provided a stimulus to pluralistic attitudes in Germany since the 
Reformation were diminished by other developments, such as the 
reduction of inter-confessional strife in 1817 with the unification of the 
two main Protestant churches in Prussia (soon followed by other German 
territories), the recognition of religious freedom in the constitution of 
Bismarck’s Reich (already foreshadowed in the Prussian legal code of 
1794), and the unification of Germany itself in 1871.
Other major developments in nineteenth-century thought 
undermined pluralism more directly. For instance, both Hegel and 
Marx saw history as a uni-directional process leading towards uniform 
political (and by implication cultural) arrangements. More significantly, 
perspectivism reappears as a central concept in Nietzsche’s thought, 
and it is with Nietzsche that it is now most closely linked. But it no 
longer has the meaning it had held for its earlier adherents. In both 
philosophy and theology, perspectivism had hitherto required a 
65  See Charles Taylor, ‘Gadamer on the Human Sciences’, in The Cambridge Companion 
to Gadamer, ed. by Robert J. Dostal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
pp. 126–42 (pp. 127–29).
66  Herder, Sämtliche Werke, XIV, 277–80 and V, 159–231.
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balance to be struck between its positive and negative aspects, between 
subjectivity and objectivity, between confidence that every perspective 
affords some degree of truth or value and scepticism as to whether any 
perspective offers an adequate degree of certainty. With Nietzsche—and 
with his postmodernist followers—the balance shifts decisively towards 
the negative, towards subjectivity, towards uncertainty. Like others 
before him, Nietzsche argues that all our knowledge is perspectival and 
therefore relative.67 He also concedes that we can increase our knowledge 
by acquainting ourselves with as many different perspectives as possible.68 
But since the number of possible perspectives is infinite, our knowledge 
can never be complete, and we have no way of deciding which, if any, of 
our judgements concerning truth or value are objectively valid. Indeed, 
our failure to recognise this fact is a source of weakness, or as Nietzsche 
puts it, it is ‘an expression of the sickness of humanity as opposed to 
the animals’.69 Our respect for truth, he maintains, is the result of an 
illusion, and the world has no underlying meaning [Sinn], but countless 
possible meanings.70 The most valuable meanings are those we create for 
ourselves and affirm with all our strength—or rather, with our will, as 
the later Nietzsche never tires of repeating. However inconsistent these 
arguments—like those of all radical relativists—may be (for example, 
it is plain that Nietzsche has his own set of values which he considers 
superior to those of others), it is certain at least that his variety of 
perspectivism did nothing to further the cause of toleration in Germany. 
In fact, he has no use whatsoever for toleration, which he sees simply as 
a cloak for indifference or lack of conviction in one’s own ideals.71
The catastrophes caused by nationalistic militarism and anti-Semitism 
in the twentieth century require no discussion here; it is enough to say 
that, after 1945, the need for religious, ethnic, and cultural toleration in 
Germany became more obvious than ever before. This need has been 
further intensified in recent decades by the presence of several millions 
of Muslims in the Federal Republic. These factors have generated a 
widespread preoccupation with toleration, witnessed by ongoing public 
67  See Steven D. Hales and Rex Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism (Urbana and 
Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), p. 35.
68  Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke in drei Bänden, ed. by Karl Schlechta (Munich: Hanser, 
1965–67), II, 860–61 (Zur Genealogie der Moral).
69  Ibid., III, 441 (Aus dem Nachlass der achtziger Jahre).
70  Ibid., III, 424 and 903 (Aus dem Nachlass der achtziger Jahre).
71  Ibid., I, 246: II, 610, 619, and 1165; III, 516 and 888, etc.
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debates and a huge volume of publications on the subject, 72 and it is 
widely acknowledged that the need for pluralistic attitudes—not only in 
Germany, but also in other western countries—is currently acute.
To return to Lessing: to what extent is his drama Nathan the Wise 
relevant to the present situation? Given that this drama emerged, as I 
have shown, from a long tradition of pluralism as a means to religious 
toleration, it obviously retains its relevance to all inter-religious 
conflicts. And although inter-religious strife is less of a problem in the 
present age of secularism and civil rights than inter-cultural friction, the 
play’s depiction of (albeit fleeting) harmony between representatives 
of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim communities also lends support 
to multiculturalism as a present-day alternative to social unrest. The 
suspense of judgement in Nathan’s parable regarding the truth claims of 
the three monotheistic religions—the judge in the parable suggests that 
a conclusive answer may be found, if at all, some million years hence—is 
also in keeping with the postmodernist conviction that no concept can 
have an ultimate, unequivocal meaning.73 The judge’s recommendation 
that the moral conduct of the three quarrelling sons, rather than their 
religious beliefs, should be the deciding factor between their claims is 
in keeping both with Kant’s moral philosophy and with the conclusions 
of Rainer Forst, the author of the fullest German study of toleration 
in recent times.74 And in Germany in particular, Lessing’s play has a 
remarkable way of gaining new relevance as events or comments in the 
play invite comparison with topical equivalents. This applies not only 
to Germany’s current relations with its Muslim minority, but also to 
the bigoted Christian patriarch’s repeated comment on the adoption of 
a Christian child by a Jew: ‘The Jew must be burnt’! [‘Der Jude wird 
verbrannt!’].75
72  For a full bibliography of works on toleration, mainly but not exclusively in German, 
from 1945 to 1995, see Kulturthema Toleranz, ed. Wierlacher (see note 2 above), 
pp. 635–70; works published since 1995 can be found in the annual bibliography 
‘Cannstatter Bibliographie zur Toleranz- und Intoleranzforschung’, which is 
available online.
73  Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, III, 95; on the play’s affinities with postmodernism see 
also Peter Sloterdijk, Gottes Eifer. Vom Kampf der drei Monotheismen (Frankfurt a. M. 
and Leipzig: Insel, 2007), pp. 170–71.
74  Rainer Forst, Toleranz im Konflikt. Geschichte, Gehalt und Gegenwart eines umstrittenen 
Begriffs (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2003), esp. pp. 596–97, 604, and 642).
75  Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, III, 117.
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What, then, are we to make of those critics—some, but by no means 
all of them Jewish—who dismiss or attack the play as irrelevant, 
unhelpful, or even pernicious? Some of their objections—for example, 
the claim that Lessing’s intention is to persuade the Jews to abandon 
their faith and become assimilated to gentile society—are demonstrably 
out of keeping with Lessing’s views, as I have shown elsewhere.76 But 
other criticisms are less easy to refute. As a set text in German schools, 
the play can all too readily become trivialised by over-familiarity, and its 
message of toleration may be undermined when repeated by less than 
tolerant teachers.77 Others find the play’s utopian ending unconvincing, 
when three of the main characters discover that they are all members 
of one family.78 More seriously, the noted German writer W. G. Sebald 
describes the early post-war performances of the play in Germany as 
‘perfidious tactlessness’ in view of the horrendous crimes committed 
by that country so shortly before.79 Seen in this context, the lessons of 
the play may well seem grossly inadequate, or indeed arouse justified 
suspicions that some of the play’s admirers may be using it as an aid to 
self-exculpation or complacency in relation to events for which they were 
at least to some extent responsible. Such feelings are certainly present 
in the Hungarian-Jewish dramatist George Tabori’s parody Nathan’s 
Death (1991), in which Sultan Saladin flatly refuses to listen to Nathan’s 
parable and Nathan, having retrieved the charred bodies of his children 
from his burnt-out house, ends up by reciting his parable with no one to 
hear it and dies alone as a demented, Lear-like figure.80 Among the most 
76  See, for example, Hans Mayer, ‘Der weise Nathan und der Räuber Spiegelberg’ 
[1973], in Lessings ‘Nathan der Weise’ (Wege der Forschung, 587), ed. by Klaus 
Bohnen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), pp. 350–73 (p. 
367); also Nisbet, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. His Life, Works, and Thought, pp. 616–18.
77  See, for example, Navid Kermani’s contribution in Angelika Overath, Navid 
Kermani and Robert Schindel, Toleranz. Drei Lesarten zu Lessings Märchen vom Ring 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), pp. 33–45 (pp. 36–37).
78  See, for example, Angelika Overath’s contribution in ibid., pp. 21–31 (pp. 29–31); 
also Avishai Margalit, ‘Der Ring. Über religiösen Pluralismus’, in Toleranz. 
Philosophische Grundlagen und gesellschaftliche Praxis einer umstrittenen Tugend, ed. by 
Rainer Forst (Frankfurt a. M. and New York, NY: Campus Verlag, 2000) pp. 162–76.
79  W. G. Sebald, ‘Die Zweideutigkeit der Toleranz. Anmerkungen zum Interesse der 
Aufklärung an der Emanzipation der Juden’, in Der Deutschunterricht, 36, Heft 4 
(1984), pp. 27–47 (p. 28).
80  See Silvia Stammen, ‘Geschichte der Zerstörung––Zerstörung der Geschichte. 
Nathans Tod im Textvergleich mit Nathan der Weise’, in Theater gegen das Vergessen. 
Bühnenarbeit und Drama bei George Tabori, ed. by Hans-Peter Bayerdorfer and Jörg 
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extreme among all the play’s critics is the German-Jewish writer Henryk 
M. Broder, who, in a work entitled Critique of Pure Tolerance (Kritik der 
reinen Toleranz), denounces the play in the course of his wider offensive 
against tolerance in general and tolerance of Islam in particular.81  
In the light of these differences of opinion, it is no wonder that any 
performance of Nathan the Wise, at least in Germany, is bound to be 
problematic. If it is performed straight (which it rarely is), it may come 
across as hackneyed, utopian, and unconvincing—or even, in this age of 
disillusion, as an involuntary satire on the ideals it is meant to represent; 
and if it is performed against the grain, it may lose sight altogether of the 
ideals which inspired it.
Where does this leave us? If we ask whether or not Nathan the Wise 
still has value as an appeal for religious and cultural tolerance, there is 
no easy answer. But if, in keeping with Gadamer’s hermeneutics, we 
enlarge our horizon to accommodate that of other perspectives and 
relate the work to the rich and long-lived German tradition of pluralism, 
it may be possible to conclude that—no less than Locke’s Letter in Britain 
and Voltaire’s Treatise on Toleration in France—Lessing’s play still merits 
its position in Germany as the most significant, though controversial, 
document on toleration in the German language. 
Schönert (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1997), pp. 283 and 318, for a detailed analysis of 
Tabori’s text.
81  Henryk M. Broder, Kritik der reinen Toleranz (2008), 2nd edn (Munich: Pantheon, 
2009), pp. 7–8 and 210.
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3. On the Function of 
Mystification in Lessing’s 
Masonic Dialogues, Ernst and Falk1
In his late work The Education of the Human Race, Lessing suggests that 
the time may now have come in which the New Testament has outlived 
its usefulness as a guidebook—at least for the more farsighted among 
his contemporaries. But anyone who has attained this insight would 
do well, he adds, to keep it to themselves: ‘Take care, you more able 
individual who stamp and fret on the last page of this primer, take 
care not to let your weaker classmates perceive what you suspect, or 
already begin to see! Until they have caught up with you, those weaker 
classmates!’2
This partiality for concealment, and indeed for mystification, is 
repeatedly evident in Lessing’s late writings and conversations, but it is 
nowhere more conspicuous than in his Masonic dialogues Ernst and Falk. 
There have, of course, been various attempts by Lessing critics to explain 
the function of secrecy in this work. But the relevant interpretations are 
often mutually incompatible, and all are in some measure incomplete. 
A comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon should not, in my 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘Zur Funktion des 
Geheimnisses in Lessings “Ernst und Falk”’, in Peter Freimark, Franklin Kopitzsch 
and Helga Slessarev (eds.), Lessing und die Toleranz (Detroit, MI and Munich; Wayne 
State University Press and edition text + kritik, 1986), pp. 291–309.
2  Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, ed. by Karl Lachmann and Franz 
Muncker, 23 vols (Stuttgart, Leipzig and Berlin: Göschen, 1886–1924), XIII, 429–
30. For the German text of Ernst and Falk, see ibid., XIII, 389–411. For an English 
translation, see Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writings, ed. 
by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 184–216; all 
references in this essay are to this edition, and are identified by page numbers in 
brackets within the text.
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opinion, confine itself to the Masonic dialogues, but should view their 
mystifications in the context of related stylistic elements in other works 
of Lessing’s later years, because they are all, as I shall try to show, part 
of a wider rhetorical strategy. The aim of this essay is accordingly to 
examine all past interpretations of the mystifications in Ernst and Falk, 
and to define their function (or functions) within his late works as a 
whole. 
It is not the purpose of this essay to examine the role of the secret 
societies in eighteenth-century Europe—not least because this topic has 
been extensively discussed from the later twentieth century onwards.3 
But I may perhaps be allowed some introductory remarks on the 
relationship of Lessing’s dialogues to the secret societies of his time. For 
it was precisely the intense interest of the contemporary public in these 
institutions that provided the context which Lessing was able to exploit 
for his own rhetorical ends.
It would seem at first sight anomalous that these societies enjoyed their 
greatest popularity in Germany and other European countries at almost 
the same time as the Enlightenment attained its fullest development. 
Attempts have been made to explain their remarkable success by 
contending that, in the age of reason, mysteries acquired a rarity value, 
and that the secret societies helped, in view of the growing secularism 
of the times, to fill the vacuum left by the decline in significance of 
religion and its associated rituals.4 These circumstances may certainly 
3  See, for example, J. M. Roberts, The Mythology of the Secret Societies (London: 
Secker and Warburg, 1972); Rudolf Vierhaus, ‘Aufklärung und Freimaurerei in 
Deutschland’, in Das Vergangene und die Geschichte. Festschrift für Reinhard Wittram zum 
70. Geburtstag, ed. by Rudolf von Thadden, Gert von Pistohlkors, and Hellmut Weiss 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), pp. 23–41; R. H. Frick, Die Erleuchteten. 
Gnostisch-theosophische und alchemistisch-rosenkreuzerische Geheimgesellschaften bis zum 
Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1973); 
Richard van Dülmen, Der Geheimbund der Illuminaten (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: 
Frommann, 1975); ibid., ‘Die Aufklärungsgesellschaften in Deutschland als 
Forschungsproblem’, in Francia, 5 (1977), pp. 251–75; Geheime Gesellschaften, ed. by 
Peter Christian Ludz (Heidelberg: Schneider, 1979); Ludwig Hammermayer, Der 
Wilhelmsbader Freimaurerkonvent von 1782 (Heidelberg: Schneider, 1980); Margaret 
C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment. Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1981); Freimaurer und Geheimbünde im 18. Jahrhundert in Mitteleuropa, 
ed. by Helmut Reinalter (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1986); Jan Assmann, 
Religio duplex. Ägyptische Mysterien und europäische Aufklärung (Berlin: Verlag der 
Weltreligionen, 2010). 
4  See, for example, Roberts, Mythology, p. 57 and Ludz (ed.), pp. 170f. 
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have contributed to the success of the secret societies, especially in 
Protestant countries. But it is equally certain that the attraction of the 
societies, at least for progressively minded thinkers, lay largely in their 
close affinity to the aims and ideals of the Enlightenment itself. And the 
societies were not slow to exploit this affinity: they made calculated use 
of the age’s enormous thirst for knowledge by creating the impression 
that initiation into their secrets promised new insights from which the 
uninitiated were excluded. Lessing himself cherished hopes of this kind 
when he sought admission to the Freemasons in 1771 in Hamburg. He 
became a Freemason because he hoped to further his research into the 
origins of Freemasonry, and he felt drawn to a movement which seemed 
dedicated to the most progressive social and political values then 
current.5 But his disillusionment with the movement followed quickly 
and comprehensively, and he shared this experience with many other 
progressive-minded thinkers of the time. Nevertheless, the societies 
had means of dealing with such negative reactions. The disappointed 
initiates were promised subsequent admission to higher grades within 
the order, and when their expectations were again disappointed, other 
societies such as the Illuminati and the Rosicrucians were available 
which, in the later 1770s and early 1780s, recruited most of their members 
from among disillusioned Freemasons. Such organisations fed on each 
other, taking over and modifying their rivals’ rituals, and thereby lured 
their proselytes with the prospect of ever higher truths and ever more 
profound secrets. Lessing did not adopt this course. Instead, he found 
his own highly original course of action by writing Ernst and Falk. 
Lessing was by no means the first to make literary capital out of the 
secret societies. The authors of the numerous novels on this theme in 
the late eighteenth century, among them Schiller and Goethe, followed 
a similar strategy.6 But there is an important difference—not only in 
the literary genre adopted—between Lessing’s dialogues and the 
contemporary prose narratives on related topics, a difference rooted 
in Lessing’s own disillusionment with such organisations. His aim is 
5  See Heinrich Schneider, ‘Lessing und die Freimaurer’, in ibid., Lessing. Zwölf 
biographische Studien (Berne: Francke, 1950), pp. 166–97 (p. 168).
6  See, for example, Wilfried Barner, ‘Geheime Lenkung. Zur Turmgesellschaft in 
Goethes Wilhelm Meister’, in Goethe’s Narrative Fiction, ed. by William J. Lillyman 
(Berlin and New York, NY: De Gruyter, 1983), pp. 85–109 (p. 108).
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fundamentally distinct, in that he writes not so much about as against 
the secret societies. He is concerned, in Ernst and Falk, to undermine 
official Freemasonry as he knew it, to reduce its mysteries and obsession 
with secrecy and redefine it as an open brotherhood of all unprejudiced 
men (there were, of course, no female Freemasons). His own disillusion 
is reflected in the disappointment of Ernst, who, soon after his admission 
to the order, loses patience with the Freemasons and their constant 
prevarications and promises of higher insights (p. 204). But we are here 
confronted with a further paradox: if the two speakers, and the author 
himself, feel so disenchanted with the secret societies, why do secrets 
and further mystifications play so essential and conspicuous a part in 
the dialogues?
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the stylistic 
devices and turns of phrase which Lessing employs for the purpose of 
mystification, and to analyse their function. A brief initial outline of the 
form and structure of the dialogues, and in particular their rhetoric of 
mystification, may facilitate this end.
The five dialogues fall into two sections, inasmuch as the first three 
are separated from the final two by a pause during which Ernst leaves 
his friend to join the Freemasons. The first three dialogues deal with the 
antithesis between, on the one hand, Freemasonry as it ought to be—that is, 
the ‘true’ Freemasonry whose task consists in counteracting the national, 
religious, and social differences between human beings, and on the 
other hand, Freemasonry as it is in the existing Masonic lodges, whereby 
its inadequacies become increasingly conspicuous. Ernst repeatedly 
confuses these two concepts, which leads him to join a lodge in the hope 
of obtaining further enlightenment. The final two dialogues examine the 
present, decadent state of the Masonic order, before concluding with 
an investigation of its origin and a return to the true historical task of 
Freemasonry. On a personal level, the first three dialogues depict Ernst’s 
growing curiosity and initiation into some of the Masonic secrets; this 
reaches its climax with his formal admission to a Masonic lodge. The 
last two dialogues depict his profound disappointment, which gradually 
gives way to a renewed conviction in the value of ‘true’ Freemasonry as 
Falk further enlightens him on its role in human history.7
7  On the structure of the dialogues see Peter Michelsen, ‘Die “wahren Taten” der 
Freimaurer. Lessings Ernst und Falk’, in Geheime Gesellschaften, ed. Ludz, pp. 293–324 
(p. 294). 
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Lessing’s choice of the philosophical dialogue is well suited to the 
theme in question, for it functions like a process of initiation8 in which 
Ernst (and with him, the implied reader)9 is gradually introduced to 
further secrets of Freemasonry. For example, when Ernst begins to grasp 
the complexity of the questions under discussion, he is informed by Falk 
that he is already ‘half a Freemason’ (p. 191). This takes place before 
he becomes the member of a lodge, which indeed affords him far less 
insight than his conversations with Falk. The dialogue form—consisting 
of private conversations in which the confidentiality of the topic and 
the need to keep it secret are repeatedly emphasised—illustrates and 
exemplifies the process which is the subject of the conversations, namely 
the process of individual and collective enlightenment. The role of 
Freemasonry in history, as Falk describes it, constitutes a parallel to his 
own role in the personal enlightenment of his friend.10
But it would be misleading to speak without qualification of 
enlightenment and growing insight. For the enlightenment which 
is imparted to Ernst (and the reader) is only relative enlightenment, 
not least because the unelucidated mysteries are much more strongly 
emphasised than those which are clarified. The very title of the work 
implies an esoteric material: the dialogues are ‘for Freemasons’. The 
dedication, with its metaphor of the unfathomable well of truth and 
its prophetic tone, is likewise profoundly mysterious (p. 184). The 
‘Preface by a third party’, which is certainly by Lessing himself, already 
acquaints us with that indirect form of expression which Falk employs 
almost exclusively throughout the later dialogues. With reference to the 
subsequent conversations, the preface asks the question: ‘Why has no 
one spoken out so clearly long ago?’ (p. 185). The question must, of 
course, be taken as ironic, for much of what follows will be anything 
but clear. Besides, no answer is supplied at all, and the preface simply 
continues: ‘This question could be answered in many different ways’, 
before the further, apparently similar, question is raised as to ‘why the 
8  See Ion Contiades, G. E. Lessing: ‘Ernst und Falk’. Mit den Fortsetzungen J. G. Herders 
und F. Schlegels (Frankfurt a. M.: Insel Verlag, 1968), p. 129.
9  See Gonthier-Louis Fink, ‘Lessings Ernst und Falk. Das moralische 
Glaubensbekenntnis eines kosmopolitischen Individualisten’, Recherches 
Germaniques, 10 (1980), pp. 18–64 (p. 24).
10  See Paul Müller, Untersuchungen zum Problem der Freimaurerei bei Lessing, Herder und 
Fichte (Diss. Berne: Haupt, 1965), p. 34.
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systematic textbooks of Christianity arose at so late a stage, [and] why 
there have been so many good Christians who neither could nor would 
define their faith in an intelligible manner’. These questions likewise 
remain unanswered, and the preface concludes with the invitation 
‘Readers may make the application for themselves’.
Right at the beginning of the dialogues proper, Falk evades his 
friend’s questions. When Ernst asks him if he is a Freemason, he at first 
does not answer the question at all, and when it is repeated, he gives the 
disconcerting reply: ‘I think I am.’ It is therefore hardly surprising that, 
early in the second dialogue, Ernst loses patience with Falk and his refusal 
to give clearer answers, and is able to pass the judgement on him and 
all Freemasons that ‘they all play with words, and invite questions, and 
answer without answering’ (p. 190). In the third dialogue, Falk confirms 
that the ways of the Freemasons are anything but straight, because he 
rejects Ernst’s conclusion that they ‘counteract’ the evils of constitutional 
states as far too definite. Instead, he says that the Freemasons help other 
people in an indirect way to become aware of such deficiencies: ‘”To 
counteract” can here mean at most to activate this awareness in them 
from afar, to encourage it to germinate, to transplant the seedlings and 
remove the weeds and superfluous leaves’ (p. 199). He is at the same 
time describing here his own tactics towards his friend, as also evinced 
when he speaks in riddles and paradoxes—for example, when he tells 
him that the good deeds of the Freemasons are ‘good deeds aimed at 
making good deeds superfluous’ (p. 190), or when, instead of providing 
unambiguous explanations, he asks rhetorical questions (e.g. on pp. 
196f.). He repeatedly teases his friend with Socratic irony, pretending 
to know less than he really knows. When Ernst becomes irritable and 
declares that he wants to hear nothing more about Freemasonry, Falk 
tells him that he is indeed willing to tell him more about them (pp. 
191f.); but as soon as Ernst again becomes curious, Falk resumes his 
evasive tactics: he even claims to have forgotten their earlier discussion 
(p. 197). Among other things, this leads to a position where, by the final 
dialogue, Ernst has come so fully to terms with Falk’s evasive behaviour 
that he hesitates to ask any further direct questions. He would like to 
ask how it came about that the Freemasons derived so much of their 
symbolism from architecture, but says instead: ‘Shall I guess, or may 
I ask?’ Falk reacts in characteristic style and declares that Ernst could 
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have guessed the answer if he had asked a different question, so that 
Ernst now has to guess what that other question might have been (pp. 
212–13).11 
Falk’s tactics of mystification, as his own comments confirm, are akin 
to the language of the Freemasons. This becomes especially clear if we 
consider the symbols and metaphors used in the dialogues, for they are 
for the most part borrowed from Masonic terminology. Among them are, 
for example, the image of flames and smoke which the two speakers first 
use with reference to the advantages and disadvantages of civil society, 
and later to those of the Masonic order itself (pp. 195 and 203), as well 
as the images of sunrise and sunset, which are used in their literal sense 
at the beginning of the dialogues but acquire a symbolic meaning at the 
end (pp. 452, 209, and 216). Falk twice uses alchemical images, thereby 
alluding to the occultism of some contemporary lodges, but since he 
employs them to denote the progressive role of ‘true’ Freemasonry in 
history, he invests them with a positive sense. Just as sodium nitrate 
must be present in the air before it can settle on walls as saltpetre, so 
must unprejudiced people be present in society before they can address 
the tasks of true Freemasonry; and just as the alchemist who is able 
to make silver deals in old scrap silver to conceal his secret, so may 
the Freemasons publicise some of their intentions in order to distract 
attention from their real activities (p. 201). And the word Arbeit (‘work’ 
in English) which official Freemasonry uses to designate the business of 
the order is used more than once by the two speakers to designate the 
business of ‘true’ Freemasonry (p. 198).12 Nearly all of these symbols and 
expressions, in keeping with the theme of the dialogues, are associated 
with the realm of mystery.
It can therefore hardly be denied that the dialogues consistently 
make use of rhetorical mystification. Although some of the secrets of 
‘true’ Freemasonry are aired as Falk gradually enlightens his friend, 
it remains a peculiarity of this work that nearly every secret that is 
revealed is balanced by a new, unresolved secret. For example, as soon 
as Falk has reported that the work of the Freemasons includes the 
11  On Falk’s evasiveness, see Wolfgang Heise, ‘Lessings Ernst und Falk’, in Weimarer 
Beiträge, 11 (1979), pp. 5–20 (pp. 11f.).
12  James Anderson, The Constitutions of the Ancient and Honourable Fraternity of Free and 
Accepted Masons, rev. edn, ed. by John Entick (London: J. Scott, 1767), p. 314
64 On the Literature and Thought of the German Classical Era
task of combatting ethnic, religious, and social prejudices, he at the 
same time emphasises that this task is only ‘part of their business’. He 
repeats this comment: ‘I say part of their business’ (p. 197), and thereby 
indicates that they are also concerned with further, unknown business. 
And when Ernst is somewhat later convinced that Falk has named all 
the social evils that the Freemasons are concerned to remove, Falk at 
once qualifies his earlier statement: ‘I have named only a few of them as 
examples. Only a few of those which are evident to even the most short-
sighted observer’ (p. 199); there are accordingly further, unnamed evils 
that must also be resisted. Even towards the end of the dialogues, after 
Falk has introduced his friend into some secrets regarding the origin of 
Freemasonry, he adds with reference to further information he has yet 
to communicate: ‘Hear me now simply as one hears the first rumour 
of some major event: it stimulates one’s curiosity more than it satisfies 
it’ (p. 214). The concluding ‘Note’ to the reader also mentions a sixth 
dialogue, which Lessing did not write (and probably had no intention 
of writing).13 His reference to a further conversation simply serves to 
emphasise the fragmentary nature of the work and the provisionality 
of the thoughts it contains: Lessing thereby hints at further unresolved 
secrets and insights into the nature of ‘true’ Freemasonry.
The dialogues accordingly leave a great deal open. The number 
of unanswered questions and resolved mysteries is roughly equal.14 
Lessing has also made the mystification tactics of the secret societies not 
just the object, but also the formal principle of his dialogues and thereby 
produced the effect of raising the curiosity of his readers to the highest 
pitch. It remains to be asked what purpose this device is meant to serve.
In the wake of Reinhart Koselleck’s study Kritik und Krise. Ein Beitrag 
zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt (Critique and Crisis. Enlightenment 
and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag, 1959; 
English edition Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988)), it became widely 
accepted by Lessing scholars that Lessing’s mystifications and the role 
of the secret societies in his dialogues must have a political explanation. 
The political interpretation of the secrecy practised by the Freemasons 
13  See Karl S. Guthke, ‘Lessings “Sechstes Freimaurergespräch”’, Zeitschrift für deutsche 
Philologie, 86 (1966), 576–97.
14  Peter Michelsen (see note 7 above), pp. 309 and 312, in my view exaggerates the 
extent to which the fifth dialogue resolves the enigmas which arose in the previous 
dialogues. 
 653. Mystification in Lessing’s Masonic Dialogues Ernst and Falk
and similar societies in the eighteenth century is, of course, much older 
than Koselleck’s book. Well over a century ago, Hermann Hettner, for 
example, declared that the secret societies of the Enlightenment were 
‘a product of the general immaturity and oppression which stifled any 
vigorous expression of public life. [...] What [...] in a despotic state is 
a secret society is under freer circumstances a free alliance and public 
association.’15 The political theory of the secret societies did, of course, 
gain a great deal in the way of breadth and complexity from the work 
of Koselleck and his followers, and it is largely due to him that interest 
in Lessing’s Masonic dialogues has grown so strongly over the last half 
century. This has led to the recognition that Ernst and Falk is a significant 
political document and Lessing’s political testament. According to 
Koselleck, the secret societies of the Enlightenment functioned as proto-
democratic organisations which prepared the way for the emancipation 
of the bourgeoisie. Secrecy was for them a political necessity, because, 
in the absolutist state, the new and potentially revolutionary ideals of 
individual freedom and equal rights could be rehearsed only in the 
private sphere. At the same time, the fact that most Masonic lodges—in 
contrast, for example, to the Illuminati—disclaimed any involvement in 
politics16 constituted an implicit criticism of the political world on which 
they turned their backs. 
The application of this theory to Lessing’s Masonic dialogues has 
led to the often repeated claim that his tactics of mystification are a 
symptom of political caution, or even that they served as a cloak for 
revolutionary attitudes.17 But the claim that Lessing held revolutionary 
15  Hermann Hettner, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im achtzehnten Jahrhundert, ed. by 
Georg Witkowski, 4 vols (Leipzig: Paul List Verlag, 1928), II, 213 (first published in 
1856–70).
16  See Anderson, Constitutions, p. 316: ‘we are also of all Nations, Tongues, Kindreds, and 
Languages, and are resolved against all Politicks, as what never yet conduced to the 
Welfare of the Lodge, nor ever will.’
17  See, for example, Ehrhard Bahr, ‘The Pursuit of Happiness in the Political Writings 
of Lessing and Kant’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 151 (1976), 167–74 
(p. 174): ‘It now becomes clear that the anonymity of the dialogues’ publication was 
due as much to their political implications as to considerations of Masonic secrecy. In 
order to have any chance for discussion and eventual application, German political 
theory was forced to hide behind the acceptable secrecy of the Freemasons’. See also 
Klaus Bohnen, Geist und Buchstabe. Zum Prinzip des kritischen Verfahrens in Lessings 
literaturästhetischen und theologischen Schriften (Cologne: Böhlau, 1974), p. 184, and 
Manfred Durzak, ‘Gesellschaftsreflexion und Gesellschaftsdarstellung bei Lessing’, 
Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie, 93 (1974), 546–60 (p. 558).
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political views is demonstrably untenable. As Gonthier-Louis Fink has 
shown in detail,18 his political ideals in Ernst and Falk are related to those 
of early German liberalism—as in the thought of the young Fichte, for 
example, or that of Wilhelm von Humboldt—with no hint of any threat 
to the existing state. Besides, these ideals are propounded quite openly 
in the first two dialogues. Anyone who maintains that the metaphor 
of the anthill, which Ernst and Falk praise as a model of peaceful 
anarchy, anticipates the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the overthrow 
of class society overlooks important contrary evidence;19 for Lessing’s 
remark, as reported by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, that ‘in a conversation 
I had with him, he became so heated that he declared that civil society 
must be abolished completely’,20 remains an isolated outburst out of 
keeping with the views expounded in the Masonic dialogues. The two 
speakers conclude regretfully that the analogy of the anthill will never 
be applicable to human society, and they are in agreement that the social 
differences which the state entails are necessary evils. The Freemasons 
must, of course, resist the state-sanctioned disunity among the populace, 
but ‘without detriment to this state or these states’ (p. 200). The evils 
inherent in civil society must indeed be resisted, but no one should try 
to eliminate them completely,‘ for one would simultaneously destroy 
the state itself along with them‘ (p. 199). And civil society and the state, 
despite all the evils associated with them, are much to be preferred to 
the state of nature (p. 195). The highest aim of Lessing’s Freemasons 
is therefore not to abolish the state, the church, or class distinctions, 
even if they employ the concepts of harmonious anarchy and perfect 
human equality as regulative, utopian ideas. They are in no way 
revolutionaries, for they disapprove of the American Revolution and the 
alleged participation of the Freemasons in it (p. 209).21
But this is not to deny that Lessing’s dialogues contain progressive 
and even radical sentiments. There are examples of these firstly, in 
Falk’s pronouncement in the second dialogue that any happiness of 
the state whereby even the smallest number of individual members 
18  Fink, ‘Lessings Ernst und Falk’, pp. 37–49 and 59–62.
19  See, for example, Heise, ‘Lessings Ernst und Falk’, pp. 5f.
20  Lessing im Gespräch, ed. by Richard Daunicht (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1971), pp. 
519f.
21  See on this Michelsen, ‘Die “wahren Taten”’, p. 307, who convincingly refutes the 
exaggerations of the Koselleck party.
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suffers is simply a cloak for tyranny (p. 191), and secondly, in Ernst’s 
attacks on class prejudices, antisemitism, and elitist attitudes within 
the Masonic order (p. 207). Similarly, Lessing’s liberal individualism, 
as in Falk’s declaration that the state is not an end in itself but only a 
means to individual happiness, does not amount to an implicit attack 
on the absolutist state such as the Prussia of Frederick the Great, in 
which there could be no question of individual freedom as an end in 
itself.22 I merely wish to point out that firstly, the political radicalism 
of this work has all too often been exaggerated, whereas its tendency 
can be described as subversive only in the sense of a belief in gradual 
and peaceful progress; and secondly, that the political content of the 
dialogues is not alone enough to explain their consistent mystification 
and secretiveness. Only a few years later, Kant, as a Prussian citizen, 
had no hesitation in openly defending liberal individualism in his essay 
What is Enlightenment? (1784) and supporting the thesis that the only 
just laws are those which a people could impose on itself. And Lessing 
himself was in no way irresolute when it came to broadcasting radical 
opinions, as he did in theological matters in 1777 when he published 
the truly explosive ‘Fragments’ of Reimarus, in which it was claimed, 
among other things, that the apostles secretly disinterred the body of 
Christ and invented the story of the resurrection.
Besides, Falk distinguishes two kinds of secret: ‘mystifications’, 
which could in principle be expressed directly if it were appropriate or 
desirable to disclose them, and ‘the secret’, which cannot be expressed at 
all (p. 205). Radical political ideas plainly belong to the former category; 
but Falk insists the ‘true’ Freemasonry has to do not with ‘mystifications’, 
but with ‘the secret’—and that, of course, is quite a different matter.23
The claim that Lessing resorted to mystification for fear of censorship24 
can be refuted on similar grounds, for although he was forbidden in 
July 1778 to publish further writings without the approval of the 
Brunswick censors, he had already completed Ernst and Falk (apart 
22  This is not contradicted by Lessing’s reply of 1769 to a letter from Nicolai in which 
he vehemently rejects the latter’s praise for the supposed freedom of speech enjoyed 
in Prussia; this was a private response provoked by Nicolai’s manifestly excessive 
claims, and would never have been made in any public statement: see Lessing to 
Nicolai, 25 August 1769, in Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, XVII, 298.
23  As Karin Hüskens-Hasselbeck, Stil und Kritik. Dialogische Argumentation in Lessings 
philosophischen Schriften (Munich: Fink, 1978), convincingly argues.
24  See, for example, Müller, Untersuchungen, p. 25.
68 On the Literature and Thought of the German Classical Era
from the dedication and prefaces) in the previous year. And even if 
the prohibition had been imposed at an earlier date, there is no reason 
to assume that he would have paid any more attention to it than he 
did during his later theological polemics, when he without hesitation 
published unapproved writings even after the prohibition.
The attempt has also been made to explain the secrecy observed by 
Lessing’s Freemasons as a moral necessity. Thus Gonthier-Louis Fink, 
for example, maintains that an action can only be described as virtuous 
if it is not publicised, for publicity would allow pride and self-regard 
to operate as motives, so that the moral autonomy of the action might 
be jeopardised.25 But although Falk maintains that the ‘true deeds’ of 
Freemasonry are a secret in the sense that they cannot be expressed in 
words, he also indicates that they do become known to outside observers 
inasmuch as they can be learnt and imitated by example (pp. 186–87). 
This fact somewhat reduces the credibility of the moral explanation of 
the secret, for it appears that such deeds are taken note of by at least 
a select public. But a further objection can be formulated to the moral 
interpretation: deeds that are kept secret for moral reasons must by 
definition be capable of communication, but this is clearly not the case 
with the ‘true deeds’ of the Freemasons; for according to Falk, they 
cannot be made known by the ‘true’ Freemason, even if he wished to do 
so. In other words, the ‘true deeds’ of the Freemasons are either known 
to some other Freemasons, in which case they are at least in part lacking 
in moral autonomy; or they are in principle incapable of disclosure, in 
which case the secrecy which surrounds them cannot be imposed by 
moral considerations. It therefore follows that the moral interpretation 
provides at most only a partial explanation for the secrecy in which 
Lessing’s Freemasons enshroud their activities.
The most obvious explanation for the mystifications in Ernst and Falk 
is, of course, that the work deals with Freemasonry—and not just the 
ideal, utopian kind of Freemasonry which Falk attempts to define, but 
also with the real Masonic order. And Lessing, as an official member of 
that order, was bound by oath not to divulge any Masonic secrets. I have 
already mentioned that the form of the work is entirely appropriate to 
its subject, and that some of its symbols and images are associated with 
Masonic practice. There is also no doubt that Falk does allude to certain 
25  Fink, ‘Lessings Ernst und Falk’, pp. 55f.
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Masonic secrets—especially in the last two dialogues, in which there are 
various references to the origin, rituals, and symbolism of Freemasonry. 
In addition, Ludwig Hammermeyer’s research on the Strict Observance 
branch of the movement has shown that Lessing’s dialogues contain, 
among other things, a commentary on the contemporary crisis within 
that system, and that Lessing was concerned to influence the present 
course of events: his attack on the Templar legend in the fourth dialogue 
equates precisely with the aim of the Grand Master of the Strict 
Observance, Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick-Lüneburg (to whom the first 
three dialogues are dedicated), namely to discredit the Templar legend, 
while his publication of the last two dialogues constitutes one of the first 
public refutations of the doctrine that the modern Freemasons are the 
direct successors of the Knights Templar. Before their publication, Duke 
Ferdinand circulated the manuscript of these two dialogues among the 
office-bearers of the Strict Observance to further his reforming plans.26
Nevertheless, the main tendency of the dialogues is to play down such 
secrets of contemporary Freemasonry as its alchemistic experiments, 
conjuration of spirits, and Templar legend, which are among those 
‘mystifications’ which could easily be expressed in words. (Besides, 
all the main secrets of institutional Freemasonry have been exposed 
at various times, as had already happened in France in the first half of 
the eighteenth century.)27 Falk even says that such mysteries, once they 
have fulfilled their purpose in the history of Freemasonry, have no need 
of further secrecy. He says, for example, of the relationship between the 
historical Knights Templar and the Freeemasons: ‘It should rather be 
stated openly, so long as one defines the specific point which made the 
Templars the Freemasons of their time’ (p. 205). But characteristically, he 
does not define this relationship specifically, and merely tells his friend 
that he would be able to guess the answer to this question himself if he 
were to read the history of the Templars more closely. Falk is speaking 
of something which may once have been a true ‘secret’, but which has 
meanwhile fulfilled its historical function, so that it can now be understood 
correctly and made public. But among those Freemasons who have not 
26  See Hammermayer, Der Wilhelmsbader Freimaurerkonvent, pp. 26f.
27  See Hans-Heinrich Solf, ‘Die Funktion der Geheimhaltung in der Freimaurerei’, in 
Geheime Gesellschaften, ed. Ludz, pp. 43–49, (p. 44).
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yet grasped the historical significance of the Templar order, its memory 
survives only in the ‘mystifications’ of the Templar legend.
It is nevertheless remarkable that Falk’s own mystifications concern 
not only the inexpressible ‘secret’ of ‘true’ Freemasonry, but also some 
of the ‘mystifications’ of the contemporary Masonic order. Is it meant 
to be merely ironic when he states that a person who discovers the 
philosophers’ stone will at that same instant become a Freemason? Or 
when he says that spirits will heed only the voice of a Freemason (p. 
204)? It seems as if Lessing wishes to leave open the possibility that an as 
yet unrecognised rational sense might underlie even the most ridiculous 
ploys of contemporary Freemasons.28 For Falk expressly declares of such 
delusions: ‘It’s enough [...] that I can already discern in their toys the 
weapons which the men will one day wield with a steady hand’ (p. 206).29
The above reflections show that the mystifications in Lessing’s 
dialogues are partly due to the fact that secrets are the subject of the 
dialogues, above all that ‘secret’ that underlies the workings of ‘true’ 
Freemasonry in history, but also those ‘mystifications’ of contemporary 
Masonic lodges which could in principle be expressed directly and 
publicised. But that by no means exhausts the problem. The mystifications 
in Ernst and Falk are part of a wider tendency, indeed a strategy, which 
can be detected throughout Lessing’s later works (although it finds its 
most prominent expression in Ernst and Falk).
Lessing was inclined throughout his life to maintain a certain reserve 
towards even his closest friends, and especially in his later years, it 
became his habit to keep his philosophical speculations to himself, to 
express them only indirectly, or to try them out in conversation with 
younger acquaintances such as Karl Wilhelm Jerusalem, Johann Anton 
Leisewitz and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. But the decisive factor which 
transformed this habit from a personal idiosyncrasy into a conscious 
principle of his thought was his growing conviction (probably 
28  It is possible that he is here alluding to the case of a Jewish Freemason, alchemist, 
and spiritualist called Samuel Jacob Falk (from whom Lessing’s Falk no doubt takes 
his name), who was expelled from Brunswick territories in the 1730s and later lived 
on in London as an important but shadowy figure in international Freemasonry; 
for further details, see H. B. Nisbet, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. His Life, Works, and 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 597–98.
29  Cf. Falk’s earlier remark (p. 204) ‘that I see in all these fantasies a quest for reality, 
and that one can still deduce from all these false directions where the true path 
leads to’.
 713. Mystification in Lessing’s Masonic Dialogues Ernst and Falk
strengthened by his intensive studies of Leibniz in the years 1772 and 
1773) that language—and particularly fixed traditional concepts—
imposes limits on the emergence and recognition of new ideas, limits 
which creative thought must seek to overcome.30
Lessing’s changed attitude towards the possibilities of linguistic 
expression is particularly conspicuous if we compare his remark in the 
Letters on Literature of 1759: ‘Language can express everything which 
we think clearly’31 with the following exchange between Ernst and Falk:
Ernst: If I have a concept of something, I can also express it in words.
Falk: Not always, and often not in such a way that others derive 
exactly the same conception from the words as what I have in 
mind. (p. 187)
Falk is here referring specifically to the concept of Freemasonry. Why, 
one might ask, should it be so difficult, or even impossible, to express its 
meaning in words? The problem becomes no easier to solve since Falk 
uses the word ‘Freemasonry’ in two distinct senses—firstly, to denote 
the real Masonic order, then also in the ideal, utopian sense of what 
he calls ‘true’ Freemasonry. But it can only be this second sense that is 
particularly difficult to define.
Peter Michelsen has tried to overcome this difficulty in the following 
manner: the true significance of Freemasonry as it appears in the final 
dialogue, he says, is simply friendship, which is able to transcend all 
the limitations of nations, religions, and classes. Friendship, however, 
cannot possibly be understood by means of its conceptual definition, but 
only through personal experience—through the experience of brotherly 
interaction between human beings.32 There is indeed a close association 
in the records of the secret societies between friendship and secrecy. 
In the original constitution of English Freemasonry, for example, it is 
stated that there are areas of Masonic life which cannot be explained 
in words, and can only be understood by means of personal contact: 
‘All Preferment among Masons is grounded upon personal Worth and 
30  On Lessing’s doubts in his later years concerning the capacity of language to express 
ideas, see paragraph 73 of The Education of the Human Race: ‘I am perhaps not so 
much in error as that language is inadequate for my concepts’: Lessing, Philosophical 
and Theological Writings, ed. Nisbet, p. 235.
31  Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, VIII, 132. 
32  Michelsen, ‘Die “wahren Taten”’, pp. 297 and 314. 
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personal Merit only [...]. Therefore no Master or Warden is chosen by 
Seniority, but for his Merit. It is impossible to describe those Things in 
Writing, and every Brother must attend in his Place, and learn them in a 
Way peculiar to his Fraternity [...]’.33
These words, however, tend to suggest that the experience 
of friendship—or fraternal collaboration—is rather a means of 
understanding Freemasonry than the aim of Freemasonry itself: a means 
of recognising and appreciating the personal worth of other Freemasons. 
The decisive insight indicated here is not so much the experience 
of fraternal interaction in itself (although this experience is entirely 
necessary), but the fact that recognition of individual merit can only be 
based on the attitudes and actions of the individual in question, which 
give him the right to be a Freemason. In Lessing’s case, it is in my view 
no different. His partners in the dialogues were already close friends 
before their conversations begin (they address each other by the familiar 
‘Du’), so that it can scarcely be the experience of friendship into which 
Ernst needs to be initiated; he must rather be led to an understanding 
of those personal attitudes and actions which turn individuals into 
true Freemasons of the kind Falk has in mind, and whose collective 
expression is the world-historical achievement of Freemasonry.
It may be helpful to consider in this context Wieland’s ideas on 
friendship and secret societies. For there is a striking similarity between 
Lessing’s definition of Freemasons and Wieland’s definition of the 
‘Cosmopolitan Order’ of his own invention, as described in his novel The 
History of the Abderites of 178134 and in more detail in his essay The Secret 
of the Cosmopolitan Order of 1788.35 Just like Lessing, Wieland distances 
himself from the actual secret societies of his time and contrasts them with 
the utopian model of a fraternity of enlightened men whom he describes 
as ‘Cosmopolitans’: ‘There is a kind of mortals who call themselves 
Cosmopolitans and who, without formal arrangement, without badges 
of membership, without lodge meetings, and without being bound by 
sworn oaths, constitute a fraternity which is more firmly united than 
any other order in the world, including Jesuits and Freemasons’. They, 
too, have a secret which cannot be expressed in words, for it is: 
33  Anderson, Constitutions, p. 313.
34  Christoph Martin Wieland, Werke, ed. by Fritz Martini and Hans Werner Seiffert, 5 
vols (Munich: Hanser, 1964–65), II, 230–32.
35  Wieland, Werke, III, 550–75.
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not a secret that depends on the silence of its members or on their care 
not to be overheard, but a secret over which nature itself has cast its veil. 
For the Cosmopolitans can without hesitation let it be trumpeted to the 
world at large; and they may be sure that, apart from themselves, no 
human being would understand it. 
According to Wieland, the Cosmopolitans are friends from the moment 
they first meet, and their friendship is based ‘on the need to love 
ourselves in those who most resemble us’.
These extracts from Wieland are not, however, just an interesting 
parallel to Lessing’s dialogues. It is also quite conceivable that they 
influenced the latter, for the version from which I have quoted in 
translation appeared already in 1774 in a continuation of his novel 
The History of the Abderites in his journal Der Teutsche Merkur36—that is, 
before Ernst and Falk, at least in its present form, was written. Lessing 
had closely followed Wieland’s career as a writer since the 1750s, and he 
regularly refers to his works (and in a very positive tone in the 1770s). 
In 1775, he declined an invitation from Wieland to contribute to the Der 
Teutsche Merkur,37 and his essay On a Timely Task of 1776 is conceived 
as an answer to a question which Wieland had posed in that journal.38 
It is therefore very likely that Lessing knew Wieland’s observations of 
1774 on the ‘Cosmopolitans’, and it cannot be ruled out that he received 
the initial inspiration from Wieland’s novel for his plan to contrast the 
actual secret societies of his time with an ideal kind of fraternity.
Friendship therefore constitutes an essential part of that secret 
which surrounds Wieland’s Cosmopolitan Order. This was implicit 
in his version of 1774, and in the essay of 1788 on the same subject he 
expressly writes: ‘The entire secret lies in a certain natural relationship 
and sympathy which manifests itself between similar beings in the 
universe’.39 No one outside the Cosmopolitan Order can partake in 
the secret, because they have no share in the friendship which exists 
between the Cosmopolitans. But significantly, it is not their friendship 
which makes them Cosmopolitans: it is rather their Cosmopolitanism 
which makes them friends. What is implicit in the 1774 version is 
formulated explicitly in the later essay, in which Wieland states: ‘One 
36  Der Teutsche Merkur, VII/2 (May, 1774), 125–65 (pp. 149–51).
37  Lessing to Wieland, 8 February 1775, in Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, XVIII, 129.
38  See Nisbet, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. His Life, Work, and Thought, p. 525. 
39  Wieland, Werke, III, 560.
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does not become a Cosmopolitan by acceptance and instruction: but one 
finds oneself in their society because one is a Cosmopolitan’.40 In other 
words, the essence of Wieland’s Cosmopolitanism—and of Lessing’s 
ideal Freemasonry—does not consist in friendship itself (although 
it does express itself in friendship), but in those personal qualities 
and attitudes which one must first possess before one can count as a 
Cosmopolitan—or a Freemason. Friendship is the means of preserving 
the secret of the Cosmopolitans or ideal Freemasons and simultaneously 
makes it possible to share their secret; but the secret they share is their 
Cosmopolitanism, or Freemasonry, itself. 
To return to Lessing’s dialogues: Falk quickly passes on from 
the concept of Freemasonry to the ‘deeds’ of the Freemasons. Since 
the essence of Freemasonry cannot be communicated in words, it is 
communicated by means of deeds, which therefore function in this 
context as a substitute for words. But it soon emerges that the concept of 
‘deeds’, like that of Freemasonry before it, has a double sense: it applies 
not only to the philanthropic actions of the actual Masonic order (the 
foundation of schools, orphanages, and the like), but also to the ‘true 
deeds’ of ideal Freemasonry. And just as in the earlier case, it is this 
second, utopian sense which, according to Falk, can be defined only 
with difficulty, or not at all:
Falk: [...] Their true deeds are their secret.
Ernst: Aha! so they can’t be explained in words either?
Falk: Probably not!—I can and may tell you only this much: the true 
deeds of the Freemasons are so great, and so far-reaching, that 
whole centuries may elapse before one can say ‘This was their 
doing!’ (p. 189)
Thus the concept of Freemasonry can only be expressed through deeds; 
but the deeds themselves cannot be defined simply either. The reason 
for this seems to consist not in the fact that, as deeds, they can only be 
recognised by means of experience, but in the fact that the historical 
consequences which lend the deeds their full significance can only be 
understood later as parts of a meaningful process (perhaps within a 
providential framework). The secret therefore contains more than just 
the experience of friendship.
40  Wieland, Werke, III, 554.
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Nevertheless, a further ambiguity still remains. Falk says ‘I can and 
may tell you only this much’. The ‘may’ creates the impression that 
he could say more if he were permitted to do so. A similar ambiguity 
occurs on several occasions in the dialogues, for example in Falk’s 
comment that true Freemasonry is ‘something which even those who 
know cannot say’ (p. 186). It remains uncertain whether those who 
know about the secret cannot express it because of the inadequacy of 
language, or whether they have decided for particular reasons to remain 
silent about it. The line between ‘mystifications’ and the ‘secret’ seems to 
be anything but clear-cut.41
All of this suggests that more than one reason is possible as to why 
the concepts of ‘Freemasonry’ and the ‘true deeds’ of the Freemasons 
must remain mysterious and indefinable. Perhaps it is in fact impossible 
to express them adequately in words, but even if it were possible, it might 
not be advisable; and the historical repercussions of the Masonic deeds 
may be so far-reaching that it becomes possible only long afterwards to 
understand their significance, and hence to define the deeds themselves 
accurately.
The dialogues do, however, contain some indications which allow us 
to conclude why Falk considers language inadequate to grasp the nature 
of Freemasonry fully. The task of the Freemasons does not consist in 
directly combatting those necessary evils which divide states, religions, 
and social classes. It is rather a matter of altering the attitudes of people 
by promoting in them an awareness of these evils—a process which can 
naturally succeed only very gradually: ‘“To counteract” can here mean at 
most to activate this awareness in them from afar’ (p. 199.) It is therefore 
a feeling, an altered awareness, that must be propagated here—and not, 
for example, a new doctrine. This passage furnishes an indication of 
what Falk must have meant earlier when he rejected Ernst’s claim that 
it must surely be possible to convey at least an approximate conception 
of Freemasonry by means of words: ‘An approximate conception would 
in this case be useless or dangerous. Useless if it didn’t contain enough, 
and dangerous if it contained the slightest amount too much’ (p. 187). 
That is, if a particular definition of Freemasonry were to understate the 
41  See also these words from the second dialogue: ‘Falk: […] you already recognise 
truths which are better left unsaid. / Ernst: Although they could be said. / Falk: The 
wise man cannot say what is better left unsaid.’ (p. 191)
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historical task of the Freemasons in moderating the necessary evils of 
society (for example, by reducing the role of the Freemasons merely to 
charitable initiatives), it would be useless; but if it were to exaggerate that 
task (for example, by representing it as a revolutionary undertaking), 
it would be dangerous inasmuch as it might call into question the 
continued existence of the state itself. It follows from this that all 
linguistic definitions should be handled with the utmost caution. Even 
if it is in principle possible to formulate such definitions (and that will 
not always be the case, for example with the experience of friendship), 
such definitions will be at best deficient. This unceasing awareness of 
the inadequacy of language—not just, for example, in conveying the 
experience of friendship, but also in conveying human convictions and 
ideals in general—is characteristic of Lessing’s Masonic dialogues and 
of his later philosophical and theological writings in general. And in my 
opinion, it is above all this awareness which accounts for the consistent 
tactics of mystification that are so conspicuous in Ernst and Falk.
What Falk, and with him Lessing, sets his face against is the tendency, 
inherent in all established concepts, to reinforce those very socio-political 
divisions which he seeks to relativise and deactivate. In her book Die 
List der Kritik (The Cunning of Criticism) Marion Gräfin Hoensbroech 
provides perhaps the best analysis to date of that ‘communicational 
scepticism’ of Lessing whereby he seeks to subvert entrenched linguistic 
conventions with a view to neutralising the traditional patterns of 
thought which tend to promote social and political disunity.42 She 
illustrates how Lessing, on the one hand, expands the conventional 
definition of Freemasonry as an exclusive philanthropic organisation 
and liberalises it in the spirit of its original constitution, and on the other 
hand, calls into question those prejudices inherent in such concepts as 
‘happiness’, ‘nature’, or ‘fatherland’ which contemporary political theory 
exploited. No one who has recognised the negative social consequences 
of such concepts can continue to use them in the same way as someone 
who uses them with all their conventional implications. But instead of 
seeking to replace them with new concepts or doctrines—for these new 
concepts and doctrines would entail exactly the same risk of exclusivity 
and intolerance as the older ones—the true Freemason continues (to 
42  Marion Gräfin Hoensbroech, Die List der Kritik. Lessings kritische Schriften und 
Dramen (Munich: Fink, 1976), p. 24.
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borrow Falk’s alchemistic metaphor) to deal publicly in the ‘scrap silver’ 
of the old concepts while secretly augmenting it with the new silver of 
that dynamic, and hence elusive, sense which he has discovered beneath 
the old ones.43
That is therefore the main reason why Lessing refuses to supply any 
unambiguous or conclusive definitions of the central concepts in his 
dialogues. He deals in the same way with the positive ‘spirit’ of religion 
in contrast to its ossified ‘letter’ in his theological writings, and with the 
mysteries of Christian revelation in The Education of the Human Race. This 
also gives us the answer to the question he posed in the preface to Ernst 
and Falk: ‘why have there been so many good Christians who neither 
could nor would define their faith in an intelligible manner?’ (p. 185). 
For even if the doctrines of Christianity can be (albeit inadequately) 
defined, it still remains advisable to regard such definitions as at best 
provisional and inconclusive. The mystifications and ambiguities in 
Ernst and Falk, as in other later writings of Lessing, are thus part of a 
well-considered strategy. They are in no way a symptom of unclear 
thinking, as one Marxist critic claims;44 this would imply that Lessing 
would have replaced his mystifications by unambiguous concepts if he 
had known the writings of Marx. But it should by now be clear that 
Lessing rejects all ideologically binding definitions—whether new 
or old—for the simple reason that, by virtue of their fixed form, they 
consolidate prejudices and one-sidedness. Instead, he rightly regards 
them all as provisional and incomplete. This is the main source of that 
liberating influence which emanates from his writings even today. 
Nothing repelled him so much as intolerance, including that associated 
with unquestioned traditional assumptions.45
The principal factor responsible for the mystifications and evasions 
in Ernst and Falk is therefore neither political caution, fear of censorship, 
respect for the moral autonomy of virtuous actions, the Masonic oath of 
secrecy, the inexpressibility of individual experience, the imponderability 
of history, nor imprecise thinking on Lessing’s part—although several 
of these elements, along with the pleasure he always took in keeping 
43  Ibid., pp. 36–48.
44  Heise, ‘Lessings Ernst und Falk’, p. 18. 
45  See, for example, Gerhart Schmidt, ‘Der Begriff der Toleranz im Hinblick auf 
Lessing’, Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung, 2 (1975), 121–36 (p. 133).
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his friends and readers guessing, doubtless played a minor part. The 
explanation lies to a far greater extent in his growing perception that 
all institutionalised concepts, especially those with a normative content, 
are at best provisionally valid and at worst liable to confirm existing 
prejudices and to prevent the development of new and more constructive 
ideas. To a certain extent, all linguistic formulas are for him at the same 
time falsifications. The cumulative effect of the mystifications in the 
Masonic dialogues therefore consists in casting doubt on all doctrinal 
systems, of which the system of institutional Freemasonry is only one 
example—but an example which, in view of the secrets associated with 
it, is extraordinarily suitable for Lessing’s purposes.
It has often been observed that the Masonic dialogues have a 
pedagogic element.46 That is certainly correct, and Falk’s mystifications 
are closely linked to the work’s didactic intention. Education consists, 
for Lessing, not in passing on existing knowledge, but in the endeavour 
to develop the pupil’s own capacities. Falk’s evasive manoeuvres, 
riddles and subtleties are designed to awaken Ernst’s curiosity and so 
to lead him towards independent thinking. This is also the explanation 
for the paradoxical juxtaposition of mystification and the ideals of the 
Enlightenment which we encounter so often in Lessing’s later writings: 
for the tactics of mystification in the dialogues are not primarily 
designed to mystify, but rather to stimulate the will to enquiry and 
discovery more effectively than could ever be achieved by direct and 
intensive preaching of the gospel of Enlightenment. As the preface of 
the work puts it, ‘Readers may make the application for themselves’ 
(p. 185). Right from the first page of the work, Lessing generates, by 
economical means, that aura of the mysterious, the adventurous, the 
forbidden, which in 1771 had made it so enticing for him to become 
a Freemason before disillusionment took over. But he separates these 
negative impressions from the Masonic order itself by redefining 
Freemasonry in a new, open sense, so that Ernst’s (and the reader’s) 
curiosity and intellectual excitement are transferred to Falk’s subversive 
and constructive ideas on human progress.
After the crisis of the Strict Observance movement around 1780, the 
prohibition of the Illuminati in 1785, and the rise of the Rosicrucians as a 
46  See, for example, Müller, Untersuchungen, p. 26 and Fink, ‘Lessings Ernst und Falk’, 
p. 26. 
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reactionary interest group in the later 1780s, the secret societies had lost 
their appeal in Germany—at least for progressive thinkers. Adolf von 
Knigge, who had formerly belonged to the inner circle of the Illuminati, 
declared in 1788 with some bitterness that the secret societies were 
‘useless [...], because there is no need in our times to conceal any kind 
of important instruction in secrecy [...]. It is pointless for individual 
people to try to speed up the process of enlightenment; for they cannot 
do so, and if they can, it is their duty to do so in public’.47 Wieland, in 
his essay of 1789 on the concept of enlightenment, had likewise said that 
the way to enlightenment must be a public way, and that the old penal 
laws against ‘secret conventicles and covert fraternities’ ought to be 
renewed.48 And in his own Masonic dialogues of 1793, Herder advocated 
the abolition of all secret societies in favour of an international and 
public community of thinking people in the spirit of the old ‘republic 
of scholars’.49 Lessing did not live to experience these developments. 
But in his own way, he had already gone beyond them. For he did not 
confine himself to rejecting the negative aspects of the secret societies 
of his time. He went one step further in turning the model of the secret 
society and its rhetoric of mystification into an effective medium for his 
own emancipatory thinking.
47  Adolf von Knigge, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Paul Raabe, 24 vols (Nendeln, 
Liechtenstein: KTO Press, 1978–93), III, 194f.
48  Wieland, ‘Sechs Fragen zur Aufklärung’, in Was ist Aufklärung? Thesen und 
Definitionen, ed. by Ehrhard Bahr (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974), pp. 23–28 (p. 27).
49  Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols (Berlin: 
Weidmann, 1877–1913), XVII, 129f.
Giovanni Battista Tiepolo, Pope St Clement Adoring the Trinity (1737–1738), 
oil on canvas, Alte Pinakothek, Munich. Photograph by Bot (Eloquence) 
(2005), Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Giovanni_Battista_Tiepolo_016.jpg
4. The Rationalisation of the Holy 
Trinity from Lessing to Hegel1
The subject of this essay is the rationalisation of religious mysteries, 
especially that of the Holy Trinity, in German thought between the 
early Enlightenment and the later stages of philosophical Idealism.2 The 
wider context of this development is, of course, the perennial debate on 
the nature of the Trinity which runs throughout the Christian era. But 
its more immediate context is that transitional period in early modern 
thought during which philosophers as well as theologians made 
considerable efforts to construct speculative, rational explications of the 
central doctrines of the Christian religion. 
Rational (or natural) theology has, of course, played a significant 
part in Christian thinking since Patristic times. The attempts of the 
Church Fathers to explicate the nature of the divine being drew freely on 
secular philosophy, especially that of Plato and Neo-Platonism. But all 
such attempts—unless they were prepared to incur the risk of heresy—
stopped short of trying to demonstrate the truth of such mysteries as 
the Trinity or the Atonement by rational means. There was, on the other 
hand, never any problem with such basic truths of natural religion as the 
existence of God and the immortality of the human soul; the Aristotelian 
theology of the Middle Ages, for example, was always ready to supply 
rational demonstrations of these. But for orthodox believers, Church 
authority and Scriptural revelation, rather than rational explanation, 
remained the principal guarantors of the truth of the central mysteries. 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘The Rationalisation of 
the Holy Trinity from Lessing to Hegel’, in Lessing Yearbook, 31 (1999), 115–35.
2  I am grateful to Professor Douglas Hedley for advice on some of the theological 
issues discussed in this essay, and to Professor Laurence Dickey for new insights 
into Hegel’s philosophy of religion.
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In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, as secular criteria 
of truth asserted their claims ever more vigorously and cosmological 
proofs of God’s existence in the Aristotelian tradition came under 
increasing attack,3 rational theology in the Platonic (or ontological) mode 
underwent one of its periodic revivals; it was redeveloped by various 
thinkers from the Cambridge Platonists to the German Idealists in order 
to place the central Christian doctrines on a sounder philosophical basis 
and to defend them against secular attitudes which were perceived as 
implicitly or explicitly hostile to Christianity.4 Such initiatives invariably 
involved some degree of accommodation or compromise with secular 
thought, and the risk of relapsing into time-honoured heresies such as 
pantheism was never far away. In these developments, as this essay will 
argue, Lessing’s reflections on the Holy Trinity mark a crucial stage. 
They point ahead to the natural theology of German Idealism and to the 
philosophy of history of Hegel.
Since its official adoption by the Council of Nicaea in AD 325, 
the doctrine of the Holy Trinity (tres Personae in una Substantia) has 
repeatedly been a focus of controversy.5 This is hardly surprising. 
Not only does it deal with such fundamental theological issues as the 
essential nature of God and his relationship with the world; it also 
presents itself as a mystery, but at the same time, by employing concepts 
associated with familiar areas of experience and regularly encountered 
in rational discourse (person, father, son, spirit, and the related term 
logos), it has seemed from the beginning to invite philosophical analysis. 
The Trinitarian controversies which form the immediate background 
to Lessing’s interest in this topic occurred during the seventeenth and 
3  On the distinction between ‘cosmological’ and ‘ontological’ approaches to natural 
theology see Paul Tillich, ‘Zwei Wege der Religionsphilosophie’, in Tillich, 
Gesammelte Werke, ed. by Renate Albrecht, 14 vols (Stuttgart: Evangelisches 
Verlagswerk, 1959–75), V, 122–37).
4  On the types of argument involved and their role in the natural theology of German 
Idealism see Werner Beierwaltes, Platonismus und Idealismus (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Klostermann, 1972).
5  On the doctrine of the Trinity in general, see Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the 
Trinity (London: Nisbet, 1943); Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation, ed. by A. E. 
J. Rawlinson (London: Longmans, 1928); article ‘Trinität’ in Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, 3rd edn, 7 vols (Tübingen: Mohr, 1957–65), VI, 1025; Emerich 
Coreth, Trinitätsdenken in neuzeitlicher Philosophie, Salzburger Universitätsreden, 
77 (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 1986); Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God. 
Contributions to Trinitarian Theology (London: SCM, 1991). On the early controversies, 
see especially Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, pp. 99 et seq.
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eighteenth centuries, and involved the Socinian, Arian, and Unitarian 
heresies.6 These controversies became acute in Germany during Lessing’s 
lifetime as both critics and apologists of religion applied the methods 
and concepts of philosophical rationalism to traditional Lutheran 
theology. Since the relationship between philosophy and theology was 
one of Lessing’s chief preoccupations throughout his life, he followed 
the relevant debates with interest and formulated his own views on the 
Trinity on several occasions. The first stage of this enquiry will be to 
examine his main observations on the subject, with brief comments on 
their specific context in the history of German thought.
Lessing’s earliest surviving reference to the Trinity is an oblique one, 
in the fragment Thoughts on the Moravian Brethren of 1750. He declares: 
‘I consider Christ [here] merely as a teacher illuminated by God. But I 
reject all the dreadful consequences which maliciousness might deduce 
from this statement.’7 As his disclaimer indicates, he is fully aware that 
the view he expresses is unorthodox; with its implicit denial of Christ’s 
equality of substance with the Father, it in fact embodies the Arian (or 
Unitarian) heresy, and implicitly calls the Trinity itself into question. 
But Lessing—himself the son of a clergyman—took theology much 
too seriously to stop at this point. For not long afterwards, he made 
a systematic attempt to demonstrate the doctrine of the Trinity with 
the help of Wolffian and Leibnizian metaphysics. His conclusions are 
embodied in the posthumously published fragment The Christianity of 
Reason, which was probably written in 1753.8 It has been suggested that 
this fragment was influenced, among other things, by his reading of 
Johann Thomas Haupt’s work on the Holy Trinity, a substantial volume 
which, from a position of Lutheran orthodoxy, enumerates and seeks to 
refute all rational explanations of the Trinity from the Scholastic period 
to the present.9 This little-known work, which is an important source 
6  On these controversies, see Hodgson, pp. 219–24 and J. Hay Colligan, The Arian 
Movement in England (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1913). 
7  Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, ed. by Karl Lachmann and Franz 
Muncker, 23 vols (Stuttgart, Leipzig and Berlin: Göschen, 1886–1924), XIV, 158; 
subsequent references to this edition are identified by the abbreviation LM.
8  The evidence for this date is contained in a letter of 1 December 1753 from Lessing’s 
friend Christian Nicolaus Naumann to Theodor Arnold Müller, in which the 
content of the fragment is accurately summarised. The letter is reproduced in 
Richard Daunicht, Lessing im Gespräch (Munich: Fink, 1971), pp. 58f.
9  See Alexander von der Goltz, ‘Lessings Fragment Das Christentum der Vernunft. Eine 
Arbeit seiner Jugend’, Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 30 (1857), 56–84 (esp. pp. 
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on philosophical debates of the Trinity in mid-eighteenth-century 
Germany, was favourably reviewed in the Berlinische Privilegierte Zeitung 
of 28 December 1751, and the review, which has traditionally been 
attributed to Lessing, appears in all major editions of his works. But 
as Karl S. Guthke has shown, there is no evidence whatsoever that this 
review—like most other reviews of the early 1750s included in editions 
of Lessing’s works—was in fact written by him; and even if he did write 
it, there is no indication that he read more than the first few pages of the 
book, for the review consists almost entirely of near-verbatim extracts 
from the author’s preface.10
Be that as it may, the young Lessing was undoubtedly familiar with 
the attempts of at least some writers to rationalise the Trinity. Leibniz, 
in his Théodicée—which Lessing appears to have studied by 1754 at the 
latest11—refers to two of these, while himself defending the orthodox 
Lutheran view that the central mysteries of Christianity are above, but 
not contrary to, reason. That is, they can be shown to be free from internal 
contradiction, even if their truth cannot be conclusively demonstrated. 
The passage in question runs as follows:12 
he who proves something a priori explains it by the efficient cause; 
and he who can furnish such reasons in an exact and sufficient manner 
is also in a position to comprehend the thing in question. That is why 
the scholastic theologians blamed Raymond Lull for undertaking to 
demonstrate the Holy Trinity by means of philosophy. [...] and when 
Bartholomew Keckermann, a well-known reformed author, made a very 
similar attempt on the same mystery, he was no less blamed by some 
modern theologians. Thus those who seek to explain this mystery and 
render it comprehensible will be blamed, whereas praise will attach to 
those who attempt to defend it against the objections of its adversaries. 
74–80). The work in question is Johann Thomas Haupt, Gründe der Vernunft zur 
Erläuterung und zum Beweise des Geheimnisses der Heiligen Dreieinigkeit (Rostock and 
Wismar: J. A. Berger and J. Boedner, 1752).
10  Karl S. Guthke, ‘Lessings Rezensionen. Besuch in einem Kartenhaus’, Jahrbuch des 
Freien Deutschen Hochstifts (1993), 1–59 (esp. pp. 38–40). For the review itself, see 
LM IV, 382f. The fact that Lessing makes no reference, in The Christianity of Reason, 
to various rationalisations of the Trinity described by Haupt which are not unlike 
his own, and that he presented his conclusions to his friend Naumann as ‘a new 
system’, might well suggest that he knew little or nothing of Haupt’s work.
11  See the various references to this work in Lessing’s and Mendelssohn’s treatise Pope 
a Metaphysician!, written in 1754 (LM VI, 411–45). 
12  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophische Schriften, ed. by Hans Heinz Holz and 
other hands, 4 vols in 6 (Darmstadt: Insel Verlag, 1965–92), II/1, p. 158.
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The rationalisations of Lull and Keckermann to which Leibniz refers 
follow a pattern which was first established in the De Trinitate of St 
Augustine. Augustine insists that the nature of the Trinity is ultimately 
incomprehensible, but (not unlike Leibniz) he also maintains that 
it is both possible and necessary to defend it against unbelievers or 
detractors.13 He therefore tries, with the help of images and analogies 
based on the operations of the human mind, to render it at least to 
some extent intelligible, and formulates his conclusions with the help 
of Aristotelian logic and concepts drawn from Neo-Platonic philosophy. 
For example, the mind consists of the separate faculties of memory, 
understanding, and will; yet all three—like the Trinity—are one.14 
Or as he puts it on another occasion, ‘there is a certain image of the 
Trinity: the mind itself, its knowledge, which is its offspring, and love 
as a third; these three are one and one substance. The offspring is not 
less, while the mind knows itself as much as it is; nor is the love less, 
while the mind loves itself as much as it knows and as much as it is.’15 
A few theologians (including those mentioned by Leibniz)16 are more 
ambitious, and attempt—at the risk of being condemned as heretics—to 
develop Augustine’s formulas into a full deductive demonstration of the 
Trinity. The basic outline of such deductions, which change little (except 
in frequency) from the Scholastic period to the eighteenth century, is 
as follows. God’s understanding being necessarily perfect, must have 
a perfect object; and since God is infinitely good, he must also will the 
objective existence of his own perfection, which he ‘eternally begets’ in 
the form of the Son. The Holy Spirit—regularly described since Patristic 
times as the vinculum or bond of love between Father and Son17—is then 
defined in terms of the necessary relation between these two Persons as 
the subjective and objective manifestations of God. 
13  St. Augustine, The Trinity, translated by Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the 
Church, 45 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1970), pp. 
175f., 467ff., 513, 521, etc.
14  Ibid., p. 311.
15  Ibid., p. 289; on the philosophical affinities of Augustine’s doctrine, see the article 
‘Augustine’, in The New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1967), I, 
1053.
16  On the Trinitarian deductions of Lull and Keckermann see the article ‘Raymundus 
Lullus’, in the Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 3rd edn (Leipzig: 
Hinrichs, 1896–1913), XI, 712–14 and the article ‘Bartholomäus Keckermann’, in 
ibid., X, 196; cf. also Haupt, Gründe der Vernunft, pp. 291ff.
17  Cf. Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 68.
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In Lessing’s early years, a deduction of this kind had been tentatively 
suggested by the leading Wolffian among Lutheran theologians, 
Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten (the elder brother of the aesthetician 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten). Like most rationalist philosophers 
of the time, Baumgarten took it for granted that God’s existence as a 
necessary and perfect being can be deduced by reason. But he then 
further argued that the cognitive and conative aspects of God’s self-
consciousness, namely ‘God’s most perfect conception of himself’ 
and ‘God’s most perfect inclination towards himself’ acquire objective 
existence as the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively:18
For if the complete inclination or determination of the divine will gives 
reality or existence to the objects conceived of, while God necessarily has 
a conception of himself and is also necessarily wholly inclined towards 
himself, it follows that this conception and inclination of God will appear 
to exist in its own right, because it would otherwise, without the reality 
of both these objects, not be the most perfect possible.
Baumgarten was nevertheless careful not to offend Lutheran orthodoxy; 
for he pointed out that, although he did claim demonstrative certainty 
for his deduction of God’s necessary existence, he made no such claim 
for his deduction of the Trinity, which he regarded as purely speculative 
and in no way as a substitute for revelation.19 It is highly probable that 
the young Lessing was familiar with these ideas, not only in view of 
his intensive studies of Wolffian philosophy during his early years,20 but 
also because his friend Christian Nicolaus Naumann explicitly refers to 
Baumgarten in the letter of 1753 in which he summarises the content of 
Lessing’s fragment The Christianity of Reason.21 
The main elements of Lessing’s deduction of the Trinity are contained 
in the following extract from that work (Lessing’s paragraph numbers 
are omitted for the sake of readability):22
18  Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, Theologische Lehrsätze von den Grundwahrheiten der 
christlichen Lehre (Halle: Gebauer, 1747), p. 82; cf. ibid., Evangelische Glaubenslehre, 
3 vols, ed. by Johann Salomo Semler (Halle: Gebauer, 1759–60), I, 570. On 
Baumgarten’s views on the Trinity, see also Haupt, Gründe der Vernunft, pp. 184f. 
and Reinhard Schwarz, ‘Lessings Spinozismus’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 
65 (1968), 271–90 (esp. pp. 275–83). 
19  Baumgarten, Theologische Lehrsätze, p. 81; cf. Evangelische Glaubenslehre, I, 565.
20  Cf. H. B. Nisbet, ‘Lessings Ethics’, Lessing Yearbook, 25 (1993), 1–40 (pp. 3, 5, and 13).
21  See note 8 above.
22  LM V, 175–78; for a complete English translation of the work, see Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writings, translated by H. B. Nisbet 
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To represent, to will, and to create are one and the same for God. One 
can therefore say that everything which God represents to himself, he 
also creates.
God can think of himself in only two ways; either he thinks of all his 
perfections at once […] or he thinks of his perfections discretely [...]
God thought of himself from eternity in all his perfection; that is, God 
created from eternity a being which lacked no perfection that he himself 
possessed.
This being is called by Scripture the Son of God, or what would be 
better still, the Son God [...]
The more two things have in common with one another, the greater 
is the harmony between them [...]
Two such things are God and the Son God, or the identical image of 
God; and the harmony which is between them is called by Scripture the 
spirit which proceeds from the Father and Son. [...]23
God thought of his perfections discretely; that is, he created beings 
each of which has something of his perfections [...]
All these beings together are called the world. 
The most novel feature of Lessing’s argument—apart from his 
substitution of the Leibnizian concept of ‘harmony’ for the traditional 
vinculum of love, with its more affective associations, between Father 
and Son—is that he deduces not only the generation of the Son, but also 
the creation of the universe, from his initial premise that thought and 
creation are identical for God. One of the implications of this premise is 
that God’s actions are governed by some kind of metaphysical necessity; 
and this, of course, is difficult to reconcile with the orthodox doctrine of 
the absolute freedom of the divine will (especially in the act of creation). 
Leibniz was aware of this difficulty, and he duly distinguished between 
the moral necessity underlying God’s choice of the best of possible worlds 
and the metaphysical necessity inherent in deterministic systems like that 
of Spinoza, from which, in keeping with his frequent professions of 
orthodoxy, he always took care to distance himself. But determinism is 
never far away from his, or Wolff’s, metaphysical optimism; and Lessing, 
who was himself to draw deterministic conclusions from it in his later 
years,24 already brings out some of these implications in The Christianity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 25–29. 
23  John XV.26 and XVI. 27.
24  See, for example, LM XII, 298; also Nisbet, ‘Lessing’s Ethics’, pp. 21–24.
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of Reason.25 This can be seen not only from the frequency with which 
the verbs müssen (‘must’), and können (‘can’) with a negative, appear 
in the fragment.26 It is even more evident from the fact that Lessing 
attributes the same kind of necessity to the (temporal) creation of the 
universe as he does to the (eternal) generation of the Son. This near-
equation of the two processes, as will become apparent later, is a step of 
major significance for philosophical interpretations of the Trinity after 
Lessing’s death.
All of these developments are the inevitable result of the attempt to 
demonstrate the doctrine of the Trinity by rational means. For logical 
necessity, when applied to physical or metaphysical realities, becomes 
indistinguishable from physical or metaphysical necessity; and if the 
same mode of necessity applies to both transcendental and immanent 
realities, the distinction between transcendence and immanence—itself 
essential to that distinction between the divine and human aspects of 
Christ with which Lessing had struggled as early as 1750—becomes 
increasingly difficult to sustain.
We do not know for certain why Lessing failed to complete The 
Christianity of Reason. It is, however, probable that Moses Mendelssohn, 
whom he first met in 1754, dissuaded him from doing so (as Lessing 
indicates in a letter to his old friend twenty years later).27 It may well 
be that Mendelssohn, as a Jew, defended his own Unitarian conception 
of God with enough eloquence to persuade Lessing to abandon his 
own Trinitarian deduction—at least for the time being.28 Lessing does, 
however, return to his idea of a necessary relation—or even identity—
between God’s thoughts and their object in the fragment On the Reality 
of Things outside God, probably composed in Breslau in 1763 in the course 
of his studies of Spinoza. From this necessary relation, he draws the 
following inference (which clearly has some affinity with Spinoza): 
‘if, in the concept which God has of the reality of a thing, everything 
is present that is to be found in its reality outside him, then the two 
25  On the possible influence of Spinoza on Lessing’s early thought see Karl S. Guthke 
‘Lessing und das Judentum’, Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung, 4 (1977), 229–71 
(pp. 252ff.); cf. also Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Propositions 17 and 33. As a 
Jew, Spinoza , of course, has no place for Christian theology in his system.
26  Namely in Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 9, 12, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, and 27.
27  Lessing to Mendelssohn, 1 May 1774, in LM XVIII, 110. 
28  Cf. Mendelssohn’s humorous critique of the doctrine of the Trinity in his letter of 1 
February 1774 to Lessing (LM XXI, 6).
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realities are one, and everything which is supposed to exist outside God 
exists in God.’29 It is true that there is no mention on this occasion of the 
Holy Trinity. But the fragment of 1763 plainly reinforces that tendency 
which was already present in The Christianity of Reason to regard the 
created universe as no less necessary a consequence of the divine nature 
than the latter’s internal divisions.
Lessing’s views on the Trinity during the twenty years between The 
Christianity of Reason and Andreas Wissowatius’s Objections to the Trinity 
of 1773 (in which he gives a favourable assessment of Leibniz’s defence 
of the Trinity against the Socinian heresy) are difficult to determine, 
because the evidence is extremely scant. It is safe to say, however, that 
they are unlikely to have been any more orthodox than before. It is 
common knowledge, however, that his views on Lutheran orthodoxy, 
and on the doctrine of the Trinity in particular, underwent a major 
change in 1771—probably as a result of his studies of Leibniz soon after 
his move to Wolfenbüttel.30 (He may also have been anxious, of course, 
to establish his credentials as a sincere Christian in advance of his 
publication of the notorious ‘Fragments’ of Reimarus.) Consequently, 
when he edited and republished Leibniz’s orthodox defence of the Trinity 
against the Socinian Wissowatius in 1773, he expressed wholehearted 
admiration for it.31 He admired it, moreover, not just for its philosophical 
acumen, but also, as he now declared, because he had come to believe 
that the orthodox defence of the Trinity as a mystery not fully accessible 
to reason, yet free from internal contradiction, is a more defensible 
philosophical position than the half-baked Socinian doctrine that Christ, 
though merely human and not consubstantial with God, nevertheless 
deserves to be worshipped. His respect for orthodoxy—especially as 
defended by Leibniz—was undoubtedly increased around that time 
by his polemical engagement with the so-called Neologists or rational 
theologians such as Eberhard, Teller, and Töllner;32 these theologians, 
while still claiming to be Christians, either played down the doctrine of 
29  LM XIV, 292 (for a complete translation of this work, see Lessing, Philosophical and 
Theological Writings, pp. 30–31); cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Propositions 15 and 35.
30  On some of these developments see Henry E. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1966), pp. 121–61.
31  See LM XII, 90 and 93–99; also Lessing to Mendelssohn, 1 May 1774, in LM XVIII, 
110 and Georges Pons, G. E. Lessing et le Christianisme (Paris: Didier, 1964), p. 267. 
32  See LM XVI, 251–53 (against Töllner and Teller); also Schwarz, ‘Lessings 
Spinozismus’, pp. 283f.
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the Trinity or rejected it altogether as incapable of rational proof. Lessing 
had much less respect for theologians of this complexion than for the 
Unitarian Adam Neuser, whose conversion from Christianity to Islam 
he defended in 1774.33 In all of these cases, his regard for intellectual 
honesty and philosophical rigour seems a more important factor in his 
assessment of Trinitarian thinking than any personal commitment to 
orthodox Lutheranism—despite the fact that he continues to treat the 
latter with respect throughout the rest of his life.
Lessing’s views on the Trinity during his last years, like his views on 
religion in general, are marked by ambiguity, scepticism, and experiment. 
It is nevertheless likely that, when he describes the doctrine of the Trinity 
as ‘complete nonsense’ in a letter to Mendelssohn in 1774,34 this extreme 
formulation is at least in part a concession to the anti-Trinitarian views 
of his Jewish friend; for he was soon to try once again, in The Education of 
the Human Race, to rationalise the Trinity in a manner similar to his early 
attempt in The Christianity of Reason. The main cause of his uncertainty, of 
course, is not so much the doctrine of the Trinity as such; it is the difficulty 
he had always had, since his earliest statement on the subject in 1750, in 
relating it to the historical personage of Jesus Christ and the latter’s claim 
to consubstantiality with the deity.35 All of his remarks on the Trinity in 
the later 1770s—with the notable exception of The Education of the Human 
Race—relate to this difficulty, which underlay his intensive studies of 
the origins of the gospels in 1777–78. His main work on the subject, the 
posthumous New Hypothesis on the Evangelists Considered as Purely Human 
Historians, concludes that the earliest versions of the gospels, and the 
testimony they contained of those who knew Christ personally, presented 
him merely as a human being (albeit a very remarkable one): ‘Indeed, 
even if they [i.e. those who knew Christ personally] regarded him as the 
true promised Messiah, and called him, as the Messiah, the Son of God: 
it still cannot be denied that they did not mean by this a Son of God who 
was of the same essence as God’.36 Only the theological interpretation 
placed on Christ’s activities at a later date by the last of the evangelists, 
namely St John, could justify the claims which were subsequently made 
33  LM XII, 203–54.
34  LM XVIII, 110
35  Cf. Pons, Lessing et le Christianisme, p. 397.
36  LM XVI, 389; English translation of this work in Lessing, Philosophical and Theological 
Writings, pp. 148–71.
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for his divine significance;37 and Lessing’s scepticism concerning this 
gospel is made abundantly clear in The Testament of St John of 1777.38 His 
final verdict on Christ’s divine status, as expressed in his First Supplement 
[…] to the Necessary Answer of 1778, is accordingly that there is no reliable 
evidence whatsoever for it in the Scriptures, and that the Church Fathers 
relied rather on oral tradition than on the Bible when they formulated the 
doctrine of the Trinity during the fourth century: ‘Anyone who does not 
bring the divinity of Christ into the New Testament, but seeks to derive 
it solely from the New Testament, can soon be refuted [...]. They [the 
Church Fathers] did not claim that their doctrine was a truth clearly and 
distinctly contained in Scripture, but rather a truth derived directly from 
Christ and faithfully passed down to them from father to son.’39 But like 
the evidence of the Bible, that of oral tradition is no more than historical; 
and this, of course, gives rise to the famous crux in On the Proof of the 
Spirit and of Power (1777) concerning ‘the broad and ugly ditch’ which 
separates historical evidence from demonstrable rational truth:40
if I have no historical objection to the fact that Christ raised someone 
from the dead, must I therefore regard it as true that God has a Son who 
is of the same essence as himself? What connection is there between my 
inability to raise any substantial objection to the evidence for the former, 
and my obligation to believe something which my reason refuses to 
accept?
It is essential to note once again that it is not the doctrine of the Trinity 
itself which Lessing here finds incompatible with reason, but only the 
identification of the historical Christ with the second person of the Trinity. 
This doubt still besets him in what is perhaps his last pronouncement on 
the subject, the short reflection The Religion of Christ, probably of 1780, 
in which ‘the Christian religion’, defined as that religion which treats 
Christ himself as divine, is described as ‘so uncertain and ambiguous 
that there is scarcely a single passage which any two individuals, 
throughout the history of the world, have thought of in the same way’.41
37  LM XVI, 390.
38  LM XIII, 9–17; English translation of this work in Lessing, Philosophical and Theological 
Writings, pp. 89–94.
39  LM XIII, 373 and 376.
40  LM XIII, 6; English translation of this work in Lessing, Philosophical and Theological 
Writings, pp. 83–88.
41  LM XVI, 519; English translation of this work in Lessing, Philosophical and Theological 
Writings, pp. 178f.
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The scepticism of these late writings is not, of course, Lessing’s 
only response to religious ideas in his final years. It goes along with 
that growing interest in intellectual experiment, in rational speculation, 
which finds its fullest expression in Ernst and Falk and The Education of the 
Human Race.42 In contrast to his defence, in 1773, of Leibniz’s orthodox 
assertion that the central mysteries of Christianity cannot be resolved by 
reason, he now returns, in The Education of the Human Race, to a position 
close to that of The Christianity of Reason, and expressly defends his right 
to unchecked speculation:43
Let it not be objected that such speculations on the mysteries of 
religion are forbidden. [...] the development of revealed truths into 
truths of reason is absolutely necessary if they are to be of any help to the 
human race. [...]
It is not true that speculations on these things have ever done damage 
and been disadvantageous to civil society […]
On the contrary, such speculations—whatever individual results 
they may lead to—are unquestionably the most fitting exercises of all for 
the human understanding […]
In his renewed attempt in this late work to explore the rational potential 
of the Christian mysteries—especially that of the Trinity—Lessing 
introduces an important new factor which had not, so far as I am 
aware, played any significant part in Trinitarian thought during the 
Enlightenment, or indeed since the Reformation, namely history. In doing 
so, he follows a twofold strategy. On the one hand, he looks to historical 
reality for a rational sense akin to that revealed in the mysteries; and 
on the other, he tries once more to deduce from the mysteries a rational 
meaning which might help to make further sense of historical reality. 
The aim of this dual approach is to demonstrate not only that reason 
and revelation coincide, but also that both have an objective correlate 
in human history. Lessing’s aim, in short, is to overcome ‘the broad and 
ugly ditch’ which separated historical from rational truth, no longer by 
direct inference from the former to the latter (for he had concluded, 
with Leibniz, that this was impossible), but by a novel attempt to detect 
parallel patterns in both. It will shortly be argued that this attempt was to 
42  See my discussion of these features in Chapter 3 above.
43  LM XIII, 431f.; English translation of this work in Lessing, Philosophical and 
Theological Writings, pp. 217–40.
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have far-reaching significance for later German thought; but something 
must first be said about the Trinitarian content of Lessing’s philosophical 
treatise. His relevant observations are as follows:44
Must God not at least have the most complete representation of 
himself, i.e. a representation which contains everything which is present 
within him? But would it include everything within him if it contained 
only a representation, only a possibility of his necessary reality, as well 
as of his other qualities? [...] Consequently, God can either have no 
complete representation of himself, or this complete representation is 
just as necessarily real as he himself is, etc. […] and this much at least 
remains indisputable, that those who wished to popularise the idea could 
scarcely have expressed themselves more comprehensibly and fittingly 
than by describing it as a Son whom God begets from eternity. [...] What 
if everything should finally compel us to assume that God […] chose 
rather to give [man] moral laws and to forgive him all transgressions 
in consideration of his Son—i.e. in consideration of the independently 
existing sum of his own perfections, in comparison with which and in 
which every imperfection of the individual disappears—than not to give 
him them and thereby to exclude him from all moral happiness, which is 
inconceivable without moral laws?
The affinity between Lessing’s reflections on the Trinity in The Education 
of the Human Race and those in The Christianity of Reason is obvious and 
has frequently been noted. Just how close the link between the two 
works is becomes even clearer when we realise that a particular topic 
which, according to Naumann’s letter of 1753, was to have been dealt 
with in the final, unwritten section of The Christianity of Reason—namely 
‘the origin of evil’45 —is in fact taken up in The Education of the Human 
Race.46 But despite such affinities, there are significant differences in the 
treatment of the Trinity in the two works. For in the first place, Lessing 
now claims—with an oblique acknowledgement of a similar, but more 
mystical scheme in the work of Joachim of Fiore and other medieval 
writers—that history itself displays a tripartite progression of increasing 
rationality, the third phase of which is yet to come:47 that is, the structure 
44  LM XIII, 430f.
45  See note 8 above.
46  In Paragraph 74 of that work: LM XIII, 431.
47  Paragraphs 86–88, LM XIII, 433f.; on Joachim’s doctrines, see Herbert Grundmann, 
Studien über Joachim von Floris (Leipzig: Teubner, 1927) and Moltmann, History and 
the Triune God, pp. 91–109. It is, however, important to note that Joachim does not 
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of the ultimate model of rationality, namely the Trinity, is reflected in the 
objective creation of the three-personed creator. And secondly, Lessing’s 
rational deduction of the Trinity itself no longer distinguishes between 
the eternal generation (‘from eternity’) of the Son and the temporal, but 
equally necessary, creation of the universe.48 On the contrary, while the 
‘necessary reality’ of God’s conception of himself (corresponding to the 
necessary identity of thought and creation for God in The Christianity of 
Reason) refers on this occasion only to the Son and not to the universe 
as well, this Son is himself defined in terms much more suggestive of 
the created universe than of the Son of Scripture and of the Athanasian 
Creed; and just as in the early fragment, no attempt whatsoever is 
made to identify this Son with the historical Christ. Friedrich Heinrich 
Jacobi was certainly in no doubt that the first two persons of Lessing’s 
Trinity were simply coded expressions for the creator and creation 
as understood in Spinoza’s metaphysics. For in response to Lessing’s 
suggestion in Paragraph 73 of The Education of the Human Race ‘that his 
[i.e. God’s] unity must also be a transcendental unity which does not 
exclude a kind of plurality’, Jacobi commented: ‘But considered solely 
in this transcendental unity, the deity must be absolutely devoid of that 
reality which can only be expressed in particular individual things. 
This, the reality, with its concept, is therefore based on Natura naturata 
(the Son from eternity); just as the former, the possibility, the essence, 
the substantiality of the infinite, with its concept, is based on Natura 
naturanti (the Father).’49 And when, in Paragraph 75, Lessing describes 
the Son as ‘the independently existing sum of his own [i.e. God’s] 
perfections, in comparison with which and in which every imperfection 
of the individual disappears’, his words are undoubtedly suggestive of 
the created universe—though not so much that of Spinoza as that of 
Leibniz, in which the apparent imperfection of individual elements is 
as nothing when compared with the perfection of the whole.50 It is also 
assimilate the Trinity itself to the historical process, as was to happen in varying 
degrees in the so-called ‘process theology’ of more recent times.
48  LM XIII, 430f.
49  Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Werke, 6 vols (Leipzig: G. Fleischer, 1812–25), IV/1, 
pp. 87f. Panajotis Kondylis, Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), p. 612, similarly concludes that Lessing identifies the 
Son with the created world in this passage.
50  LM XIII, 431; the use of ‘in which’ in addition to ‘with which’ is significant: it 
suggests that the imperfections are to be found within the Son, which would scarcely 
make sense if the Son were distinct from the created world.
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significant that, in the last few references to God after the deduction 
of the Trinity in The Education of the Human Race, only one (on the God 
of Joachim and his medieval contemporaries) directly employs the 
word ‘God’ (Paragraph 88), which is replaced by ‘nature’ on two other 
occasions (Paragraphs 84 and 90). And as for the traditional distinction 
between the supra-temporal existence of the Trinity (including the Son) 
‘from eternity’, and the finite and temporal existence of creation, Lessing 
seems to be at pains to efface it: in his vision of the future course of 
history and of the transmigration of souls within the present world, 
he presents this process not as finite but as eternal, as the concluding 
sentence of the entire work emphasises: ‘Is not the whole of eternity 
mine?’.51 Finally, it is a curious fact that the Holy Spirit, which had 
featured in the deduction of the Trinity in the Christianity of Reason, does 
not appear at all in the parallel deduction in the Education of the Human 
Race. This serves to reinforce that parallel between history and revelation 
(or reason) which Lessing tries to establish with the help of Joachim of 
Fiore’s chiliastic interpretation of history: just as the third age (of the 
Spirit) has still to come, so too does the self-realisation of reason (or the 
rational deduction of dimly perceived truths by the human intellect) 
remain at present unfinished.
It must be emphasised that the assimilation of the Trinity to the 
temporal universe and to human history in The Education of the Human 
Race is by no means complete. In keeping with the experimental, allusive 
strategy of his late works, Lessing offers no systematic theology of 
history: the precise status of the Son remains ambiguous, and no rational 
deduction of the Holy Spirit is supplied. It is true that, in Christian 
theology, there had always been some kind of link between the second 
person of the Trinity and the temporal universe—at least since Origen 
formulated his doctrine of eternal generation; and while orthodoxy 
has always insisted that Father and Son are co-eternal, it has long been 
acceptable to believe that ‘the Father represents the Eternal Source of 
created Time, the Transcendent Origin, and the Son represents the 
Eternal Agent, immanent in the Time-process’.52 But as soon as creation 
itself is deduced as a necessary consequence of God’s being, pantheistic 
implications are difficult to avoid; for as one authority puts it: ‘The heart 
51  LM XIII, 436.
52  F. H. Brabant, ‘God and Time’, in Rawlinson (ed.), Essays on the Trinity, pp. 354f.
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of pantheism is to be found in the abolition of particularity because the 
world and everything in it becomes reduced to a logical implication of 
the being of God.’53 In this very general sense—and without seeking 
to re-open the time-honoured debate concerning Lessing’s supposed 
Spinozism—we may certainly detect pantheistic overtones in Lessing’s 
Trinitarian deductions. But in his case, the balance is already shifting 
away from all three persons of God to the created world: his rational 
deduction of the Trinity is complemented by an inductive review of 
history within a Trinitarian framework. In fact, the assimilation of the 
universe to God in the pantheism of the early modern period is merely 
a prelude to the assimilation of God to the universe, and Lessing’s 
doctrine of the Trinity marks a crucial stage in this progression. He is the 
first, so far as I can determine, to relate the Trinity simultaneously to the 
self-realisation of reason as a divine or ideal principle and to the created 
universe (and more specifically to human history). The consequences of 
this development for subsequent German thought will be discussed in 
the remainder of this essay.
Lessing’s (at least partial) assimilation of God to the created universe 
and to human history did not pass unnoticed among his contemporaries. 
It is one of the central themes in the so-called Spinozastreit (‘Spinoza 
Quarrel’) of the 1780s, and probably helped to shape the theology of 
Herder’s dialogues God of 1787.54 But the full implications of Lessing’s 
Trinitarian speculations were to be realised not in the works of Herder, 
but in the writings of the next generation.
From an early stage in his career, the philosopher Schelling was 
familiar with Lessing’s speculative construction of the Trinity in The 
Education of the Human Race. He refers explicitly to it in his Lectures on the 
Method of Academic Study of 1802, saying of the doctrine of the Trinity:55
Reconciliation, through God’s own birth into finitude, of the finite 
realm which has fallen away from him is the first thought of Christianity 
53  Colin E. Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), p. 56.
54  See Marion Heinz, ‘Existenz und Individualität. Untersuchungen zu Herders 
Gott’, in Kategorien der Existenz. Festschrift für Wolfgang Janke, ed. by Klaus Held and 
Jochem Hennigfeld (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993), pp. 160–78 (p. 
173).
55  F. W. J. von Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by K. F. A. Schelling, 14 vols (Stuttgart: 
Cotta, 1856–61), I. Abteilung, V, 294.
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and the completion of its whole view of the universe and its history in 
the idea of the Trinity, which for that very reason is absolutely necessary 
to it. It is well known that Lessing, in his work The Education of the Human 
Race, attempted to reveal the philosophical significance of this doctrine, 
and what he said about it is perhaps the most speculative element in all 
his writings. But his view still lacks the connection of this idea with the 
history of the world, which consists in the fact that the eternal Son of 
God, born from the being of the Father of all things, is the finite realm 
itself as it is in the eternal contemplation [Anschauung] of God, and 
which appears as a suffering God subordinated to the vicissitudes of 
time and, in the culmination of its appearance, in Christ, closes the world 
of finitude and opens that of infinity, or the domain of spirit. 
Perhaps in order to magnify the originality of his own Trinitarian 
speculations, Schelling is unfair to Lessing on two counts here. For 
despite Schelling’s denial, Lessing had indeed established close links 
between the Trinity and human history in The Education of the Human 
Race (as described in detail above); and he had also implied that a 
strong affinity, or even identity, exists between the Son of the Trinity and 
the finite world as a whole (Schelling’s ‘finite realm itself as it is in the 
eternal contemplation of God’). The only significant difference between 
the two thinkers here is that, while Lessing offers allusive hints rather 
than dogmatic propositions, and detects a structural parallel between 
human history and the Holy Trinity without explicitly assimilating the 
former to the latter, Schelling presents a systematic deduction of a kind 
that Hegel was later to develop more fully, in which human history and 
its phases appear as necessary consequences of the self-realisation of 
the divinity. Schelling gives no indication, however, whether he was 
familiar with Lessing’s earlier reflections on the Trinity in The Christianity 
of Reason. He does continue, in his later works (see p. 103 below), to 
speculate further on the Trinity; but these later thoughts are neither as 
fully developed nor as closely related to those of Lessing as are those of 
his friend Hegel, whose Trinitarian thought and its relationship to that 
of Lessing will now be examined. 
Hegel’s debt to and affinities with Lessing have never been adequately 
investigated, and only a few scholars have noted specific influences. 
These include Henry E. Allison, who suggests that the central thesis of 
the young Hegel’s fragmentary essay The Positivity of the Christian Religion 
(1795–96) echoes Lessing’s distinction, in his posthumous fragment 
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The Religion of Christ, between the religion of Christ as a purely ethical 
faith, and the Christian religion with all its positive doctrines.56 Wulf 
Köpke also notices a close familiarity with Nathan the Wise in Hegel’s 
early writings,57 and Johannes von Lüpke detects ‘the determining 
influence of Lessing’ in the writings of Hegel’s Berne and Frankfurt 
periods.58 Other Lessing scholars not infrequently point to similarities 
between The Education of the Human Race and Hegel’s philosophy of 
history; but they tend simply to note that both thinkers present history 
as a teleological process governed by an immanent providence,59 or to 
describe Lessing’s essay as the first of a series of increasingly secular 
philosophies of history continued by Hegel, Marx, and others.60
Hegel scholars, on the other hand, have long been aware that the 
young Hegel was profoundly influenced by Lessing, and that he even 
looked up to him as something of a hero.61 Schelling, after all, addressed 
him in 1795 as ‘Lessing’s intimate’;62 and although Hegel’s early excerpts 
from Lessing’s works have not survived,63 various scholars have noted 
that he was closely familiar with, and indebted to, several of Lessing’s 
works, including Nathan the Wise,64 The Education of the Human Race65 
56  Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment, pp. 193f.; see also Hegel, Werke, ed. by Eva 
Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), 
I, 104–229: Hegel cites Lessing on several occasions in this essay.
57  Wulf Köpke, ‘Der späte Lessing und die junge Generation’, in Humanität und Dialog. 
Lessing und Mendelssohn in neuer Sicht, ed. by Ehrhardt Bahr and other hands 
(Detroit, MI and Munich: Wayne State University Press and edition text+kritik, 
1982), pp. 211–22 (pp. 211 and 215f.).
58  Johannes von Lüpke, Wege der Weisheit. Studien zu Lessings Theologiekritik (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1989), p. 28.
59  See, for example, Wilm Pelters, Lessings Standort. Sinndeutung der Geschichte als Kern 
seines Denkens (Heidelberg: L. Stiehm, 1972), pp. 97–100. 
60  See, for example, Arno Schilson, Geschichte im Horizont der Vorsehung. G. E. Lessings 
Beitrag zu einer Theologie der Geschichte (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1974), 
pp. 291 and 293. 
61  For detailed evidence, see the references to Lessing in the index to H. S. Harris, 
Hegel’s Development. Toward the Sunlight 1770–1801 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 
especially those on pp. 43, 99, 101–03, 140f., 174n., and 189.
62  Schelling to Hegel, 4 February 1795, in Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. by Johannes 
Hoffmeister, 5 vols (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952–54), I, 21.
63  See Harris, Hegel’s Development, p. 48.
64  Ibid., pp. 37, 141, 174, 329, etc.
65  Ibid., pp. 99 and 213n; also Laurence Dickey, Hegel. Religion, Economics, and the 
Politics of Spirit 1770–1807 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 160 
and 284.
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and Ernst and Falk.66 In addition to these works, he was almost certainly 
familiar—as already mentioned—with the posthumous fragment The 
Religion of Christ, which Lessing’s brother Karl published in 1784 in 
the volume G. E. Lessing’s Posthumous Theological Papers and again in 
1793 in Volume 17 of Lessing’s Complete Works. But if this is the case, 
then it is equally likely that the young Hegel also knew Lessing’s early 
fragment The Christianity of Reason, which appeared posthumously in 
the same two volumes, and which—together with Paragraphs 73 and 
75 of The Education of the Human Race—constitutes Lessing’s main 
attempt to rationalise the mystery of the Holy Trinity. Whether or not 
Hegel studied and ruminated on the writings in question—and there is 
a strong probability that he did—the remainder of this essay will argue 
that there is a striking continuity between his own Trinitarian reflections 
and those of his early hero Lessing: the logic of the earlier thinker’s ideas 
is amplified and completed in the work of his more systematically-
minded successor.
It has rightly been said that Christianity ‘is the most direct route to the 
heart of Hegel’s philosophy’.67 And the one aspect of Christianity which 
is absolutely central to his thinking is the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, 
which he sees as the archetypal model of spirit (Geist) in general. All 
spirit or thought, for Hegel, is a dynamic process, and the structure of 
the Trinity is in his view essentially dynamic. It is for him the supreme 
example of spirit’s self-comprehension and self-realisation, and hence of 
universal reason as it progressively actualises itself throughout creation, 
and in particular in human thought and history. As he puts it in his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of History:68
Spirit, therefore, is the product of itself. The most sublime example 
is to be found in the nature of God himself [...]. the older religions also 
referred to God as a spirit; [...] Christianity, however, contains a revelation 
of God’s spiritual nature. In the first place, he is the Father, a power which 
is abstract and universal but as yet enclosed within itself. Secondly, he 
66  Jacques d’Hondt, Hegel Secret. Recherches sur les sources cachées de la pensée de Hegel 
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1968), pp. 267–80; also Harris, Hegel’s 
Development, p. 105. 
67  Duncan Forbes, Introduction to Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. 
Introduction: Reason in History, translated by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), p. ix.
68  Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (as in note 67 above), p. 99.
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is his own object, another version of himself, dividing himself into two 
so as to produce the Son. But this other version is just as immediate an 
expression of him as he is himself; he knows himself and contemplates 
himself in it—and it is this self-knowledge and self-contemplation which 
constitutes the third element, the Spirit as such. [...] It is this doctrine of 
the Trinity which raises Christianity above the other religions. [...] The 
Trinity is the speculative part of Christianity, and it is through it that 
philosophy can discover the Idea of reason in the Christian religion too.
Hegel’s Trinitarian reflections are, of course, much more central to his 
thought, and much more fully developed, than Lessing’s.69 But as the 
above quotation shows, they plainly have much in common with them. 
In particular, both thinkers regard the Trinity as a model for the process 
of human history, which displays a pattern parallel to the internal 
dynamics of reason itself: just as the divine nature is progressively 
realised in rational creation, so also does human reason progressively 
develop to ever higher degrees of insight (which Lessing associates 
primarily with the development of morality, and Hegel primarily 
with that of freedom). Hegel, of course, goes far beyond Lessing’s 
simple tripartite model of the three ages of man, and provides a long 
and circumstantial account of the whole of world history, including its 
geographical basis and the rise and fall of all major cultures of the past 
as known in his time. Nevertheless, his basic premise that history is 
itself a rational process, and that the archetypal model of this process 
is the Trinity, reveals a fundamental affinity between his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History and Lessing’s Education of the Human Race.70
If we now turn to the theological significance of Lessing’s and 
Hegel’s thoughts on the Trinity, the continuity between the two is again 
conspicuous. Hegel attempts, for example (again in his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History), to deduce both the Son and the created world from 
the nature of God as spirit or universal reason, much as Lessing had done 
in The Christianity of Reason; he does so by distinguishing between two 
69  Hegel’s fullest discussion of the Trinity appears in his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion: see Hegel, Werke, XVII, 221–40. For a general account of his Trinitarian 
thought and its development see Jörg Splett, Die Trinitätslehre G. W. F. Hegels 
(Freiburg and Munich: Alber, 1965); also Dale M. Schlitt, Hegel’s Trinitarian Claim. A 
Critical Reflection (Leiden: Brill, 1984).
70  I accordingly cannot agree with Schilson, Geschichte im Horizont der Vorsehung, p. 
274, who says that neither Lessing’s early nor late discussions of the Trinity in any 
way anticipate Hegel’s Trinitarian construction of the philosophy of history.
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discrete aspects of the spirit’s self-expression, namely as pure Idea (the 
Son) and as finite particularity (the world) respectively. As in Lessing’s 
two modes of divine self-conception (‘at once’ and ‘discretely’), these 
two aspects are parallel and equally necessary expressions of God:71
the spirit sets itself in opposition to itself as its other […] The other, 
conceived as pure idea, is the Son of God, but this other in its particularity 
is the world, nature, and finite spirit: the finite spirit is thereby itself 
posited as a moment of God. Thus man is himself contained in the 
concept of God, and this containment can be expressed as signifying that 
the unity of man and God is posited in the Christian religion. 
But his Trinitarian deduction is at the same time more comprehensive 
than Lessing’s, in that Hegel also finds a place in it for the Incarnation 
of the Son—i.e. the coming of the historical Christ, whom Lessing had 
found it impossible to accommodate in his rational deduction of the 
Trinity: ‘“When the fullness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son”, says 
the Bible.72 This simply means that self-consciousness had raised itself to 
those moments which belong to the concept of spirit, and to the need to 
grasp these moments in an absolute manner.’73 What we have here is in 
fact the full and systematic exposition of ideas which were adumbrated 
in Lessing’s writings in fragmentary and experimental form, and briefly 
enlarged upon by the young Schelling.
But apart from the fact that they are more fully and systematically 
developed than Lessing’s, Hegel’s Trinitarian deductions would appear 
at first sight to differ from Lessing’s in a more fundamental respect, 
in that he consistently seems more anxious—not unlike Leibniz and 
Wolff—to show that his interpretations of Christian mystery are entirely 
compatible with orthodox Christian doctrine. This is obvious, for 
example, in the care he takes to give separate rational explanations of 
the Son as part of the Trinity and the historical Christ as the embodiment 
of the Son in time, i.e. in history. The same concern is evident when 
he explicitly warns, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, against 
any direct identification—such as Lessing had seemed to hint at in 
The Education of the Human Race—of ‘the eternal Son’ with the created 
universe.74
71  Hegel, Werke, XII, 392.
72  Galatians IV.4.
73  Hegel, Werke, XII, 386f.
74  Ibid., XVII, 245.
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Why Hegel should be more concerned than Lessing often was to 
accommodate his religious ideas to orthodox doctrines is an interesting 
question. His apparent respect for orthodoxy has, I believe, much more 
to do with philosophical, indeed secular considerations than with any 
profound theological conformity, or with any desire to preserve the 
Christian mysteries from full rational explication—for he is no less 
committed than Lessing was to doing precisely that. The apparent 
difference between Hegel and Lessing in the matter of Christian 
orthodoxy is due above all to the systematic character of Hegel’s thought, 
as opposed to Lessing’s love of experiment and his insouciance over any 
real or apparent philosophical contradictions he might find himself in. 
For Hegel’s fundamental philosophical endeavour is to defend the unity 
and mutual compatibility of all expressions of the human mind, and of 
the various elements of his own system in particular. That is, in its fully 
developed form, religion, as well as art, must ultimately embody the 
same truths as philosophy. The truths which art and religion embody 
can therefore in principle be fully expressed in philosophical terms, and 
in practice, Hegel claims to have so expressed them in his own system. In 
short, there is no ultimate mystery about existence which philosophy—
or reason—cannot resolve.75 
Hegel accordingly says of Lutheran Protestantism, which is for him 
the supreme and most developed form of Christianity: ‘Protestantism 
requires us to believe only what we know’.76 And it is here that his position 
as an heir to the Enlightenment, and his close affinity with Lessing, 
becomes most obvious (although he also exhibits an esprit de système 
which has more in common with early eighteenth-century rationalism 
than with the later phases of the Enlightenment). In his early years, 
Lessing had set out, very much in the spirit of Wolffian rationalism, to 
construct a ‘Christianity of Reason’, but soon abandoned it in a half-
finished state. When he resumed it in The Education of the Human Race, 
his conclusions are even more tentative and fragmentary—but this 
75  It is precisely the claim to have rationalised all mystery out of Christianity that 
rendered Hegel’s system unacceptable to various philosophically inclined Christians 
such as Coleridge: see Douglas Hedley, ‘Coleridge’s Intellectual Intuition, the Vision 
of God, and the Walled Garden of “Kubla Khan”’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 54 
(1998), 115–34 (p. 134).
76  Hegel, Werke, ed. by Phillip Marheineke and other hands, 18 vols (Berlin: Duncker 
und Humblot, 1832–45), XII/1, p. 246. 
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time by design, as the older Lessing is more interested in destabilising 
existing systems than in creating new ones. [On this feature of the older 
Lessing’s thought, see Chapter 3, pp. 77–78 above]. But Hegel began 
where Lessing left off, and completed the project of a ‘Christianity 
of Reason’ more comprehensively—if I am not mistaken—than any 
other thinker before or since. His logical analysis of the Spirit and its 
Trinitarian structure is a much more circumstantial development of 
Lessing’s rational deduction; his rationalisation of the Son achieves 
what Lessing had vainly aspired to, and comprehensively embraces the 
second person of the Godhead, the historical Christ, and the created 
universe; his philosophy of history—as already mentioned—is a more 
detailed and impressive rational account of the historical process as 
the realisation of spirit (again with strong Trinitarian implications) 
than Lessing’s simple Joachite scheme; and his presentation of revealed 
religion and its mysteries as an embodiment of truth at a less developed 
level than that of rational philosophy is an impressive fulfilment of 
Lessing’s demand for ‘the development of revealed truths into truths of 
reason’. This is not for a moment to suggest that Lessing’s writings on 
the Trinity were the direct source or inspiration of Hegel’s philosophical 
system, whose origins are far more complex than that. All that I wish 
to argue is that Lessing’s reflections on the Trinity represent a critical 
stage in the application of philosophy to Christian theology, and open 
up possibilities which various others, and Hegel in particular (probably 
in conscious awareness of Lessing’s earlier efforts) were later to exploit.
In conclusion, a few words may be said on later developments in 
Trinitarian thought, and on the significance of Lessing’s and Hegel’s 
contributions to it as viewed in historical retrospect. Speculative 
constructions of the Trinity reappear in the works of various writers 
after Hegel, and many of them are plainly indebted to him. The late 
Schelling, for example, in his ‘philosophy of revelation’ of the 1840s and 
1850s, renews the Joachite model of the three ages of history,77 and cites 
Leibniz and Lessing as major philosophical interpreters of the Trinity 
in the modern period.78 Clearly indebted to Hegel, Schelling repeats 
the latter’s denial that the Son can be identified with the created world, 
77  Schelling, Werke, ed. by Manfred Schröter, 6 vols (Munich: Beck, 1965; reprint of 
1927 edition), V. 463f.
78  Ibid., VI, p. 314.
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but nevertheless proceeds to interpret the Persons of the Trinity as 
‘cosmic, demiurgical powers’ which progressively realise themselves in 
temporal reality.79 Related ideas, again obviously influenced by Hegel, 
can be found in the works of such nineteenth-century philosophers 
and theologians as Anton Günther (1783–1863),80 Christian Hermann 
Weisse (1801–66),81 and Aloys Emanuel Biedermann (1819–85).82
It is possible, however, that Hegel’s philosophical analysis of the 
Trinity took this particular line of enquiry as far as it could go, for 
few philosophers have attempted to take it any further. His legacy is 
to be found not so much among philosophers as among theologians, 
especially the exponents of that so-called ‘process theology’ which 
presents God as developing in time and influenced by temporal events.83 
In orthodox quarters, the reception of this aspect of his thought in recent 
times has, of course, remained predominantly critical. It was already 
apparent to Leibniz that philosophical deductions of the Trinity are 
fraught with difficulty, and he and other defenders of orthodoxy in the 
eighteenth century were not convinced by them. Johann Thomas Haupt 
pointed out in 1752 (following Porphyry’s critique of Christianity in the 
third century) that attempts to deduce the second person of the Trinity 
from the first readily lead to an infinite regress: for even if we conclude 
that God’s ‘representation of himself’ necessarily has an independent 
objective existence as the Son, equal and parallel to that of the Father, 
the Son’s ‘representation of himself’ must in turn have an independent 
objective existence, and so on ad infinitum: in short, there is no rational 
ground for limiting the number of persons in the Trinity to three.84 
This difficulty is removed, of course, as soon as the Son is identified 
with the created universe, which can be represented not as a mirror-
image of the Father but as a gradual unfolding of the Father’s perfections 
in the temporal process. But this construction is no less fraught with 
difficulties than the previous one. Even Hegel’s formulation—although 
79  Ibid., VI, 314 and 339f.
80  See Bernhard Osswald, Anton Günther. Theologisches Denken im Kontext einer 
Philosophie der Subjektivität (Paderborn and Munich: Schoningh, 1990, esp. pp. 
179–229.
81  See the article on Weisse in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie XLI, 590–94 (p. 591).
82  See the article on Biedermann in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XLVI, 540–43 (p. 
541).
83  Cf. Schlitt, Hegel’s Trinitarian Claim, p. 1.
84  Cf. Haupt, Gründe der Vernunft (see note 9 above), pp. 170, 185, 198f., and 294.
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it is far more sophisticated than its eighteenth-century predecessors—
attributes a metaphysical necessity of an impersonal kind to the 
expression of the Absolute in the world of appearances, a necessity 
which is incompatible with the action of a consciously intelligent, free, 
and omnipotent creator of the universe of space and time; for unlike 
Christian orthodoxy, it implies that the created universe (including 
human history) is a necessary ‘moment’ of the divine nature, essential 
to the being of God as the vehicle of his developing consciousness, rather 
than the free product of his will.85 As one theological critic of German 
Idealism puts it:86 
The Father ‘eternally begets and loves the Son through the Spirit’. 
But this activity of God is not the same as the Time process. The eternal 
begetting of the Son is not the same as the creation of the world, through 
which God comes to self-consciousness. This is to make us necessary to 
God, and in fact to make us the Second Person of the Trinity. 
But the main weakness of Hegel’s construction of the Trinity, like 
Lessing’s and every other speculative deduction before and since, 
is that it is ultimately incommensurable with the empirical nature of 
the revelation which it purports to explain. In the last resort, Lessing’s 
‘broad and ugly ditch’ remains as unbridgeable as ever. No rational 
deduction can demonstrate that the self-revelation of God necessarily 
took place specifically in Jesus of Nazareth as distinct from any other 
individual,87 nor can it prove the identity of the latter with that Son 
whom the Nicene Creed describes as ‘begotten of his Father before all 
worlds’, and of whom St Paul declares ‘he is before all things, and by 
him all things consist’.88
Lessing was conscious of these difficulties. But he did not abandon 
his efforts to rationalise the Trinity and other Christian mysteries, 
because he was convinced of their heuristic potential—even if whatever 
rational sense they might yield bore little relation to the historical basis of 
Christianity. As he puts it in Paragraph 77 of The Education of the Human 
Race: ‘And why should we not nevertheless be guided by a religion 
whose historical truth, one may think, looks so dubious, to better and 
85  Cf. Hodgson, Doctrine of the Trinity, pp. 130–33 and 190.
86  F. H. Brabant in Rawlinson (ed.), Essays on the Trinity, p. 349. 
87  Cf. Moltmann, History and the Triune God, p. 82.
88  Colossians I.17.
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more precise conceptions of the divine being, of our own nature, and of 
our relations with God, which human reason would never have arrived 
at on its own?’89
What Lessing suggests here is, I think, absolutely right—more right 
(or at least potentially more productive) than what he says in Paragraph 
4 of the same work, which notoriously appears to contradict the later 
statement just quoted from Paragraph 77: ‘revelation [...] gives the 
human race nothing which human reason, left to itself, would not also 
arrive at; it merely gave it, and gives it, the most important of these things 
sooner.’90 This latter passage reflects his own earlier endeavours, as in The 
Christianity of Reason, to provide a conclusive rational demonstration of 
one of the main Christian mysteries. Paragraph 77, however, represents 
his later, more fruitful insight that the source of an idea (and this is 
as true in philosophy as it is in science) is in itself unimportant. It is 
its potential to generate further thought that counts. I have tried to 
show how some of that potential was realised, not just in theology 
but also in the philosophy of history; for in conjunction with Herder’s 
cultural relativism, Hegel’s assimilation of the Trinity, as universal, self-
realising reason, to history supplied the basis for the most influential 
philosophical account in modern times of the historical process and its 
internal dynamics.
89  LM XIII, 482.
90  LM XIII, 416. See, however, Karl Eibl, ‘”kommen würde” gegen “nimmermehr 
gekommen wäre”. Aufklärung des “Widerspruchs” von § 4 und § 77 in Lessings 
Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts’, Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift, 65 (1984), 
pp. 461–64, who makes an interesting case for the view that the two paragraphs are 
not in fact in contradiction.

La Matrone d’Éphèse, etching and engraving from Contes et nouvelles en vers par Jean 
de La Fontaine (Paris: de l’imprimerie de P. Didot, 1795), Metropolitan Museum of 





5. Lessing and Misogyny:  
Die Matrone von Ephesus1
The story of the widow of Ephesus is recorded in innumerable versions, 
from Europe to China and from antiquity to the present day.2 But the 
most familiar version, at least in European literature, is that in the 
Satyricon of Petronius.3 A young widow, renowned for her fidelity, vows 
to starve herself to death in her husband’s tomb. One night, a soldier 
on guard nearby over the corpses of some crucified thieves notices a 
light in the tomb and discovers the widow, with her maidservant in 
attendance. Encouraged by the maidservant, he prevails upon the 
widow first to share his meal, and subsequently to respond to his 
amorous advances. Meanwhile, a relative of one of the crucified thieves 
removes the unattended corpse and takes it away for burial. The soldier, 
on discovering the loss, resolves to commit suicide rather than face 
execution for neglecting his duty. But the widow proves equal to the 
emergency: reluctant to lose her lover, she offers her husband’s body as 
a substitute for the one stolen from the cross.
My aim in this essay is to examine Lessing’s unfinished comedy on 
this subject, Die Matrone von Ephesus, and in particular to explain why 
he abandoned it when it was almost completed. This question has been 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘Lessing and Misogyny. 
“Die Matrone von Ephesus”’, in Texte, Motive und Gestalten. Festschrift für Hans Reiss, 
ed. John L. Hibberd and H. B. Nisbet (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989), pp. 13–31.
2  See Peter Ure, ‘The Widow of Ephesus. Some Reflections on an International 
Comic Theme’, Durham University Journal, 49 (1956–57), 1–9; M. Dacier, ‘Examen 
de l’Histoire de la Matrone d’Ëphèse’, Mémoires de littérature, tirés des Registres de 
l’Académie Royale des Inscriptions, 41 (1780), 523–45; and Eduard Grisebach, Die 
Wanderung der Novelle von der treulosen Witwe durch die Weltliteratur, 2., vermehrte 
Ausgabe (Berlin: Lehmann, 1889).
3  Petronius, Gaius, Satyricon, and Seneca, L. Annaeus, Apocalocyntosis, Loeb Classical 
Library, rev. edn (London: Heinemann, 1956), pp. 228–35. 
© 2021 Hugh Barr Nisbet, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0180.05
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discussed before, but none of the explanations so far advanced strikes 
me as satisfactory. Before I turn to the fragment itself, however, I should 
like to say something about the misogynistic associations of the story 
and Lessing’s attitude to them, for this will have a bearing on my later 
attempt to explain why the play remained a fragment.
The attitude of misogyny is closely associated with the story of 
the widow, but its scope and expression vary considerably from one 
version to another. Over the centuries, these versions move along a scale 
between two extreme positions: between misogynistic condemnation 
of female infidelity on the one hand, and good-humoured tolerance, 
or even approval, of the widow’s change of heart on the other. Lessing 
described Petronius’s story as ‘undoubtedly the most bitter satire ever 
written on female frivolity’,4 and it certainly does imply a cynical and 
negative judgement on womanhood (which is hardly surprising in the 
context of a work in which most of the male characters are paederasts). 
Nevertheless, Petronius’s version is a long way from the extreme of 
misogyny. This extreme is reached in the versions of monkish compilers 
in the Middle Ages, some of whom conclude with diatribes on female 
depravity, and even aggravate the widow’s offence by having her 
mutilate her husband’s body to make it more closely resemble the 
corpse of the crucified thief.5 But in modern times, the movement is 
all in the opposite direction. In La Fontaine’s influential verse-tale La 
Matrone d’Éphèse of 1682, the humorous element is predominant,6 as it is 
in almost all versions written in the eighteenth century, when the story 
achieved its greatest popularity.7 Most writers are, of course, aware of 
the misogynistic potential of the tale; but they generally qualify it or 
tone it down considerably,8 even to the extent of making the main figure 
a man instead of a woman. In short, a more tolerant attitude than ever 
4  Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, ed. by Karl Lachmann and Franz 
Muncker, 23 vols (Stuttgart, Leipzig and Berlin: Göschen, 1886–1924), IX, 333; for 
the text of Lessing’s (incomplete) dramatic version, see ibid., III, 439–66. Subsequent 
references to this edition are identified by the abbreviation LM. 
5  See, for example, Ure, p. 2 and Elisabeth Frenzel, Stoffe der Weltliteratur (Stuttgart: 
Kröner, 1962), pp. 666–69. 
6  Jean de La Fontaine, Contes et Nouvelles en vers, ed. by Georges Couton (Paris: 
Garnier, 1961), pp. 341–45.
7  See Roseann Runte, ‘The Matron of Ephesus in Eighteenth-Century France. The 
Lady and the Legend’, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 6 (1977), 361–75.
8  See Michael M. Metzger, Lessing and the Language of Comedy (The Hague: Mouton, 
1966), pp. 164ff.
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before is taken towards the widow’s lapse. In so far as her return to life 
is prompted by natural feelings—and in the age of sensibility, the voice 
of the heart has great moral authority—it merits approval rather than 
condemnation.9 Nevertheless, her abrupt conversion from obsession 
with the dead to passion for the living becomes a frequent object of 
satire prose and verse narrative, fable, comedy, farce, and even opera.
Such good-humoured satire on female fickleness is prominent in 
the dramatic versions with which Lessing was most familiar, namely 
Houdar de La Motte’s La Matrone d’Éphèse10 and Christian Felix Weisse’s 
Die Matrone von Ephesus.11 The idiom of these comedies, unlike that of 
Lessing’s own fragment, is not yet that of the age of sensibility, but the 
robuster and more cynical humour of the Rococo period. The cruder 
of the two plays, La Motte’s prose comedy, in fact contains a good deal 
of knockabout farce, with servants blundering into each other in the 
darkness of the tomb, and the widow subjected to the advances not only 
of the soldier, but also of the soldier’s seventy-year-old father. There is, 
admittedly, a virulent denunciation of female perfidy towards the end;12 
but it cannot be taken seriously, since it comes from the jealous old man 
when he discovers that his son has beaten him in the competition for the 
widow’s affections. In fact, this same old man pleads with the widow 
soon afterwards to substitute her husband’s body for the missing corpse 
and to marry his son to save him from suicide. And this, of course, helps 
to diminish the widow’s responsibility for the gruesome act which 
follows.
The comedy of Lessing’s friend Weisse is very much in the Anacreontic 
mode. Its morality is that stylised and ironic hedonism which is typical 
of Rococo poetry and the widow is easily won over by the conventional 
carpe diem arguments of the soldier and the maidservant. Within these 
9  See Runte, pp. 363 and 367; also Wilhelm Heinse’s remark of 1773, quoted in 
Grisebach, Die Wanderung der Novelle von der treulosen Witwe, p. 119: ‘Just set yourself 
in the position of the widow! You will find nothing unnatural about her.’
10  Houdar de La Motte, Oeuvres, 10 vols (Paris: Prault, 1753–54), V, 463–510; though 
not published until 1754, the play was first performed in 1702 (see Metzger, Lessing 
and the Language of Comedy, p. 167).
11  Christian Felix Weisse, Weissens Lustspiele, 3 vols (Karlsruhe: Schmieder, 1778), I, 
209–60; rev. edn, in Weisse, Lustspiele 3 vols (Leipzig: Dykische Buchhandlung, 
1783), I, 365–422. 
12  La Motte, Oeuvres, V, 505: ‘Henceforth, all women are for me so many monsters that 
I abhor! They are nothing but frivolity, inconstancy, dissimulation, perfidy, and all 
the vices in the world together.’
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Rococo conventions, women are, of course, primarily a source of erotic 
pleasure, and the institution of marriage tends to elicit misogynistic 
comments, as in Weisse’s lines ‘I know that many would gladly pay 
double the fare/ If Charon would take the wife away promptly.’13 When 
the subject of corpses is mentioned in this play, it is treated quite literally 
with gallows humour as in the maidservant’s remark on the removal 
of the thief’s body: ‘Oh you accursed thief, who stole the thief away/ 
May the devil take you and the corpse along with you!’14 But here, as 
in the widow’s own suggestion concerning her husband’s body, the 
black humour has no undertones of moral criticism, and the play’s 
Anacreontic frivolity gives it an unreality which takes the edge off its 
satire on the heroine.
The misogynistic humour which sometimes occurs in these dramas 
is also to be found in Lessing’s works, especially in his early years. It 
appears most often in his epigrams, many of which are modelled on 
those of Martial, and which are frequently directed at the institution of 
marriage. The following are typical:15
The world contains at most a single evil wife:
It’s sad that every man thinks his one fits the role.
A wife—God spare me this!—is useful only twice—
Once in the marriage bed, and once when she is dead.
There are numerous other examples of acerbic wit at the expense of 
women in Lessing’s early poems, many of them in the Anacreontic 
idiom;16 and the early comedy The Old Maid contains only slightly less 
virulent satire on an old maid who is desperate to catch her man.17 (Such 
satire, it must be added, is not directed solely and specifically at women: 
in the same year as The Old Maid, Lessing wrote another satirical comedy, 
The Misogynist, this time at the expense of men.)
It is against this background that we must assess Lessing’s interest in 
the story of the widow of Ephesus, which began during his friendship 
with Weisse when the two were students in Leipzig, and continued at 
least until the end of his Hamburg period. We do not know what his 
13  Weisse, Lustspiele (1783), I, 369.
14  Weissens Lustspiele (1778), I, 258.
15 LM I, 12 and 43.
16  See, for example, LM I, 161f.
17  LM III, 201–34.
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earliest sketches were like.18 But when he did most of his work on the 
play—namely in Hamburg—he was concerned above all to modify or 
neutralise the misogynistic element in the story, and there is little sign 
in the surviving fragments of the venomous satire on women which 
we find in his early poetry. Indeed, with Lessing’s version of the story, 
we reach the opposite extreme to that of the medieval misogynists: it 
marks the culmination of the eighteenth-century tendency to depict the 
widow in as favourable a light as possible. Lessing makes every effort to 
retain our sympathy for the widow, and to present her change of heart 
as fully understandable. His main reason for doing so, as he indicates 
in the Hamburg Dramaturgy, is to bring the play into line with his own 
theory of comedy as it had now developed—that is, as a realistic form of 
drama which evokes sympathetic laughter at human weakness, without 
forfeiting the audience’s respect for the comic hero.19
As Lessing puts it, anyone who attempts to dramatise the story 
faces a peculiar difficulty, a difficulty which previous dramatisations, 
such as La Motte’s, had failed to overcome. The problem is that, in a 
dramatic version, it is much more difficult to take a tolerant view of the 
widow’s behaviour than it is in the narrative form. For in the narrative 
version, our distance from the events and our delight at the story’s 
ironic twists make us able to accept, or even excuse, the widow’s final 
stratagem to save her lover, namely the surrender of her husband’s 
body: ‘her weakness seems to us to be the weakness of the entire sex; 
[...] what she does, we believe almost any woman would have done’.20 
But on the stage—especially if the characters are realistically drawn—it 
is difficult to make the widow’s act, when we experience it at first hand, 
seem anything other than a revolting crime, and the widow herself as 
meriting anything less than the death penalty: ‘And the less artistry the 
poet employs in her seduction, the more she seems to us to merit this 
18  They may well have differed considerably from the surviving fragments, as a letter 
from Weisse to Karl Wilhelm Ramler on 21 July 1768 suggests. Weisse writes: ’He 
[Lessing] showed me the plan of his Widow of Ephesus several years ago: in his 
version, if I remember rightly, the widow’s husband comes to life again’ (cited in 
Waldemar Oehlke, Lessing und seine Zeit, 2 vols (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1919), I, 438). 
This suggests that Lessing intended to diminish the widow’s guilt by revealing at 
the end that the husband was not after all dead—a device employed in various 
versions before his time (cf. Ure, ‘The Widow of Ephesus’, p. 4 and Runte, ‘The 
Matron of Ephesus’, p. 364).
19  See LM IX, 333f. and 302ff. (Hamburg Dramaturgy, §§36 and 28f.).
20  LM IX, 334
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punishment; for we then condemn in her not women’s frailty in general, 
but a preeminently frivolous and dissolute female in particular.’21 In other 
words, what Lessing objects to most of all in the earlier dramatisations 
of the story is their failure to retain our sympathy and respect for the 
widow. And he blames this shortcoming on the dramatists’ failure to 
motivate her change of heart convincingly, and to eliminate the offensive 
aspects of the ending: ‘In short, if Petronius’s tale is to be transferred 
successfully to the theatre, it must both retain the same ending and not 
retain it; the widow must go so far and not go so far. The explanation of 
this on another occasion!’ He is clearly alluding here to the solution he 
adopted in his own uncompleted play: he makes the report of the stolen 
corpse an invention of the soldier’s servant, thus obviating the need for 
the substitution to be carried out at all.22 Nevertheless, the widow still 
has to go so far as to agree to the substitution before it is shown to be 
unnecessary; and it is shortly before this point is reached that Lessing’s 
final draft of The Widow of Ephesus breaks off. As a result, most critics 
have concluded that he abandoned the work because he was unable 
to present the widow’s agreement to the substitution convincingly or 
acceptably—that is, to avoid making her seem vicious or depraved.23
I do not believe that this is the reason why he failed to complete the 
play. But in order to prove my point, I must first ask what measures he 
adopted to solve the problem he himself identified—that of motivating 
the widow’s final actions convincingly and presenting them so as not to 
forfeit our sympathy. To accomplish this end, he employed two distinct 
strategies: he set about raising the level of the principal characters and 
their dialogue, making them more refined and sophisticated than in 
any previous version of the story and eliminating the coarser elements 
almost completely; and he worked out the widow’s motivation to the last 
21  Ibid.
22  LM III, 443.
23  See, for example, F. J. Lamport, Lessing and the Drama (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), p. 156: ‘after the seriousness with which Antiphila and her grief are 
portrayed it is hard to imagine her being convincingly cured to the point even of 
agreeing to such a scheme’, and T. C. van Stockum, ‘Lessings Dramenentwurf 
Die Matrone von Ephesus’, Neophilologus, 46 (1962), 125–34, (p. 131): ‘we may well 
assume that Lessing finally gave up the experiment as psychologically impossible’; 
see also Robert Petsch, ‘Die Matrone von Ephesus. Ein dramatisches Bruchstück von 
Lessing’, Dichtung und Volkstum, 41 (1941), 87–95 (p. 88); Jürgen Schröder, Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing. Sprache und Drama (Munich: Fink, 1972), p. 303; and Peter Pütz, Die 
Leistung der Form. Lessings Dramen (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1986), p. 72. 
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detail, building up a series of pressures which leave her little alternative 
but to act as she does, and render her behaviour wholly understandable.
In the first of these strategies, Lessing was merely carrying further the 
tendency of his age to portray the widow in an increasingly sympathetic 
light. Thus, La Fontaine, La Motte, and others had made the suggestion 
concerning the substitution of the corpse come not from the widow, as 
in Petronius, but from her servant,24 and, as a concession to religious 
sensibilities, they described the thief as hanged rather than crucified. 
Besides, the widow’s admission of love for the soldier now usually 
came after his threat of suicide instead of before.25 Lessing’s draft for the 
ending of the play shows that he planned not only to adopt such earlier 
mitigations of the widow’s conduct, but also—as already mentioned—
to add the significant new device of making the report of the stolen 
corpse an invention of the soldier’s servant, thereby eliminating the 
grisly ending altogether. The soldier himself has also become an officer 
and—at least in some respects—a gentleman. Furthermore, as critics 
have noticed,26 Lessing’s efforts to raise the tone of the play from farce to 
more serious comedy can be detected even from one draft of his play to 
the next. For example, in the earlier of the two longer fragments, the first 
thought of the widow Antiphila on waking from her sleep is food; in 
the final version, it is of her departed husband. And whereas the officer 
Philokrates, in the earlier version, invents the story of an ambiguous 
oracle which had prophesied that ‘he would find the best woman 
among the dead’, this misogynistic joke is deleted in the later version. In 
fact, all the coarser and misogynistic humour that remains is relegated 
to Philokrates’s servant Dromo, as when he declares that he believes 
in women’s fidelity just as he believes in ghosts, or when he echoes the 
earlier promise of the widow’s maidservant Mysis that they will witness 
‘an example of marital love [...] such as [...] the world sees every day’. 27 
24  See La Fontaine, Contes et Nouvelles, p. 345 and La Motte, Oeuvres, V, 509.
25  See, for example, Weisse (1778 edition), I, 257. All this, of course, is part of a 
wider process of growing refinement throughout the eighteenth century; cf. John 
McManners, Death and the Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 
p. 451. 
26  See, for example, Petsch, ‘Die Matrone von Ephesus’, p. 90 and Karl S. Guthke (ed.), 
postscript to G. E. Lessing, D. Faust; Die Matrone von Ephesus (Stuttgart: Reclam, 
1968), p. 76.
27  LM III, 444. This rejoinder appears only in the penultimate version of the fragment; 
but since the initial cue for it is retained in the final version (LM III, 450), it is clear 
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It is, however, going too far to suggest that Lessing has so ennobled 
the main characters as to remove the element of satire entirely.28 The 
jokes of the servant Dromo are aimed at female weakness in general; 
but they are also a commentary on the widow’s weakness in particular. 
Besides, the widow Antiphila herself swears the superbly ironic oath 
never to leave the tomb ‘without my soul’s beloved’. But this delightful 
touch does not merely ironise her own supposed fidelity; it is also an 
ingenious device to prevent her from committing perjury, and thus 
helps to temper the force of the satire. Her very name ‘Antiphila’ (which 
Lessing takes over from Weisse, although he adopts no other names 
from the latter’s play) casts an ironic light on her chastity, since it means 
‘returner of love’.29 What Lessing has done, then, is to strike a balance 
between refining the widow’s character on the one hand to make her 
more sympathetic, and retaining an element of satire—albeit mild and 
good-humoured satire—on her weakness on the other.
But it is to the second of his strategies—that of providing a 
flawless motivation for the widow’s conduct—that Lessing devotes 
most attention. As he had pointed out in the Hamburg Dramaturgy, 
her culpability increases ‘the less art the poet has employed on her 
seduction’. Accordingly, he develops the widow’s psychology in far 
greater detail than any previous writer, and employs every conceivable 
device to make her seduction plausible and convincing.
For example, we are told by her servant near the beginning that she 
has been convulsed with grief for forty-eight hours, and has finally 
fallen asleep through exhaustion. There can thus be no doubt about 
her affliction; but is it also clear that its most critical phase is over. 
Tears, as Kant points out in his Anthropology, have a restorative effect 
in such situations: ‘A widow who, as they say, will not let herself be 
comforted (i.e. will not let her tears be prevented), looks after her 
health without knowing or actually wishing it.’30 And sleep doubtless 
that Lessing intended to supply the punchline in the (unwritten) revised version of 
the scene in question.
28  This is the drift of Metzger’s interpretation, which takes a wholly positive view of 
the main characters and represents the play as a serious comedy in the same vein as 
Minna von Barnhelm (Metzger, Lessing and the Language of Comedy, pp. 171–74).
29  Metzger (see previous note) takes her name to mean ‘against love’, which makes 
no sense in the light of Philokrates’s description of it as ‘a lovely, flattering name’ 
(Metzger, p. 170).
30  Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Preussische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1900–), VII, 262.
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plays its part too. For although, when the widow awakens, she 
launches into despairing tirades and takes her solemn oath never to 
leave the tomb without her beloved, she is at least able to talk about 
her situation now without breaking down. And when she suddenly 
learns from her servant that a soldier has been there while she slept 
and is about to return with his commanding officer, it is clear that her 
consciousness of her femininity has also returned. For although she is 
forced to feign sleep again to escape the officer’s attentions, the stage-
direction tells us that she throws herself on her husband’s coffin ‘in 
a negligent but alluring posture’.31 Forcing her to feign sleep is one 
of Lessing’s most ingenious additions to the plot: for the widow is 
thereby compelled to listen to the enraptured officer’s praises of her 
beauty, delivered with passionate eloquence, whereas this would 
have been out of the question if she admitted to being awake. When 
she is eventually obliged, by the ardent officer’s touching her hand, 
to abandon her pretence, his abject plea for shelter from the storm 
outside, followed by respectful praise for her fortitude and resolution, 
is not easy to dismiss. But even so—and despite the maidservant’s 
growing intervention on behalf of the officer—she resolves to flee 
the tomb as soon as he goes off to fetch provisions (thereby revealing 
an impulsive tendency which casts doubt on the seriousness of her 
oath). She is prevented from leaving only by the officer’s immediate 
return. When, on realising her intention, he suddenly and nobly 
capitulates and agrees to leave himself, she is momentarily caught off 
balance; this allows him to regain the initiative, which he promptly 
does by claiming, at the mention of her husband, to have been her 
husband’s bosom friend and comrade-in-arms in earlier days. This 
ruse is Lessing’s second major innovation, and it is as ingenious as the 
previous one of forcing the widow to feign sleep. For the officer is now 
able to gain the widow’s confidence, and to appear to share her grief; 
and she, very understandably, now retreats from her insistence that 
he leave at once. The more he commiserates with her and magnifies 
their common loss, the more she likes it—and him—until he suddenly 
remembers his duty.
This is where Lessing’s final fragment breaks off. The widow’s 
motivation up to this point is complete. All that remained to be written 
31  An earlier draft is more explicit: ‘in a not unpractised posture’. 
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was one short scene with the false report concerning the stolen corpse, 
followed by the officer’s suicidal despair and the widow’s agreement 
to save him. With the widow now facing a new catastrophe which 
she must associate intimately with the first—the loss of her husband’s 
friend and the sharer of her grief—it is not straining credibility unduly 
to suppose that she is not likely to resist for long her servant’s insistence 
that, as a matter of life and death, the only way to save the officer is 
by surrendering her husband’s corpse. This grim prospect would have 
been removed immediately, however, by the confession of the officer’s 
servant that he had invented the story of the theft to further his master’s 
designs; and after the officer’s stern rebuke, the comic atmosphere 
would have returned with the final scene, essentially complete in draft, 
between the two servants.
One further device should be mentioned which Lessing employs 
in order to make the widow’s change of heart acceptable. Although 
he was able, by the ambiguous wording of the widow’s oath, to 
prevent her committing perjury, this does not excuse her morally 
from breaking the vow she believed she was making. But even here, 
he retains our sympathy for her by making this vow the product of 
extreme, indeed excessive grief, which has plunged her into religious 
despair and caused her to question providence and even to denounce 
the gods.32 We know, however, from the crises of faith of Tellheim in 
Minna von Barnhelm and the hero of Nathan the Wise that such doubts of 
providence are, for Lessing, signs of temporary emotional imbalance 
in people who have reached the end of their tether. It is incumbent 
on the dramatist to counteract such doubts and to reaffirm the world-
view of theodicy, of metaphysical optimism.33 The widow’s denial of 
the gods, and the oath she swears in her state of despair, are a sign that 
her grief has gone too far. If there is a providence—and its existence is 
axiomatic for Lessing—she will surely, and rightly, be prevented from 
carrying out the oath she thought she was making. In short, this oath 
itself was an aberration; and conversely, her violation of it will confirm 
that she has returned to normality.34
32  LM III, 452.
33  See LM, X, 120f. (Hamburg Dramaturgy, §79).
34  Cf. Lamport, Lessing and the Drama, p. 156 and Metzger, Lessing and the Language of 
Comedy, p. 173.
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Never was what Friedrich Schlegel described as Lessing’s ‘dramatic 
algebra’ put to more rigorous use than it is in The Widow of Ephesus to 
make the heroine’s motivation comprehensible in terms of realistic 
psychology. Never before had so diverse, subtle and devastating an 
accumulation of pressures been brought to bear so tellingly against the 
widow’s resistance, or her capitulation been made to seem so inevitable. 
Some measure of Lessing’s success can be obtained if we compare it 
with his attempts shortly afterwards to solve the related problem of 
motivation in Emilia Galotti,35 in which the heroine has to confess, 
immediately after her bridegroom’s murder, that she may not be able to 
resist the advances of a seducer—a seducer whom she has every reason 
to suspect of complicity in the murder. In The Widow of Ephesus, we 
witness in detail how the widow’s seduction is put into effect and her 
resistance overcome. In Emilia Galotti, on the other hand, our knowledge 
of the heroine’s psychology depends largely on hearsay and on her own 
concluding statements, for we have not seen enough of her behaviour at 
first hand to form an independent assessment of her motives.36 But this 
is too familiar to need elaboration. All I wish to point out is that Emilia’s 
motivation is much less transparent, and much more problematic, than 
the widow’s motivation for her change of heart towards the officer. And 
if this is so, it must seem improbable that Lessing’s dissatisfaction with 
the widow’s motivation was the reason why he failed to complete The 
Widow of Ephesus, as several critics maintain,37 although he successfully 
completed Emilia Galotti soon afterwards.
It has also been suggested that the widow’s final action—her 
agreement to surrender her husband’s corpse—was potentially too 
offensive for Lessing to be able to complete the play.38 He had, of course, 
35  The affinities between the two plays, including verbal echoes of The Widow of Ephesus 
in the later play, have often been noticed: compare, for example, the maidservant’s 
words at the end of Lessing’s draft of the eighth scene of his comedy (LM III, 444) 
and the closing words of the prince at the end of Emilia Galotti; also the officer’s 
enumeration of the identifying traits of the widow’s late husband (LM III, 463) and 
the dialogue between the prince and Marinelli in Act I, Scene 6 of Emilia Galotti. 
36  This point is well made by G. A. Wells, ‘What is Wrong with Emilia Galotti?’, German 
Life and Letters, 37 (1983–84), 163–73.
37  See note 23 above.
38  See Erich Schmidt, Lessing. Geschichte seines Lebens und seiner Schriften, 4th edn, 2 vols 
(Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1923), I, 559: ‘Even as a mere jeu d’esprit, 
this wanton transposition of bodies resists theatrical treatment, for one plays no 
games with corpses’.
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already eliminated the most offensive aspect of the traditional ending 
by making the substitution of the corpse unnecessary. And there is a 
further factor which helps to make the widow’s consent to this proposal 
acceptable, as comparison with Emilia Galotti will again confirm. Both 
plays are based on prose narratives of classical antiquity. But Emilia 
Galotti is given a modern, contemporary setting, whereas The Widow of 
Ephesus retains its setting in ancient times. The change of setting created 
serious problems with the former play, whose tragic ending—the 
father’s killing of his daughter to save her virtue—became much less 
plausible in a modern context than in the context of family honour and 
threatened enslavement in ancient Rome.39 Such problems do not arise 
in The Widow of Ephesus, however, for it presupposes a society in which 
a widow can publicly decide to starve herself to death in her husband’s 
tomb and in which a soldier can face execution for allowing a dead 
man’s body to be removed by his relatives for burial. But once we have 
accepted such customs as these, the need for the substitution of a corpse, 
and the widow’s consent to this under extreme pressure also become 
easier to accept than they would have been in a modern setting. As in 
Nathan the Wise, the psychology is realistic, but the setting gives us a 
certain distance from the events depicted.
Besides, one must not exaggerate the eighteenth century’s 
squeamishness over such matters as references to corpses on stage.40 The 
sheer number of dramatisations of the story suggests that the subject-
matter in itself was not considered unacceptable,41 and the positive 
reception of Lessing’s fragment when it appeared posthumously in 
1784 indicates that its content as such was not regarded as offensive.42 
This is hardly surprising, when we consider that much more gruesome 
39  See Wilfried Barner and other hands, Lessing: Epoche–Werk–Wirkung, 5th edn 
(Munich: C. H. Beck, 1987), p. 364; also Lamport, Lessing and the Drama, pp. 177f.
40  Erich Schmidt’s reaction to this question (see note 38 above) is more characteristic 
of his own times than of Lessing’s (his Lessing biography was first published in 
1884–92).
41  Oehlke, Lessing und seine Zeit, I, 468, cites the Bibliothèque des Théâtres of 1784 as 
stating ‘Chaque théâtre a sa Matrone d’Ëphèse’; see also Ure, ‘The Widow of 
Ephesus’, pp. 5f.
42  See, for example, the review in the Litteratur- und Theaterzeitung of 1784 cited in G. E. 
Lessing, Werke und Briefe, ed. by Wilfried Barner and other hands, 12 vols (Frankfurt 
a. M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985–2003), VI, 791f.: ‘A marvellous, marvellous 
play!’ [etc.].
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material than this was currently appearing on the German stage. In 
Gerstenberg’s Ugolino of 1768, which was successfully performed in 
Berlin in 1769 and sympathetically received by Lessing43 and Herder,44 
two coffins are brought on to the stage, one containing Ugolino’s dying 
son and the other his dead wife; another of the sons subsequently has 
to be restrained from making a cannibalistic attack on his mother’s 
corpse. 45 There is nothing remotely like this in The Widow of Ephesus, 
whose potentially gruesome aspects are eliminated entirely or reduced 
to an absolute minimum. Their presence therefore does not explain why 
Lessing left the work unfinished.
It has also been suggested that he failed to complete the play for 
reasons of time or pressure of work on Emilia Galotti.46 But this play in 
particular, which is by far the most complete of his dramatic fragments, 
needed very little work indeed to finish it: the final scene was complete 
in draft., and only the penultimate scene, whose outlines had also been 
established, remained to be written. And to say that his interest shifted 
to Emilia Galotti is to state the consequence, not the cause, of his loss of 
interest in the earlier play. Some reports in fact suggest that he actually 
did complete it. For example, Boie claims on 28 May 1771, after a visit to 
Lessing, that the play was complete but that Lessing refused to show it 
to him, and Eschenburg reports in 1785 that a complete text of the play 
was among the box of papers which Lessing lost in 1775 in Leipzig.47 
But even if the play was complete in 1771, we still have to explain why 
Lessing did not publish it or show it to anyone in the following years, 
although he had no such inhibitions about Emilia Galotti, which he 
published as soon as it was completed.
43  See Lessing, Werke und Briefe, XI/1, 470 and 503–07, Lessing to Nicolai, 4 August 1767 
and Lessing to Gerstenberg, 25 February 1768. The widow’s dream, as recounted in 
the penultimate fragment of Lessing’s play (LM III, 441), is in fact modelled on 
Gaddo’s dream in Ugolino, as Schröder, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, p. 298, points out.
44  See Herder’s extensive review in Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by 
Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877–1913), IV, 308–20.
45  Heinrich Wilhelm von Gerstenberg, Ugolino, ed. by Christoph Siegrist (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 1966), pp. 31 and 58f.
46  See the respective editors’ remarks in Lessing, Werke und Briefe, VI, 792 and LM III, 
p. xiii.
47  See Lessing im Gespräch, ed. by Richard Daunicht (Munich: Fink, 1971), pp. 303 and 
392; see also the report of Johann Anton Leisewitz on p. 574 of the same volume. 
Lessing was, however, in the habit of declaring that he had completed a play as soon 
as he had drafted a complete scenario, as C. F. Weisse reports (Daunicht, Lessing im 
Gespräch, p. 29).
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Thus, none of the explanations advanced for Lessing’s failure to 
complete or publish The Widow of Ephesus—the problem of the widow’s 
motivation, the difficulty of coping in a dramatic version with the 
coarser and potentially distasteful aspects of the story, lack of time, or 
the pressure of other work—is wholly adequate. The decisive factor is 
altogether more obvious—so much so that this may explain why no one, 
so far as I can see, has suggested it before.
We do not know precisely when Lessing abandoned his fragment, 
but it is generally agreed that he must have done so at some time 
between 1769 and 1771.48 During this time, a series of events occurred 
which decisively affected his personal life, and which had an unforeseen 
bearing on the play he was working on. The first of these was the death 
of a friend. In December 1769, his friend Engelbert König died in Venice 
in the course of a business trip to Italy, and the news reached Lessing 
in January 1770 in Hamburg.49 In April of that year, Lessing moved to 
Wolfenbüttel; and in June, he began an affectionate correspondence 
with Eva König, the widow of his deceased friend and his own wife-
to-be. Life had suddenly caught up with art: the courtship of a widow 
had become the centre of Lessing’s own emotional existence.
But is there any evidence of more specific parallels between the real-
life situation and that in the play, and if so, of whether Lessing was ever 
aware of them? Such evidence does indeed exist, and it is to be found in 
his correspondence with Eva König.
On 21 September 1770, on her way from Hamburg to Vienna to settle 
her late husband’s affairs in that city, Eva wrote to Lessing from Salzburg. 
Although she had experienced bouts of grief and depression over her 
recent bereavement during earlier stages of her journey, there is no trace 
of it in this letter: she has had a busy week, her health has improved, 
she has met numerous friendly people, she has been sightseeing, and 
she gives Lessing news of the local theatre. But she also tells him of an 
48  See, for example, LM III, p. xiii; Schmidt, Lessing, I, 560; and Lessing, D. Faust, ed. 
Guthke, p. 76. This dating is confirmed by echoes in the text of Lessing’s Wie die 
Alten den Tod gebildet, completed in 1769 (cf. Metzger, Lessing and the Language of 
Comedy, p. 180 and Schröder, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, p. 301), and by the echoes 
of Die Matrone von Ephesus in Emilia Galotti (completed winter 1771–72; cf. note 35 
above). 
49  See Gert Hillen, Lessing-Chronik. Daten zu Leben und Werk (Munich: Hanser, 1979), p. 
60.
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unfortunate incident with her maidservant which has deprived her of 
sleep on the night before her journey is due to resume:50
My maid, in the company of the valet of a count whose lodging is 
opposite mine, has got so terribly drunk that she has done nothing all 
night but vomit. I am her attendant [...] A pleasant occupation!—given 
that there is in any case nothing in the world that I find more repulsive 
than a drunkard. She has just fallen asleep, and I only wish that, when 
she awakens, she will be in a state that allows us to depart. 
Her next letter, written nine days later from Vienna, is very different in 
tone. Suddenly plunged into her late husband’s business affairs, she can 
no longer suppress her grief, and writes: ‘Whenever someone speaks to 
me, I have tears in my eyes: [...] But how can it be otherwise? Everything 
reminds me of my past happiness’.
Lessing replies to both of these letters on 25 October. And the 
remarkable thing about his reply is that it rolls the situations in Eva’s 
two separate letters into one. He writes:51
Your maid was as good as no maid at all, if not worse than none. But 
who knows? In the end it was probably better that the miserable creature 
had her own activities, that she loved and drank the best available 
wine with the best available fellow—than if she had been a good and 
sensitive soul who did not let her mistress out of her sight and wept no 
less than she did. In the former case, you were forced to abandon your 
own thoughts; in the latter, your grief would have been intensified. You 
will say that I have a particular gift for discovering something good in 
something bad. I do indeed have this gift, and I am prouder of it than of 
anything I know or can do.
The situation, as Lessing imagines it, has become that of the widow 
of Ephesus, whose maidservant’s flirtation with the officer’s servant 
was the first step in the widow’s return to life and love. And instead 
of blaming the maid for keeping Eva, who was in precarious health, 
up all night, he commends her for helping to distract her from her 
grief and restore her to life. He is applying the psychology of his 
drama to the real-life situation, and echoing his own attempts to 
portray the widow’s recall to life in a favourable, even providential 
50  Meine liebste Madam. Lessings Briefwechsel mit Eva König 1770–1776, ed. by Günter 
and Ursula Schulz (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1979), p. 22.
51  Ibid., pp. 32f.
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manner. But once these connections had been made, it would have 
been unthinkable for him to resume work on the incomplete play, or to 
publish it if he had already completed it; for in it, the widow’s recall to 
life is coupled with a betrayal of her deceased husband’s memory, and 
her suitor’s claim to have been her late husband’s friend is shown up as 
a calculated falsehood. For different reasons, it would have seemed to 
both Eva and Lessing like a sick joke. Instead, Lessing abandoned the 
play for another long-standing dramatic project, namely Emilia Galotti, 
which he could complete with an easier conscience. For although its 
view of female psychology is akin to that of The Widow of Ephesus—for 
the heroine confesses to the same kind of weakness as that to which 
the widow succumbs—Emilia does not betray the memory of her 
deceased fiancé, but chooses to die instead.
Although Eva may have known of Lessing’s interest in the theme in 
his Hamburg years, it is unlikely that he ever showed her the dramatic 
fragment. For she was only too ready to look for connections between 
his writings and his personal life. For example, a few weeks before 
their engagement in September 1771, she writes urging him to join her 
in Hamburg, and mentions that she has just been reading his recently 
reprinted epigrams, with their biting misogynistic humour:52
I have just put down your epigrams, and am now confirmed in my 
long-held opinion—that you are an arch-misogynist. But is it not quite 
godless of you to put us down in this way at every opportunity? You 
must have come up against some desperately wicked women. If this is 
the case, I forgive you; but otherwise, you must really be punished for all 
the malice you treat us to. 
Her tone is teasing and light-hearted, but she has clearly been taken 
aback. It is not difficult to imagine how she would have reacted to the 
far more subtle satire on feminine weakness, with its embarrassing 
closeness to her own situation, which Lessing had just come so near to 
completing.
I therefore believe that it was primarily external circumstances, rather 
than failure to solve the internal problems he had identified in the story, 
which prevented Lessing from completing or publishing The Widow of 
Ephesus. And I could end this discussion here, were it not that I have 
52  Ibid., p. 82 (10 August 1771).
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so far said nothing about the feminist perspective and what it can tell 
us about the play. So far as I can see, the feminists have not yet turned 
their attention to this work, although there has been a fair amount of 
feminist criticism of other dramas by Lessing, and one feminist essay 
has been written on the theme of the widow of Ephesus in eighteenth-
century France.53 The line taken in these accounts is predictable: women 
are inherently good, and any shortcomings they display are the result of 
their oppressed position in a male-dominated society. The essay on the 
widow of Ephesus is no exception: it argues that most French versions 
of the theme after 1700 glorify the widow as a champion of natural 
feeling over social injustice and an inequitable custom.54 This line of 
interpretation certainly fits Lessing’s fragment too, inasmuch as Lessing 
does not condemn the widow, but portrays her change of allegiance 
as understandable and excusable. There is, however, no suggestion 
in Lessing’s fragment that the widow is a victim of social injustice or 
an unjust custom, for her decision to starve herself to death, though 
not resisted by her fellow-citizens, is not encouraged by them either. 
Nevertheless, there is an element of male egotism and male injustice 
in Lessing’s play. And I should be sorry if this element were not given 
due recognition. For firstly, the officer Philokrates is an unabashed male 
chauvinist, as his dialogue with the widow’s maidservant Mysis reveals 
when he announces that he has come to comfort the widow:55
Philokrates: I come to comfort her.
[...] Mysis: She is sleeping.
[...] Philokrates: So much the better! Then I can see whether she’s 
worth comforting […] I’ll gladly let her go back to sleep if she 
disappoints my expectations.
His pity, in other words, is entirely dependent on the widow’s sexual 
attractiveness. And secondly, Philokrates’s story that he was a close 
friend of her late husband is an unscrupulous invention, designed 
merely to further his ulterior end. In short, if the widow’s return to life 
and love is a positive step, we must not forget that it is made possible 
53  See note 7 above.
54  Runte, ‘The Matron of Ephesus in Eighteenth-Century France’, p. 367; see also p. 
369: ‘She [the widow] rose from the depths of mysogenic [sic] satire [...] to the 
heights of goodness (when Good is equated with Natural).’
55  LM III, 455.
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by the relentless pressure of a predatory male who avails himself of all 
the seducer’s arts. It would therefore seem that, on some occasions at 
least, even the male chauvinist has his uses.
But this brings me to what I think is the real internal weakness of 
Lessing’s play, a weakness exacerbated by his very success in overcoming 
the problem he had set out to solve, namely that of the widow’s 
motivation. Lessing’s widow is subjected, at her most vulnerable 
moments, to an overwhelming series of pressures, beginning with 
flattery she cannot escape, appeals to her pity, praise of her fortitude, 
apparent compliance with her wishes, professed friendship for her 
late husband, and feigned commiseration, culminating in an all-too-
genuine threat of suicide. These pressures are so great, and they are 
applied with such finesse and timing, that her momentary consent to 
the macabre proposition that was to have been put to her would have 
been both understandable and excusable. But the very magnitude of 
these pressures means that her decision to abandon her oath cannot 
be wholly free. She overcomes the tyranny of her husband’s memory 
only by surrendering to another dominant male; whereas only a free 
decision to return to life, taken without external harassment, could 
fully restore her dignity. Yet such a decision is not possible within 
the framework of the traditional story—not, at least, if it is to remain 
credible in terms of realistic psychology. For the story itself contains an 
element of misogyny which no amount of manipulation on Lessing’s 
part could expunge. The problem is that, the freer an agent the 
widow is, the more vicious she will appear; and the less free she is, 
the more she will appear a passive victim of male domination. The 
story, in other words, can be varied to emphasise either the widow’s 
fickleness or her weakness; but in neither case will she appear in a 
favourable light. Lessing chose to retain our sympathy for her by 
diminishing her responsibility. But as her responsibility diminishes, 
so too does her moral autonomy. And even if he found this view of 
female psychology more acceptable than most of us would do today,56 
it is doubtful whether he could have been entirely happy, after writing 
Minna von Barnhelm, with a heroine as passive as his widow eventually 
56  Compare his remark in the Hamburg Dramaturgy (LM IX, 334) on the widow’s 
seduction in Petronius’s story: ‘her weakness seems to us the weakness of her entire 
sex; [...] what she does, we think just about any woman would have done’. 
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became. The fact that he went on to complete Emilia Galotti is perhaps 
significant; for Emilia asserts her moral autonomy to avoid falling 
victim to the weakness to which she confesses herself susceptible.
There is in Lessing a streak of cynical humour which at times assumes 
misogynistic or even misanthropic forms57—although he was certainly 
no misogynist in his personal views, as his letters and conversations 
amply testify.58 It was, I suspect, to this side of his humour that the story 
of the widow of Ephesus first appealed in his student days in Leipzig. 
And although he did all he could to mitigate the morally offensive 
aspects of the story, and although his version stands historically at the 
opposite extreme to the misogynistic diatribes of the medieval monks, he 
could not eliminate its misogynistic content entirely without destroying 
the story’s structure, and with it the main source of its humour. Whether 
or not he had such considerations in mind when he decided to abandon 
his comedy, it is impossible to say. But it is certain that, around the 
time at which he stopped work on it, he was confronted with a real-life 
situation which must have shown up the play’s latent misogyny in all 
its harshness. And that was enough to ensure that it would never be 
published in his lifetime.
57  See, for example, the searing witticisms in his famous letter on the death of his son 
to Eschenburg (31 December 1777, in LM XVIII, 259), at which Eschenburg was 
understandably horrified, and Lessing’s subsequent explanation (7 January 1778, in 
LM XVIII, 261): ‘And my fault is not despair, but rather levity, which at times only 
expresses itself in a somewhat bitter and misanthropic manner’. 
58  See, for example, his letter of 29 November 1770 to Eva König (Meine liebste Madam, 
p. 39) in which he takes exception to a recently published play with the title Die 
Hausplage (The Domestic Plague: feminine) on the grounds that a domestic plague 
could just as easily be a man as a woman; see also Daunicht, Lessing im Gespräch, 
p. 440 for his defence of a prostitute on whose death dismissive remarks had been 
made.
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6. The German Reception of an 
Irish Eccentric:  
The Controversy over Thomas Amory’s  
The Life of John Buncle, Esq. (1778–79)1
Apart from his published works—of which The Life of John Buncle, Esq. was 
easily the most successful—little is known of Thomas Amory, described 
in the Dictionary of National Biography as an ‘eccentric writer’. The son 
of one Councillor Amory who accompanied William III to Ireland and 
acquired extensive property in County Clare, he was probably born in 
1691. He may have been born in London, to which he returned after 
spending a substantial period in Dublin; he subsequently pursued his 
work as a writer and became a virtual recluse. He died at an advanced 
age in 1788, survived by his only son.
The Life of John Buncle, Esq. is a novel in autobiographical form,2 and 
there are some similarities between the career of the eponymous hero 
and that of the author. As the hero tells us, ‘I was born in London and 
carried as an infant to Ireland, where I learned the Irish language, and 
became intimately acquainted with its original inhabitants’ (I,vii). He 
spent his childhood, we are told, ‘at Bagatrogh Castle, my father’s seat 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘The German Reception 
of an Irish Eccentric. The Controversy over Thomas Amory’s “Life of John Buncle, 
Esq.”, 1778–79’, in P. Skrine, R. E. Wallbank-Turner and J. West (eds.), Connections. 
Essays in Honour of Eda Sagarra on the Occasion of her 60th Birthday (Stuttgart: Heinz 
Verlag, 1993), pp. 179–89.
2  The first edition, published anonymously, is entitled The Life of John Buncle, Esq.; 
Containing Various Observations and Reflections, Made in Several Parts of the World; 
and Many Extraordinary Relations, 2 vols (London: J. Noon, 1756–66). Subsequent 
references to this work in the text and notes are identified by volume and page 
numbers only.
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in Mall-Bay, on the coast of Galway’ (II, 525) and studied for five years 
in Dublin, at Trinity College (I, 4 and II, 146), before embarking on 
an extended tour of northern England, the account of which occupies 
most of the novel. After marrying seven wives3 in quick succession and 
losing each in turn through illness or accident, he goes off on a voyage of 
circumnavigation—of which no details are supplied in the novel—and 
finally settles in London to write his memoirs. 
Buncle’s expeditions over the fells of Westmorland, Durham, and 
Yorkshire follow a recurrent pattern with only minor variations. After 
traversing previously unscaled crags, terrifying abysses. bottomless 
lakes, blazing outcrops of bitumen, and tortuous potholes, he arrives in 
a secluded and idyllic valley where he encounters one or more women 
of exceptional beauty, erudition, and affluence, usually associated with 
a religious community dedicated to a Unitarian faith opposed to both 
Anglican orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.4 After an interval of 
elegant living and dining, during which Buncle holds forth at length on 
theology in particular—although he is equally capable of discoursing 
on such diverse subjects as algebra, microscopy, ethics, bibliography, 
medicine, conchology, and politics—he marries his hostess and enjoys a 
brief period of bliss, which is abruptly terminated by his wife’s untimely 
death. The hero, now enriched by his deceased partner’s fortune, then 
resumes the cycle of mountaineering, learned discourse, matrimony, 
and bereavement. During his travels, he repeatedly chances upon 
acquaintances from his Irish past, most of whom, like Buncle himself, 
are decidedly eccentric.
It is not at first sight obvious why this curious work, when it became 
known in Germany during the 1770s, should have provoked responses 
3  The German commentators speak of eight, presumably because Friedrich Nicolai 
cites this number in his preface to the German translation: Leben Bemerkungen und 
Meinungen Johann Bunkels nebst den Leben verschiedener merkwürdiger Frauenzimmer. 
Aus dem engländischen übersetzt, 4 vols (Berlin: Nicolai, 1778). On the history of this 
work’s publication and the identity of the editor (Hermann Andreas Pistorius) 
and translator (Raimarus von Spieren) see Alexander Košenina, ‘Zur deutschen 
Übersetzung zweier Romane Thomas Amorys und der sich anschliessenden Fehde 
zwischen Wieland und Nicolai’, Daphnis 18 (1989), 179–98. The second novel 
included in this translation, Amory’s Leben verschiedener merkwürdiger Frauenzimmer, 
will not be considered here, since it played no significant part in the controversy 
over the main novel.
4  Miss Maria Spence is typical of these women, possessing (in addition to considerable 
wealth) ‘the head of Aristotle, the heart of a primitive Christian, and the form of 
Venus de Medicis’ (II, 162).
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ranging from delight and admiration to indignation and contempt. On 
the one hand, it was the main inspiration of Friedrich Nicolai’s novel 
Sebaldus Nothanker (1773–76),5 and Moses Mendelssohn recommended it 
with enthusiasm to Lessing, who was sufficiently impressed to consider 
translating it himself. A translation by another writer was subsequently 
commissioned by Nicolai, with sixteen engravings by the celebrated 
Daniel Chodowiecki, and published, after considerable publicity 
and a highly successful subscription, in 1778.6 On the other hand, 
Christian Garve found Buncle’s learned disquisitions so unoriginal 
and platitudinous that he had difficulty finishing the book, and the 
plot likewise failed to capture his interest.7 Wieland, for his part, was so 
incensed by the novel that he published a circumstantial denunciation, in 
five instalments, in his Der Teutsche Merkur;8 this elicited a bitter counter-
attack from Nicolai,9 to which Wieland duly responded,10 and a further 
counterblast from Nicolai appeared shortly afterwards (1779).11 The 
dispute between the two writers became the object of a feeble satire by 
August Friedrich Cranz (1779),12 and a satirical sequel to the novel itself, 
published anonymously by Andreas Stein, appeared a few years later.13 
5  See Richard Schwinger, Friedrich Nicolais Roman ‘Sebaldus Nothanker’ (Weimar: 
Felber, 1987), p. 264) and Lawrence Marsden Price, The Reception of English Literature 
in Germany (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1932), pp. 225f.
6  See Košenina, ‘Zur deutschen Übersetzung […]’, pp. 192f.
7  Garve to Nicolai, 9 February 1771 (quoted from the unpublished original by 
Košenina, ‘Zur deutschen Übersetzung […], p. 182).
8  Christoph Martin Wieland, ‘Die Bunkliade’, in Der Teutsche Merkur (1778), Drittes 
Vierteljahr, 77–90 and 165–72; Viertes Vierteljahr, 55–75, 158–73, and 248–60.
9  Friedrich Nicolai, [advertisement and call for subscriptions] in Allgemeine Deutsche 
Bibliothek, 31 (1777), unpaginated notices at end of this volume, pp. [1] and [3]; ‘Ein 
paar Worte betreffend Johann Bunkel und Christoph Martin Wieland’, (Berlin and 
Stettin: no publisher named, 1779); this also appeared in 1778 in a supplementary 
volume to the Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek. 
10  Wieland, ‘Abgenöthigter Nachtrag zur Johann-Bunkliade’, Der Teutsche Merkur 
(1779), Erstes Vierteljahr, 154–72.
11  Nicolai, ‘Nachricht’, in Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek, 37 (1779), Erstes Stück, pp. 
295–316.
12  [August Friedrich Cranz], ‘Fragment eines Schreibens über den Ton in den 
Streitschriften einiger teutschen Gelehrten und Schöngeister’ (no author, place 
of publication or publisher named, 1779); the British Library holds a copy of this 
wordy and puerile performance, which begins with satirical allusions to Amory’s 
novel and Nicolai’s German edition, but soon loses all contact with them. Košenina, 
‘Zur deutschen Übersetzung [...]’, p. 194 lists two supplementary pieces by Cranz, 
published in 1779 and 1781 respectively, which I have been unable to consult. 
13  [Andreas Stein], Geschichte einiger Esel oder Fortsetzung des Lebens und der Meynungen 
des Weltberühmten John Bunkels, 3 vols (Hamburg and Leipzig: no publisher named, 
1782–83). 
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The dispute between Nicolai and Wieland was exacerbated by an 
earlier disagreement, and not least by the fact that Wieland’s Der 
Teutsche Merkur and Nicolai’s Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek were 
currently engaged in a circulation war. Nevertheless, real issues of 
literary criticism were involved, and Wieland’s polemic embodies a 
serious, if one-sided, reading of Amory’s novel. The aim of the present 
essay is to examine briefly the main arguments involved, with a view to 
defining more precisely the literary status of this problematic novel and 
the reasons why it met with such divergent reactions in Germany.
The most obviously contentious feature of the novel was, of course, 
its unorthodox treatment of religion. Buncle’s hostility towards the 
Athanasian Creed and its doctrine of the Trinity—a hostility which, 
ironically enough, he seems to have absorbed from his tutor at Trinity 
College Dublin (I, 379)—his obsessive advocacy of Unitarianism,14 his 
opposition to supernaturalism and defence of natural religion, and his 
evident debt to the English and French freethinkers of the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries15 doubtless account for much of the 
novel’s appeal to the Berlin Aufklärer. Mendelssohn, for example, 
regarded the Trinity as logically absurd, and held that Unitarianism was 
closely akin to his own Jewish faith.16 Lessing’s positive response to the 
novel when he first read it (in English) in 1771 was certainly influenced 
by the same factors, but his enthusiasm waned, as he explained to 
Nicolai eight years later, when he began to take Christian orthodoxy 
more seriously during the ensuing period, and to find Unitarianism (or 
Arianism) unsatisfactory in spite of its superficially greater rationality.17 
These writers would also have found little to quarrel with in Buncle’s 
14  Or, more precisely, of Socinianism: he recognises Christ as an object of worship, but 
denies his divinity (II, 247f. and 255f.).
15  He names Locke as his chief intellectual mentor (I, 6), but his long discussion of 
contradictions in the gospels (I, 451–94) shows familiarity with works by Toland, 
Morgan, Collins, Simon and many others. His bibliographical references should be 
treated with caution, however, since some of his authorities—for example, ‘the Rev. 
Athanasian Bigot’ (II, 528) are plainly fictitious. 
16  See his letter to Lessing of 1 February 1774 in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Sämtliche 
Schriften, ed. by Karl Lachmann and Franz Muncker, 23 vols (Stuttgart, Leipzig and 
Berlin: Göschen, 1886–1924), XXI, 6 and Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften. 
Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. by Michael Brocke and other hands, c. 38 vols (Stuttgart/Bad 
Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1971–), VII, 102 and 106. 
17  See Lessing’s letter of 30 March 1779 to Nicolai, in Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, XVIII, 
312; also G. L. Jones, ‘Lessing and Amory’, German Life and Letters, 20 (1966–67), 
298–306.
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fulminations against Catholicism—‘the diabolism of popery’ (I, 344), 
with its worship of ‘the tiny god of dough’ (II, 491)—even if Nicolai 
and Pistorius (the editor whom Nicolai appointed to supervise the 
translation of the novel) considered it politic to delete or tone down 
the more extreme anti-Catholic passages in order to secure the imperial 
privilege for the work’s publication. Nicolai still felt able, however, to 
reassure potential subscribers in respect of Buncle’s religious views: 
‘They are to be highly recommended to all readers who are prepared to 
reflect seriously on religious matters.’18
Wieland’s objections to the novel, however, had little to do with its 
religious unorthodoxy. He was, after all, a product of the Aufklärung 
himself and—at least in his mature years—sympathetic towards liberal 
opinions in theology. Buncle’s liberal attitudes were in accord with 
Wieland’s in other respects too, as in the following passage on women’s 
intellectual capacities and education: ‘Learning and knowledge are 
perfections in us not as we are men, but as we are rational creatures, 
in which order of being the female world is upon the same level as the 
male [...]. And if women of fortune were so considered, and educated 
accordingly, I am sure the world would soon be the better for it’ (II, 
281; cf. also I, 273f.). Nevertheless, Buncle’s attitude towards women 
is fundamental to Wieland’s criticism of the novel—and indeed to any 
interpretation of the work. It accordingly calls for further discussion 
here.
Buncle has two obsessions in life, one of which is Unitarian theology. 
The other is women. In his own words (II, 483f.): 
As I was born with the disease of repletion, and had made a resolution 
not to fornicate, it was incumbent on me to have a sister and companion, 
with whom I might lawfully carry on the succession [...] And if [...] I was 
to live for ages, and by accidents lost such partners as I have described; 
I would with rapture take hundreds of them to my breast, one after 
another, and piously propagate the kind.
As a modern editor of the novel comments, ‘John Buncle is a Mormon 
born out of due time’:19 his repeated marriages are as close as he can 
18  Nicolai [advertisement and call for subscribers], in Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek, 31 
(1777), Zweites Stück, p. [3] of unpaginated notices at end of volume. 
19  Baker, Ernest A., Introduction to his edition of Thomas Amory, The Life and Opinions 
of John Buncle Esquire (London: Routledge, 1904), p. ix. 
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get to polygamy without violating legal and religious prohibitions, and 
death is always at hand to ensure a brisk turnover of spouses. The novel 
is full of erotic suggestion, often of a polygamous kind, as when Buncle 
discovers the beautiful Azora at the head of a religious community 
consisting solely of women, a plague having carried off all the men. Such 
episodes recall The Isle of Pines of 1668, with its polygamous narrator on 
his desert island.20 The absence of effective male competition adds relish 
to Buncle’s enjoyment, and his encounter with the lovely widow Imelda 
gains piquancy from the thought of her deceased husband, ‘Sir Loghlin 
Fitzgibbons, an old Irish knight, who was immensely rich, and married 
her when he was creeping on all fours, with snow on his head, and frost 
in his bones, that he might lie by a naked beauty, and gaze at that awful 
spot he had no power to enjoy’ (II, 185). The private medical studies 
which Buncle subsequently takes up suggest to him a more ingenious 
way of overcoming the restrictions of monogamy when he happens to 
dissect a woman of unusual anatomy: as he tells us, ‘there was found 
two vaginas, and a right and left uterus’ (II, 445). He decides, however, 
that the risk of superfetation would outweigh any advantages which 
such a wife might offer, and concludes ‘I should not chuse to marry a 
woman with two vaginas, if it was possible to know it before wedlock’. 
(Nicolai’s editor, the clergyman Pistorius, understandably omitted this 
passage from the German translation.)
All this is squarely in the Rabelaisian tradition,21 of course (although 
Amory’s novel, unlike the work of Rabelais, has no satirical element, 
and the narrator himself is without any sense of humour or irony), 
and it would not have shocked the broader-minded among eighteenth-
century readers unduly. Wieland, who often sailed close to the wind 
himself in his treatment of erotic subjects, was nevertheless scandalised 
by Buncle’s behaviour. But what offended him was not so much 
Buncle’s polygamous inclinations as his unconvincing attempts to lend 
them moral and religious respectability. One of Buncle’s objections to 
Catholicism, for example, is to its requirement of priestly celibacy, and 
he points out in one of his learned digressions that many priests, and 
20  See Paul Ries, ‘Die Insel Pines: Philosophie, Pornographie oder Propaganda?’, in 
Literatur und Volk im 17. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wolfgang Brückner and other hands 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1985), pp. 753–76.
21  Cf. William Hazlitt’s remark, cited in Baker, Introduction, p. v: ‘The soul of Francis 
Rabelais passed into John [sic] Amory.’
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even saints, of the early Church—including St Peter himself—were 
married (II, 128ff.). He also resorts to the most questionable variety of 
casuistry in his (inevitably successful) attempts to talk the reluctant 
beauty Statia into matrimony: ‘Oppose not the gospel covenant [...]. 
I will pour out my spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine 
offspring [...] it must be a great crime, to deprive children of this intailed 
heavenly inheritance, by our resolving to live in a state of virginity. In 
my opinion, it is a sin greater than murder’ (II, 46f.). Wieland, who 
describes this argument as ‘the most perfect ideal of impertinence and 
insanity that was ever shaken out of a human brainbox’, concludes: ‘The 
most infamous thing about this is that religion always has to serve as a 
figleaf to cover the nakedness of his goatish old Adam’.22
There can be no doubt that, especially in the second volume of the 
original novel (which was published ten years after the first), Buncle’s 
high moral tone and habitual concern with outward respectability 
progressively diminish. He is less fastidious in his choice of company, and 
some of the Irish friends from his student days whom he encounters on 
his travels are plainly delinquents (and, one suspects, representatives of 
Buncle’s own half-repressed inclinations). These include Jack Gallaspy, 
whose exploits he recounts with evident relish (‘He debauched all the 
women he could, and many whom he could not corrupt, he ravished’) 
and Tom Gollogher, who ‘left nineteen daughters he had by several 
women a thousand pounds each. This was acting with a temper worthy of 
a man’ (II, 150 and 155f.). During a stay in London, he tours the brothels 
in the company of the bookseller and pornographer Edmund Curll (one 
of several real personages who make a disconcerting appearance in the 
novel). His excuse for such visits—that they were made only ‘on account 
of the purity of the wine, and the stillness of the house’ (II, 388)—will 
convince few readers; his real interest, of course, is in the inmates, and 
his long narrative of the career of Carola Bennet, a reformed prostitute 
(II, 384–400), reads like an extract from John Cleland’s Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure.
The nadir of Buncle’s moral development is reached, however, when 
he abducts two attractive wards of Old Cock, a wealthy curmudgeon, 
in order to recoup his gambling losses (II, 201), and later elopes with 
22  Wieland, ‘Die Bunkliade’, in Der Teutsche Merkur (1778), Viertes Vierteljahr, pp. 66 
and 73.
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another miser’s daughter in order to boost his fortune (II, 411f.). These 
lapses, together with the priggish and pharisaical way in which he seeks 
to exonerate his own conduct while censuring the moral shortcomings 
of others (apart from his old cronies) are among the most frequent 
targets of Wieland’s criticism, summed up in his description of Buncle 
as ‘neither more nor less than a selfish anti-trinitarian idler, lecher, and 
libertine, of no use to God or the world’.23
But the main reason for Wieland’s indignation, and for the lengths 
to which he goes in order to justify and express it, is not so much the 
novel itself as the contrast between it and the claims which Nicolai had 
made for it in his advertisement to potential subscribers. For Nicolai 
had emphasised ‘[the] goodheartedness, good humour, and noble 
philanthropy which runs throughout the work’ and described the 
hero as a man who looks back on his life ‘with a good conscience and 
complete awareness of having been irreproachable and useful’.24 Such 
claims, Wieland contends, amount to a brazen misrepresentation, a 
ploy to increase the sales of a worthless book: ‘From his [Nicolai’s] 
hand we have the repugnant changeling of an Irish non-conformist 
crossbreed of zealot and freethinker in place of a pleasant, useful, witty 
and edifying work.’25 
Ought we therefore to conclude that the appeal of Amory’s novel to 
such readers as Nicolai, Mendelssohn, and Lessing consisted exclusively 
in its liberal views on religion, and that it was otherwise, as Wieland 
suggested, devoid of all poetic as well as moral merit? Such a verdict 
would be premature, above all because it takes insufficient account of 
the novel’s literary qualities. It is with these that the remainder of this 
essay will be concerned.
Nicolai, like any enterprising publisher, spared no effort to present 
his product in the most favourable light possible. In order to do so, 
he emphasised the novel’s affinities with as many famous writers and 
popular tendencies in literature as he could. He knew from the start, 
of course, that the prestige of English literature was currently such 
that almost any hitherto untranslated novel could expect reasonable 
sales; but if it could also be shown to bear comparison with the works 
23  Wieland, ‘Die Bunkliade’, in Der Teutsche Merkur (1778), Drittes Vierteljahr, p. 167.
24  Nicolai, as in note 17 above, pp. [1] and [3].
25  Wieland, ‘Die Bunkliade’, in Der Teutsche Merkur (1779), Erstes Vierteljahr, p. 166.
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of the greatest English writers, its commercial success was effectively 
guaranteed. He accordingly wrote in his advertisement of 1777:26 
He [i.e. Buncle] is perfectly unique in himself, and as original in 
his own way as Shakespeare or Samuel Richardson, although with this 
difference, that their perfections stem solely from an innate uncultivated 
genius, whereas Buncle’s sublime peculiarity seems to be the fruit of a 
genius and imagination that have been heated and led to sprout, as if in 
a hothouse, by a romantic nature and religious zeal.
All the signals were there for the fashionable German readership of 
the 1770s, from the names of the most idolised English writers to such 
catchwords as ‘original’, ‘genius’, and ‘sublime peculiarity’;27 and for 
good measure, Nicolai’s translator rendered the novel’s title The Life of 
John Buncle, Esq. as Life, Observations and Opinions of John Buncle, with its 
echo of Sterne’s immensely popular Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy 
(and of Nicolai’s own successful Life and Opinions of Sebaldus Nothanker, 
on whose format and outward appearance those of the new translation 
were modelled).
This comparison with Shakespeare and Richardson was, of course, 
grossly inflated, and it was duly ridiculed by Wieland. Nevertheless, 
it did not originate with Nicolai, for as his advertisement makes clear, 
this particular passage is a quotation, translated from the remarks of an 
anonymous English critic in the Monthly Review of 1766.28 This evidence 
that Amory’s novel had its admirers in England as well as in Germany 
should at least be borne in mind before Nicolai’s positive judgement 
is dismissed as purely self-interested; in fact, even his favourable view 
of Buncle’s moral character has its counterpart in another passage 
which he translated from the same English review: ‘For all his oddity, 
he always displays the character of an honest man, full of earnest 
desire to promote the welfare of his fellow men and eagerly in pursuit 
of what he considers to be the cause of truth.’29 The association with 
Sterne, moreover, is not entirely gratuitous (although the two novelists 
are plainly of a very different calibre). The autobiographical form, the 
constant digressions, the personal hobbyhorses and the eccentricity of 
26  Nicolai, as in note 18 above, p. 133.
27  Cf. Košenina, ‘Zur deutschen Übersetzung [...]’, p. 192.
28  Nicolai, as in note 18 above, p. 133; Monthly Review, 35 (1766), p. 34.
29  Nicolai, ibid.
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the characters are genuine points of similarity, even if the differences—
such as Amory’s complete lack of irony—are fundamental. (It is perhaps 
worth adding that there can be no question of Tristram Shandy having 
influenced Amory’s novel significantly, for its first volume appeared 
more than four years after the first volume of The Life of John Buncle, Esq. 
was published.)
Apart from the novel’s affinities with specific English writers, 
Nicolai was also at pains to emphasise its realistic aspects, no doubt in 
view of the fact that realism in fiction had grown in popularity since 
the time of Fielding, in Germany no less than in Britain. There are 
indeed certain realistic features in Amory’s work, such as its genuinely 
autobiographical elements (for example, the narrator’s account of his 
studies), its description of various identifiable localities, its portraits 
of low life in London, and its observations on science and natural 
history. For much of the time, however, Amory’s love of the bizarre 
and the fantastic, together with his addiction to hyperbole, relegate 
such tendencies to a subordinate position. Nicolai nevertheless did his 
utmost to magnify them, explaining the more conspicuous oddities of 
personality and behaviour as characteristic of English provincial society. 
Thus, he accounts for the omnipresence of erudite young women in 
Stainmore Forest and the valleys of Westmorland by pointing out ‘that 
in England, an understanding of many truths important to mankind is 
more widely distributed, and less confined to major cities and exalted 
circles than in other countries’, and he attributes the remarkable 
fondness of such ladies for theological speculation to the wild and 
‘romantic’ nature of their mountainous surroundings.30 This insistence 
on the work’s realistic character (wahrscheinlich is the term Nicolai uses), 
is no doubt also designed to reinforce his contention that the novel is full 
of practical educational value.31 
Such were Nicolai’s principal claims in that advertisement to which 
Wieland took such exception. It certainly contains exaggerations and 
distortions, particularly with regard to the novel’s moral significance 
and its standing in English literature (although there were precedents 
for such judgements in earlier criticism); and Nicolai’s endeavours to 
associate the work with such different types of literature as realistic 
30  Nicolai, as in note 18 above, p. 133.
31  Ibid.
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fiction, autobiography, the picturesque tour, and the novel of religious 
edification and moral instruction sound very much like an attempt to 
make it seem all things to all men. Nevertheless, there is evidence that 
his lack of precision is, at least to some extent, the result of genuine 
uncertainty as to how to classify an idiosyncratic text which incorporates 
characteristics of a whole series of literary forms. He accordingly 
describes it as ‘a novel, if one will’, and admits that ‘this story […] does 
not have the profile of a formal novel intended to follow a single main 
action through in accordance with a consciously devised plan’; he then 
proceeds to note its affinities with autobiography.32 He might also have 
added, with equal justification, that it contains elements of other types 
of fiction as well, including the erotic novel, the literature of fantasy (like 
the memoirs of Baron Munchhausen, published a few years later), and 
above all the picaresque novel; but none of these forms was sufficiently 
respectable to accord with the high moral claims which Nicolai wished to 
make for the work. Interestingly enough, Wieland was just as uncertain 
as to the precise literary category to which Amory’s novel belonged. But 
instead of attributing this uncertainty to the originality and uniqueness 
of the work, he argued more harshly that the work was worthless by 
any literary definition, and finally described it as a ‘rhapsody’, a term 
indicative of disorder and formlessness:33 
That John Buncle’s life and opinions, as delivered to us by the 
bookseller Nicolai, is in every respect—whether as a true life-history, a 
philosophical and Christian novel, a work of genius, wit or taste, or as a 
moral book written to instruct and teach by example—a highly insipid 
scrawl and a rhapsody filled with ill-reasoned ratiocinations, false 
principles and offensive examples; [...] all this requires no other proof 
than that someone to whom God has given reason and five senses should 
also pray for the measure of patience needed in order to read this book 
[...].
Thus, just as there was no agreement about the novel’s literary merit, 
so also was there no agreement about its literary form—nor has there 
been any since. An interesting more recent attempt to define its place 
in literary history is that of Ian Campbell Ross, who suggests that the 
main reason why the novel has on the whole been ignored by historians 
32  Ibid.
33  Wieland, ‘Abgenöthigter Nachtrag’ (see note 10 above), pp. 163f.
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of English literature is that it lies outside the English literary tradition: 
‘It is, rather, an early attempt at a novel in English by an Irish writer: a 
novel founded on anecdote, one which exploits a rich and rewarding 
seam of fantasy and which, in addition, throws some light on the origins 
of Irish fiction.’34 According to Ross, its ancestry is to be found not so 
much in earlier fiction by English authors as in the Irish seanchas, in the 
oral tradition of fantastic storytelling in which the narrator insists on the 
story’s truth. This interpretation has much to recommend it, because 
Buncle is indeed a compulsive raconteur, his stories are usually fantastic, 
he insists on their complete veracity, and the flimsiness and—quite 
literally—rambling nature of the plot are just what one might expect if 
its function were merely to link a series of anecdotes loosely together. 
But not even this reading is entirely satisfactory, because the greater part 
of Buncle’s narrative does not consist of anecdotes at all—or indeed of 
any other mode of fiction—but of a succession of learned harangues and 
disquisitions (including self-contained written treatises) on theology, 
ethics, and numerous different subjects, sometimes attributed to other 
characters whom Buncle encounters, and often embodying lengthy 
inventories of facts, from chemical formulae and medical bibliographies 
to episodes in Church history. As one editor of the novel puts it, ‘It is, in 
fact, such a paradox of a book that it tempts one to fly into paradoxes’35
It may therefore be possible to understand why some critics have 
dismissed this strange composition as totally absurd, of even as the 
product of a deranged mind. Thus the anonymous notice in the Critical 
Review of 1766—the same year in which the Monthly Review likened 
the author to Shakespeare and Richardson—consisted of the single 
sentence: ‘This is an irreviewable performance because the nonsense 
we encounter in perusing it, is insufferable.’36 Over a century later, the 
Dictionary of National Biography, in its article on Amory, declared that 
some of the episodes in the novel ‘suggest the light-headed ramblings 
of delirium’, and added ‘Amory was clearly disordered in his intellect’.
Whichever way one looks at it, The Life of John Buncle, Esq. is a strange 
and anomalous production. It is of an indeterminate and composite 
34  Ian Campbell Ross, ‘Thomas Amory, John Buncle, and the Origins of Irish Fiction’, 
Éire––Ireland, 18/3 (1983), 71–85 (p. 72).
35  Baker, Introduction, p. vi.
36  Anon., Critical Review, 21 (1766), p. 470; also quoted in Ross, ‘Thomas Amory […]’, 
p. 85.
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genre, and it is difficult to see why many of its parts were included at 
all; it is repetitive and digressive, and most of its dialogues are really 
monologues of the hero to which his collocutors meekly listen and 
assent; the learned discourses are long-winded and derivative, and 
often shallow and platitudinous; the plot is fantastic and incredible; and 
the whole composition, as Wieland remarked, is lacking in coherence. 
It is, in fact, a kind of literary montage in which the degree of unity 
prescribed by the classicistic poetics of its time, and encountered in the 
vast majority of novels until the fictional experiments of modernism, is 
altogether absent. Such unity as it does possess lies in the personality 
of its hero and narrator, in whose mind and life-history the disparate 
elements of the work converge. But since the hero’s personality is itself 
riven by a fundamental contradiction which is neither resolved nor 
relativised by any higher authorial perspective, even this unity is fragile 
and imperfect.
Despite all those moral shortcomings to which Wieland took such 
exception, there is nevertheless a positive quality about John Buncle 
which is central to the work’s appeal. There is something engaging, 
even wholesome, about his unflagging zest for life and that boundless 
self-confidence which enables him to ignore the contradictions in his 
own personality. He is never malicious, he is simply led by his passions; 
and his pedantic attempts to assert his moral disinterestedness while 
constantly betraying his real and far from disinterested motives are 
not without their involuntary humour. He is, for all his intellectual 
pretensions and theological learning, basically naïve. He lives by his 
impulses—especially his sexual impulses—and imagination, and most 
of his intellectual effort is aimed at justifying and sanctifying their 
promptings. He is also filled with a naïve curiosity and eagerness to 
learn about all manner of subjects; but despite his five years at Trinity 
College, this curiosity is marked by the indiscriminate zeal and arbitrary 
enthusiasms of an untrained mind.37
What, then, did the controversy between Nicolai and Wieland 
contribute to the understanding of Amory’s novel? The answer must 
be: very little indeed. Nicolai presented it as an edifying work of moral 
37  It is worth mentioning that there is apparently no record of Amory himself having 
studied at Trinity College (see Ross, ‘Thomas Amory […]’, p. 73) or, for that matter, 
at any other university.
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realism in the autobiographical mode, and tried to relate it, not very 
convincingly, to the mainstream of English literature. Wieland, in his 
entertaining polemic, had no difficulty in refuting these claims, and 
presented it instead as a mixture of literary trash and moral humbug. 
Both of these approaches, however, miss the true source of the work’s 
appeal, because they take the hero—and particularly his ideological 
protestations—much too seriously. The kind of criteria which Nicolai 
and Wieland apply are simply not appropriate to one who ends his 
preface (written by Amory in the persona of Buncle) with the following 
valediction to the literary critics: ‘I have only to add, that I wish you all 
happiness; that your heads may lack no ointment, and your garments 
be always white and odoriferous’ (I, viii). One of these critics has since 
concluded that Amory’s novel is ‘impossible to understand [...] outside 
of an Irish context’.38 This may well be so; and if it is, there could clearly 
be little hope for either Nicolai or Wieland, both of whom were German 
and knew virtually nothing of Ireland or Irish culture.39 One may not 
have to be Irish oneself, of course, in order to appreciate Amory’s 
writings—but it probably helps.
38  Ross, ‘Thomas Amory […]’, p. 85.
39  On the widespread ignorance of Ireland in eighteenth-century Germany see Eda 
Sagarra, ‘Die “grüne Insel” in der deutschen Reiseliteratur. Deutsche Irlandreisende 
von Karl Gottlob Küttner bis Heinrich Böll’, in Europäisches Reisen im Zeitalter der 
Aufklärung, ed. by Hans-Wolf Jäger (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1992), pp. 182–95.

Portrait of Johann Gottfried Herder by Gerhard von Kügelgen (1809), oil on canvas, 
Tartu University Library, Photograph by Trzęsacz (2018), Wikimedia, Public Domain, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Herder_by_K%C3%BCgelgen.jpg
7. Herder’s The Oldest Document of 
the Human Race and his Philosophy of 
Religion and History1
A perplexing feature of Herder’s Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts 
(The Oldest Document of the Human Race) of 1774–76 is its fundamental 
ambivalence regarding the legitimacy of natural and supernatural 
modes of explanation. On the one hand, he denies that the creation story 
in the book of Genesis has anything more than limited temporal and 
geographical significance for our understanding of nature. But on the 
other hand, he attributes to that same creation story, and particularly to 
what he calls its ‘hieroglyphic’ form, a supra-temporal significance for 
the development of human knowledge, including natural science. The 
aim of this essay is firstly, to examine the two sides of this ambivalence, 
and secondly, to trace the historical influences which underlie Herder’s 
conviction that the Mosaic ‘hieroglyph’ served as a basic key to 
understanding nature in the past, and even retains this function in the 
present.
In the earliest drafts of The Oldest Document, the above-mentioned 
ambivalence is not yet apparent. Herder’s antipathy towards all 
interpretations of the Bible in the light of modern science and vice 
versa is strongly marked: the Bible and science, he believes, should be 
kept strictly separate. He writes, for example, of the prophecy of the 
Flood to Noah: ‘In truth, [...] a geographical or physical report was not 
God’s intention’; and then, more generally on nature as understood by 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘Die naturphilosophische 
Bedeutung von Herders “Ältester Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts”’, in Brigitte 
Poschmann (ed.), Bückeburger Gespräche über Johann Gottfried Herder 1988 (Rinteln: 
Bösendahl, 1989), pp. 210–26.
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an inhabitant of the ancient East: ‘He had not been on voyages with 
Maupertuis and Condamine. He had not weighed the earth and heavenly 
bodies with Newton’.2 The world of modern science, he later continues, 
is disproportionately more complex than that of the ancient Hebrews: 
‘Our world is not the creation of heaven and earth; it is composed of suns 
and earths, of planets and comets, of spiral galaxies and milky ways’.3 
It is consequently mistaken to look in the Mosaic creation story for 
revelations concerning the basic truths of modern science: ‘Oh, it is one 
of the weakest infirmities of the human spirit to expect a supernatural 
physics and metaphysics of creation from the divine understanding, or 
even to contemplate it for a single moment’.4
Besides, Herder leaves us in no doubt as to why he regards all attempts 
to harmonise the Bible and modern science as absurd. There are three 
major reasons for his negative attitude. Firstly, and especially in his early 
drafts of the years 1768 and 1769, he adopts a fundamentally secular 
approach: he views all supposedly supernatural influences with distrust, 
and condemns all those who seek to limit scientific freedom by religious 
dogma: ‘To claim to discover Galileo’s and Torricelli’s and Newton’s 
physics in an ancient song of the Sabbath—is strange enough! But to be 
compelled to find it? to compel it to be there if it does not freely present 
itself? [...]—that is Gothic ignorance and barbarous Gothic distortion! 
It suppresses the human spirit and hampers free invention [...]’.5 And 
although such virtually freethinking sentiments are considerably toned 
down in the final version of 1774 and the discoveries of modern science 
are even described—albeit metaphorically—as ‘revelations’, he still 
insists that these discoveries should not be judged by the yardstick of 
Mosaic cosmology: ‘Descartes and Newton, Newton and Euler! Emissaries 
of God to the human race, why should their revelations be expurgated 
in the light of an ancient oriental composition?’6
The second reason why Herder resists all attempts to harmonise 
the Bible and natural science is his conviction that the creation story 
is primarily a poetic document rather than a philosophical or scientific 
2  Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämtliche Werke (henceforth SW), ed. by Bernhard Suphan, 
33 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877–1913), VI, 49; cf. VI, 205ff. 
3  SW VI, 46.
4  SW VI, 86f.
5  SW VI, 85.
6  SW VI, 207; cf. SW VI, 89. 
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treatise. Thus he writes in his early fragments entitled Archaeology of the 
Orient: ‘And I maintain that a physical system [...] will never provide 
the key to Moses. The whole piece is obviously nothing but a poem, an 
oriental poem, built entirely on sensuous appearance, on the opinions 
of the national faith, and even on utterly false opinions’.7 Although 
the implicit critique of supernaturalism that still clings to such early 
pronouncements is absent in the 1774 version, Herder still emphasises 
the poetic character of the creation document as a ‘commemorative song’8 
or ‘a portrait of dawn, an image of the break of day’.9 In this respect, the 
document in question is accordingly much more accessible to aesthetic 
intuition than to the scientific understanding. 
The third and final reason why Herder wishes to keep the Bible and 
science strictly separate is that historicism which distinguishes so many 
of his early works on literature and history. It is simply inconceivable 
for him that the ancient Israelites, in their own historical and cultural 
context, could have held the same views on nature as the scientists of 
the eighteenth century:10
Since in the earliest times the true composition of air, the atmosphere, 
and the formation of rain, hail, snow, clouds, thunder and lightning was 
unknown to them or not yet as familiar as it is to us, their ecstatic, image-
filled eyes created for them a world as they saw it, or thought they saw 
it. Thus the sky was for them at one moment a great, widespread tent, 
at another a blue, solid vault, at another even the floor of God and his 
thunder-horses and thunder-chariot.
To summarise the conclusions so far: from the earliest to the final 
version of The Oldest Document, Herder’s arguments against the 
application of modern science to the first book of Moses and vice versa 
play a major part. They are particularly prominent in the final version 
of 1774, for they are discussed right at the beginning of the work and 
occupy nearly the first twenty pages.11 The entire project of physico-
theology, whereby attempts were made in the first half of the eighteenth 
century to reconcile the most diverse areas of science with the Bible and 
7  SW VI, 32f.
8  SW VI, 325.
9  SW VI, 258.
10  SW VI, 13.
11  SW VI, 197–217.
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Christian dogmatics, is dismissed as an aberration. In Herder’s words, 
‘Scheuchzer’s, Nieuwentyt’s and other works of this kind are mostly good 
or excellent in their physical sections, but lamentable in their theological, 
and especially their interpretative parts’.12
One might therefore expect that The Oldest Document would have little 
positive to offer in respect of natural science and natural philosophy, let 
alone that the author would himself attempt to attribute any scientific 
significance to the Mosaic creation story. But precisely the opposite is the 
case. In fact, Herder begins between 1770 and 1774 to modify his views 
on this entire range of questions; but instead of abandoning his original 
arguments against scientific interpretations of Genesis, he simply lets 
them stand and increasingly applies the same methods which he had 
previously condemned in other interpreters.
Such contradictions are, of course, by no means uncommon in 
Herder’s works. In the present case, the explanation is not difficult either, 
because we can follow step by step how the plainly secularising approach 
of his Archaeology of the Orient of 1768–69 is gradually superseded by the 
much more ambivalent attitude of The Oldest Document of 1774–76. 
This development is, of course, connected with his apparent turn 
to revealed religion and his increasingly close relationship with the 
Christian fideist Hamann. The effects of this change of outlook in The 
Oldest Document of 1774 include, for example, the fact that the creation 
story is now described as a ‘divine revelation’,13 and that naturalistic 
interpretations of the earliest phase of human history by Voltaire, Hume, 
Maupertuis and others are circumstantially rejected.14 In addition to 
revelation by natural means, Herder now expressly speaks of ‘the voice 
of a teacher [...], for which no one but God was present at the beginning of 
time’. 15 Despite his earlier pronouncements, he now seems to suggest 
that the first human beings gained through divine revelation insights 
into nature and cosmogony which they could not have attained by 
natural means.16
12  SW VI, 202.
13  SW VI, 258.
14  SW VI, 265f., 309, etc.
15  SW VI, 265f.
16  Cf. Rudolf Haym, Herder, 2nd edn (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1954), 2 vols, I, 592: 
‘Thus Herder’s view fluctuates in mystical vagueness between the natural and the 
miraculous.’
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But along with this apparent new piety, there is a second and 
more important factor which caused Herder, despite his own counter-
arguments, to assume a positive scientific content in the creation story. 
This factor is his conviction, already emerging in his years in Riga, 
that the explanation of any phenomenon must be sought above all in 
its origin or first manifestation—in other words, that its later stages of 
development are already present in its earliest state and can perhaps 
already be detected there. This conviction is expressed as follows in his 
early Fragments on Recent German Literature: ‘In the seed lies the plant 
with all its parts; in the embryonic animal the creature with all its limbs: 
and in the origin of a phenomenon the whole wealth of elucidation 
through which its explanation becomes Genetic’.17 As this sentence 
suggests, Herder’s so-called ‘genetic method’18 seems to be related to the 
preformation theory of eighteenth-century biology, a theory to which 
Herder subscribed until at least his Bückeburg period.19 If one applies 
this ‘genetic method’ to the first emergence of science—and these 
beginnings, for Herder, are to be found in that very document which 
he and most of his contemporaries regarded as the oldest surviving 
description of the origin of the world, i.e. the initial chapters of the 
Bible—one must logically conclude that the discoveries of modern 
science must at least implicitly be contained in this ‘oldest document’. 
And this is precisely what Herder’s theory of the Mosaic ‘hieroglyph’ 
maintains. In short, Herder’s predilection for ‘genetic’ explanation led 
him to revive and reformulate a much older concept, still current in the 
seventeenth century, namely the concept of a prisca sapientia, or original 
wisdom of the first human beings, in which all the scientific discoveries 
of later centuries were implicitly or explicitly foreshadowed.20
This concept of a prisca sapientia is merely the philosophical and 
scientific version of a much more comprehensive theory of religious 
17  SW II, 62.
18  This expression is used, for example, by Max Rouché, La philosophie de l’histoire de 
Herder (Paris: Société d’édition: Les Belles Lettres, 1940), p. 21. 
19  Cf. H. B. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science (Cambridge: 
MHRA, 1970), pp. 65f. and 201f.; also Hans Dietrich Irmscher, ‘Grundlagen der 
Geschichtsphilosophie Herders’, in Bückeburger Gespräche über Johann Gottfried 
Herder, ed. by Brigitte Poschmann (Rinteln: Bösendahl, 1984), pp. 12–19.
20  The concept of a prisca sapientia is discussed in detail in the important article by J. E. 
McGuire and P. M. Rattansi, ‘Newton and the “Pipes of Pan”’, Notes and Records of 
the Royal Society, 21–22 (1966–67), 108–43 (pp. 115 and 123).
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history—the theory of a prisca theologia or original revelation of all the 
main truths of religion to the first human beings.21 The following outline 
of the prisca theologia and prisca sapientia may serve to furnish a better 
understanding of Herder’s hypothesis of a ‘hieroglyph’, particularly 
in its scientific connotation; and at the same time, Herder’s ‘genetic 
method’ will be applied to his own thought.
The conception that all religions and mythologies of early antiquity 
are based on a single original revelation, of which the Old Testament 
version is merely the oldest and most reliable record, was already 
current in antiquity. It was first developed and expounded in detail by 
several Church Fathers, above all Lactantius, Clement of Alexandria, 
and Eusebius. These Church Fathers supported their theory by 
reference to various supposedly ancient texts of the pagan religions, for 
example the hermetic and Orphic writings and Pythagorean ‘Carmina 
aurea’. (In fact, most of these writings were nor composed until the first 
centuries AD.) They took the view that all these texts, albeit with many 
later falsifications, reflected a single prototheology which contained 
such articles of faith of the Judaeo-Christian tradition as monotheism, 
the Holy Trinity, and the creation of the world out of nothing. It was 
also believed that traces of the original revelation could be discerned 
in Platonic philosophy. The main object of these reinterpretations of 
heathen texts was, of course, apologetic: they were meant to convince 
the heathens that their own religious and philosophical writings were 
merely corrupt versions of the oldest sacred writings of Christianity, 
and that the only authentic record of the original revelation was that in 
the Bible. If they could once be convinced that this was the case, there 
was no further obstacle to their conversion to Christianity.
The history of this theory of a prisca theologia from the Church 
Fathers and Neo-Platonism to its revival in and after the Renaissance 
by various thinkers from Ficino to Cudworth was largely illuminated in 
1972 by D. P. Walker in his essay collection The Ancient Theology. Studies 
21  On the concept of a prisca theologia, see especially D. P. Walker, The Ancient Theology. 
Studies in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century (London: 
Duckworth, 1972). Although Walker (p. 1) claims to have first introduced the term 
prisca theologia, it occurs in several works within the tradition he himself discusses, 
e.g. in one of the passages he cites (p. 20) from Ficino, and in Paul Ernst Jablonski, 
Pantheon Aegyptiorum, 3 vols (Frankfurt an der Oder: Christian Kleyb, 1750–52), III, 
p. iv. 
 1517. Herder’s The Oldest Document and his Philosophy of Religion and History
in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century. One of 
the most interesting insights which Walker provides is that of the central 
role which ancient Egypt, and particularly the Egyptian God Thoth or 
Theut (who is sometimes identified with Hermes Trismegistus), played 
in the transmission of the original revelation.22
Herder is actually one of the last proponents of this ancient theory. 
He first discovered the outlines of the prisca theologia chiefly from ancient 
sources, as his letter of 15 October 1770 to J. H. Merck indicates: he cites 
in it a list of authors he has read in connection with his ‘hieroglyph’ 
hypothesis, namely ‘Jablonsky, Philo, Clement [of Alexandria], 
Eusebius, Orpheus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, and the Pythagoreans of 
Gale’.23 The Church Fathers and Neo-Platonists listed here were all 
indebted to the tradition of the prisca theologia. Jablonski, who is named 
in The Oldest Document as an authority on the Egyptian religion, was 
also an adherent of the prisca theologia, as were Thomas Hyde, Ralph 
Cudworth, and other commentators on the religions and philosophies 
of antiquity with whose work Herder became acquainted between his 
Riga and Bückeburg periods. Herder’s library, in which oriental works 
were particularly numerous, also contained a remarkable number of 
works directly related to the prisca theologia tradition.24
It may at first sight seem surprising that this theory of the prisca 
theologia could still be taken seriously around 1770 despite its drastic 
simplification and generalisation of ancient religious history. It owed its 
enduring credibility above all to the short Biblical chronology which—
apart from a few sceptics—was still generally taken as authoritative, 
although it was increasingly called into question by geological 
discoveries. If the earth was less than 6,000 years old, all the religions of 
antiquity must have arisen within a relatively short time among peoples 
22  Walker, The Ancient Theology, pp. 16, 18f., and 101; cf. McGuire and Rattansi, 
‘Newton and the “Pipes of Pan”’, p. 128. 
23  Johann Gottfried Herder, Briefe. Gesamtausgabe 1763–1803, ed. by Karl-Heinz Hahn, 
Wilhelm Dobbek and Günter Arnold, 10 vols (Weimar: Böhlau, 1977–2001), I, 261. 
The work by Gale cited by Herder is presumably the Opuscula mythologica physica 
et ethica, graece et latine, ed. by Thomas Gale (Amsterdam: Henricus Wetsteinius, 
1688); it contains an item entitled Ex quorundam Pythagoreorum libris fragmenta, in 
quibus de Philosophia Morali agitur (pp. 657–752). 
24  Bibliotheca Herderiana (Weimar: privately printed, 1804): No. 6oo, Das Platonisch-
Hermetische Christentum von Colberg; No. 1062, Ursinus de Zoroastre, Hermete Trism. 
Sanchoniathone. Norimb. 1661; No. 2927, Ath. Kircheri Oedipus Aegyptiacus. Rom 
1652; etc.; cf. Walker, The Ancient Theology, pp. 231ff.
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whose common origin was still recent. And if the Old Testament—or 
at least the five books of Moses—dated from the earliest times, it was 
quite probable that the oldest writings of all the other early religions 
were in some way indebted to them or related to them via a common 
source. Already in the seventeenth century, this theory was also applied 
to science. This application seemed particularly appropriate, since the 
first chapter of the Bible had the origin of the world as its subject and 
since cosmogony occupied a central place in nearly all the religions of 
antiquity. As part of the original revelation, the Mosaic creation story 
therefore seemed to be the model for all the later creation stories; and 
if its truth was supposedly beyond doubt, as it still was in seventeenth-
century Europe, then all parts of modern science which dealt with 
the origin of the world must necessarily be in accord with the Mosaic 
account. 
One did not need to subscribe to the prisca theologia theory in order to 
accept that the Bible and science were compatible, since this was in any 
case an article of faith for all the Christian churches. But the extended 
version of this theory, that of the prisca sapientia, went much further. This 
theory assumed that the original revelation contained a greater number 
of truths concerning nature and the universe than those recorded in 
the Bible. Newton, for example, was of the opinion that not only the 
Copernican theory of the planets, but also his own theory of gravity 
was among these truths, which had subsequently been lost but already 
rediscovered by some thinkers in antiquity.25 There are even some 
indications that Newton saw the main purpose of his own scientific 
work as that of rediscovering the pure and unadulterated truths of 
the original divine revelation, and that he for a time had the intention 
of incorporating his thoughts on this problem in a new edition of his 
Principia Mathematica.26
This conception of science as a rediscovery of truths from the earliest 
times is, of course, very different from the usual picture of modern 
science and its development from Galileo to Newton as a progressive and 
secularising movement which turned its back on all received wisdom 
and tradition. But in more recent times, it has become ever clearer that 
25  See McGuire and Rattansi, ‘Newton and the “Pipes of Pan”’, p. 109; also Walker, The 
Ancient Theology, p. 243.
26  See McGuire and Rattansi, ‘Newton and the “Pipes of Pan”’, p. 121.
 1537. Herder’s The Oldest Document and his Philosophy of Religion and History
the ideological premises of science, right down to the present day, 
have been by no means as uniform and straightforward as previously 
assumed.27 Even by the time of the Enlightenment, we still encounter all 
kinds of archaic elements and relics of mystical and hermetic wisdom, 
and not just in the thought of such outsiders as Swedenborg and Lavater, 
but also in the work of Leibniz, Newton, and other leading thinkers.28 
There were, of course, great differences, both between individuals and 
national traditions. For example, French natural philosophy since the 
time of Descartes emphasised its originality and superiority to all earlier 
disciplines more strongly than was the case in other countries, and 
showed little interest in looking for precursors of its own theories in 
the earliest times.29 In England, however, the case was quite otherwise: 
scholars as different as Francis Bacon, whose work De sapientia veterum 
presented ancient mythology as an allegorical expression of opinions 
closely related to his own theories,30 and the Cambridge Platonists 
More and Cudworth, along with the experimental scientists Boyle 
and Newton,31 considered many—if not all—modern discoveries as 
rediscoveries of ancient truths. This constant retrospection on the 
most distant past certainly contributed to that preoccupation with 
first beginnings and original circumstances that became characteristic 
of the eighteenth century, and is encountered in the works of Leibniz, 
Rousseau, Buffon, and Kant—as well, of course, as Herder.32
These were accordingly the traditions which Herder took up when 
he applied his ‘genetic method’ to the so-called ‘oldest document of the 
human race’. The end result was that his Mosaic ‘hieroglyph’ became 
a universal means of explanation, and threatened to supplant that 
historical relativism which was still dominant in the early versions of 
27  Cf. J. V. Golinski, ‘Science in the Enlightenment’, History of Science, 24 (1986), pp. 
411–24; I am indebted to Robert Iliffe of the Department of History and Philosophy 
of Science, University of Cambridge, for the reference to this article and to Newton’s 
interest in the prisca sapientia in his unpublished papers. 
28  Cf. Rolf Christian Zimmermann, Das Weltbild des jungen Goethe. Studien zur 
hermetischen Tradition des deutschen 18. Jahrhunderts, 2 vols (Munich: Fink, 1969–79), 
I, 139f.
29  See Walker, ‘Newton and the “Pipes of Pan”’, pp. 195f.
30  On Herder’s familiarity with such ideas of Bacon see H. B. Nisbet, ‘Herder and 
Francis Bacon’, Modern Language Review, 62 (1967), pp. 267–83 (pp. 268f.).
31  See McGuire and Rattansi, ‘Newton and the “Pipes of Pan”’, pp. 132–36.
32  Cf. Frank E. Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 132. 
154 On the Literature and Thought of the German Classical Era
his work. The ‘hieroglyph’ was now not only intended to serve as a key 
to the wisdom of the earliest human societies, but was also endowed 
with a supra-temporal significance for modern science.
Herder’s growing belief in the authority of the Bible, even in relation 
to science, is most prominently expressed in the fourth part of The Oldest 
Document, published in 1776: the story of Adam is here interpreted with 
the help of the theories of Haller and Buffon.33 For it is now Herder’s 
intention to prove that the truths of revelation have been confirmed by 
modern science—the very hypothesis which he had condemned in the 
first part of his work two years earlier. But it is significant that nearly all 
the scientific references of 1776 are to Haller’s physiology, whereas the 
equivalent theories of other contemporary thinkers and scientists such 
as Helvétius, Moscati, La Mettrie and de Maillet are unceremoniously 
rejected.34 What Herder particularly likes about Haller’s reflections 
is their vitalistic tendency: all biological processes are reduced to 
invisible ‘forces’ (Kräfte), which Herder so often employs as a means 
of avoiding the appearance of contradiction between naturalistic 
and supernaturalistic modes of explanation; in contrast with this 
approach, the methods of Helvétius and the other rejected theorists are 
unambiguously mechanistic and materialistic. Thus, Herder can appeal 
to Haller when he declares: ‘The breath of God is within us, a collection of 
invisible, powerful and so diverse vital forces combined only in vapour’.35 But 
this solution to the conflict between opposite methods of explanation 
is only apparent: it leaves untouched that deeper ambivalence which 
runs through The Oldest Document, and which derives from Herder’s 
characteristic wish to employ both relative and absolute standards in the 
explanation of natural and historical processes.
Let us finally turn to the scientific and philosophical significance 
of Herder’s ‘hieroglyph’. When this theory first appears in the drafts 
of 1768 or 1769, its claims to validity are still modest. For example, the 
‘hieroglyph’ still has nothing to do with nature and natural science; it 
purports to be no more than a structural feature of the creation story, 
a complex of symmetries and parallelisms in the Mosaic description of 
33  SW VII, 11f., 17f., 24, 80, 90f., etc.
34  SW VII, 71–76; cf. also SW, VII, 114: the name ‘Telliamed’ cited here is a reversal of 
his own name used by de Maillet as a pseudonym.
35  SW VII, 13.
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the seven days of creation which Herder describes as a ‘hieroglyph’.36 Its 
significance at this stage is purely formal and poetic. The first indication 
that Herder accords a wider scope to his theory occurs in his letter to 
Merck of 15 October 1770, in which he tells his friend: ‘I have made 
a strange discovery in recent days, that the hieroglyph which I have 
long since noticed in the first book of Moses, Chapter I and Chapter 
II to verse 3 [...] is as certainly basic throughout the entire Egyptian 
pantheon, secret rituals, wise teachings of Thoth or Theut, etc. as my 
name is Herder.’37 He further asserts—just like the advocates of the 
prisca sapientia—that the creation story must have arisen before the time 
of Moses, because the Egyptians seem to have acquired it from an earlier 
source. This lends a higher degree of probability to his suppositions that 
the original revelation contained many more truths than Moses records, 
and that the ‘hieroglyph’ implies far more extensive knowledge than the 
Bible explicitly mentions.
When the first volume of The Oldest Document appeared in 1774, the 
scope of Herder’s theory had become wider still. The ‘hieroglyph’, he 
claims, was the basis not just of the Egyptian religion, but also of all the 
arts and sciences of early times: ‘now all human writing and symbolism 
had taken shape around it and in it, the oldest, most important arts and 
sciences of human society, physics and chronology, astronomy and what was 
called philosophy emerged from it’.38 Towards the end of the first part 
of the work, such claims become even more exaggerated, inasmuch as 
the ‘hieroglyph’ now counts as something ‘which was to engage all the 
senses and forces of the human being, exert pressure on and guide his entire 
soul for eternities of his race’39—and hence fulfils a permanent heuristic 
function; in short, it was the origin of everything that exists!’40
Thus Herder now claims for his ‘hieroglyph’ a cognitive content 
which goes far beyond the limits of our knowledge of nature. The scope 
of this content also exceeds everything I could find in the main sources 
on which he drew for The Oldest Document, although the ‘hieroglyph’ 
is in this respect merely a logical extension of the ancient notion of a 
36  SW VI, 38f.
37  Herder, Briefe. Gesamtausgabe, I, 261.
38  SW VI, 290.
39  SW VI, 319.
40  SW VI, 323.
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prisca sapientia. Herder’s immediate source seems to have been Paul 
Ernst Jablonski (whose name is, incidentally, the first in the list of 
sources mentioned in his letter to Merck). One reads in Jablonski, for 
example, that Thoth or Theut was originally not a god but only the 
name of a monument on which all the elements of Egyptian religion 
were inscribed (no doubt in hieroglyphic script).41 What Herder says 
about the scientific content of his ‘hieroglyph’ is likewise largely based 
on Jablonski, to whom he owes many of his remarks on chronology and 
the seven planets, the seven primary colours, the seven metals, the seven 
musical notes, etc. as basic elements of Egyptian natural history.42 That 
the number seven in The Oldest Document became almost an obsession 
for him is again partly due to Jablonski.43 Herder’s choice of the word 
‘hieroglyph’ to designate the symmetrical structure of the creation 
story is, however, due to Hamann;44 but it cannot be ruled out that the 
extensive literature on the Egyptian hieroglyphs listed in the catalogue 
of Herder’s library may also have played a part—for example, the work 
entitled Hieroglyphica sive de sacris Aegyptiorum (Basle, 1556) by J. P. 
Valeriano, who emphasised that Moses had gained his education in 
Egypt and described his manner of writing as ‘hieroglyphic’.45
But before I leave these reflections, I should like to draw attention to 
an interesting parallel to Herder’s ‘hieroglyph’—a parallel which was 
perhaps known to him and which, like his own equivalent, is closely 
related to the tradition of the prisca theologia. In the last years of the 
seventeenth century, the French Jesuit Joachim Bouvet, a missionary in 
China who had immersed himself in the wisdom of the ancient Chinese, 
claimed to have discovered an important secret. He believed that he had 
unravelled the mystery of the Y-King, a work supposedly written by the 
41  Jablonski, Pantheon Aegyptiorum III, iv.
42  SW VI, 376 and 382; cf. Jablonski, Pantheon Aegyptiorum, III, liiif.
43  See Jablonski, Pantheon Aegyptiorum, III, xxiv: ‘numerus septenarius Orientalibus 
sanctus erat’. 
44  See Sven-Aage Jørgensen, in Bückeburger Gespräche über Johann Gottfried Herder 1988, 
ed. by Brigitte Poschmann (Rinteln: Bösendahl, 1989), p. 104.
45  See also Walker, The Ancient Theology, p. 102 and Bibliotheca Herderiana No. 2651: 
Jo. Pier. Valeriani Hieroglyphica, Francof. 1678; No. 1650: Hieroglyphica Horapollinis a 
Dav. Hoeschelio. Aug. Vind. 1595; No. 2676: Athan. Kircheri Prodromus Aegypticus, 
Rom. 1636; etc.; on the history of the hexagonal figure described by Herder as a 
‘hieroglyph’, whose origins lie not in Biblical studies but in the magical and 
alchemistic literature of the Middle Ages, see Gershom Scholem, ‘The Curious 
History of the Six-Pointed Star’, Commentary. A Jewish Review, 8 (1949), 243–51. 
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mythical emperor Fohi, which played an important part in the thought 
of Taoism. The Y-King contains a long series of hexagrams, i.e. squares 
composed of six parallel lines, one or more of which may be interrupted 
in the middle. These hexagrams had been used for prophecy since 
ancient times, but Bouvet believed he had discovered a much more 
profound sense in them, namely the lost wisdom of the first Biblical 
patriarchs who had visited China in early times, and which they then 
recorded in symbolic form in the Y-King. (The intention which underlay 
his efforts, of course, was to convert the Chinese to Christianity.) He 
said in summary of his conclusions: ‘The figure in the system of FOHI 
was like a universal symbol, invented by some extraordinary genius of 
antiquity like Hermes Trismegistus, in order to render visible the most 
abstract principles of all the sciences.’46 Bouvet further remarked on 
the Y-King: ‘this kind of writing seems to me to embody the veritable 
idea of the ancient hieroglyphs and the Cabbala of the Hebrews’,47 and 
concluded that the study of this work offered an opportunity ‘to recover 
the ancient and universal system of the sciences’.48 He also declared 
that the Chinese script was derived from the Egyptian hieroglyphs, 
and that the emperor Fohi was presumably none other than Hermes 
Trismegistus, Enoch, or Zoroaster.49
These ideas first became known in Europe through Bouvet’s 
correspondence with Leibniz. This correspondence, in which Leibniz 
showed a keen interest in Bouvet’s research and himself attempted a 
mathematical interpretation of the hexagrams, lasted from roughly 1697 
to 1702; it was published in extract in 173450 and included in 1768 in the 
major Leibniz edition compiled by Louis Dutens.51
There is no evidence that Herder knew this correspondence. But 
we do know that he was reading ancient Chinese writings during the 
46  G. W. Leibniz, Opera omnia, ed. by Louis Dutens, 6 vols (Geneva: Fratres de Tournes, 
1768), IV/1, pp. 147f. (letter of Bouvet to le Gobien, 8 November 1700, forwarded by 
le Gobien to Leibniz on 10 November 1701). On this entire episode see Walker, The 
Ancient Theology, pp. 221–29 and Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, 
vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp. 340–45.
47  Leibniz, Opera omnia, IV/1, pp. 154f.
48  Ibid., IV/1, p. 168.
49  Ibid., IV/1, pp. 160 and 158.
50  G. W. Leibniz, Recueil de diverses Pièces sur la Philosophie, ed. by Christian Kortholt 
(Hamburg: publisher unknown, 1734), pp. 70ff.
51  Leibniz, Opera omnia, IV/1, pp. 145–68.
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preparation of The Oldest Document. For example, he borrowed in June 
1772 through his friend Christian Gottlob Heyne another sacred text 
from the Göttingen library,52 namely the Shu-King, in an edition which 
also included an essay on the Y-King;53 extracts from this essay and 
from the Shu-King itself are still present in his posthumous papers.54 
The author of the essay on the Y-King was a colleague of Bouvet, who 
refers to the latter’s theory on the common ancestry of the Chinese 
and Christian religions, but without going into any detail. However 
that may be, Herder also possessed a work by Johann Thomas Haupt 
on the Y-King, in which the questions discussed by Bouvet and Leibniz 
are mentioned;55 it remains to be seen whether he already possessed 
this book at the time of writing The Oldest Document. But even if Herder 
knew nothing of Bouvet’s correspondence with Leibniz at the time 
of The Oldest Document, it is unlikely that the similarity between his 
‘hieroglyph’ and Bouvet’s theory of the Chinese hexagrams was simply 
coincidental. For the similarity must be due at least in part to the fact 
that Bouvet and the other French Jesuits in China were working within 
the framework of the same tradition that Herder encountered through 
other sources—the tradition of the prisca theologia and the prisca sapientia.
Finally, another important question remains unanswered. What did 
Herder mean when he declared that the ‘hieroglyph’ was the origin of 
all the sciences, and that it was destined to guide human beings ‘for 
eternities of [their] race’?56 That the ‘hieroglyph’ may have hinted at a few 
basic elements of the oldest theories of nature, especially if it concerned 
simple groups of seven planets, notes, metals, etc., is conceivable and 
comprehensible. But in what sense could it also have foreshadowed 
discoveries of modern science? 
In the first part of his Ideas on the Philosophy of History of 1784, Herder 
develops a theory which was to play a significant part in nineteenth-
century biology—the theory of an animal ‘type’, according to which 
52  Herder, Briefe. Gesamtausgabe, II, 183, Herder to Heyne, June 1772.
53  Le Chou-King, un des livres sacrés des Chinois, ed. by Joseph de Guignes (Paris: N. M. 
Tilliard, 1770). 
54  See Hans Dietrich Irmscher and Emil Adler, Der handschriftliche Nachlass Johann 
Gottfried Herders. Katalog (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 1979), p. 235.
55  Bibliotheca Herderiana, No. 2813: Joh. Thom. Haupts Auslegung des kayserl. Buchs Ye 
Kim, Rostock 1753.
56  SW VI, 319.
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all the vertebrates, and perhaps even other creatures and natural 
forms, were constructed on a single model.57 In the same connection, 
he cites similar ideas from Buffon’s works on comparative anatomy, 
which probably influenced his own theory.58 Despite this anatomical 
connection, I am not convinced that Herder’s concept of an organic ‘type’ 
was derived from his anatomical reflections; it arose rather, I believe, 
from the ‘hieroglyph’ of The Oldest Document. The two theories have 
numerous points of contact. For example, Herder calls his ‘hieroglyph’ 
the ‘type of creation’;59 and on another occasion, he compares it to the 
human figure and calls it a ‘microcosm’,60 just as, in an early draft of the 
Ideas, he associates his concept of ‘type’ with that of a microcosm.61 Even 
the theological expressions he uses to characterise the ‘hieroglyph’ recur 
in the Ideas when he defines the ‘type’ as follows: ‘this one type, i.e. the 
basic inner laws of this single active force through which the creative 
and productive deity reveals himself’.62 But more important than these 
verbal affinities is the conceptual relationship between the two theories. 
When Herder draws attention to the parallelisms in the creation story in 
order to elucidate his ‘hieroglyph’, he refers more than once to the fact 
that Moses groups together the creatures of the water and the air. In 
view of the anatomical similarities between the two classes of animals, 
he maintains that this association is entirely justified: ‘The parallel of the 
two oceans, air and water! Here the fish fly, as it were, on their winged 
fins, and there the birds swim on their wings’. 63 Within the framework 
of comparative anatomy, he reverts in the Ideas to the same parallel with 
a reference to Moses.64 In other words, even the anatomical content of 
the ‘type’ theory recalls the ‘hieroglyph’ of The Oldest Document. 
But there is an even closer connection between the ‘hieroglyph’ and 
the ‘type’, which Herder only hints at in his later works, as for example 
in the following sentences from an early draft for the Ideas: ‘One and the 
57  SW XIII, 66–69; cf. SW XIII, 274 and SW XIV, 590. For further details on this theory, 
see H. B. Nisbet, ‘Herder, Goethe and the Natural “Type”’, Publications of the English 
Goethe Society, 37 (1967), pp. 83–119.
58  SW XIV, 624 and 693. 
59  SW VI, 485. 
60  SW VI, 314f. and 419.
61  SW XIII, 68n.
62  SW XIII, 274.
63  SW VI, 245; cf. SW VI, 53f. 
64  SW XIII, 424.
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same form repeats itself in all earthly beings. Where formation begins, 
from the snowflake and the crystal [...] up through all the structures of 
plants and animals, only one prototype seems to be present’.65 And he 
says many years later in his Adrastea: ‘The laws of formation of creative 
nature are everywhere the same; the flower of winter, the snowflake, 
reveals to you the secret of emerging worlds’.66 The answer to the 
question as to why the snowflake in particular should be the key to this 
secret lies, of course, in the form of the snow crystal, which represents 
a hexagonal star and is therefore identical with Herder’s ‘hieroglyph’.
If Herder still has in mind the ‘hieroglyph’ of The Oldest Document in 
such passages from his late works, and if the concept of the ‘type’ in the 
Ideas arose out of it, why does he not explicitly refer to his earlier theory? 
It probably is not mentioned for the same reason that it is not referred to 
in the section of the Ideas on ancient Egypt, where one might most readily 
have expected it: after the negative reception of his mystical speculations 
in The Oldest Document, Herder hesitates to renew these speculations in 
works or contexts where the progress of the empirical sciences is the 
focus of discussion.67 In his later works, his natural philosophy is based 
largely on Spinoza, and his scientific thought mainly on the results of 
recent research. But it can be seen from The Oldest Document that some of 
his ideas on natural philosophy go back to a very much older tradition.
65  SW XIV, 590.
66  SW XXIII, 533; cf. SW XXII, 88.
67  Cf. Ulrich Faust, Mythologien und Religionen des Ostens bei Johann Gottfried Herder 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1977), p. 102: ‘The chapter on Egypt in Herder’s Ideas 
indirectly indicates that he has taken back those [earlier] empty and vague 
speculations on the history of Egyptian religious history.’

Darstellung der Urpflanze. Woodcut by Pierre Jean François Turpin based on a 
concept by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1837), scanned from Anita Albus, Die 
Kunst der Künste. Erinnerungen an die Malerei (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag, 
1997). Photograph by JuTa (2010), Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Urpflanze.png
8. The Ethical Foundation of 
Goethe’s Scientific Thought1
From the scientific revolution of the seventeenth to the end of the 
nineteenth century, the main opposition to science came from religion. 
During the twentieth century, this opposition was largely replaced—at 
least in the Western world—by a new polarisation of science and the 
humanities, culminating in the so-called ‘two cultures debate’, unleashed 
by the famous lecture of 1959 by C. P. Snow on ‘The Two Cultures and 
the Scientific Revolution’.2 Snow’s central claim was that science and 
the humanities had by this time parted company to such an extent that 
they now constituted two separate, and fundamentally incompatible 
cultures. We have since come to think of this opposition as essentially a 
feature of modernism, and of the twentieth century in particular. 
It is less often remembered that a particularly extreme version of this 
conflict took place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
in the work of Goethe, who set up his own version of science in open 
hostility to that of Newton. In his Colour Theory of 1810, he describes 
Newton’s Optics as ‘a model of sophistical distortion of nature, [...] which 
only an extraordinary mind like that of Newton, whose wilfulness and 
obstinacy were the equal of his genius, was capable of constructing’.3 
He continues with a metaphor from gambling, presenting Newton 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘Die ethische 
Grundlage von Goethes Naturwissenschaft’, in Thomas Jung and Birgit Mühlhaus 
(eds.), Über die Grenzen Weimars hinaus—Goethes Werk in europäischem Licht (Oxford, 
Berne, Berlin, etc.: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 171–83.
2  C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, The Rede Lecture, 1959 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959); new edition, with an introduction 
by Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
3  Goethe, Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, ed. by the Deutsche Akademie der 
Naturforscher (Leopoldina) (henceforth LA), I. Abteilung, 17 vols (Weimar: 
Böhlau, 1947–70); II. Abteilung (Weimar: Böhlau, 1959–), LA I. Abt., V, 86.
© 2021 Hugh Barr Nisbet, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0180.08
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as a ‘cardsharper’ who boosts his winnings by deceptive means,4 
and describes Newton’s optical theories alternately as ‘dishonest’, 
‘shameless’, ‘scandalous’, ‘distorted’ and ‘foolish’.5 What we have here is 
an extraordinary spectacle: the greatest European poet of the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, who was not otherwise addicted to 
polemics, denounces the most respected scientist in the world as a liar 
and swindler, and declares that one of his greatest works in physics is 
fundamentally false.
How could it come to this extremity? The cause, in my opinion, lies 
not simply in Goethe’s difference of opinion with Newton on the nature 
and production of colour. For Goethe’s above-quoted condemnations 
plainly show that his objections to Newton’s optics were at least as 
much ethical as scientific in nature, given his contention that Newton’s 
whole way of thinking was ethically suspect or erroneous. And if 
one wishes to explain how Goethe reached this conclusion, and what 
assumptions underlie it, one must consult not just his Colour Theory, 
but also his scientific thought in general—and especially the way in 
which this thought developed from his first scientific observations in 
the early 1780s. 
Goethe’s scientific research was much more than a hobby or pastime. 
His scientific writings occupy thirteen volumes of the Weimar edition 
of his works, and in the second half of his life, around a third of his 
working time was devoted to science. He also declared in his final 
years that he considered his Colour Theory a greater achievement than 
his entire poetic works.6 This judgement may strike us as extravagant 
or incomprehensible; but for Goethe, it was justified inasmuch as he 
regarded his scientific works as a central component of his life’s work 
as an author. They were, for him, an expression of his most profound 
metaphysical, aesthetic, and not least ethical convictions. 
It is not possible in the space of a short essay to discuss the entire 
corpus of Goethe’s scientific writings. I shall therefore confine myself 
to considering its basic principles. This task is made easier by the fact 
that his entire work is based on only a few fundamental discoveries 
4  LA I. Abt., V, 157.
5  LA I. Abt., V, 82, 118, 184f., 187.
6  Goethes Gespräche mit Eckermann, ed. by Franz Deibel (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1921), p. 
457 (19 February 1829).
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or insights which he attained within a very short time—roughly 
between 1784 and 1790; his later research consists almost exclusively in 
consolidating and applying these initial insights. I shall therefore begin 
with a brief survey of these insights, before attempting to define their 
significance for Goethe’s thought in general.
Goethe began his scientific work in the early 1780s with comparative 
anatomy, and discovered the so-called intermaxillary bone in human 
beings.7 This discovery was prompted by the fact that various 
anatomists had denied that the bone in question, which is present in all 
other mammals and contains the upper incisors, can be distinguished 
in human beings from the other bones of the upper jaw.8 From this 
circumstance, it was inferred that the absence of this bone, together 
with other exclusively human qualities such as the capacity for speech 
and the hope of immortality, is an important distinguishing feature 
of the human species. Goethe, however, succeeded in distinguishing 
this bone—of rather the joints or sutures which separate it from the 
adjoining bones—in human embryos, and later also in hydrocephalic 
and other malformed skulls.9 There was, he concluded, no fundamental 
osteological difference between man and the animals.
The historical context of this discovery was the debate in the second 
half of the eighteenth century on the classification of plants and animals. 
Goethe associated himself with that group of scientists such as Buffon 
who attempted to construct a so-called ‘natural system’ in which all 
organisms might be classified by their degree of similarity, in gradual 
transitions, with other forms in the hierarchy of beings.10 A natural 
system of this kind would not be guided by superficial or fortuitous 
differences, as was the case with the ‘artificial’ (i.e. arbitrary) system 
of the Swedish botanist Linnaeus, who classified flowering plants 
according to the number of their stamens and pistils. The ‘natural’ 
classes of plants and animals which Goethe, Buffon and others sought to 
distinguish were, of course, not yet evolutionary classes in the Darwinian 
7  Cf. Goethe to Herder, 27 March 1784, in Goethes Werke, Weimar edition (henceforth 
WA), 133 vols (Weimar: Böhlau, 1889–1919), IV. Abteilung, VI, 258.
8  Goethe names in particular the anatomists Camper and Blumenbach.
9  The relevant essays can be found in LA I. Abt., IX, 154–86.
10  LA I. Abt., X, 326f. and 331; see also Goethe’s Italian Journey, 27 September 1786, in 
WA I. Abt., XXX, 89f.; cf. also H. B. Nisbet, Goethe and the Scientific Tradition (London: 
Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London, 1972), p. 8.
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sense, for the state of knowledge was at that time quite insufficient to 
form the basis of a Darwinistic theory of common descent. Their aim 
was simply to distinguish larger groups of living organisms by means of 
structural similarities. For Goethe, the decisive feature of his discovery of 
the intermaxillary bone was ultimately its metaphysical significance: it 
confirmed man’s essential membership of nature as a whole, within which 
all natural forms were related to one another via gradual transitions.11 
Goethe’s next discovery supplied a further proof of the unity of 
nature, in this case of the flowering plants in particular. In the year 1786, 
on a visit to the botanic gardens in Padua, he came up with the idea 
‘that one can perhaps derive all botanical forms from a single example’.12 
This hypothetical basic form, which he soon began to describe as the 
‘Urpflanze’ (archetypal plant), was in his own words a ‘model’ with 
which ‘one might then invent further plants in an infinite series [...] 
which, even if they do not exist, at least could exist’.13 Whether he hoped 
to find a real plant to match this model (as he maintained in later years)14 
remains uncertain; but his subsequent investigations in Palermo at least 
led him to a further insight, which rapidly superseded his theory of the 
‘Urpflanze’. As he compared the many unfamiliar plants, he became 
convinced that all the main organs of the stem (for example, stem leaves, 
bracts, sepals, petals, stamens, etc.) are homologous—that is, that they 
are all modified leaves (as suggested by their names in German, nearly 
all of which end in ‘–blätter’).15 This insight becomes the central thesis of 
his main botanical work, the essay ‘The Metamorphosis of Plants’ of 1790 
(which, strictly speaking, ought rather to be called ‘The Metamorphosis 
of the Leaf’). Thus, if Goethe had not succeeded in finding the archetypal 
plant, he had at least found, to his own satisfaction, the archetypal form 
of most organs of the flowering plants. The unity of nature was once 
again confirmed.
Goethe’s next two discoveries, inspired by his work on comparative 
anatomy in the early 1780s but not put into written form until 1790, 
11  Cf. Goethe to Knebel, 17 November 1784 in WA IV. Abt., VI, 389f.
12  Italian Journey, 27 September 1786, in WA I. Abt., XXX, 89; cf. Goethe to Frau von 
Stein, 9 July 1786, in WA IV. Abt., VI, 242. 
13  Italian Journey, 17 May 1787, to Herder, in WA I. Abt., XXXI, 239f.
14  Italian Journey, 17 April 1787, in WA I. Abt., XXXI, 147 (compiled between 1815 and 
1817).
15  Cf. the history of his botanical theories, in LA I. Abt., X, 334; also Italian Journey, July 
1787, in WA I. Abt., XXXII, 44 and LA I. Abt., IX, 8f. and 59.
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are the osteological counterparts to the botanical theories of the 
archetypal plant and the leaf as the archetypal organ of plants. The 
so-called ‘osteological type’16 (which Goethe also refers to in later 
years as the ‘Urtier’ or archetypal animal)17 corresponds to the 
archetypal plant as the ideal model for the skeleton of animals: for 
Goethe now claims to have established that the same osteological 
units are present, in the same arrangement, in all mammals, from the 
mole to the elephant and the walrus to human beings.18 (He was the 
first to describe the comparative study of these forms in their endless 
variations as ‘morphology’, the term still in use for this procedure 
today.) In osteology, the counterpart of the botanical theory of the leaf 
as archetypal organ of plants is the so-called ‘vertebral theory of the 
skull’ which Goethe formulated in 1790 after finding the broken skull 
of a sheep that seemed to him to prove that all the main bones of the 
vertebrate skull are modified vertebrae.19 The vertebra must therefore, 
he argued, be regarded as the archetypal organ not only of the spine, 
but also of the skull. In these two anatomical theories of 1790, a deeper 
unity or homology was therefore once again basic to the apparently 
most diverse natural forms.
Goethe’s last important insight as a scientist was gained at around the 
same time, probably in the first months of 1790.20 He himself relates how 
he had tried in Italy to discover the basic laws of form and composition 
in painting.21 But on the nature of colour in particular, he had been 
unable to discover anything significant, either from the painters he had 
met in Rome or from the textbooks and paintings themselves,22 so that 
he finally decided to investigate the problem, on his return to Germany, 
from first principles. The standard work on optics at that time was, 
of course, Newton’s Optics, and Goethe therefore undertook to study 
16  LA I. Abt., IX, 13; see also H. B. Nisbet, ‘Herder, Goethe and the Natural “Type”’, 
Publications of the English Goethe Society, 37 (1967), 83–119.
17  LA I. Abt., X, 78.
18  LA I. Abt., X, 142.
19  Cf. Diary, 22 April 1790, in WA III. Abt., II, 19; Tag- und Jahreshefte 1790, in WA I. 
Abt., XXXV, 15; also letters to Frau von Kalb, 30 April 1790 and Caroline Herder, 4 
May 1790, in WA IV. Abt., IX, 202 and 204 and LA I. Abt., IX, 208, 309 and 357f.
20  On the precise date, cf. LA II. Abt., III, xvif and Goethes Werke, Hamburg edition 
(henceforth HA), ed. by Erich Trunz, 14 vols (Hamburg: Christian Wegner, 1948–
64), XIII, 613. 
21  See Goethe’s History of Colour Theory, in LA I. Abt., VI, 415ff.
22  See the preface to his Contributions to Optics (1791) in LA I. Abt., III, 12.
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Newton’s theory and repeat its central experiments.23 When he was 
briefly prevented from conducting the experiments, he took a quick look 
through a prism he had borrowed at the white wall of his room, and 
expected, on the strength of dimly recollected lectures from his student 
days in Leipzig, to see the entire surface of the wall resolved into all the 
colours of the spectrum. He of course noticed at once that this was not 
the case, and describes his astonished reactions in the following famous 
words of his Colour Theory:24
How amazed I was when the white wall that I looked at through the 
prism remained white as before, and that a more or less definite colour 
showed up only where it bordered on a dark object. The window frames 
ultimately appeared in the most vivid colours, whereas no trace of colour 
was visible in the pale grey sky outside. It required no long reflection 
for me to realise that a limit was necessary to produce colours, and I at 
once said aloud to myself, as if by instinct, that the Newtonian theory 
was false. 
Over the next two decades, Goethe repeated all of Newton’s experiments 
and supplemented them by many others. But he never withdrew his 
original conclusion that Newton’s theory was false, and remained 
convinced as before that the colours were not, so to speak, contained in 
the white light and then extracted from it by refraction, but were only 
produced when light and dark images were superimposed. In other 
words, clearly defined images of different brightness and darkness 
are a necessary condition of colour production.25 From this original 
opposition, this polarity of light and darkness, Goethe derives all possible 
kinds and combinations of coloured images that arise under different 
circumstances, and orders them in series with gradual transitions.26 He 
outlines, as it were, a morphology or ‘natural system’ of colours which 
is closely linked to those series of typical forms whose ‘metamorphoses’ 
he had earlier attempted to classify in botany and zoology.27 But the 
unifying element in his continuous series of coloured images is neither 
a conceptual generalisation nor an abstract, mathematically based 
23  LA I. Abt., VI, 417–21.
24  LA I. Abt., VI, 420; also Tag- und Jahreshefte 1790, in WA I. Abt., XXXV, 13f.
25  Cf. LA I. Abt., VI, 424f.
26  Cf. LA I. Abt., VIII, 314f. (The Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject).
27  Cf. Neil M. Ribe, ‘Goethe’s Critique of Newton. A Reconsideration’, Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Science, 16 (1985), 315–55 (p. 325).
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theory in the manner of Newton, who derived the colours from the 
different refractive indices of light, but a concrete image, which Goethe 
now begins to describe as an ‘Urphänomen’ (archetypal phenomenon) 
on the model of his earlier archetypal plant and osteological type. The 
archetypal phenomenon of chromatics is the production of coloured 
images when light or darkness are viewed through a turbid medium 
(for example, when the setting sun is viewed through progressively 
denser layers of the atmosphere).
It is therefore clear that Goethe’s colour theory is closely connected 
to his earlier morphological studies. The biology of his age still consisted 
largely of natural history, i.e. the description and classification of plants 
and animals according to their similarities and differences; the functional 
aspects of biology, such as physiology, embryology, and genetics, were 
still in their initial stages. Goethe also approached the physical sciences 
as a natural historian, so that the science of chromatics was for him 
primarily a natural history of colour. When he was disappointed in his 
expectations, he attributed the absence of a colour theory of this kind 
to the enormous prestige and—as it now seemed to him—fraudulent 
machinations of Isaac Newton. For he did not simply believe that Newton 
had drawn the wrong conclusions from some specific experiments. He 
quickly realised that the entire methodology of Newtonian physics was 
uncongenial to him. I shall mention only two reasons for his misgivings 
before I examine their ethical implications.
In the first place, Goethe objected to the application of mechanics to 
nature beyond its function of explaining the simplest kinds of movement. 
The model of the machine, which the rationalists of the Enlightenment 
applied not just to the movement of the heavenly bodies, but also to the 
processes of life itself, was already inimical to him in his early years, 
because machines are activated by external forces, whereas Goethe 
believed by 1770 at the latest that nature has its own life force within 
itself. He prefers to view the earth itself as an organism rather than as 
a machine. Indeed, despite the Newtonian theory of gravity, he goes so 
far in a late essay on meteorology as to attribute to the earth a periodic 
expansion and contraction which he likens to the breathing in and out 
of a living organism.28
28  LA, I. Abt., XI, 244–68.
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Newton’s mechanical optics was also repugnant to him because he 
regarded chromatics in principle not as a part of physics, but primarily 
as a science of perception with close links to physiology.29 Prisms and 
angles of refraction are, of course, objective entities accessible to physical 
analysis; but colour only appears when it is perceived by the eye. In 
other words, mechanics has little relevance to a colour theory whose 
main aim is to study human perception.
A second fundamental objection of Goethe to Newton concerns 
the application of mathematics to the study of nature. Physical 
measurements, as in Newton’s optics, in Goethe’s opinion yield only a 
superficial picture of the relevant natural phenomena and miss the main 
point altogether. In Goethe’s words, ‘Number and measurement in their 
vacuity eliminate form and banish the spirit of living contemplation’.30 
The impermissible simplification of nature of which he also accuses 
mechanics and causal explanation, is for him, in the case of mathematics, 
particularly serious, because mathematics is a kind of language and 
Goethe, as a poet, is acutely aware of the inability even of ordinary 
language to do justice to the plenitude, complexity, and intangibility of 
natural phenomena.31 Even poetic language—and at least in this area, 
he really was an expert—is not completely adequate to this task, and it 
comes closest to doing so when it employs concrete images, symbols, and 
metaphors. (One need only think of his novel The Elective Affinities, in 
which the inadequacy of conceptual language becomes a major theme.) 
In comparison, the language of mathematics is totally inadequate.
In sum, we may conclude that all Goethe’s objections to Newtonian 
science are directed at a single feature, namely its abstraction.32 For 
Newton’s procedure always concentrates on one dimension of nature 
which corresponds to a particular human need, and therefore necessarily 
29  Cf. Gernot Böhme, ‘Ist Goethes Farbenlehre Wissenschaft?’, in Böhme, Alternativen 
der Wissenschaft (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1980), pp. 123–53.
30  LA I. Abt., IX, 367.
31  Cf. Karl J. Fink, Goethe’s History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), p. 46; also Nisbet, Goethe and the Scientific Tradition, p. 66.
32  Cf. LA I. Abt., IV, 5; also HA XII, 417 and 432 (Maxims and Reflections, nos. 386 
and 487); and John Neubauer, ‘”Die Abstraktion, vor der wir uns fürchten”. 
Goethes Auffassung der Mathematik und das Goethebild in der Geschichte der 
Wissenschaft’, in Versuche zu Goethe. Festschrift für Erich Heller, ed. by Volker Dürr 
and Géza von Molnár (Heidelberg: L. Stiehm, 1976), pp. 305–20; also Manfred 
Wenzel, ‘”Die Abstraktion, vor der wir uns fürchten”. Goethe und die Physik’, 
Freiburger Universitätsblätter, 35, Heft 133 (1996), 55–79.
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affords an incomplete or excessively simple image of observed reality; 
and if abstraction is taken to be a definitive reflection of that reality, 
superior to sensuous intuition, the result is a one-sided and potentially 
dangerous misapprehension of nature. It is above all this aversion to 
abstraction that lends Goethe’s science its distinctive character, which 
rapidly gained him the reputation of an outsider and dilettante among 
the specialists, and the physicists in particular.
But Goethe’s mistrust of abstraction is not just the naïve reaction of a 
non-mathematician to exact sciences which he was unable to understand. 
The same mistrust is a feature of his entire thinking, present long before 
his disagreements with Newton. He repeatedly distances himself from 
philosophical abstractions, especially in metaphysics,33 and accepts 
only particular propositions in the metaphysics of Spinoza, Kant, 
or Schelling which he feels are in keeping with his own pre-existing 
convictions. His judgement of didactic poetry is in general negative, 
because it contains too much abstraction,34 and his own philosophical 
poems are distinguished by concrete images and metaphors. His 
attitude to abstractions in theology,35 for example, or political theory,36 is 
no different. It is accordingly not surprising that he was likewise averse 
to scientific abstractions. The greatest problem he had to grapple with in 
the 1790s as he attempted to define his own experimental methodology 
was consequently how to make generalisations about nature without 
lapsing into abstraction. For a time, he felt attracted to the inductive 
philosophy of Francis Bacon, because it is based on sensuous experience; 
but it did not ultimately satisfy him, since Bacon’s inductions also end in 
abstract generalisations, as for example his famous definition of heat as 
‘expansive movement of the particles of bodies’.37 Goethe’s own solution 
to the problem emerged from his earlier theories of the archetypal plant 
and the osteological type, with the new concept of the ‘Urphänomen’ or 
archetypal phenomenon, whose main feature is that is can be observed 
33  Cf. his reaction to Holbach’s metaphysics in Poetry and Truth, in WA I. Abt., XXVIII, 
68ff. 
34  Cf. his essay on didactic poetry, in WA I. Abt., XLI (2), 225ff.; also my essay on 
Lucretius in the present volume, pp. 1–33, (p. 13). 
35  Cf. the article ‘Unerforschliches’ in the Goethe-Handbuch, ed. by Bernd Witte and 
other hands, 5 vols (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1996–99), IV/2, 1072–74.
36  Cf. Hans Reiss, Formgestaltung und Politik. Goethe-Studien (Würzburg: Königshausen 
& Neumann, 1993), p. 292.
37  Cf. Nisbet, Goethe and the Scientific Tradition, p. 36.
172 On the Literature and Thought of the German Classical Era
in the concrete individual instance, and at the same time incorporates 
the shared qualities of all similar instances.38 It is, in other words, a 
concrete generalisation.
It is tempting to conclude that the distinctive character of Goethe’s 
science, namely its aversion to abstraction, is simply that he is not 
primarily a scientist but a poet and artist. That is indeed the case, 
inasmuch as concrete images and visible forms are for him the basic 
material of both art and science, and he is convinced that the language 
of art can often convey more about nature than the language of science.39 
But his main objections to Newton are not aesthetic in character, and 
aesthetic considerations relatively rarely have a direct influence on 
his scientific observations. Much more important is the fact that, in 
the course of his morphological observations, he gained the insight—
very rare among his contemporaries—that there is no generally valid 
paradigm for all sciences in all ages, and that not only each individual 
science, but the scientific method itself is constantly changing and 
developing in the course of history. He consolidated this insight by 
detailed historical investigations and implements it convincingly in 
his most important historical work, the History of Colour Theory. In this 
work, he shows how colour theory has undergone profound changes 
on the basis of different theoretical premises from one historical epoch 
to the other. He also discerns a cyclic movement in the development of 
this science,40 whereby periods of inductive research are succeeded by 
periods of theoretical reflection in which the theories in turn solidify 
into dogmas, until these again are undermined by the emergence of 
new opinions and assumptions and inductive work again supervenes. 
Thus Goethe manages to discover forerunners of his own methods and 
theories in earlier ages—for example, in Greek antiquity. In short, there 
are different kinds of science, and some are more fertile than others.
This historical relativism makes a very modern impression.41 But 
unlike most historians of science today, Goethe ascribes a much more 
important role to the individual personalities of leading scientists such 
38  LA, I. Abt., IV, 71.
39  Cf. Goethe to Riemer, 28 October 1821, in WA IV. Abt., XXXV, 158.
40  LA I. Abt., VI, 94’; cf. Goethe-Handbuch III, 737.
41  On the relationship of Goethe’s theory of the history of science to the corresponding 
theories of Thomas Kuhn and other modern thinkers, cf. Fink, Goethe’s History of 
Science, pp. 85–90; also Dennis Sepper, Goethe contra Newton. Polemics and the Project 
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as Bacon, Descartes, and Newton than, for example, to economic and 
cultural influences.42 This psychological mode of explanation leads 
him to conclude, for instance, that the optical theories of Newton, 
or at least some of their underlying features, must reflect Newton’s 
personal character. This thought at last leads me back to the question 
I posed at the beginning of this essay, namely why Goethe’s aversion 
to Newton appears to be influenced more by ethical than by scientific 
considerations, since Goethe takes the view that Newton’s stubborn and 
deceitful character led him to defend false scientific opinions, even after 
he had recognised them as such,43 and that his gullible followers blindly 
recited his pronouncements as infallible truths.44 
The problematic aspect of this explanation is that Goethe has not the 
slightest evidence for Newton’s alleged duplicity apart from Newton’s 
scientific writings themselves. In other words, it is not a perceived 
moral weakness of Newton that leads Goethe to condemn his optical 
theories, but an alleged weakness of these optical theories that leads 
him to condemn Newton’s moral character. It is basically Newton’s 
whole conception of nature that seems ethically questionable to Goethe, 
because it in his opinion both does violence to nature and calls Newton’s 
character itself into question. For Goethe belonged to a generation for 
which the concept of nature was by no means value-free, but loaded 
with moral implications. From Shaftesbury’s nature enthusiasm to the 
vogue for literary sensibility, the glorification of nature, which steadily 
increased in the course of the eighteenth century, was familiar to Goethe 
from an early date. Not only his early literary successes such as Götz von 
Berlichingen and The Sorrows of Young Werther, but also his passion for 
botany in the early 1780s owed much to the works of Rousseau, in which 
for a New Science of Color (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 18f. 
and 186f.
42  Cf. LA I. Abt., VI, 87: ‘The conflict of the individual with direct experience and 
indirect tradition is indeed the history of the sciences.’ This view is in keeping 
with the fact that Goethe’s favourite form of historiography is the biographical or 
autobiographical narrative.
43  Cf. LA I. Abt., VI, 295f.: ‘It will surely be conceded that many scientific enigmas can 
only become comprehensible by means of an ethical solution’; see also LA I. Abt., 
VI, 252f. (on Newton’s alleged moral deficiencies).
44  On Goethe’s employment of theological categories and metaphors in his polemics 
against Newton, cf. Albrecht Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie (Munich: C. H. Beck, 
1987).
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nature is praised as the highest ethical authority and its neglect equated 
to decadence or corruption.45 
But the works which Goethe consulted at the time when he was 
studying Newton’s optic theories in the early 1790s play a considerable 
part in these developments. There is evidence that his first closer 
acquaintance with Newton’s colour theory was derived not from the 
English or Latin text of the Optics, but from German editions of textbooks 
such as Erxleben’s Elements of Physics46 and a German translation of 
Priestley’s History of Optics.47 The difference in languages is in this case 
decisive. For whereas the English technical terms for the behaviour of light 
in optical experiments (for example, ‘refraction’, ‘diffraction’, ‘inflexion’, 
‘dispersion’, etc.) sound merely learned and Latinate, the corresponding 
German expressions like Brechung, Beugung, Spaltung, Zerstreuung, 
Zerlegung, etc. convey an impression of drastic intervention in nature 
which Goethe was bound to find deeply offensive. He took particular 
exception to the sixth experiment in Newton’s Optics, in which light is 
passed through two small apertures and two prisms to demonstrate that 
light is composed of rays of different refrangibility which correspond to 
different colours. Newton called this experiment the experimentum crucis, 
i.e. the experiment of the cross, or decisive experiment. But Goethe at 
once fastens on to the origin of this metaphor, and writes:48
This is the so-called experimentum crucis, in which the researcher 
subjected nature to torture in order to force it to confess what he had 
already made up his mind about. But nature is like a steadfast and noble-
minded person who sticks to the truth, even under every kind of torment.
To put it differently, Newton’s procedure violates the integrity and 
unity of the object, which is nature. But Goethe is also convinced that 
45  On Rousseau’s influence on Goethe’s botanical studies, cf. LA I. Abt., X, 327–30; see 
also Goethe to Karl August, 16 June 1782, in WA IV. Abt., V, 347f.
46  On Goethe’s use of Erxleben and other German textbooks cf. LA I. Abt., III, 15 
(Beiträge zur Optik, 1791) and LA I. Abt., VI, 418 (Geschichte der Farbenlehre); HA 
XII, 403f. (Maxims and Reflections, no. 278); Sepper, Goethe contra Newton, p. 28; and 
Jeremy Adler, ‘Eine fast magische Anziehungskraft’. Goethes ‘Wahlverwandtschaften’ und 
die Chemie seiner Zeit (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1987), pp. 77f.
47  On Priestley, cf. HA XIV, 226f. and 335f.; on Goethe’s borrowing of Priestley’s History 
in Klügel’s German translation, cf. Elise Keudell, Goethe als Benutzer der Weimarer 
Bibliothek (Weimar: Böhlau, 1931), p. 5 (5 July 1791); on his first borrowings of 
works of Newton, cf. ibid., 5 October 1791 and 26 June 1792. 
48  LA I. Abt., V, 45.
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this procedure at the same time endangers the integrity of the subject, 
i.e. the researcher himself. From the 1790s onwards, he laments the 
increasing specialisation of science and the harmful effect which this 
specialisation must have on the development of the individual. He 
declares, for example, that ‘this is precisely the greatest evil of recent 
physics, that it has, as it were, divorced the experiments from humanity 
and seeks to recognise nature only in what artificial instruments reveal 
of it’.49 The human being is gradually alienated from nature, inasmuch 
as all his reactions are excluded apart from abstract thought.
But even these anxieties are not enough to explain the violence, 
untypical of Goethe, with which he directs his polemics against 
Newton. To understand his reaction correctly, one must look back 
on those six extraordinarily productive years he experienced before, 
during, and immediately after his Italian journey. This was the time 
in which his views on nature and science fully matured, and in which 
he also believed he had discovered the basic classical rules of art. He 
came up with the idea that nature and art are parallel spheres,50 and that 
both are characterised by elementary forms, by unity in variety, and by 
organic wholeness and harmonious proportions. In this sense, his view 
of nature was no less ‘classical’ than his view of art. His disappointment 
in the professional scientific world had begun in 1784, when his essay on 
the intermaxillary bone had met with incomprehension on the part of 
the anatomists, and he finally began to lose courage when his treatise on 
‘The Metamorphosis of Plants’ was ignored almost completely.51 When 
his classical views on art were called into question by the Romantics, 
his criticism of the latter on account of their one-sided subjectivity 
was the counterpart of his polemics against Newton in the sphere of 
science.52 But towards the end of the polemical section of his Colour 
Theory, he seems to have had an uneasy feeling that he had perhaps 
gone too far in his attacks on Newton, and refers, by way of apology, to 
49  Goethe to Zelter, 22 June 1808, in WA IV. Abt., XX, 90; on the need to employ all 
one’s mental powers and skills in the contemplation of nature, cf. Goethe to C. W. 
M. Jacobi, 16 August 1799, in WA IV, 153.
50  Cf. WA I. Abt., XXXII, 77f.
51  On these disappointments see Goethe-Handbuch, III, 744f. and 754f.
52  Cf. Hans Joachim Schrimpf, ‘Über die geschichliche Bedeutung von Goethes 
Newton-Polemik und Romantik-Kritik’ in Gratulatio. Festschrift für Christian Wegner, 
ed. by M. Honeit and M. Wegner (Hamburg: Grossohaus Wegner, 1963), pp. 62–82.
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the turbulent times he has lived through.53 (He had indeed begun work 
on the polemical section of his work shortly before the Battle of Jena and 
the French invasion of Weimar.) He felt even more isolated than before 
after Schiller’s death in 1805, and feared that the philosophy of nature 
and man which he had constructed in the final years of the ancien régime 
was under threat from all sides.
Was Goethe then merely an outsider and eccentric in the sphere 
of science? So it seemed to most professional scientists in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, and in optics, almost into the present day.54 
But in more recent decades, relativistic models in the history of science 
have encouraged more interpreters to see in Goethe’s scientific writings 
an idiosyncratic but defensible view of nature, even if his individual 
theories have long been superseded; and at the same time, studies of 
perception have increasingly recognised the physiological section of his 
Colour Theory as a pioneering achievement.55
Goethe’s biggest mistake as a scientist was his belief that it is 
impossible to be a specialist in the exact (i.e. mathematical) sciences and 
at the same time to hold a comprehensive vision of nature as a whole. It 
simply did not occur to him that Newton’s methods and his own view of 
nature might complement each other. But his scientific writings are still 
of some value today. His conviction that nature is an organic whole, of 
which human beings are an essential part, and that we should not pursue 
our immediate ends without heeding their consequences for the whole, 
is more relevant and necessary today than in the eighteenth century; it 
is therefore no coincidence that Goethe has often, and rightly, been cited 
in recent years as an advocate of environmentalism and a forerunner 
of green politics.56 This does not, of course, mean that he shared that 
53  LA I. Abt., V, 193.
54  On the reception of Goethe’s scientific studies in professional circles, cf. Christoph 
Gögelein, Zu Goethes Begriff von Wissenschaft auf dem Wege der Methodik seiner 
Farbstudien (Munich: Hanser, 1972), pp. 170–200; Felix Höpfner, Wissenschaft wider 
die Zeit. Goethes Farbenlehre aus rezeptionsgeschichtlicher Sicht (Heidelberg: Winter, 
1990); Karl Robert Mandelkow, Goethe in Deutschland. Rezeptionsgeschichte eines 
Klassikers, 2 vols (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1980–89), I, 173–98 and II, 39–48.
55  Cf., for example, Ribe, ‘Goethe’s Critique of Newton’, p. 334, and Sepper, Goethe 
contra Newton, pp. 14ff.
56  Cf., for example, Böhme, ‘Ist Goethes Farbenlehre Wissenschaft?’; also several 
contributors (including Gernot Böhme and Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich) to the 
volume Goethe und die Verzeitlichung der Natur, ed. by Peter Matussek (Munich: C. 
H. Beck, 1998). 
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hostility to technology that has been voiced by some opponents of 
scientific progress in recent decades.57 He expresses his approval, in a 
late essay, of attempts to harness the elements, even on a large scale; but 
significantly, he adds that we must be guided by the ordering principles 
of nature itself before we attempt to control it.58 In one of his best known 
poems, he illustrated the disastrous consequences that ensue if we fail 
to do so: I refer, of course, to the ballad of the magician’s apprentice, 
who unleashes natural forces which he can no longer control.59 What the 
apprentice and his present-day successors lack is that all-embracing and 
unitary conception of nature as a whole, which in Goethe’s view ought 
to underlie all activities informed by scientific knowledge.
57  On Goethe’s generally positive attitude towards industry and technology, see the 
Goethe-Handbuch IV, 104–07 (mining); 458ff. (handicrafts); 531–35 (industry); 
686–89 (machinery).
58  LA I. Abt., XI, 264 (on meteorology); on my article on this topic see Goethe-Handbuch, 
III, 778–85.
59  This poem was written at the same time (1797) as Goethe began the first intensive 
work on his Colour Theory.
Portrait of Immanuel Kant by Johann Gottlieb Becker (1768), oil on canvas, Schiller-
Nationalmuseum, Marbach am Neckar, Germany. Photograph by UpdateNerd 
(2018), Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/f/f2/Kant_gemaelde_3.jpg
9. Natural History and Human 
History in Goethe, Herder,  
and Kant1
The relationship between natural history and human history has played 
a decisive part in the rise of modern science and the modern historical 
consciousness. On the one hand, the application of historical thought 
to nature—i.e. its ‘temporalisation’2—towards the end of the eighteenth 
century led to a radical reappraisal of nature as a whole. It was then 
no longer seen as a timeless hierarchy of unchanging forms, but as a 
developmental process in which first the physical, and subsequently 
the biological world were understood as the product of a natural 
evolution from simple to ever more complex forms.3 On the other hand, 
the tendency to view human history increasingly as part of nature and 
hence as an object of scientific enquiry led to novel attempts to discover 
historical laws and thereby to predict, or even influence, the future 
course of history. A central figure in these developments was Goethe; 
and no less important were his contemporaries Herder and Kant, whose 
thoughts on nature and history influenced Goethe’s thinking (although 
they also contradicted it in significant respects). A comparison of their 
views on nature and history may not only lead to a better understanding 
of Goethe’s own views, but also provide a greater insight into one of the 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘Naturgeschichte und 
Humangeschichte bei Goethe, Herder und Kant’, in Peter Matussek (ed.), Goethe 
und die Verzeitlichung der Natur. Goethe-Sonderband in der Reihe Kulturgeschichte der 
Natur (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1998), pp. 15–43.
2  See Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1933), esp. Chapter 9. 
3  See Dietrich von Engelhardt, Historisches Bewusstsein in der Naturwissenschaft 
(Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1979), pp. 44–101.
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most important developments in the scientific and historical thought of 
the modern era.
All three thinkers were influenced in different ways by the growing 
tendency of their times to interpret nature as a historical, evolutionary 
process, and they themselves contributed to it. This essay will first 
consider their views on the history of the earth and its living organisms, 
before comparing the theoretical premises of the views in question. 
Secondly, their views on human history will be examined, and their 
thoughts on the relationship between nature and history will in turn 
be compared. The development of their ideas on these topics will be 
discussed in sequence, from Kant to Herder and finally to Goethe.
Natural History: Empirical Aspects
Theories of nature as a chronological process first appeared in the 
context of the physical sciences, and particularly that of astronomy. 
The belief that the physical world, and indeed nature as a whole, has 
developed over the course of time in a causal process is not, of course, a 
modern invention: it was already formulated by Democritus, Epicurus, 
and other atomists of antiquity. It found its most complete expression 
shortly before the Christian era in Lucretius’s didactic poem De rerum 
natura. But not until the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century 
did this doctrine receive a scientific foundation, for example in the 
work of Descartes and Leibniz, and not least in Kant’s epoch-making 
treatise of 1755, the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. 
The preface to this work clearly shows that Kant found himself in some 
embarrassment over the obvious affinity between his own cosmogony 
and that of the ancient atomists, because it was well known that the views 
of the latter were in contradiction to the doctrines of the church; he is 
therefore at pains to stress the compatibility of his own view concerning 
the mechanistic theory of the earth’s origin with the doctrine of divine 
creation.4 With reference to Newton’s mechanistic theory of gravitation, 
he explains the development of the solar system and the universe at 
large out of an original chaos of scattered material to its present state, 
4  Immanuel Kant, Werkausgabe (henceforth WW), ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel, 12 vols 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1968), I, 233ff.
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in which new galaxies, suns and planets continue to be created through 
the interaction of gravitational and centrifugal forces.
As soon as it was realised that the physical world as a whole had 
arisen through natural causes, there were grounds for concluding that 
its individual components might have arisen in the same way. The main 
reason why only a few eighteenth-century scientists managed to take 
this step was that the generally recognised length of the earth’s history 
(itself based on Biblical chronology) was much too short to accommodate 
even the most cautious estimates of the time needed for so numerous and 
complex organisms as those already present to evolve through natural 
causes. Besides, there were numerous indications that these organisms 
had not undergone any substantial alterations during the last three or 
four millennia (that is, around half of the earth’s supposed age of some 
six thousand years). There was accordingly a pressing need to look more 
closely at earth history in order to answer the question as to how the 
development of the earth itself could have taken place in so short a time. 
It naturally soon became clear that an incomparably greater length of time 
had to be postulated. One of the first works to draft a new chronology was 
Buffon’s Époques de la nature of 1778. Admittedly, the length of Buffon’s 
geological epochs was again unbelievably short by present-day standards, 
although he reckoned with tens of thousands instead of just thousands of 
years. But his work did at least provide an incentive for other scientists to 
view earth history as a long and complex process.5
As far as the universe itself was concerned, Kant was quite prepared 
to contemplate a really long period of development. He writes, for 
example, in his Universal Natural History: ‘Perhaps a whole series of 
millions of years and centuries elapsed before the sphere of organised 
nature in which we find ourselves attained its present stage of perfection; 
and perhaps an equally long period will elapse until nature takes as 
great a further a step out of chaos.’6
Kant’s early essay The Question of whether the Earth is Growing Old 
Considered in Terms of Physics (1754) treats earth history, albeit only 
sketchily, as a very long process.7 He further develops this draft with 
reference to Buffon and other earlier theorists in various subsequent 
5  Cf. Wolf Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte (Munich: Hanser, 1976), p. 43.
6  Kant, WW I, 334.
7  Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften (henceforth AA), ed. by the Preussische 
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Reimer, 1902–), I, 193–312.
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writings, for example his Physical Geography8 and the essay On the 
Volcanoes on the Moon.9 And although his geological theories, given 
the limitations of contemporary knowledge, are highly speculative, he 
constantly strives to base them on natural causes and on natural laws 
that retain their validity today. He invokes, for example, earthquakes, 
subsidence, volcanoes, etc. in order to explain the formation of the 
earth’s surface over long periods of time. (The Lisbon earthquake of 
1755 had made a deep impression on him.) But the important role 
which he, like Buffon and other predecessors, ascribes to the sea and 
its supposed coverage of the earth in early times already looks forward 
to the neptunistic theories which gained wide acceptance in Germany 
towards the end of the eighteenth century.
It is therefore not surprising that, in view of the pronounced 
historical tendency of Kant’s vision of nature, he even considers the 
possibility that all living organisms may be linked by descent from 
common ancestors. In a well known passage in his Critique of Judgement 
(1790), he observes that the anatomical similarity between many animal 
species might suggest such a relationship; but he adds ‘A hypothesis of 
this kind might be described as an adventure of reason, and there can 
be few natural scientists, including the most acute among them, whose 
minds it has not on occasion crossed.’10
There is already a reference in Kant’s review of Herder’s Ideas on the 
Philosophy of History to such hypotheses, but Kant considers them ‘so 
monstrous […] that reason shies away from them’,11 and in another work 
from that same decade he describes the constancy of natural species as a 
‘law of nature’.12 But his resistance to the theory of evolution had nothing 
to do with religion; like many other Enlightenment thinkers, he simply 
found the empirical evidence so inadequate and the necessary timescale 
so long that the theories in question seemed ultimately incredible or 
at best unproven. At any rate, he did not yet feel able, on the basis of 
such daring hypotheses, to contemplate that ‘monstrous’ revision of the 
8  First as a lecture series between 1756 and 1796, then as a book in 1802; cf. AA XIX, 
153–436 (esp. pp. 206 and 296–305).
9  1785; AA VIII, 67–76.
10  WW X, 375. 
11  WW XII, 792.
12  WW IX, 145.
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traditional view of nature which would result from the recognition of an 
evolutionary relationship between the animals and man.13
Herder’s views on the history of nature and the origin of species show 
many similarities with those of Kant. He had attended Kant’s lectures 
on physical geography in Königsberg and was also familiar with his 
scientific writings. Since I have dealt in detail with Herder’s scientific 
writings elsewhere,14 I shall confine myself here to a brief outline.
Herder’s Ideas on the Philosophy of History is one of the best examples of 
that eighteenth-century tendency, already mentioned above, to establish 
a connection between nature and history. For he envisages the history 
of the earth and its living creatures as a continuous process of which 
human history is a natural sequel. In other words, even the structure of 
his work presupposes that nature has its own history, and that human 
history is a part of nature.
Herder was very well read in the scientific literature of his time, and 
his cosmological reflections in the Ideas are many-sided and eclectic.15 
Even more than Kant, who, like Buffon, significantly influenced the 
initial chapters of the Ideas, Herder was attracted to drastic theories 
of earth history, and speculates at length on geological upheavals and 
convulsions, for example a shift of the earth’s axis, in order to explain the 
earliest development of the earth. Some of the most extreme reflections 
of this kind were deleted or omitted (probably on the advice of Goethe, 
who collaborated closely with Herder during the composition of the 
first parts of the Ideas).16 The published version of the Ideas stresses 
the influence of the sea, out of which the earth’s earliest mountains 
crystallised; and like Goethe, Herder identified himself increasingly 
with the neptunism of Abraham Gottlob Werner in his later years.
But much more important than Herder’s individual theories is the 
fact that his conception of nature is fundamentally historical. It is also 
significant that, despite his tenure of a senior office in the Lutheran 
church, he takes the view that the earth has developed by purely 
13  On other evolutionary theories of the late eighteenth century see Engelhardt, 
Historisches Bewusstsein, pp. 82–89.
14  See H. B. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science (Cambridge: MHRA, 
1970).
15  Cf. ibid., pp. 167–80.
16  Cf. Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämtliche Werke (henceforth SW), ed. by Bernhard 
Suphan, 33 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877–1913), XIII, 470–84; also Nisbet, Herder 
and the Philosophy, pp. 174–76.
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natural causes from its primitive elements: he explicitly states ‘that […] 
creation […] animates itself through organic forces implanted within 
these elements’.17 Such statements as this, along with the then widely 
held view that certain simple forms of life have arisen spontaneously 
and that new varieties of plants and animals can be produced by 
climatic influences,18 led various Herder scholars, particularly in the 
later nineteenth century, to present Herder as a precursor of Darwin. 
This claim has long since been refuted:19 for example, Herder explicitly 
denies in the Ideas that man is genetically linked to the apes and that any 
species can depart from its original genetic character.20 Nonetheless, he is 
often involuntarily led in the direction of the theory of evolution, as Kant 
rightly noticed.21 His often expressed belief that nature is animated by 
dynamic, monad-like forces which work their way upwards through the 
hierarchy of beings from simple to ever higher forms22 does indeed look 
forward, on an ideal level, towards that evolutionism which was later 
confirmed empirically by the palaeontological and genetic discoveries 
of the nineteenth century. As Arthur O. Lovejoy demonstrated, 
such hypotheses of idealistic genetics were a necessary stage in that 
temporalisation of the so-called ‘chain of being’ which prepared the way 
for the later, empirically grounded theory of a real evolution of species.23
Goethe’s theories of earth history have many common features with 
those of Kant and Herder—features which largely go back to the time of 
his collaboration with Herder in the early 1780s.24 But in contrast to those 
of Kant and Herder, Goethe’s ideas are marked by a reluctance to speculate 
on the earliest phases of earth history. He refuses to go further back in 
history than the evidence of the earth’s present surface and in particular 
of the oldest granite mountains permit, and declares: ‘My spirit has no 
wings to soar back to those first beginnings. I stand firmly on the granite, 
17  SW XIII, 422.
18  Cf. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy, pp. 214f. and 223ff.
19  See esp. Max Rouché, Herder précurseur de Darwin? Histoire d’un mythe (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nouvelle Thouars, 1940); cf. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy, pp. 
210–39.
20  SW XIII, 256f. and 415.
21  WW XII, 792.
22  SW XIII, 167 and 177–81.
23  See Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, passim. 
24  Cf. George A. Wells, ‘Goethe’s Geological Studies’, Publications of the English Goethe 
Society, 35 (1965), 92–137. 
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and ask it […] how the mass from which it arose was constituted’.25 This 
aversion is doubtless connected with his dislike of theories which seek 
to explain the origin of the earth by violent forces, and he also declares 
that ‘the dynamic’ of slow, quasi-organic development seems more 
important to him than ‘the atomistic and mechanical’ which is active 
in the dissolution and deposition of elements that are already present.26 
For similar reasons, he was particularly drawn to neptunism,27 because it 
regarded the slowly acting effect of water on the earth’s surface as more 
fundamental than the spectacular but ultimately insignificant outbursts 
of volcanoes and earthquakes. In his later years, he is equally convinced 
that many geological events are initiated by imperceptible chemical 
processes.28 In all these cases, he is much more strongly interested in 
those phenomena which are still active in the present than in completely 
different phenomena which were allegedly active in a hypothetical 
primeval era. This scepticism towards hypotheses imposes limitations 
on Goethe’s historical understanding of nature, and his reflections on 
earth history are consequently markedly different from those of Kant 
and Herder. Since he considers only the more recent, empirically evident 
phases in the earth’s history as a developmental process in time, his view 
of nature can be described only in a qualified sense as historical.
Goethe’s views on the origin and development of living organisms 
are subject to similar qualifications. Here again, he distrusts abstract 
speculation and confines his attention to existing phenomena. Like 
Herder, he emphasises the effects of climate and environment on living 
organisms, and adds that ‘the animal is shaped by circumstances 
to circumstances’29 and ‘the genus […] can change to the species, the 
species to the variety, and this in turn can change again in infinite ways 
as a result of other conditions’.30 But the changes he has in mind—for 
example, the development of the horse or ox from antiquity to the 
25  Goethe, Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, ed. by the Deutsche Akademie der 
Naturforscher (Leopoldina) (henceforth LA), I. Abteilung, 17 vols (Weimar: 
Böhlau, 1947–70); II. Abteilung (Weimar: Böhlau, 1959–): LA I. Abt., I, 62f. 
26  LA I. Abt., I, 378 (1811).
27  Cf. LA I. Abt., I, 95ff. (1785).
28  See LA I. Abt., I, 348 (1807). 
29  LA I. Abt., IX, 126 (1795).
30  LA I. Abt., X, 334 (1831). 
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present31—are relatively superficial, and just like Herder, he doubts 
whether there is a genetic relationship between man and the apes. He 
writes, for example, ‘one cannot (or scarcely can) say that we are related 
to the apes through the Moors’.32 The qualification ‘or scarcely can’ 
is characteristic of his scientific thought: where the hitherto available 
empirical evidence does not permit an unambiguous answer, he simply 
leaves the question open (even though in this particular case, he was 
fully familiar with the anatomical relationship between man and the 
animals, as his essay on the intermaxillary bone in man demonstrates).33 
When he reflects, in a later essay, on the origin of the giant sloth, he 
adds the following qualification to his provisional observations: ‘May 
we be permitted some poetic expression, since prose in general may 
not be adequate in this instance.’34 And although in 1823 he publishes 
a work by the botanist Ernst Heinrich Friedrich Meyer in which the 
latter declares: ‘It is impossible for one species to arise out of another’, 
Goethe neither affirms nor denies this proposition;35 here again, the 
question must remain open. As far as evolution is concerned, Goethe’s 
thinking is therefore akin to that of Kant and Herder: he is in principle 
prepared to understand the development of life and living organisms as 
a historical process, but the empirical evidence for a fully fledged theory 
of evolution still strikes him as inadequate.
We may therefore conclude that Kant, Herder, and Goethe were 
equally convinced of the historicity of the earth and nature as a whole—a 
natural history governed by natural laws. All three are in this respect 
true representatives of the European Enlightenment, whose basic 
convictions included the rule of natural law in all spheres of reality. But 
the most pronounced difference between their positions—and hence 
also the originality of Goethe’s concept of nature—becomes really 
apparent only when we consider their methodological premises and 
their understanding of those processes and mechanisms through which 
nature develops over time and thereby acquires a historical dimension. 
A comparative account of the methods and principles which underlie 
the views of these three thinkers on scientific modes of explanation, and 
31  LA I. Abt., IX, 254–60 (1822)
32  LA II. Abt., IXA, 201.
33  LA I. Abt., IX, 154–61 (1786).
34  LA I. Abt., IX, 247 (1821).
35  LA I. Abt., IX, 300 (1823).
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on causation and change in nature, will therefore conclude the first part 
of this enquiry.
Theoretical Aspects: Kant
In comparison with those of Herder and Goethe, Kant’s theoretical 
pronouncements on nature and natural history are much more 
differentiated, thorough, and systematic. Kant was an established 
philosopher who had addressed scientific themes in whole or in 
part in his earliest writings as well as in several of his major works. 
His theory of science was from the start associated with Newtonian 
physics, and it owed many of its insights to Kant’s intimate knowledge 
of contemporary physical theories, including their mathematical and 
technically most demanding aspects. Neither Herder’s nor Goethe’s 
knowledge of mathematical physics and its philosophical implications 
bears comparison with that of Kant.
This difference had a profound influence on the ways in which the 
three thinkers sought to understand and explain natural processes. For 
Kant, mathematical physics remained the supreme model of scientific 
explanation.36 It is even a primary support of his critical idealism, for 
the authority of Newtonian mechanics and its laws of motion stands for 
him on a higher intellectual level than that of merely empirical rules. He 
notes, for example, in the Critique of Pure Reason, that such laws are a priori 
necessary, whereas the necessity of principles of empirical observation 
is only indirect and dependent on contingent circumstances.37 In the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Science he declares ‘that every particular 
theory of nature contains only as much genuine science as mathematics 
is present in it.’38 Thus by this definition, only mathematical physics 
can count as genuine science; and although the theory of gravitation, 
for example, is partly based on empirical observations,39 it can count 
as scientifically sound only in so far as it is based on a mathematical 
formula in keeping with the inverse square law. Even chemistry, not 
36  See Michael Friedman, ‘Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. by Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), pp. 161–99 (p. 165f.). 
37  Cf. WW III, 201–03; also Friedman, ‘Causal Laws’, pp. 165 and 174.
38  WW IX, 14.
39  WW II, 574f.
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yet subject to mathematical treatment in Kant’s time, is in his opinion 
‘no more than a systematic art, or experimental doctrine, but never a 
genuine science’.40
Kant’s aim in his own writings on the empirical study of nature is 
always that of causal explanation in accordance with recognised laws of 
nature. In an essay of 1785 on earth history, for example, he condemns 
any appeal to supernatural agencies and says ‘in all natural epochs, since 
no one of these can be defined in a world of the senses as absolutely the 
first, we are therefore not exempt from the obligation to search as far as 
possible among universal causes and to follow its chain, as long as the 
links hang together, in accordance with already established laws’.41
Here, the venerable image of the chain, in use since antiquity as 
a metaphor for the hierarchy of beings in space, is unambiguously 
temporalised: Kant’s view of nature is fundamentally historical. In 
another work from the same decade (On the Use of Teleological Principles 
in Philosophy), he likewise notes that the term ‘natural history’ is 
misleading, because natural history has hitherto dealt almost exclusively 
with the systematic description of presently existing natural forms; in 
its place, he outlines as follows a new, genuinely historical definition 
of its task as that of linear causal explanation: ‘to trace the connection 
between the present conditions of nature and their causes in earlier 
times, in accordance with laws of action which we do not invent, but 
derive from the forces of nature as it presents itself to us now, and follow 
it back only as far as analogy permits—that would be a natural history’.42
Where the empirical evidence is lacking, the second-best method is 
in Kant’s opinion the heuristic use of analogies. Or, as he had put it in 
an earlier work, our conjectures would gain in probability ‘if one drew 
on the help of analogies, which must guide us in such cases where our 
understanding lacks the thread of infallible proof’.43 It will later be seen 
that this recommendation of analogical thinking was taken up by Kant’s 
pupil Herder, even if Herder did not always employ this method with 
the critical circumspection of his teacher. 
Basic to Kant’s theory of science is the opposition between rational 
and empirical methods, as for example in his distinction between 
40  WW IX, 15. 
41  AA VIII, 76.
42 WW IX,142.
43  WW I, 336.
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explanations by means of a priori necessary mathematical laws, and 
explanations by means of merely empirical rules.44 The boundary 
between these two modes of explanation does, of course, shift in the 
course of Kant’s philosophical development. For example, in his late Opus 
postumum, he endeavours to ground further areas of science—above all 
chemistry—on a secure a priori foundation, but the dualistic distinction 
remains in principle valid. A parallel distinction between physical and 
biological modes of explanation is equally present in various works of 
Kant, but even here, the boundary between the two is fluid, although 
the distinction is never abolished. In the Universal Natural History, he 
defines it as follows:45 
No one should take exception if I venture to suggest that it should be 
possible to understand the formation of all the heavenly bodies, the cause 
of their motion, and in short, the origin of the entire present constitution 
of the universe before it will be possible to explain clearly and completely 
the production of a single herb or caterpillar on mechanical principles.
In this early work, Kant still clings to the traditional belief that the 
apparently purposive organisation of plants and animals should be 
explained not only by a special, non-mechanical (namely teleological) 
kind of causality, but should also be derived from the intentions of a 
rational creator.46 The same distinction between mechanical and biological 
spheres again appears in the Critique of Judgement of 1790 in the following 
statement: ‘absolutely no human reason can […] hope to understand the 
production of even a blade of grass by purely mechanical causes.’47 But 
this time, the teleological mode of explanation is no longer associated 
with the assumption of a higher reason. All scientific explanations must, 
according to the older Kant, be based on natural causes,48 although in 
the case of organic life, these must be supplemented by a teleological 
judgement which presupposes a purposive causality—but without 
44  WW III, 180; cf. Karen Gloy, Die Kantische Theorie der Naturwissenschaft (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 1976), pp. 19f., 31f., and 183.; see also Hans Schimank, ‘Der Aspekt der 
Naturgesetzlichkeit im Wandel der Zeiten’, in Das Problem der Gesetzlichkeit, ed. by 
the Joachim-Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Vol. II (Hamburg: Richard 
Meiner, 1949), pp. 139–86 (p. 140).
45  WW I, 237.
46  Ibid., 232 and 234f.; cf. Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 12.
47  WW X, 364.
48  Ibid., p. 331. 
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claiming that such purposes have any objective existence outside the 
teleological judgement of the viewer.49 The highest aim of science 
remains, as before, that of ‘mechanical’ explanation: that is, even organic 
processes are based on physical and chemical agencies.50 But where this 
mode of explanation is inadequate or impossible because of incomplete 
knowledge, the ‘regulative’ use of teleology comes to its aid. Thus, just as 
in physics, Kant’s views in biology on the limits of scientific explanation 
also become somewhat more flexible in his later years, although the 
distinction in principle between rigorous and less rigorous modes of 
explanation is never abandoned. What cannot yet be explained is now no 
longer automatically consigned to the sphere of theology, but referred to 
a supplementary, regulatory mode of explanation which in biology, for 
example, must remain in use until a ‘mechanical’ causality is discovered 
in this area too.
The last aspect of Kant’s theory of scientific explanation which calls 
for mention here concerns the nature of natural causes themselves. 
His attitude to this question alters considerably over the years. In his 
early works, for example, he still subscribes to Leibniz’s metaphysics: 
the Leibnizian monads as simple, dynamic units are for him the 
basic constituents of the universe.51 But even in his earliest works, he 
dispenses, in scientific contexts, with speculations on the inner nature 
of those forces (such as attraction and repulsion) which he holds 
responsible for all natural processes in the physical world. Here, as in 
so many cases, he doubtless follows the example of Isaac Newton, who 
rejected all speculation on the inner nature of gravitational force with his 
famous statement ‘hypotheses non fingo’.52 By the time of his Inaugural 
Dissertation of 1770, he no longer makes any connection between the 
spatio-temporal world of science and its supposed metaphysical 
substratum.53 And in his critical phase, he recognises natural forces 
only in mathematical formulations and without any anthropomorphic 
associations. In his late period—that is, in his Opus postumum—he 
admittedly no longer lays as much stress on the mathematical as on 
49  Ibid., pp. 369f.
50  Ibid., p. 371; cf. Clark Zumbach, The Transcendental Science. Kant’s Conception of 
Biological Methodology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), pp. 80–83.
51  See, for example, his Monadologia physica (1756), in WW II, 516–63.
52  Cf. Schimank, ‘Der Aspekt der Naturgesetzlichkeit’, p. 172; also WW VIII, 805.
53  Cf. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, p. 34.
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the dynamic side of Newtonian physics, but without any intention of 
rehabilitating Leibniz’s metaphysics:54 Kant’s dynamism is still entirely 
phenomenological, and he has no interest in the metaphysical character 
of natural forces, but only in the scientifically grounded laws of their 
effects. To this extent, he holds the same opinion as most physicists 
towards the end of the eighteenth century, whose view is encapsulated, 
for example, in the definition of natural law in Gehler’s Physikalisches 
Wörterbuch (Dictionary of Physics) of 1787–95:55
In reality, only the particular effects are present in nature, and the 
laws exist only in the ideas of natural scientists or the system of physics. 
Hence the knowledge of natural laws is also not yet a knowledge of 
the efficient causes and the mechanism whereby the phenomena are 
produced in time. The laws teach us only what is happening, not why 
and how it does so.
It is clear from this evidence that Kant’s views on natural history and 
the dynamics of natural processes were decisively influenced by his 
knowledge of the exact sciences since Newton. His cosmogony, for 
example, is based almost exclusively on Newton’s celestial mechanics, 
and even his theories of earth history are to a large extent dependent on 
mechanical laws, in order to explain, for example, the process of erosion 
and deposition through rain, rivers and sea.56 It seems at first sight as 
if the ideas of his pupil Herder on such questions are closely related to 
his; but on closer inspection, it emerges that Herder’s theoretical views, 
particularly his theories of scientific explanation, natural laws, and 
causality, are completely different from those of Kant.
Theoretical Aspects: Herder
Neither Herder’s cosmogony nor his theory of natural law shows that 
marked affinity to Newtonian physics which was characteristic of Kant’s 
thinking. Admittedly, there are frequent references in Herder’s works to 
mathematical concepts, laws of motion, and other aspects of mechanics.57 
But unlike Kant, he employs such concepts and principles less in their 
54  AA XXI, 479; cf. ibid., p. 226.
55  Gehler, III. Teil, cited by Schimank, ‘Der Aspekt der Naturgesetzlichkeit’, p. 144.
56  See, for example, AA IX, 296ff. (Physische Geographie).
57  Cf. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy, pp. 86–90 and 92–98.
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original scientific sense than as metaphors or analogies, as will shortly 
be seen, in order to describe non-physical processes such as the course of 
world history or the moral development of human beings. This tendency 
is already evident in his admission to an astronomer friend: ‘I lack [...] 
the use of higher mathematics, in which, as I suspect, there must at least 
be excellent analogies to enable us to reach higher levels in philosophy.’58
Herder’s theory of natural laws is also quite different from that of 
Kant. Like Francis Bacon, whose writings he greatly valued, he regards 
such laws as inductive generalisations from experience, without any a 
priori components.59 In 1769, for example, he writes: ‘All laws of attraction 
are nothing other than observed qualities which we rearrange among 
themselves until a basic principle emerges [...]. The further we can 
generalise these [principles], the fewer and simpler the laws become, 
and the nearer we come to a single concept, i.e. the basic concept of the 
area in question.’60
Herder’s natural laws are therefore by no means the same as 
the mathematical laws which play so great a part in Kant’s critical 
philosophy, but rather akin to those empirical regularities which Kant 
usually describes as ‘rules’. For Herder, the mathematical formulation 
of such laws is in any case irrelevant; in his attempts to refute the 
critical philosophy, he also indicates that he considers mathematical 
knowledge not as knowledge a priori, but as empirical.61 And as for the 
three laws of motion which Kant regards as a priori necessary truths, 
they are for Herder nothing more than identical propositions; the 
truth of such propositions may well be necessary, but their necessity 
is merely that of tautologies without any empirical content.62 It follows 
from this that Herder’s definition of natural laws is much more open, 
more comprehensive, and looser than that of Kant, so that he does not 
hesitate to designate numerous phenomena outside the sphere of the 
exact sciences as ‘natural laws’, for example in world history or the 
moral development of mankind. 
58  Johann Gottfried Herder, Briefe. Gesamtausgabe 1763–1803, ed. by Karl-Heinz Hahn, 
Wilhelm Dobbek and Günter Arnold, 10 vols (Weimar: Böhlau, 1977–2001), III, 109.
59  See H. B. Nisbet, ‘Herder and Francis Bacon’, Modern Language Review, 62 (1967), 
267–83 (pp. 271f.).
60  SW IV, 465; cf. also SW XXI, 228f. 
61  See, for example, SW XXI, 32f.
62  Ibid., 37f.
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There is a similar divergence between Herder’s and Kant’s views on 
the role of teleology in natural science. It is true that, in the chapters of the 
Ideas on natural history, Herder tends to avoid a purely anthropocentric 
teleology as well as any reference to the supposed intentions of God. 
He writes, for example: ‘The philosophy of final causes has been of no 
benefit to natural history’;63 and we also know that he was strengthened 
in this opinion not only by the anti-teleological attitude of, for example, 
Spinoza, Bacon, and Buffon, but also by the objections of his friends 
Goethe and Knebel to certain teleological passages in the first draft 
of the Ideas.64 He is, indeed, much less consistent in his treatment 
of teleology than the critical Kant. He makes no clear distinction, for 
example, between physical phenomena, which Kant believes can only be 
explained by mechanical principles, and biological processes, which are 
sometimes intelligible only with the help of teleology;65 on the contrary, 
in keeping with his Neo-Platonic, Leibnizian metaphysics of nature, 
he is always at pains to avoid any abrupt distinction between different 
realms of nature. He is also concerned, in his dual role as theologian 
and secular thinker, to leave open the choice between teleology and 
mechanical causality by describing the same phenomena both as natural 
events and as a consequence of divine intentions.66 But he sometimes 
falls back on unmistakably teleological models, without any critical 
reservations;67 and his opposition to Kant reaches its climax in his later 
years, when he condemns even the mechanical cosmogony of Kant’s 
Universal Natural History which had influenced his own cosmogony so 
profoundly in the Ideas, and instead praises the teleologically flavoured 
description of the universe as an expression of divine wisdom in Johann 
Heinrich Lambert’s Cosmological Letters.68 
On the real nature of natural causes, Herder again thinks quite 
differently from Kant. That Leibnizian doctrine of monads which 
Kant himself had recognised in his early years becomes in Herder’s 
case the foundation of a comprehensive metaphysics of nature in the 
Neo-Platonic tradition. Nature is for him a continuous hierarchy of 
63  SW XIV, 202.
64  Cf. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy, p. 54. 
65  Cf. ibid., pp. 46f.
66  Cf. ibid., pp. 49ff.
67  Cf. ibid., p. 53.
68  SW XXIII, 525f.
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forms, created, preserved, and transformed by indwelling forces.69 
(He speaks rather of ‘forces’ than of monads, no doubt because the 
former expression sounds more down-to-earth and therefore more 
acceptable in a scientific context.) His concept of forces makes it 
possible for him to operate with at least terminological consistency 
between metaphysical, physical, biological and even psychological 
spheres; but this kind of dynamism is fundamentally different from the 
purely phenomenological dynamism of the older Kant, who rejects all 
speculation on the inner essence of natural forces. Herder does, it must 
be said, sometimes speak with a certain sympathy of the metaphysical 
scepticism of Hume and the phenomenological reservations of Newton 
and Kant;70 but in other cases, he equates the concept of causes to his 
own concept of forces and turns it into an animistic or spiritual subject. 
Thus he declares, for example, ‘[We] rightly conclude that an active 
force, hence a subject, is basic here’.71 The whole of nature, for Herder, 
is therefore filled with dynamic elements which he at times describes as 
quasi-personal causal forces. When he adduces this principle in order to 
explain natural processes, his language, despite some similarities with 
the language of science, recalls neither that of exact Newtonian science 
nor that of modern natural philosophy, but rather that of Neo-Platonic 
metaphysics.
Theoretical Aspects: Goethe
Goethe’s view of scientific explanation is markedly different from 
that of Kant. But it has many points of contact with that of Herder 
(which is scarcely surprising in the light of his close collaboration with 
Herder around the time of the latter’s Ideas). But there are nevertheless 
considerable differences between Herder’s and Goethe’s understandings 
of nature. This may help to answer the question of why Goethe’s views 
on nature—in contrast to those of Kant and Herder—have remained so 
attractive to many people down to recent times.72 
69  Cf. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy, pp. 8–16.
70  See, for example, SW VII, 381; VIII, 177; XIII, 10, 47, 161, 358, etc.
71  SW XV, 533; cf. also SW XXI, 152. 
72  For a range of examples of this positive reception see most of the contributions to 
the volume Goethe und die Verzeitlichung der Natur, ed. by Peter Matussek (Munich: 
C. H. Beck, 1998).
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Goethe’s aversion to mathematical physics and Newtonian mechanics 
is so well known that it requires no further detailed examination here.73 
But this aversion is at least in part responsible for the fact that Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, with its uncompromising dualism and close 
relationship to Newton’s physics, appealed much less to Goethe than 
did his Critique of Judgement, which treats art and nature as parallel 
realms.74 Goethe’s concept of natural law is also fundamentally different 
from that of Kant. He often speaks, like Herder, of natural laws not only 
in the physical world, but in the biological sphere too; in comparative 
anatomy, for example, he discovers ‘the law [...] that nothing can be 
added to one part without a corresponding diminution of another, and 
vice versa’,75 and he regards the spiral tendency of plants as a ‘basic law 
of life’.76 It is plain that such laws are for Goethe—and for Herder—are 
rather general observations of regularities in the empirical world than 
a priori necessary basic laws on the Kantian model. The terms ‘law’ 
and ‘rule’ indeed seem to be almost identical in meaning for Goethe,77 
although the second suggests a simple regularity, whereas the first, 
with its juristic associations, also calls to mind duress and limitation 
(often in contrast to arbitrariness, contingency or immoderacy). The 
word ‘law’ has for Goethe—again like Herder—a much broader sense 
than in Newtonian physics. He speaks, for example, of ‘the universal 
law of separation and convergence, rise and fall, alternate balancing 
movements’ in various spheres of nature,78 and on one occasion defines 
the beautiful as ‘a manifestation of secret natural laws’;79 but in this case 
again, he is thinking of empirical regularities of a very general kind, and 
not of precise means of explanation and prediction of natural processes 
on the model of exact science.
73  On Goethe’s natural philosophy in its historical context, see H. B. Nisbet, Goethe and 
the Scientific Tradition (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London, 
1972).
74  Cf. LA I. Abt., IX, 90–94.
75  LA I. Abt., IX, 124 (1795).
76  LA I. Abt., I, 10 and 346, etc. (1831); cf. also LA I. Abt., I, 9 and 23 (1790); LA I. 
Abt., I, 9 and 62 (1817); LA I. Abt., I, 9 and 111 (1820); LA I. Abt., I, 10 and 393, etc. 
(1830). 
77  Cf. LA I. Abt., I, 10 and 387 (1830); LA I. Abt., I, 9 and 341 (1824); LA I. Abt., I, 4 and 
71 (1808).
78  LA I. Abt., I, 4 and 220 (1808).
79  Goethes Werke, Hamburg edition (henceforth HA), ed. by Erich Trunz, 14 vols 
(Hamburg: Christian Wegner, 1948–64), XII, 467.
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This aspect of Goethe’s concept of law is perhaps most clearly in 
evidence in his writings on optics, particularly in his Colour Theory. The 
word ‘law’ is often used in the Colour Theory as a general description 
of periodically recurring natural processes, for example, in Goethe’s 
reference to ‘the first basic law, already familiar to the ancients, that 
the eye is drawn together and contracted by darkness and conversely 
released and expanded by brightness’.80 Goethe proposes the new term 
Urphänomen (archetypal phenomenon) as a more appropriate description 
of the fundamental colour phenomenon—probably because he wishes 
to distance himself from the current Newtonian associations which the 
term ‘law’ had acquired in the context of physics. For as he says, there 
are ‘higher rules and laws, which do not, however, reveal themselves 
through words and hypotheses to the understanding, but [...] through 
phenomena to the intuition. We call them archetypal phenomena, 
because nothing lies above them in the world of appearance’.81
It therefore follows that Goethe’s conception of natural law as an 
empirical generalisation is very close to that of Herder—except that, in 
Goethe’s case, the process of generalisation does not lead to an abstract 
concept, but to a visual intuition.82 He distances himself much more 
decisively than Herder, however, from the belief that the goal of scientific 
generalisation is the explanation of natural processes, and declares: ‘One 
should not look for anything behind the phenomena. They themselves 
are the theory’,83 or again: ‘we do not ask for causes here, but for the 
conditions under which the phenomena appear’.84 His view of nature is 
therefore fundamentally descriptive, and hence closer to older natural 
history than to modern science. For this reason, he is also much less 
interested than Kant and Herder in the oldest epochs of earth history, 
and he leaves the question of the natural evolution of living forms open; 
his aim is to describe natural processes which are still active, without 
trying to determine their causes or genetic stages in earlier eras which 
are no longer accessible to observation. He therefore states that his 
morphology seeks ‘only to represent, and not to explain’;85 and although 
80  LA I. Abt., VII, 4 (1810).
81  LA I. Abt., IV, 71 (1808).
82  Cf. Nisbet, Goethe and the Scientific Tradition, pp. 36–44.
83  HA XII, 432.
84  LA I. Abt., XI, 40 (1798).
85  LA I. Abt., X, 140 (1795).
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he often speaks of the ‘metamorphosis’ of natural organisms, he does 
not have in mind the descent of such organisms from earlier organisms 
which are no longer extant, but only the diverse manifestation of constant 
basic forms in each individual organism (such as the basic form of the 
leaf in different organs of the plant) or the morphological differences 
between diverse species (for example, in the skeletons of vertebrates).
Goethe’s rejection of teleology is much more consistent and thorough 
than that of Herder, so that he is able to welcome Kant’s discussion of 
teleology in the Critique of Judgement.86 But his objections to teleological 
interpretations of nature are not only indebted to the arguments of 
Kant, Spinoza, and others against the projection of human intentions 
and attributes into nature; he rejects them also for the same reason that 
he rejects all explanations of natural processes by mechanical or causal 
agencies, because such explanations artificially detach a linear series of 
causes and effects from the unitary, multi-dimensional whole of nature, 
in which all individual entities mutually condition each other. As he 
himself puts it, ‘if so many beings interact with one another, where are 
we able to gain the insight in order to decide what is dominant and 
what is subordinate, what is destined to lead and what is obliged to 
follow?’87 And although, like Herder, he sometimes appeals (for 
instance in some of his late pronouncements on human immortality) 
to Leibnizian dynamism as a metaphysical system,88 he usually takes 
care not to explain natural processes as the effect of invisible forces. 
He says, for example, ‘the word “force” denotes primarily something 
physical or even mechanical’, and takes the view that anthropomorphic 
growth forces in biology are only inadequate aids to help us to form 
some conception of what is in fact incomprehensible.89 His conception 
of natural forces—at least in scientific contexts—is therefore basically 
phenomenological, like that of Kant.
For all these reasons, it is plain that Kant, Herder, and Goethe tried 
to solve the problem of the historicity of nature in different ways, and 
that Goethe in particular diverges from the others—and from his age 
as a whole—inasmuch as he is prepared only with major reservations 
86  LA I. Abt., IX, 92 (1817)
87  LA I. Abt., XI, 245
88  See, for example, Goethes Gespräche mit Eckermann, ed. by Franz Deibel (Leipzig: 
Insel-Verlag, 1921), p. 524 (3 March 1830).
89  LA I. Abt., IX, 99f. (1820).
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to apply historical models and linear models of explanation to nature; 
this is true not only of his thoughts on the evolution of living organisms, 
but also of his reflections on cosmogony and earth history as well as 
of his own theory of science. His relative indifference to the temporal 
dimension is reminiscent not so much of modern science as of earlier 
natural history, whose main task was to describe an unchanging 
hierarchy of natural forms. Herder’s view of nature, of course, is likewise 
in some respects old-fashioned—especially his belief in that Neo-
Platonic metaphysics of nature which Kant had already rejected in his 
pre-critical period and which Schelling and other Romantics vainly tried 
to rescue around the turn of the century. But Herder is also decidedly 
modern in his consistently historical outlook, which he develops above 
all in his pronouncements on human history. For him, as also for Kant 
and Goethe, human history is in a certain sense a natural process. In 
conclusion, this essay will examine the attempts of these three thinkers 
to define more closely the relationship between nature and human 
history.
Human History: Kant
The continued growth of secularisation in the eighteenth century 
reinforced the tendency to look on world history as a natural process 
governed by natural laws and at least to some extent capable of 
explanation by scientific methods.90 This tendency begins with Dubos 
and Montesquieu, and reaches its climax in the deterministic systems of 
the nineteenth century such as those of Marx, Comte, and Taine. Kant, 
and above all Herder, played a significant part in this development; 
Goethe was affected to a much lesser degree. The relevant statements 
of all three thinkers on history are almost exclusively of a theoretical 
nature. It will therefore be unnecessary to retain there that distinction 
between empirical and theoretical pronouncements which served to 
articulate the first part of this essay.
Kant’s short essay Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan 
Point of View (1784) is his most important attempt to understand human 
90  See the article ‘Gesetz’ in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, ed. by Otto Brunner, Werner 
Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, 8 vols (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972–92), II, 875ff.
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history with the help of scientific methods.91 Herder is not mentioned in 
it, but the title and theme of the essay recall his Ideas for the Philosophy 
of History; the first part of the latter, published a few months before 
Kant’s essay, was in fact known to Kant before he published his own 
essay.92 Both works expressly present history as a natural process and 
consider the possibility of treating it as an object of scientific analysis. 
But since Kant published two highly critical reviews of Herder’s Ideas 
soon afterwards, it is entirely possible that he intended to show in his 
essay of 1784 how the philosophy of history might be conducted in a 
more rigorous manner than he believed it had been in the work of his 
former pupil.
The main difficulty which Kant encountered in his presentation of 
history as a natural process was his own dualistic conception of human 
nature; for in Kant’s moral philosophy, man is not only a natural being, 
but also a free moral subject. He attempts to solve the resulting problem 
by arguing that the behaviour of humans as natural beings (who are 
consequently determined by natural laws) gradually enables them to 
develop a rational consciousness of their own moral freedom, and so 
to emancipate themselves from the control of nature. But even before 
they reach that stage, human beings, in contrast to animals, are already 
free beings to the extent that they can choose between different kinds 
of behaviour (irrespective of whether the choice they make is morally 
good or evil).93 But even if the human will is in this sense inherently 
free, the actions it initiates are nevertheless for Kant ‘natural events’. As 
he explains, ‘hence the phenomena to which it [i.e. the human will] gives 
rise, namely human actions, are determined, just like any other natural 
event, by general laws of nature’.94
But it is clear from the examples cited by Kant that the actions in 
question are not in the same sense natural as mechanical processes in 
inanimate nature, because such actions are always guided by conscious 
and unconscious intentions;95 they are ‘natural’ only in the sense that 
91  WW XI, 33–50.
92  See Rudolf Haym, Herder, ed. by Wolfgang Harich, 2 vols (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 
1954), II, 275.
93  See Erich Adickes, Kant als Naturforscher, 2 vols (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1924–25), I, 463.
94  WW XI, 33; on the concept of nature for Kant and his contemporaries cf. Robert 
Spaemann, ‘Genetisches zum Naturbegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts’, Archiv für 
Begriffsgeschichte, 11 (1967), 59–74.
95  See, for example, WW XI, 34.
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they are motivated by natural desires and impulses such as ambition, 
greed,96 aggressiveness,97 competitiveness,98 etc. As an expression of 
selfishness, such impulses are, of course, potentially antagonistic. But 
according to Kant, this very antagonism between individuals or states, 
in combination with their mutual dependence for the satisfaction of their 
needs, constitutes a natural mechanism which drives the development 
of human capabilities and ultimately compels the individuals or states 
in question to establish, in their own interests, a peaceful national or 
international system to guarantee the further development and security 
of all.99 This natural process is in the course of time confirmed and 
accelerated by the insight of reason (for after all, reason itself is, for Kant, 
in a certain sense an ‘implanted’ natural proclivity of human beings)100 
until the opposition between nature and reason is finally overcome.101
It can clearly be seen from Kant’s remarks that he certainly does 
not regard the supposed natural laws which govern this process of 
political progress as equivalent, for example, to the laws of mechanics. 
They must rather be of a statistical character, for he compares the 
events in which they can in his opinion be detected to those statistical 
regularities which are manifest in births, marriages, and deaths or in 
meteorological observations.102 He presumably believes that similar 
statistical data (for example, on the increasing rarity of wars, the 
spread of republican constitutions, the growing interdependence of 
various states in world commerce, etc.) provide a firm basis for laws 
which have yet to be discovered and will eventually confirm the 
progressive direction of history. The laws in question will therefore 
be of the same kind as, for example, the statistically based laws of 
supply and demand, which were already beginning to be formulated 
in eighteenth-century economics.103 
96  WW XI, 38.
97  WW XI, 42.
98  WW XI, 46.
99  WW XI, 37f. and 42.
100  WW III, 158.; see also Hans Werner Ingensiep, ‘Die biologischen Analogien und die 
erkenntnistheoretischen Alternativen in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft B, §27’, 
Kant-Studien, 85 (1994), 381–93 (p. 392).
101  Cf. WW XI, 38, 41, 46f. and 50.
102  WW XI, 33f.
103  Cf. Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, ed. by Elizabeth Boody 
Schumpeter (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954), pp. 209–12; cf. also Hegel’s 
Rechtsphilosophie, §189, Zusatz. 
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Kant nevertheless also cites the discoveries of recent astronomy in his 
essay on the philosophy of history—if only as an analogy to describe the 
discoveries he hopes for in the social sciences. He says, for instance, of 
the creative activity of nature: ‘Thus it produced a Kepler, who subjected 
the eccentric orbits of the planets to specific laws in an unexpected way, 
and a Newton, who explained these laws as the result of a universal 
natural cause.’104 And although he does not explicitly say so, that natural 
antagonism between selfish and constructive social tendencies which he 
regards as the driving force of history is obviously conceived by analogy 
to the forces of attraction and repulsion of his own Universal Natural 
History and Newton’s celestial mechanics.105 The scientific background 
becomes clearer when he compares the search for a long-term progressive 
tendency in world history to the attempts of the astronomers to track 
the barely perceptible path of the sun and its satellites through the 
galactic system.106 Again by analogy with mechanics, the mechanism of 
human selfishness will finally compel human beings to identify ‘a law 
of equilibrium’ between states and to base on it an international system 
which ‘can automatically maintain itself‘.107
These efforts of Kant to discover gradual political progress in history 
with the aid of scientific models can scarcely be contested on grounds of 
method, even if the empirical evidence he hopes for is still incomplete. 
But his further contention that a ‘plan of nature’ is visible in history,108 his 
conviction that nature has the ‘intention’ to develop all human capacities 
and establish a liberal law-governed state,109 and his replacement of the 
word ‘nature’ towards the end of his essay by the word ‘providence’110 
all seem to belong to an earlier period in the history of philosophy. 
They recall rather the optimistic teleology of Leibniz than the Critique 
of Pure Reason. But we must not forget that these objections apply only 
to supplementary arguments in support of Kant’s main thesis, which is 
itself based on purely naturalistic premises. The very title of Kant’s essay 
indicates that his teleological interpretation of the causal mechanism of 
history is only a regulative ‘idea’ of reason, i.e. a working hypothesis 
104  WW XI, 34.
105  Cf. AA XV, 590f. where this analogy is more prominently expressed. 
106  WW XI, 45.
107  WW XI, 43f.
108  WW XI, 34.
109  WW XI, 39. 
110  WW XI, 49.
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designed, among other things, to promote the alleged progress in 
history; it should therefore on no account be mistaken for a constitutive 
principle. The function of this regulative idea is also, not least, rhetorical: 
it is meant to prove itself as a self-fulfilling prophecy by gaining the 
reader’s cooperation in implementing it. As so often in Kant’s writings 
on empirical topics—such as nature and history—his methodological 
circumspection and consistency, i. e. the systematic reservations with 
which he underpins his main thesis, are much more impressive than his 
empirical deductions which, in keeping with the state of then existing 
knowledge, are based on highly selective experience.
Kant’s reflections on the philosophy of history are in this respect 
much more impressive than those of Herder’s Ideas. This, of course, is 
partly due to the fact that his short essay sets itself a much more modest 
aim than Herder’s wide-ranging work. Kant’s pronouncements are 
scientifically more plausible because he chooses a very precise causal 
connection and a linear mode of explanation on a scientific model in 
order to furnish a proof that the dialectic of conflict and interdependence, 
of competition and need in human society, must generate a quite specific 
long-term tendency in political history. Herder’s aim is much more 
comprehensive and ambitious. He, too, attempts to apply concepts and 
models of scientific origin to the study of history; but the results of this 
attempt are unconvincing, and his real achievement as a philosopher of 
history relies on quite different methods to those of science. (His first 
work on the philosophy of history, Another Philosophy of History (1774), 
is not considered here because natural history and scientific models 
play a much more limited part than in the later—and much more 
extensive—Ideas.)
Human History: Herder
Unlike Kant’s philosophy, Herder’s holistic view of nature in the Ideas, 
which is significantly influenced by Spinoza’s monism, makes no 
abrupt distinction between the realm of natural necessity and that of 
human freedom. Both realms are part of a single continuum in which 
all transitions are gradual. For him, too, man is also ‘a free creature’ 
and ‘the first emancipated being in creation’;111 but his primary concern in 
111  SW XIII, 146f.
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the Ideas is to present human history as a natural process, as he himself 
admits: ‘The whole of human history is a pure natural history of human 
forces, actions, and impulses in time and place.’112 In contrast to Kant, 
he makes no explicit attempt to resolve the tension in his work between 
natural causality and free human intentions.113
Generally speaking, Herder follows two complementary strategies 
in applying models derived from science and natural history to human 
history. Firstly, he uses his knowledge of natural history and physical 
geography—that is, of the environment in the widest sense—in order to 
throw light on the characteristic qualities of numerous human societies 
in past and present, and thereby to explain their distinctive contributions 
to history as far as possible by natural causes. This strategy, which forms 
the core of his ‘historicism’, is highly successful and had a profound 
effect on the philosophy of history and historiography of the nineteenth 
century.114 But its main concern is with the internal development of 
individual nations rather than their interaction and succession in the 
world-historical process. In his treatment of world history proper, he 
employs the second of his main strategies to explain historical events by 
propounding historical laws which have a certain similarity to familiar 
laws of physics and mechanics. This strategy is less successful than the 
previous one, for reasons that will now be considered further. 
Herder speaks, particularly in the Ideas, so often of ‘laws’ and ‘natural 
laws’ in connection with human actions and human history that the 
concept of law is obviously of fundamental importance to his thought.115 
But the significance of this concept is so wide and at the same time so 
variable that its precise sense in particular contexts is often difficult to 
determine. For example, it is often unclear whether Herder intends to 
discover similar or identical laws in nature and history, or whether, in 
employing the word ‘natural law’ and related expressions, he is merely 
borrowing them from science as analogies and metaphors in order to 
denote roughly comparable regularities in human life. Sometimes, he 
112  SW XIV, 145.
113  Cf. Frederick M. Barnard, Self-Direction and Political Legitimacy. Rousseau and Herder 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 187.
114  Cf. H. B. Nisbet, ‘Goethes und Herders Geschichtsdenken’, Goethe-Jahrbuch, 110 
(1993), 115–33.
115  See, for example, SW XIII, 116, 120, 160, 182, 234, 333; XIV, 53, 83, 86, 117, 203, 207, 
213ff., 218, 225, 235, 248, 250, etc.
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seems to take the view that identical laws are at work in both areas, as 
when he declares: ‘Thus, one and the same law extends from the sun, 
and from all suns, to the smallest human action. What preserves all 
beings and their systems is only One: the relation of their forces to periodic 
rest and order.’116
But in other cases, he seems to speak not of an identity, but an 
analogy, as when he envisages the possibility of a ‘physics of history’,117 
whose laws are allegedly active on a higher level than that of physics 
proper, or when he suggests that ‘mind and morality are also physics, 
and serve the same laws, which are all ultimately dependent on the 
solar system, but in a higher order’.118 Besides, since Herder regards 
the whole of nature, including human society, as a unitary whole, he 
is always anxious to detect similarities between its different areas, and 
to discover analogous processes on different levels.119 This is no doubt 
one of the reasons why he uses the term ‘natural law’ in so wide a 
range of senses and why it is often difficult to determine whether he 
considers the relevant parallels as identities or only as analogies.120 His 
historical laws are for the most part commonplaces, for example when 
he mentions an alleged law ‘which creates order out of chaos’121 or when 
he speaks of ‘laws of a disturbed balance’ in both nature and history.122 
The concepts which he uses in such cases are general enough to include 
both areas; but for the same reason, they are rarely specific enough to 
have an intelligible relation to concrete situations (as with his favourite 
concept of a ‘nemesis’ or ‘Adrastea’ in history, which he employs both in 
a mythological and in a physical or mechanical sense).123
116  SW XIII, 234; cf. also SW XIII, 16.
117  SW V, 558.
118  SW XIII, 20; cf. SW XIV, 248.
119  Cf. Hans Dietrich Irmscher, ‘Beobachtungen zur Funktion der Analogie im Denken 
Herders’, Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 55 
(1981), 64–97.
120  Cf. Hans Dietrich Irmscher, ‘Aneignung und Kritik naturwissenschaftlicher 
Vorstellungen bei Herder’, in Texte, Motive und Gestalten der Goethezeit. Festschrift für 
Hans Reiss, ed. by John L. Hibberd and Hugh Barr Nisbet (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
1989), pp. 33–63 (p. 53). 
121  SW XIV, 215.
122  SW XIV, 218.
123  Cf. Wulf Köpke, ‘Nemesis und Geschichtsdialektik’, in Herder Today. Contributions 
from the International Herder Conference 1987, ed. by Kurt Müller-Vollmer (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 1990), pp. 85–96; also Michael Maurer, ‘Nemesis-Adrastea oder Was ist 
und wozu dient Geschichte?’, in ibid., pp. 46–63.
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This criticism applies in particular to those historical laws which 
Herder propounds in the fifteenth book of the Ideas.124 He takes his lead 
here from the attempts of the mathematician Johann Heinrich Lambert 
to apply mechanical concepts such as equilibrium, steady states and 
pendular oscillation to non-mechanical phenomena—for example, 
social systems—and himself claims to detect a regular cycle in world 
history whereby reason and order are repeatedly restored in spite of 
all threats and will in the long term increasingly prevail over unreason 
and disorder. He writes, for example: ‘All destructive forces in nature 
must in the course of time […] give way to the forces of preservation‘125 
and ‘abuses will punish themselves, and disorder will with time become 
order through the tireless efforts of an ever-growing rationality’.126 In 
the historical ‘laws’ themselves, such propositions as these are simply 
reformulated by the addition of metaphors from mechanics, as when 
Herder declares ‘that when a being or system of beings is displaced 
from this steady state of its truth, goodness, and beauty, it will return to 
this state through inner force, either in oscillations or in an asymptote’.127 
But no mechanical metaphors or analogies can lend such assertions 
credibility, because the pairs of concepts they contain (order/disorder, 
destruction/preservation, abuses/rationality) have no reference to any 
objectively definable conditions; they are rather the result of subjective 
value judgements. 
It must admittedly not be overlooked that metaphors and analogies 
from the realm of science were particularly popular in Herder’s day.128 
Kant employed such analogies, as already noticed. in order to designate 
supposedly progressive tendencies in history, for which he expected 
statistical evidence to emerge in the future. But in the absence of such 
evidence, he took care not to formulate historical ‘laws’, and simply 
expressed the hope that some future student of history might discover 
a law of this kind. But Herder had no such inhibitions. He formulates 
several so-called ‘natural laws’ of history; and although he uses the same 
124  SW XIV, 213–52.
125  Ibid., p. 213.
126  Ibid., p. 249.
127  Ibid., p. 226.
128  Cf. Ulrich Dierse, ‘Der Newton der Geschichte’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 30 
(1986–87), 158–82; also Ahlrich Meyer, ‘Mechanische und organische Metaphorik 
politischer Philosophie’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 13 (1969), 128–99. 
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analogy as Kant for the discovery of such laws (namely the attempts 
of astronomers to track the scarcely perceptible course of the sun 
through the Milky Way), he does not apply this analogy to objectively 
identifiable political conditions such as Kant was particularly interested 
in, but to ‘the scarcely visible progress of the good in history’129—that is, 
of a moral tendency which can hardly be identified by objective means. 
The scientific terminology which Herder makes use of in the Ideas 
accordingly offers no prospect of a new method of scientific explanation 
of historical processes. It serves rather as a rhetorical means of support 
for the historical and metaphysical optimism of his later years. This is 
confirmed by the fact that, towards the end of the fifteenth book of the 
Ideas, he abandons the language of mechanics in favour of traditional 
teleological concepts such as ‘providence’, ‘fate’, ‘wise goodness’, etc.130 
Thus, like his teacher Kant, he outlines a teleology of history which 
claims to be based on a ‘natural’ providence; but he does not supply 
those methodological reservations and qualifications which distinguish 
the critical philosophy from pre-critical metaphysics.
Although the foregoing account of Herder’s attempts to explain the 
development of history as a natural process may seem all too one-sided 
and negative, it must not be forgotten that these attempts form only a 
small part of his work as a philosopher of history, and that the earlier 
and more original of his two works on that subject, namely Another 
Philosophy of History has not been considered here. So long as he confined 
himself to other means of understanding history than those of science, 
he wrote with genuine originality, as when he conjures up past ages with 
vivid imagination and empathetic understanding in Another Philosophy 
or describes alien forms of culture and their geographical determinants 
as phenomena of natural history in the ethnological chapters of the 
Ideas. And in Another Philosophy, he does not yet seem to feel the need 
to set up quasi-scientific natural laws of history: his metaphors, which 
are in part drawn from the realm of natural history and science, are 
still unmistakably metaphors, and his analogies are plainly nothing 
other than analogies. Thus he compares the natural development of 
individual nations and their succession in the world-historical process 
to the stages of human life or the growth of a tree and its branches.131 
129  SW XIV, 235.
130  SW XIV, 244.
131  SW V, 499, 512, 528f., 566, 575, etc.
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On the other hand, he describes the interruption or obstruction of this 
natural development by violent or regressive means with the help of 
metaphors from mechanics: thus, the absolutist Prussian state, for 
example, is likened to a machine, just as modern culture as a whole has 
allegedly lost its former spontaneity and likewise become mechanical. 
But when he attempts in the third part of the Ideas to identify linear causal 
processes in world history by analogy with mechanics and combines 
them with a theory of moral progress, he places excessive demands on 
his basically very loose comparisons. His ‘physics of history’ remains, as 
before, a completely utopian aim.
Human History: Goethe
No single writer had so much influence on Goethe’s historical thought 
as Herder.132 But simply because Goethe absorbed this influence above 
all in his early years (namely around the time of Herder’s Another 
Philosophy), he remained relatively unaffected by Herder’s later efforts 
in the third part of the Ideas to discover quasi-mechanical laws of world 
history. Goethe’s conception of history remains indebted, until his 
final years, to the historical scepticism of Herder’s early treatise, which 
had attacked Enlightenment optimism and recommended historical 
relativism and an empathetic understanding of earlier ages of history.
Goethe nevertheless does share the older Herder’s view in the Ideas 
that nature is a unitary swhole, of which both the lives of individuals 
and human history in general form integral parts. He is consequently 
no less ready than Herder to discover analogies between different 
levels of organisation (for example, in the novel The Elective Affinities 
between human behaviour patterns and the reactions of chemical 
compounds). Like Herder, he makes no sharp distinctions between 
natural necessity and human freedom, and declares that ‘there is 
yet everywhere only one nature, and the traces of dismal, passionate 
necessity also run inexorably through the realm of serene, rational 
freedom’.133 For him, as for Herder, the healthy development of both 
the individual and society at large is analogous to the growth of living 
organisms, and he likes to describe such processes with the help of 
132  Cf. Nisbet, ‘Goethes und Herders Geschichtsdenken’, passim. 
133  Goethe, HA VI, 621.
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biological metaphors.134 Conversely, mechanical metaphors have 
for him—as for the young Herder—a predominantly negative range 
of meaning: in their application to nature and history, he therefore 
usually associates them with violent and destructive occurrences.135
Since world history contains all too many events of this kind, it is fully 
understandable that Goethe in general passes very negative judgements 
on it. He sees in it no regular development and consequently makes no 
attempt to propound historical laws in analogy to the laws of physics. 
Quasi-mechanical laws of progress like those in Herder’s Ideas are quite 
unthinkable for him; like nature itself, world history is in his opinion 
far too complex to be reduced to a few simple formulas of this kind. 
The kind of historiography which most appeals to him sets itself more 
modest aims, as for example in cultural history, which depicts the quasi-
organic development of a single, clearly defined era in culture or art 
such as that of ancient Greece, Persia, or the Florentine Renaissance.136
Even in cultural history, such eras are, of course, rather the exception 
than the rule; they are all too often interrupted or extinguished by 
unforeseen and violent incursions from outside. The older Goethe 
consequently gives great weight to the role of chance and unforeseen 
events in history, whereby the noblest endeavours are frustrated by 
human folly or arbitrary intervention. But this sceptical attitude towards 
history—especially political history—is already apparent in his early 
works, above all in the dramas Götz von Berlichingen and Egmont, and 
it was later intensified by the experience of the French Revolution. 
The important role which what he calls ‘the incommensurability of 
history’ plays in his final years is, of course, in direct contradiction to 
the historical optimism of the late Enlightenment as defended by Kant 
and the later Herder. If history really is influenced by regular laws, it 
is in Goethe’s view difficult, or even impossible, to distinguish these 
from the contingent and the arbitrary: ‘Law and chance interact, and 
the individual spectator often ends up by confusing the two, as is 
particularly evident in biased historians’.137 
134  Cf. Goethes Werke, Weimar edition (henceforth WA), 133 vols (Weimar: Böhlau, 
1889–1919), I. Abteilung, XL/I, 217 and VII, 51; cf. Nisbet, ‘Goethes und Herders 
Geschichtsdenken’, p. 120. 
135  Cf. WA I. Abt., XXVIII, 68–70; LA I. Abt., IV, 221; also Nisbet, Goethe and the Scientific 
Tradition, pp. 54–58 
136  Cf. Nisbet, ‘Goethes und Herders Geschichtsdenken’, pp. 115f.
137  WA II. Abt., III, 134 (1810).
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Although Goethe, no less than Herder, is theoretically convinced 
that nature and history are equally important parts of the world as 
a harmonious whole, it is nevertheless comprehensible why he often 
presents nature as the realm of the law and history as the realm of 
the arbitrary. He was, of course, always aware (especially in his final 
years) that chaos, or ‘the aimless power of unbridled elements’ may 
break in at any time upon the peaceful life of nature.138 But such 
convulsions remain rather the exception than the rule, whereas 
chance seems to him in principle to play a considerably greater role 
in history than in nature, since human actions are more variable and 
unpredictable than most natural processes. (Unlike Kant, for example, 
Goethe does not appear to have considered the possibility that at least 
statistically predictable regularities might be present in collective 
human behaviour.) But Goethe is also aware of the fact that there is 
a certain methodological difference between natural science and the 
study of history, a difference which the young Herder had recognised 
in Another Philosophy of History, but apparently lost sight of in the later 
Ideas.139 For the role of the observer of history is in an important respect 
different from that of the observer of nature. Each individual has their 
own necessarily incomplete perspective on events, which coincides 
only partially with that of other individuals; and the process of history 
itself cannot be distinguished nearly so easily as that of nature from 
the subjective viewpoint of the observer, because history can only be 
constituted by the reports of contemporary observers, each of whom 
saw the events from their own point of view and in terms of their own 
teleology. There is consequently no privileged, absolute perspective, 
and all general judgements on history are necessarily dubious. For 
this reason, Goethe confines himself in his History of Colour Theory 
to a sparse commentary on the extensive extracts he includes from 
the source materials, through which he lets the work of past colour 
theorists speak directly to the reader. For the same reason, he tends 
to favour those forms of historical writing which focus on personal 
experience, such as biography, autobiography, memoirs, travelogues, 
138  HA III, 309 (Faust, Part II, line 10,219).
139  Cf. Hans Dietrich Irmscher, ‘Die geschichtsphilosophische Kontroverse zwischen 
Kant und Herder’, in Hamann–Kant–Herder. Acta des vierten Internationalen Hamann-
Kolloquiums 1985, ed. by Bernhard Gajek (Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1987) pp. 111–92 
(p. 153).
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etc., and in which history is viewed from an unambiguously personal 
perspective.
The one kind of regularity which Goethe recognises in the process 
of history is the simple alternation of opposite tendencies such as 
constructive and destructive eras or (particularly in cultural history) 
the cycle of growth, efflorescence, and decline.140 Any reference to a 
teleology of providence or moral progress, such as Herder and Kant in 
their different ways claimed to detect, is for him out of the question. It is 
therefore no wonder that he was not impressed when the young historian 
Heinrich Luden told him in 1806 that he had given up mathematics for 
history. Goethe commented: ‘what the historian [...] regards as truth is 
always only truth for him, only subjective truth [...]. But mathematical 
truth is the same for everyone’.141 In short, a historical science in the 
proper sense is for Goethe an impossibility. His historical scepticism 
finally becomes so extreme in his last years that he can describe history 
as ‘a web of nonsense’ or ‘a mass of follies and wickedness’.142
If we disregard such ill-tempered outbursts, history ultimately 
consists for Goethe of the events themselves, although these are 
inevitably communicated through the necessarily biased reports of 
individual observers. The best we can obtain is a more or less factual 
description of the events, which we interpret from our own perspective. 
And the most we can hope for is to project ourselves to some extent, by 
empathy and imagination, into past epochs of culture. All theoretical 
initiatives are one-sided and inadequate, and every attempt to discover 
a linear development and to explain past events by causal or teleological 
models must result in a simplification, or indeed distortion, of the 
indeterminable multiplicity of the events in question.
Finally, we may conclude that Goethe’s views on science and the 
study of history are internally consistent and mutually compatible, 
although he can accept only with major reservations that the methods 
of each are transferable to the other. Nature does indeed have a history, 
140  Cf. Arnold Bergstraesser, ‘Die Epochen der Geistesgeschichte in Goethes Denken’, 
in Bergstraesser, Staat und Dichtung (Freiburg: Rombach, 1967), pp. 87–97; see also 
WA I. Abt., VII, 157; WA I. Abt., XXVII, 98f.; WA II. Abt., III, 133; etc.
141  Conversation with Heinrich Luden, 19 August 1806, in Goethes Gespräche, ed. by 
Wolfgang Herwig, 5 vols (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998), II, 121.
142  Conversation with Friedrich von Müller, 17 Decenber 1824, in Goethes Gespräche, 
III/1, 742.
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but the empirical knowledge necessary for its reconstruction were in 
his day so limited that suspense of judgement often seemed to him the 
only alternative to arbitrary speculation. In any case, causal explanation 
is not, in his opinion, the proper task of science. The scientist is for him 
primarily still a natural historian in the older sense of that term, and 
not a historian of nature, because he ought rather to be occupied with 
description and classification than with explanation and prediction.
If Goethe then has strong reservations about applying historical and 
linear ways of thinking to nature, he is no less sceptical regarding the 
possibility of applying scientific methods to human history—firstly, 
because he sees linear modes of explanation as no less inadequate in 
a historical context than in natural history, and secondly, because the 
observer of history cannot possibly attain the degree of objectivity 
required by the observer of nature. In other words, there cannot be a 
science of history, but at most a natural history, on the model of Herder’s 
historicism, of certain clearly defined aspects of the past (and particularly 
cultural history).
Conclusion
The foregoing comparisons between Goethe’s, Kant’s, and Herder’s 
thought set out to present, among other things, Goethe’s ideas on 
nature and history in their historical context. It has been shown that 
Goethe’s views are by no means typical of his times. His scientific beliefs 
are idiosyncratic and opposed to that Newtonian tradition which 
underpinned Kant’s theory and practice of science; and although his 
view of nature is based on the same Neo-Platonic premises as that of 
Herder, Herder’s own views on science are fundamentally different 
from those of Goethe, both in respect of his readiness to speculate 
beyond the limits of experience and in his essential agreement with 
the aims of Newtonian science. Goethe’s historical thought is likewise 
remote from that of Kant’s (albeit regulative) teleological optimism 
and his efforts to apply scientific models and methods to history. And 
although he was strongly influenced by the young Herder’s historical 
relativism and scepticism towards the Enlightenment’s theories of 
progress, he parts company with the older Herder’s attempts—which, 
despite the latter’s rejection of the critical philosophy, are closely 
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related to those of Kant—to detect quasi-scientific laws of progress or 
moral retribution in history.
From today’s perspective, the views of all three thinkers are, of 
course, essentially obsolete. Kant’s philosophy of science remains, as 
before, an intellectual achievement of the highest order. But the theory 
of relativity has superseded the whole of Newtonian physics, on which 
both Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Metaphysical Elements of Science 
were based, and Kant’s assumption of a firm a priori structure of space 
and time as the foundation of all empirical knowledge has likewise been 
refuted; and since the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics have 
applied two quite different principles to different aspects of nature, a 
consistent unitary theory of nature as a whole is no longer available. It 
follows from this that no single theory of science can now claim absolute 
validity; its validity can only be partial and provisional. The Neo-Platonic 
metaphysics which underpins Herder’s and Goethe’s image of nature 
was already obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century, and is of only 
historical interest today, while the individual scientific theories of the 
three thinkers here discussed were soon superseded by the progress of 
geology, the theory of evolution, and other branches of science.
It is therefore not at first sight obvious why Goethe’s view of nature 
still holds a much stronger attraction today than that of Kant or Herder. 
The main reason for this is that Kant’s and Herder’s views of nature are 
far more heavily indebted to the now obsolete science of the eighteenth 
century than Goethe’s, whereas Goethe’s view is fundamentally 
different both from the dominant scientific tradition of his age and from 
modern science in general. Although his individual theories are indeed 
for the most part obsolete, his image of nature as an organic whole 
of which human beings are an essential part and his rejection of all 
linear models of explanation still strike a sympathetic note with many 
readers for whom modern science has acquired too many negative 
associations. It is therefore not surprising that the ecological movement 
of recent decades has awakened a new interest in Goethe’s science. 
The instrumentalisation of nature by modern technology, which itself 
owes its origin to that linear and mechanistic way of thinking to which 
Goethe was strongly opposed, has had disastrous consequences for the 
environment; and these have understandably created a demand for an 
alternative view of nature that treats it not just as a means, but as an end 
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in itself. For those in search of an image of nature of this kind, Goethe’s 
writings on science therefore have obvious advantages. But this fact 
does not provide a justification for condemning modern science itself 
as misguided and presenting Goethe’s view of nature as alone correct. 
Such judgements are applicable at most to certain ethical attitudes that 
are often—but by no means necessarily—associated with this or that 
attitude towards nature. The two views of nature are in fact not so much 
mutually exclusive alternatives as complementary perspectives from 
which nature can be viewed with different purposes in mind.143 For it 
is entirely possible to consider nature as a whole as an end in itself, and 
at the same time to regard particular parts of it as means of realising 
our current aims by developing and applying the requisite technology 
which modern science has made possible.
In the philosophy of history too, the thought of Kant and Herder 
seems to some extent more antiquated from today’s point of view than 
that of Goethe (although Kant’s political philosophy is still rightly taken 
seriously). For the moral optimism and teleological belief in providence 
of Kant and the later Herder cannot readily be reconciled with the 
catastrophes of the twentieth century, while the negative political effects 
of the allegedly ‘scientific’ theories of history of Marx and others, along 
with the manifest failure of predictions of the future based on such 
theories, have aroused widespread distrust of the supposedly necessary 
historical laws and scientific claims of the corresponding philosophies of 
history. Against this background, Goethe’s sceptical thoughts on history 
and his holistic view of nature still retain their attraction.
143  Cf. Karl Robert Mandelkow, ‘Natur und Geschichte bei Goethe im Spiegel seiner 
Rezeption im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’, in Geschichtlichkeit und Aktualität. Studien 
zur deutschen Literatur seit der Romantik. Festschrift für Hans-Joachim Mähl, ed. by 
Klaus-Detlef Müller, Gerhard Pasternak, Wulf Segebrecht und Ludwig Stockinger 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1988), pp. 69–96 (p. 95).
Autograph of Schiller’s ‘Ode to Joy’ (1785). Photograph by Historiograf 
(2011), Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/2/2d/Schiller_an_die_freude_manuskript_2.jpg






Deine Zauber binden wieder,
Was der Mode Schwert geteilt;
Bettler werden Fürstenbrüder,
Wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.
Chor
Seid umschlungen, Millionen!
 Diesen Kuß der ganzen Welt!
Brüder—überm Sternenzelt
 Muß ein lieber Vater wohnen.
Wem der große Wurf gelungen,
Eines Freundes Freund zu sein;
Wer ein holdes Weib errungen,
Mische seinen Jubel ein!
Ja—wer auch nur eine Seele
Sein nennt auf dem Erdenrund!
Und wer’s nie gekonnt, der stehle
Weinend sich aus diesem Bund!
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘Friedrich Schiller. “An 
die Freude”. A Reappraisal’, in Peter Hutchinson (ed.), Landmarks in German Poetry 
(Oxford, Berne, Berlin, etc.: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 73–96.
2  The text is that of the original version published in 1786, as reproduced (with 
spelling and punctuation largely modernised), in Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke 
(henceforth SW), ed. by Gerhard Fricke and Herbert G. Göpfert, 5 vols, 7th edn 
(Munich: Hanser, 1984), I, 133–36.
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 Chor
Was den großen Ring bewohnet,
Huldige der Sympathie!
Zu den Sternen leitet sie, 
Wo der Unbekannte thronet.
Freude trinken alle Wesen
An den Brüsten der Natur,
Alle Guten, alle Bösen
Folgen ihrer Rosenspur.
Küsse gab sie uns und Reben,
Einen Freund, geprüft im Tod.
Wollust ward dem Wurm gegeben,
Und der Cherub steht vor Gott.
Chor
Ihr stürzt nieder, Millionen?
Ahndest du den Schöpfer, Welt?
Such ihn überm Sternenzelt,
Über Sternen muß er wohnen.
Freude heißt die starke Feder
In der ewigen Natur.
Freude, Freude treibt die Räder
In der großen Weltenuhr.
Blumen lockt sie aus den Keimen, 
Sonnen aus dem Firmament, 
Sphären rollt sie in den Raümen,
Die des Sehers Rohr nicht kennt.
Chor
Froh, wie seine Sonnen fliegen,
Durch des Himmels prächtgen Plan,
Laufet, Brüder, eure Bahn,
Freudig wie ein Held zum Siegen.
Aus der Wahrheit Feuerspiegel
Lächelt sie den Forscher an.
Zu der Tugend steilem Hügel
Leitet sie des Dulders Bahn.
Auf des Glaubens Sonnenberge
Sieht man ihre Fahnen wehn,
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Durch den Riß gesprengter Särge
Sie im Chor der Engel stehn.
Chor
Duldet mutig, Millionen!
Duldet für die beßre Welt!
Droben überm Sternenzelt
Wird ein großer Gott belohnen.
Göttern kann man nicht vergelten,
Schön ists, ihnen gleich zu sein.
Gram und Armut soll sich melden,
Mit den Frohen sich erfreun.
Groll und Rache sei vergessen,
Unserm Todfeind sei verziehn,
Keine Träne soll ihn pressen,
Keine Reue nage ihn.
Chor
Unser Schuldbuch sei vernichtet!
Ausgesöhnt die ganze Welt! 
Brüder—überm Sternenzelt
Richtet Gott, wie wir gerichtet.
Freude sprudelt in Pokalen,
In der Traube goldnem Blut
Trinken Sanftmut Kannibalen,
Die Verzweiflung Heldenmut –
Brüder, fliegt von euren Sitzen,
Wenn der volle Römer kreist,
Laßt den Schaum zum Himmel sprützen:
Dieses Glas dem guten Geist. 
Chor 
Den der Sterne Wirbel loben,
Den des Seraphs Hymne preist,
Dieses Glas dem guten Geist
Überm Sternenzelt dort oben!
Festen Mut in schwerem Leiden,
Hülfe, wo die Unschuld weint,
Ewigkeit geschwornen Eiden,
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Wahrheit gegen Freund und Feind,
Männerstolz vor Königsthronen –
Brüder, gält es Gut und Blut, –
Dem Verdienste seine Kronen,
Untergang der Lügenbrut!
Chor
Schließt den heilgen Zirkel dichter, 
Schwört bei diesem goldnen Wein:
Dem Gelübde treu zu sein,
Schwört es bei dem Sternenrichter!
Rettung vor Tyrannenketten,
Großmut auch dem Bösewicht,
Hoffnung auf den Sterbebetten, 
Gnade auf dem Hochgericht!
Auch die Toten sollen leben!
Brüder trinkt und stimmet ein,
Allen Sündern soll vergeben,
Und die Hölle nicht mehr sein.
Chor
Eine heitre Abschiedsstunde!
Süßen Schlaf im Leichentuch!
Brüder—einen sanften Spruch
Aus des Totenrichters Munde!
English translation:
Joy, thou lovely spark immortal,
Daughter from Elysium, 
Drunk with fire we dare to enter
Heavenly one, thy holy shrine.
Your magic spells have reunited,
What the sword of custom cleft; 
Beggars become princes’ brothers,
Where your gentle wings alight.
Chorus
We embrace you, all ye millions!
Let all the world receive this kiss!
Brothers—above the starry heavens
There must dwell a loving father.
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Whoever met the weighty challenge, 
Of giving friendship to a friend; 
Whoever won a lovely woman, 
Let him mix his joy with ours!
And even him who on this earth 
Has just one soul to call his own!
But let who never passed this test 
Steal weeping from this league of ours!
Chorus
May all who dwell in this great ring
Pay homage now to sympathy!
To the stars it leads the way, 
To the unknown being’s throne.
Joy is drunk by every creature
Drunk by all at nature’s breasts,
All the good, and all the evil
Follow down her rosy path.
She gave us both vines and kisses, 
And a friend, loyal unto death.
Even the worm is rapture given, 
The cherub stands in face of God.
Chorus
You fall before him all ye millions!
Do you the world’s creator sense?
Seek him beyond the starry vault,
Above the stars he has his dwelling.
Joy is yet the mighty mainspring
In eternal nature’s realm.
For by joy the wheels are driven
In the universal clock.
From the buds she draws the flowers, 
Suns out of the firmament, 
Spheres she rolls within the spaces
That no seer’s lens can scan.
Chorus 
Happy, as his suns are flying,
On the heavens’ splendid plane,
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Run, ye brothers, on your courses, 
Joyful, like a conquering hero.
Out of truth’s refulgent mirror
The researcher sees her smile.
To the steep hillside of virtue
The endurer’s path she guides.
Up on faith’s high sunlit mountain 
One can see her banners fly, 
Through the crack of bursting coffins
See her in the angels’ choir.
Chorus
Suffer bravely, all ye millions!
Suffer for a better world!
Up above the starry vault
You’ll find a great God’s recompense.
Gods can never be requited; 
To be like them is beautiful.
Let grief and poverty come hither, 
And with the happy ones rejoice.
Let rage and vengeance be forgotten, 
Forgiven be our mortal foe, 
Not one teardrop shall oppress him, 
Chorus
Let our book of debts be cancelled!
Let all the world be reconciled!
 Brothers—above the starry vault
God will judge as we have judged.
Joy will sparkle in the goblets, 
In the golden blood of grapes
Cannibals may drink sweet temper
And desperation courage take—
Brothers, leap from where you’re sitting,
When the brimming glass goes round,
Let the foam spray up to heaven:
To the good spirit drink this toast.
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Chorus
Whom the constellations honour,
Whom the seraph’s hymn applauds,
Drink this glass to the good spirit
Beyond the starry vault above!
Courage firm in sore affliction, 
Succour where the innocent weep, 
Eternity to words of honour, 
Truth to friend and foe alike, 
Manly pride in royal presence –
Brothers, if goods and blood it cost, –
Crowns to those who best deserve them, 
Downfall to the lying brood!
Chorus
Close the sacred circle tighter, 
Swear upon this golden wine:
To be faithful to the vow,
Swear it by the judge above!
Rescue from the chains of tyrants, 
Kindness towards the villain too,
Hope for those who lie on deathbeds,
Pardon those condemned to death!
The dead shall also join the living!
Brothers, drink and join the song,
Every sin shall be forgiven, 
Hell itself shall cease to be.
Chorus
A serene hour of departure!
Peaceful sleep beneath the shroud!
Brothers—and a gentle verdict
On the dead the judge may utter!
When Schiller’s poem ‘An die Freude’ (‘Ode to Joy’) first appeared in 
1786, it was an immediate popular success. It soon became, as Schiller 
later acknowledged, ‘to some extent a folksong’.3 It was set to music over 
3  Schiller to Körner, 21 October 1800, in Schillers Werke, Nationalausgabe (henceforth 
NA), ed. by Julius Petersen and Gerhard Fricke (Weimar: Böhlau,1943-), XXX, 
206f.).
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a hundred times,4 and its fame received an extra boost when Beethoven 
incorporated it—or more precisely, less than half of it—in the fourth 
movement of his Ninth Symphony. Along with ‘The Song of the Bell’, 
it remained Schiller’s best known poem throughout the nineteenth 
century; and well into the twentieth century, its popular appeal—by 
now inseparable from that of Beethoven’s symphony—remained 
undiminished. In the second half of the century, however, a reaction set 
in. The poem came to be regarded, especially in Germany, as at best 
of historical interest5 and at worst as an embarrassment: significantly, 
a popular edition of Schiller’s poetry, still in print,6 which includes 
over 150 items, omits it altogether. ‘An die Freude’ now survives, in 
Beethoven’s abbreviated version—and in the English-speaking world 
mainly in archaic or incompetent translations7—as the text of the choral 
section of the Ninth Symphony, whose music still manages to bring 
some of the poem’s emotional charge back to life. But the words, images, 
and concepts which first transmitted that charge to the composer are 
no longer an equal partner in the symphony’s overall effect—they are 
simply part of its archaeology. The fact that Beethoven’s famous melody 
is now often performed on its own, without Schiller’s text,8 is a sure sign 
that this text is now widely considered superfluous.
My aim in this essay is to examine the poem’s origins, ancestry, and 
reception, with a view to discovering why it enjoyed such immense 
popularity when it first appeared, what Beethoven found so attractive 
about it, and what kept it alive until relatively recent times. And finally, 
I shall ask what, if anything, it still has to offer us today.
4  See the editors’ commentary in Friedrich Schiller, Werke und Briefe, Frankfurt edition 
(henceforth FA), ed. by Otto Dann and other hands, 12 vols (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1988–2004), I, 1038; Schiller-Handbuch, ed. by Helmut 
Koopmann (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1998), p. 311; Julius Blaschke, ‘Schillers Gedichte in 
der Musik’, Neue Zeitschrift in der Musik (1905), 397–401.
5  See Schiller-Handbuch, p. 889.
6  Friedrich Schiller, Gedichte, ed. by Norbert Oellers (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2009).
7  The best known version is still the nineteenth-century rendering by Lady Natalia 
Macfarren, reproduced in C. P. Magill, ‘Schiller’s “An die Freude”’, in Essays in 
German Language, Culture and Society, ed. by Siegbert S. Prawer, R. Hinton Thomas 
and Leonard Forster (London: Institute for Germanic Studies, 1969) pp. 36–45 (pp. 
37f.). Typically marred by errors and infelicities is that in Nicholas Cook, Beethoven: 
Symphony No. 9 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 109. 
8  See Andreas Eichhorn, Beethovens Neunte Symphonie. Die Geschichte ihrer Aufführung 
und Rezeption (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1993), pp. 296ff.
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 The ’Ode to Joy’ was composed in the late summer or autumn of 
1785, when Schiller, living a hand-to-mouth existence as a fugitive from 
his native Württemberg, at last found security and happiness in a circle 
of friends around Christian Gottfried Körner.9 Along with others of 
Schiller’s works, it was published in February 1786 as the opening item 
of the second issue of his periodical Thalia, with a musical setting by 
Körner, himself an amateur musician.10 But although the poem’s theme 
and mood plainly reflect Schiller’s personal experience, it is in no sense 
an autobiographical statement in the manner of Goethe, or even of 
Klopstock.11 On the contrary, its poetic currency is largely conventional. 
In fact, five or more poems by various authors entitled ‘Die Freude’ 
or ‘An die Freude’ had appeared over the previous half century, most 
of them personifying joy as a goddess or divine being and equating it 
with that feeling of elation or happiness which accompanies a life of 
modest virtue and cheerful conviviality among a small circle of friends.12 
Schiller’s poem is full of echoes of these earlier works, from the opening 
line of Hagedorn’s poem (‘Freude, Göttin edler Herzen’)13 to that of Uz’s 
equivalent work (‘Freude, Königinn der Weisen’).14 Schiller’s metrical 
scheme is in fact identical with that of Uz, apart from his addition of 
a chorus after each verse. Several of the earlier poems belong to the 
Anacreontic phase of mid-eighteenth-century German poetry, which, in 
a light-hearted spirit, celebrated the trinity of wine, love, and friendship; 
the third verse of Schiller’s poem, with its references to roses and kisses, 
grapes and friendship, faithfully reproduces this older idiom. But the 
‘Ode to Joy’ is equally indebted to another traditional class of lyric, namely 
the Masonic song, as performed by Freemasons at festive gatherings in 
celebration of their brotherhood and its beliefs; for example, Schiller’s 
references to the creator above the stars echo such lines as ‘Up above 
the starry host/Our Master rules on high’ in the Masonic songbooks 
9  See FA I, 1036; also Schiller-Handbuch, p. 13.
10  See Schiller-Handbuch, p. 750; also Schiller to Georg Joachim Göschen, 29 November 
1785 and 23 February 1786 in NA XXIV, 28f. and 35f.
11  Cf. Hans Mayer, ‘Schillers Gedichte und die Tradition deutscher Lyrik’, in Jahrbuch 
der Deutschen Schiller-Gesellschaft, 4 (1960), 72–89 (p. 87).
12  See FA I, 1037 and Franz Schulz, ‘Die Göttin Freude. Zur Geistes- und Stilgeschichte 
des 18. Jahrhunderts’, Jahrbuch des Freien Deutschen Hochstifts (1926), 3–38 (pp. 
5–27). 
13  Text in Schulz, ‘Die Göttin Freude’, pp. 5f.
14  Text in ibid., pp. 19f.
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of the day.15 His astronomical references likewise recall the poetry of 
Brockes and Haller early in the century, with its praise of the Newtonian 
universe and its creator. In short, precedents can be found in the lyric of 
the German Enlightenment for most of the motifs and images in the ‘Ode 
to Joy’. The poem’s originality consequently lies not so much in its detail 
but, as I shall try to show, in two other, more general qualities—firstly, in 
the rhetorical power with which the familiar material is put across, and 
secondly, in the remarkable concentration of eighteenth-century themes 
and allusions which Schiller achieves in so short a work.
But before I examine these qualities, I shall give a brief outline of the 
poem’s structure and development, relating it to the modes and genres 
of poetry current in Schiller’s time. In its original form as reproduced 
here, the poem consists of nine verses, each followed by a chorus; 
Schiller himself shortened it, in the second version published in 1805, 
by deleting the final verse and chorus, at the same time making minor 
alterations to the first verse.16 The first verse addresses joy directly as a 
divine being and unifying force promoting human brotherhood, and 
then the chorus at once expands the frame of reference to the universe 
at large and its benevolent creator. The second verse celebrates human 
friendship, with a concluding reprimand for unsociable individuals who 
have failed to establish a bond of friendship with others. The second 
chorus, like all the subsequent choruses, again enlarges the perspective 
to the astronomical universe and its architect, who is given different 
names from one chorus to the next, from ‘God’ and ‘the unknown 
being’ to ‘the good spirit’ and ‘the judge of the dead’. The third verse 
refers to joy in the third person, as the animating force in all created 
beings from the worm to the cherub, and as the inspiration imparted by 
love, wine, and friendship. (The references here to grapes and drinking 
prepare the way for the drinking ritual of the last three verses.) Verse 
four again invokes joy as a cosmic power, this time as the driving force 
of the physical and biological universe. The fifth verse adopts an older 
didactic idiom, that of allegorised abstraction, and returns to the world 
of human experience: joy is now coupled with personified values such 
15  See Hans Vaihinger, ‘Zwei Quellenfunde zu Schillers philosophischer Entwicklung’, 
Kant-Studien, 10 (1905), 373–89 (p. 388); also Gotthold Deile, Freimaurerlieder als 
Quellen zu Schillers Lied ‘An die Freude’ (Leipzig: Verlag Adolf Weigel, 1907), pp. 
88–112.
16  See p. 234 below for the revised version.
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as truth, virtue and faith, while the last two lines, with their reference 
to bursting coffins, contain a somewhat incongruous reminiscence 
of sepulchral poetry and the Gothic novel. The sixth verse includes a 
further series of abstract concepts, this time calling on those oppressed 
by deprivation or destructive passions to rise above their affliction in a 
spirit of joyful forgiveness; these hopeful and conciliatory sentiments, 
addressed to mankind at large, are echoed in the choruses to verses five 
and six. Verses seven to nine form a relatively self-contained unit: this 
is the climax of the poem, in which all the positive sentiments of the 
preceding verses become the object of joyful celebration in a fraternal 
company bound together by an oath of loyalty. This company rises to 
its feet to drink a series of toasts, first to the creator—now described 
as ‘the good spirit’—and then to a series of human virtues and worthy 
causes such as courage in adversity, succour for the innocent, freedom 
from tyranny, etc. The last two verses consist entirely of such toasts, 
culminating in a series of eschatological references to death and the Last 
Judgement; the formula ‘The dead shall also join the living’ ingeniously 
combines the traditional ‘vivat!’ formula of the salutation or toast with 
the idea of resurrection from the dead. This final section of the poem 
contains further incongruities: secular jollification combines with 
religious solemnity, Christian with pagan allusions, a series of moral, 
political, and religious values are invoked, and—with a touch of Sturm 
und Drang extravagance and an allusion to the voyages of discovery—we 
are even invited in verse seven to imagine the spectacle of wine-bibbing 
cannibals.
The poem was clearly intended from the start for choral performance, 
for its choruses are specifically labelled as such, and there are several 
internal references to song and music. Its moral content, its praise of the 
creator and his works, and its eschatological conclusion lend it affinities 
to the Christian hymn: it indeed refers explicitly to the seraph’s hymn 
and to the choir of angels. But its Anacreontic associations, its toasts, 
and the fraternal company addressed in the concluding verses link 
it no less strongly with the drinking songs of the student fraternities 
(‘Brothers, drink and join the song’) and—as already mentioned—with 
the Masonic song, in which secular conviviality and deistic religiosity 
traditionally come together. But for all its religious references, the 
sentiments and values in Schiller’s poem are basically secular: it is in 
fact a kind of secular hymn.
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Apart from its external structure, with its regular metre, rhyme, 
verses, and choruses, the poem also has an internal structure in the way 
in which its ideas, images, and sentiments are organised. This internal 
organisation is largely responsible for its rhetorical power, which is 
one of its two most memorable features. As in many of his later poems, 
Schiller’s imagination follows an architectonic, spatial model:17 the 
unifying power of joy embraces not only present friends, but expands 
horizontally outwards to embrace the whole of humanity in an immense 
ring or circle, as in the lines ‘We embrace you, all ye millions!’ and ‘all who 
dwell in this great ring’. At the same time, joy extends upwards through 
a vertical hierarchy from the lowest forms of life to the supreme being 
beyond the stars. This vertical axis of height and depth, which is invoked 
in every chorus, and the interaction of extremes which it entails, is, of 
course, the stuff of Schiller’s dramatic as well as his lyrical imagination: 
the aesthetic modality here is that of sublimity, and both of the two 
varieties of sublimity later distinguished by Kant are present: on the one 
hand, we have what Kant calls the ‘mathematical’ sublimity of number 
and size, both in the ‘Millionen’ of all humanity and in the vastness of 
the stellar universe which transcends the limits of the imagination and 
fills us with awe; and on the other, we have Kant’s ‘dynamic’ sublimity of 
overwhelming power as the millions fall prostrate before the might of the 
creator (third chorus).18 Similarly, the poem includes those two sublime 
objects to which Kant famously refers at the end of his second Critique of 
1788, namely ‘the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me’;19 
for Schiller repeatedly invokes the starry heavens in his choruses, and 
the moral law is a constant presence in the second half of the poem. This 
association between joy and sublimity remained a real one for Schiller 
for the rest of his life; it appears once more in the concluding line of The 
Maid of Orleans, in which the heroine triumphs over human weakness to 
declare ‘Short is the pain, and eternal is the joy.’ 
17  Cf. his use of an imaginary landscape of varying heights and depths in his poem 
‘Der Spaziergang’ (‘The Walk’) in SW I, 228–34 and his comments on the poetic 
function of landscape in his review of Matthisson’s poems in SW V, 997f. See also 
Martin Dyck, Die Gedichte Schillers (Berne: Francke, 1967), pp. 60 and 73.
18  See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft §§ 25–29, in Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, 
Akademie-Ausgabe (henceforth AA), (Berlin: Königlich-Preußische Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, 1900–), V, pp. 248–78; cf. also Eichhorn, Beethovens Neunte 
Symphonie, p. 226.
19  Kant, AA V, 161.; cf. Eichhorn, Beethovens Neunte Symphonie, p. 233.
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 This contrast of extremes inherent in the experience of sublimity is 
matched by other kinds of opposition and conflict both within this poem 
and between it and other early poems by Schiller. In the same issue of 
his Thalia which opened with the ‘Ode to Joy’, he included two poems of 
diametrically opposite character, namely ‘Freethinking of Passion’ and 
‘Resignation’, whose mood is respectively one of nihilistic defiance and 
black despair. The agonistic tensions which run throughout Schiller’s 
work20 are also present in the ‘Ode to Joy’ itself, although in this case, 
they are invoked only to be decisively overcome. The all-conquering 
power of joy transcends or vanquishes Grief, Poverty, Rage, Vengeance, 
Repentance, Debts, Desperation, Affliction, Death, and even Hell itself—
if only in the poetic imagination and in moments of high euphoria. It is 
nevertheless the extreme contrasts in which this poem abounds21—and 
their triumphant resolution in joyful solidarity—which lend the ‘Ode 
to Joy’ an exuberance and rhetorical power rarely equalled in any of the 
lyrical traditions which influenced it.
So much for the poem’s rhetorical power. Before I look at its other 
most original feature, namely its unusual concentration of eighteenth-
century themes and allusions, I should like to call to mind its immediate 
historical context. It was written in the second half of 1785, around 
the mid-point of the final decade of the ancien régime. This was on the 
whole a propitious time in the history of European culture. There had 
been no major wars in continental Europe for the last twenty years; 
Mozart and Haydn, Reynolds and Gainsborough were at the height 
of their powers; Beaumarchais’ Marriage of Figaro had just caused a 
sensation at the Comédie Française; and Part II of Herder’s Ideas on the 
Philosophy of History, with its celebration of all the world’s peoples, had 
just been published. There was an atmosphere of expectancy in Europe: 
the Enlightenment felt that it had come of age, and it was time for its 
promises to be delivered. Only a year before, Kant had delivered an 
optimistic answer to the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’, predicting a 
further enlargement of those human liberties which enlightened rulers 
like Frederick the Great had inaugurated. There were, it is true, some 
20  See Günter Schulz, ‘Furcht, Freude, Enthusiasmus. Zwei unbekannte philosophische 
Entwürfe Schillers’, Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft, 1 (1957), 103 and 
113–19. 
21  Cf. Hans H. Schulte, ‘Werke der Begeisterung’. Friedrich Schiller—Idee und Eigenart 
seines Schaffens (Bonn: Bouvier, 1980), p. 271.
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clouds on the horizon: the affair of the necklace was about to cause 
serious disquiet in France; and in Germany, the Bavarian government 
had already begun to suppress the secret society of Illuminati, which 
represented the radical wing of the Aufklärung. But enlightened rulers 
still sat on the thrones of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and no one could 
yet foresee the chaos that would engulf the continent a few years later. 
Schiller, who shared the prevailing mood of optimism, was already at 
work on Don Carlos, with its stirring appeal for political freedom. This 
same mood of hope and self-confidence pervades the ‘Ode to Joy’, which 
embodies a set of metaphysical and ethical principles derived from the 
popular philosophy of the time—principles which Schiller expounds 
more fully in his Philosophical Letters, a work which he published only a 
few months after the poem.
The metaphysics of both works is essentially that of Leibniz, as 
expounded in his Théodicée and other related writings.22 The continuous 
chain of being extends, as Schiller puts it, from the worm to the cherub. 
Evil and suffering do exist, but they are only a subordinate part of the 
best of possible worlds, and with time and human effort, they can be 
further reduced, if not wholly eliminated. Although Leibniz himself 
did not presume to do so, some proponents of his optimism in the 
later eighteenth century, such as the Berlin theologian Johann August 
Eberhard, had proceeded to reject the doctrine of eternal punishment, 
and hence the eternity of hell itself.23 Schiller appears to endorse 
Eberhard’s position in the last verse of his poem with the lines ‘Every 
sin shall be forgiven,/Hell itself shall cease to be.’ It was this same 
metaphysical optimism which made it impossible for Goethe’s Faust, 
like Lessing’s Faust before him,24 to end his career in eternal damnation. 
When we try, however, to discover why Schiller came to regard joy 
not simply as a human emotion but as a metaphysical principle of cosmic 
significance, no easy answer presents itself. In his Philosophical Letters, it 
is love (Liebe) rather than joy (Freude) which links all beings together—a 
22  Cf. SW V, 357 and editors’ commentary in ibid., pp. 1094 and 1098.
23  In his Neue Apologie des Sokrates oder Untersuchung der Lehre von der Seligkeit der 
Heiden, 2 vols (Berlin: Nicolai, 1772–78); cf. Lessing’s riposte to this work in his 
essay ‘Leibniz von den ewigen Strafen’, in Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften (henceforth 
LM), ed. by Karl Lachmann and Franz Muncker, 23 vols (Stuttgart: Göschen, 1886–
1924), XI, 461–87.
24  Cf. Lessing, LM III, 384–90.
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sentiment which is not uncommon in pre-critical German philosophy.25 
It goes back to the Neo-Platonic doctrine of cosmic sympathy, which 
received a new lease of life in the eighteenth century when the success 
of Newton’s theory of gravity as a unitary explanation of the physical 
universe encouraged philosophers to look for a parallel principle in the 
moral world. We know that Schiller encountered such ideas in Adam 
Ferguson’s Institutes of Moral Philosophy, which he read in Christian 
Garve’s translation.26 But even in the Philosophical Letters, he endows not 
just love but also joy with a metaphysical significance, declaring that 
insight into the harmony and perfection of the natural universe fills us 
with joy by making us aware of our affinity with the creative spirit which 
produced it.27 As such, ‘Freude’ appears as an emotionally heightened, 
ecstatic form of love, which is itself described as a joyful emotion in 
others of Schiller’s early works.28 
The older literature on Schiller often maintains, however, that the 
concept of ‘Freude’ as encountered in the many poems on joy from 
Hagedorn to Schiller is derived from, and a virtual synonym for, 
Shaftesbury’s concept of ‘enthusiasm’ as defined in his Letter Concerning 
Enthusiasm of 1708.29 It is true that Shaftesbury’s work was well received 
in Germany from an early date,30 and that the term ‘Enthusiasmus’ is 
often used in the Sturm und Drang period in that positive sense of creative 
enthusiasm associated with Shaftesbury.31 But it is hard to believe that 
the term ‘Freude’ had the same semantic content as ‘Enthusiasmus’ for 
Schiller and the other poets who sang its praises, not least because the 
word ‘Enthusiasmus’ continues to be used as a separate term alongside 
25  For further details, see Wolfgang Riedel, Die Anthropologie des jungen Schiller 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1985), pp. 182–98.
26  See David Pugh, Dialectic of Love. Platonism in Schiller’s Aesthetics (Montreal, QC: 
Queen’s-McGill University Press, 1996), pp. 173–76. 
27  SW V, 344f.
28  See, for example, the poem ‘Die Freundschaft’ (1782), in SW I, 91ff., with its 
reference to the ‘ewgen Jubelbund der Liebe’ and its ‘freudemutig’ enthusiasm. 
29  See, for example, Schulz, ‘Die Göttin Freude’, pp. 7 and 31f.; also Ernst Cassirer, 
‘Schiller und Shaftesbury’, Publications of the English Goethe Society, 11 (1935), 35–59 
(p. 52).
30  See, for example, Leibniz’s favourable reception of Shaftesbury in Leibniz, 
Philosophische Schriften, ed. by C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols (Berlin: Weidmann:, 1875–90), 
III, 424f.
31  Cf. Schulte, ‘Werke der Begeisterung’, passim and ibid., ‘Zur Geschichte des 
Enthusiasmus’, Publications of the English Goethe Society, 39 (1969), 85–122.
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‘Freude’32 and hardly ever appears in poetry itself. Schiller’s debt to 
the popular philosophy of his age is still underexplored,33 and I do not 
propose to explore it further here. But it does strike me as significant 
that, as one critic has pointed out,34 there is no evidence that Schiller 
encountered any of Shaftesbury’s works before his move to Weimar in 
1787. Besides, the term ‘Freude’ had already acquired philosophical and 
even metaphysical significance before anyone had heard of Shaftesbury 
in Germany—not least in the writings of Leibniz, who uses it in one 
of the few works he wrote in German to denote that sentiment which 
arises out of insight into the divine wisdom of creation, and which itself 
promotes increased perfection, in this world and the next, among those 
who experience it.35 I am not suggesting here that Schiller knew this work 
by Leibniz, which in fact remained unpublished until after Schiller’s 
death.36 I am merely arguing that, by the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the term ‘Freude’ already carried sufficient philosophical 
weight to account for its subsequent prominence in reflective poetry 
from Hagedorn onwards.
The apex of Schiller’s metaphysical universe is, of course, the divine 
being above the stars. It is not difficult to identify this being with the 
God of Christianity, for the poem is full of Biblical references, from the 
cherub who stands before God to the choir of angels, the seraph, and 
above all the ‘judge above’ or the judge at the end of the poem who 
passes judgement on the dead or resurrected. On the other hand, the 
poem begins with an address to joy as a goddess or ‘spark immortal’ and 
a daughter of Elysium, the pagan equivalent of heaven. This mingling of 
Christian and pagan mythology is not uncommon in post-Renaissance 
poetry, but by Schiller’s time, it is often a sign that all the references 
in question are merely symbolic expressions of basically secular beliefs 
and values. For in the first place, the god of the ‘Ode to Joy’ is the god 
32  See, for example, SW V, 344 and 350.
33  Cf. Wolfgang Riedel’s comments in Schiller-Handbuch, pp. 155f.
34  Ibid., p. 164.
35  Leibniz, ‘Von der Glückseligkeit’, in Philosophische Schriften, ed. by Hans-Heinz Holz 
and other hands, 4 vols in 6 (Frankfurt a. M.: Insel: 1965–92), I, 391–401 (p. 396).’it 
follows from this that, the more one understands the beauty and order of God’s 
works, the more one enjoys delight and joy, and of such a kind that one becomes 
oneself more enlightened and perfect and, by means of the present joy, secures the 
joy of the future too.’ 
36  See the editor’s comments in Leibniz, Philosophische Schriften, I, 389f.
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of the astronomers, of natural religion, the supreme being of the deists 
and Freemasons. Secondly, the references to resurrection and judgement 
are there merely to furnish a traditional underpinning for that belief in 
human immortality and the rectification of injustice in the afterlife to 
which most of the Aufklärer, including Kant, still clung—if only as a sheet 
anchor for morality, as a ‘hope for those who lie on deathbeds’, as Schiller 
puts it, and a bulwark against despair: ‘Up above the starry vault/You’ll 
find a great God’s recompense.’37 And the third, and most important 
article of natural religion is also present: the freedom of the human will 
to choose between good and evil. In short, this poem is a small part of 
that great endeavour in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
Germany to translate the human and moral substance of Christianity 
into a new and secular idiom which was to become that of German 
idealism, simultaneously conserving that substance, raising it up, and 
superseding it in all three senses which Hegel packs into the German 
verb aufheben.
But the most important part of Schiller’s natural religion, in common 
with that of Kant, is its ethical content. The drinking ritual at the end of 
the poem is not, as some critics have argued,38 an incongruous intrusion. 
It is a secular ceremony, akin to a Masonic gathering, in celebration above 
all of ethical values, which are an essential part of the young Schiller’s 
philosophy of universal love, and the toasts in the last two verses are all 
in honour of moral virtues. This coupling of joy with moral virtue is, of 
course, nothing new; it is to be found in all the German poems on joy 
from Hagedorn onwards, but in Schiller’s case, it is derived from the 
moral philosophy which he absorbed at the Carlsschule from his teacher 
Abel and from Ferguson’s treatise on ethics. The moral philosophy in 
question goes back to Hutcheson and Shaftesbury, both of whom saw 
virtue as the product of natural human benevolence;39 and the pursuit of 
virtue leads in turn to moral perfection and personal happiness. These 
ideas, once again derived from the Neo-Platonic tradition, likewise 
underlie Adam Ferguson’s doctrine of ‘sympathy’, to which Schiller 
explicitly alludes in the second chorus. In all of these eudaemonistic 
doctrines, virtue and happiness—which in Schiller’s poem is elevated to 
37  Cf. Pugh, Dialectic of Love, pp. 178f.
38  See, for example, Magill, ‘Schiller’s “An die Freude”’, p. 42.
39  Cf. Riedel, Die Anthropologie des jungen Schiller, pp. 125 and 131.
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its fullest expression in the emotion of joy—are regarded as inseparable:40 
in the happy man (or woman), the purpose of existence, indeed of the 
whole universe, is fully realised,41 and in moments of joy, those who 
experience it feel at one with the whole of creation. As Schiller puts it 
in his Philosophical Letters (with numerous verbal parallels to his poem): 
‘There are moments in life when we are inclined to press to our bosom 
every flower and every distant star, every worm and every higher spirit 
whose existence we sense—an embrace of all of nature as our beloved.’42
Predominant among the moral virtues which the poem celebrates 
is that of friendship. In the mid-eighteenth century, effusive 
demonstrations of friendship between males, either in a small group or 
between individuals, is a central feature of the literature of sensibility. 
The young Schiller’s letters and lyric poetry—as in his poem ‘Die 
Freundschaft’ of 178243—perpetuate this tradition. In the latter part of 
the century, however, such friendship is more often expressed in larger 
groups or formally constituted societies such as the literary ‘Hainbund’ 
founded in 1773 in Göttingen.44 The Freemasons in particular became 
associated with the ideal of friendship, as in Lessing’s Masonic 
dialogues Ernst and Falk,45 and it was no doubt partly for this reason that 
Schiller’s poem was warmly welcomed in Masonic circles.46 The liberal 
and charitable aims of the Freemasons, as well as the deistic framework 
within which these aims were pursued, accord very well with Schiller’s 
poem, and especially with the drinking ritual of the last three verses. 
40  Cf., Schiller’s Carlsschule address ‘Virtue Considered in its Consequences’ in SW V, 
280–87 (p. 282).
41  Goethe expresses this same belief in his essay ‘Winckelmann’ of 1805, in Goethes 
Werke, Hamburg Edition, ed. by Erich Trunz (Hamburg: Wegner, 1948—64), XII, 
96–129 (p. 98).
42  SW V, 350.
43  SW I, 91ff. 
44  Cf. Schulte, ‘Zur Geschichte des Enthusiasmus’, p. 104; see also the article 
‘Freundschaft’ in the Lexikon der Aufklärung, ed. by Werner Schneiders (Munich: C. 
H. Beck, 1995), pp. 139–41.
45  On the significance of friendship in this work, see Peter Michelsen, ‘Die “wahren 
Taten” der Freimaurer. Lessings Ernst und Falk’, in Michelsen, Der unruhige Bürger. 
Studien zu Lessing und zur Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts (Würzburg: Konigshausen & 
Neumann, 1990), pp. 137–59 (pp. 157ff.).
46  Cf. Zerboni di Sposetti to Schiller, 14 December 1792, in Schiller, NA XXXIV/, 208. 
Despite numerous approaches by Freemasons, Schiller resolutely refused to join 
the order himself; see Deile, Freimaurerlieder, pp. 20–30 and Hans-Jürgen Schings, 
Die Brüder des Marquis Posa. Schiller und der Geheimbund der Illuminati (Tübingen: 
Niemeyer, 1996), pp. 108f.
 23310. Schiller’s ‘Ode to Joy’: A Reappraisal 
In a kind of secular equivalent of the Eucharist, the circle of friends 
pledges its faith in humanity and its potential for constructive moral 
action. And significantly, the wine they drink is drunk not for anything 
it represents, but for its physical effects: the young Schiller’s morality 
has no hint of Kantian rigorism about it, for human benevolence springs 
spontaneously from the psycho-physical harmony of well-adjusted 
human nature—and alcohol and convivial company can only enhance 
this process. The ideal of personal friendship is accordingly enlarged, 
in this poem, to encompass the entire human race47 in the cosmopolitan 
spirit of the Enlightenment and of German literary Humanität. 
It is this wider ethical relevance which gave this poem its popular 
appeal from the 1780s to recent times. For it celebrates not just individual 
moral values such as courage, charity, and honesty, but also the political 
values of liberty, equality, and fraternity—although Schiller does not 
group these together as a trinity as happened soon afterwards in France. 
Liberty, as a liberal rather than a revolutionary ideal,48 is invoked in the 
lines ‘Manly pride in royal presence’ (verse eight) and especially ‘Rescue 
from the chains of tyrants’ (verse nine). In the nineteenth century, Schiller 
was regularly hailed as a champion of freedom, whether of the nation (as 
in Wilhelm Tell) or of the self-determining individual (as in the tragedies 
and later philosophical writings). This even gave rise, in the case of the 
‘Ode to Joy’, to the myth that his original title for the poem was ‘An 
die Freiheit’ (‘Ode to Freedom’), later changed by the censor to ‘An die 
Freude’.49 In the euphoria of 1989 in Berlin, Leonard Bernstein actually 
conducted a performance of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony in which the 
word ‘Freiheit’ replaced ‘Freude’ throughout the choral section.50 This 
inspired one misguided Germanist51 to revive the myth of the censor’s 
intervention, an absurd claim which ignores not only the long tradition 
of earlier poems on the theme of ‘Freude’ but also the fact that Schiller 
himself explicitly gives the poem its present title in the covering letter 
47  Cf. T. J. Reed in the Schiller-Handbuch, p. 13.
48  Cf. Rudolf Dau, ‘Friedrich Schillers Hymne “An die Freude”. Zu einigen Problemen 
ihrer Interpretation und aktuellen Rezeption’, Weimarer Beiträge, 24 (1978), Heft 10, 
38–60 (pp. 43 and 50).
49  See Gottfried Martin, ‘Freude Freiheit Götterfunken. Über Schillers Schwierigkeiten 
beim Schreiben von Freiheit’, Cahiers d’Études Germaniques, 18 (1990), 9–18 (9f.); cf. 
Eichhorn, Beethovens Neunte Symphonie, pp. 320f.
50  Schiller-Handbuch, p. 181; also Martin, ‘Freude Freiheit Götterfunken’, p. 9.
51  Martin, ibid..
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with which he sent it to his publisher in 1785.52 Nevertheless, political 
liberty does appear in the list of ethical ideals celebrated in the poem, 
especially in the final verse, which Schiller deleted after events in France 
had invested it with unintended revolutionary overtones.53
Social and political equality are likewise commended in the poem. 
In the second half of the first verse, Schiller praises the power of joy to 
efface those distinctions which the divisive force of class conventions 
(‘the sword of custom’)54 imposes: ‘Beggars become princes’ brothers,/
Where your gentle wings alight’. Here again, he took fright after the 
French Revolution, and the second version of the poem removes both 
the hint of violence in ‘the sword of custom’ and the suggestion of social 
and political upheaval implicit in the reference to beggars by recasting 
the lines in question as follows:
Your magic spells have reunited, 
What strict custom split apart;
Every man becomes a brother,
Where your gentle wings alight.
But it is the last, and most neglected,55 of the three aspirations of 
the revolutionary era—namely fraternity—which is by far the most 
prominent in Schiller’s poem in both its versions. The word ‘brother’ 
occurs no fewer than eight times, both in the sense of personal friendship 
as pledged in the German ceremony of ‘drinking brotherhood’ and in 
that of universal brotherhood as the supreme ideal of the Enlightenment. 
In the first of these senses, Schiller’s references to brotherhood reflect 
that ideal of personal friendship which runs through the literature of 
sensibility in Germany; such friendship defines itself in those years as a 
middle-class virtue, as the opposite of aristocratic insincerity and courtly 
intrigue,56 an opposition which is hinted at in verse eight of the poem 
52  Schiller to Göschen, 29 November 1785, in Schiller, NA XXIV, 29.
53  Cf. Schiller’s circumstantial condemnation of the French Revolution in his 
conversation of 1793–94 with Friedrich Wilhelm von Hoven, in Schiller, NA XLII, 
179.
54  On the political significance of the term ‘Mode’ (custom), see Hans Mayer, ‘Neunte 
Symphonie and Song of Joy’, in Mayer, Ein Denkmal fur Johannes Brahms. Versuche 
über Musik und Literatur (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1983), pp. 28–39 (pp. 28ff.).
55  See the article ‘Fraternity’ in The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment, ed. by 
John W. Yolton and other hands (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 173f.
56  See the article ‘Freundschaft’ in the Lexikon der Aufklärung, ed. Schneiders, p. 140; 
also the article ‘Friendship’ in the Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, ed. by Alan 
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(‘Manly pride in royal presence/ [...] Downfall to the lying brood!’). In 
its second, universal sense, the ideal of fraternity as human brotherhood 
pervades the entire poem, and the principal function of God as ‘a loving 
father’ is to provide a head for the fraternal family of mankind (and, in 
a cosmic sense, of all created beings).57 Although this family exists as yet 
only as an ideal, it may one day be realised in practice (‘Suffer bravely, all 
ye millions!/Suffer for a better world!’). In short, the poem embodies the 
basic political as well as moral ideals of the Enlightenment; but they are 
formulated in such general terms that no specific political programme 
can be abstracted from them.
The critical reception of the poem has not been helped by the fact 
that Schiller himself, in 1800, condemned it in no uncertain terms. As he 
wrote to Körner:58 
[The Ode to] Joy [...] is also thoroughly faulty, according to my 
present taste, and even if it does recommend itself by a certain emotional 
fire, it is nevertheless a bad poem and signifies a stage of education 
which I certainly had to leave behind me in order to accomplish anything 
worthwhile. But because it appealed to the defective taste of its time, it 
received the honour of becoming something of a folksong. Your liking 
for this poem may be based on the period of its origin; but this also lends 
it the only value it has, and it has it only for us, and not for the world or 
for the art of poetry.
In other words, its only value is personal and particular, as a reminder 
of a moment of happiness shared by Schiller, Körner, and their circle. 
Schiller had several reasons for dismissing the poem in this way. I have 
already mentioned his unease over certain lines which, after 1789, 
might be construed in a revolutionary sense. It is also possible that the 
references to hell, resurrection, etc. in the final verse which he deleted 
in the second edition sounded too exclusively Christian for his liking in 
later years. And the eudaemonistic ethics of cosmic sympathy alluded to 
throughout the poem must have struck him as naive and old-fashioned 
after his studies of Kant’s moral philosophy in the early 1790s.59 But 
Charles Kors, 4 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), II, 91–96.
57  Cf. Schiller’s remarks on the family of mankind in his address ‘Virtue Considered 
in its Consequences’ (1780), in SW V 283; also Riedel, Die Anthropologie des jungen 
Schiller, p. 177.
58  See note 3 above; cf. also Körner’s reply defending the poem, in Schiller, NA 
XXXVIII/1, 393.
59  Cf. the editor’s comments in Schiller, FA I, 1039.
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above all, he rejected the poem for aesthetic reasons. Its popular tone 
and direct appeal to the emotions reminded him of the popular ballads 
and Masonic songs which he now openly despised;60 and in describing 
the work as a Volkslied, he was implicitly putting it in the same class as 
the poems of Gottfried August Bürger, with their down-to-earth echoes 
of the folksong, which he condemned in his scathing review of the 
latter’s works in 179161—a review whose harshness owes as much to his 
disapproval of his own early poetry as to his distaste for that of Bürger. 
His classical aesthetics of the 1790s demanded reflective distance, 
refinement, and emotional restraint in poetry, and the ‘Ode to Joy’ now 
appeared far too immediate, homespun, and effusive for his liking.
The faults which Schiller found in it—its popular idiom, lack of 
refinement, and autobiographical origins—are not necessarily faults by 
today’s standards. But even today, it is difficult not to find deficiencies 
in the poem. It lacks that combination of simplicity and originality 
which we admire in Goethe’s lyric, and it has none of the complexity 
and multiplicity of meaning we associate with Hölderlin or Rilke. Its 
idealistic optimism and rhetorical enthusiasm are alien to our age, 
and for historical reasons, they are viewed with particular suspicion 
in Germany. As already mentioned, it also draws heavily on earlier 
poems, both in theme and in expression: many of its pronouncements 
are commonplaces, or even clichés.62 It is full of incongruous images and 
allusions, and has been described by one critic as a confused ‘jumble 
of pietist emotion, Sturm und Drang ranting and Aufklärung lore’.63 
Yet it does have a dynamic coherence, as I have tried to show: but its 
organising principle is not so much logical as cumulative and climactic, 
as its joyful exuberance expands outwards and upwards to embrace 
an ever wider range of experience, and as its tempo accelerates with a 
concluding series of one-line acclamations. This cumulative character, 
this richness of reference, inevitably generates incongruities, but it is at 
the same time one of the poem’s greatest strengths—even by Schiller’s 
60  See, for example, Schiller’s letters to Goethe, 24 May 1803, to Körner, 10 June 1803, 
and to Wilhelm von Humboldt, 18 August 1803, in NA XXXII, 42, 45, and 63. 
61  SW V, 970–85.
62  Cf. Dyck, Die Gedichte Schillers, p. 10; also ibid., ‘Klischee und Originalität in Schillers 
Gedichtsprache’, in Tradition und Ursprünglichkeit. Akten des III. Internationalen 
Germanisten-Kongresses 1965 in Amsterdam, ed. by Werner Kohlschmidt and Herman 
Meyer (Berne and Munich: Francke, 1966), pp. 178f.
63  Magill, ‘Schiller’s “An die Freude”’, p. 42.
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own classical standards. For in that same review in which he condemns 
Bürger’s poems, he defines the task of poetry as follows: ‘It ought to 
collect together the manners, character, and entire wisdom of its age 
in its mirror, and create, with its idealising art, a model, refined and 
ennobled, for its century from the century itself.’64
The ‘Ode to Joy’ fulfils the spirit of this requirement more completely 
than any other German lyric poem of the half-century from 1740 
to 1790 that I know. It is a microcosm and summation of the culture 
and aspirations of the German Enlightenment, from sensibility and 
Anacreontic frivolity to the Sturm und Drang and Gothic revival, from 
Leibnizian metaphysics to Hutchesonian moral sense, from Aufklärung 
didacticism and Newtonian astronomy to Klopstockian fervour and 
pietistic devotion, from the literature of travel to the cosmopolitan secret 
societies and the declarations of the rights of man. Its incongruities 
are those of the age and culture which produced it. But when Schiller 
defined the task of poetry in 1791, he was aware that the age which 
he now called on poetry to represent was no longer the age he had 
known in 1785: the political revolution in France and the intellectual 
revolution of the critical philosophy had generated new problems and 
new attitudes which called for a new poetic currency, even if popular 
poetry continued to employ the old one. 
I therefore conclude that the historical importance of Schiller’s 
‘Ode to Joy’ is greater than its critics, from Schiller himself onwards, 
have generally acknowledged. As for its relevance today, such life as 
it still possesses it owes almost entirely to Beethoven’s setting of 1824. 
Beethoven knew and loved the poem from his years in Bonn onwards, 
and he planned to set it to music as early as 1793.65 Several attempts 
remained fragments or no longer survive, and when he finally composed 
his choral symphony, the text he had before him was Schiller’s second 
version, which ends rather lamely in the middle of the drinking ritual 
at the end of the eighth chorus. The poem was, of course, still too long 
for Beethoven’s purposes, and he retained only those parts—namely the 
first three verses and the choruses to verses one, three, and four—which 
he considered most important. He also changed their order by grouping 
64  SW V, 971.
65  See the Schiller-Handbuch, p. 179; Magill, ‘Schiller’s “An die Freude”’, p. 39; and 
Eichhorn, Beethovens Neunte Symphonie, p. 225. 
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the verses together as a separate body, followed by the choruses as a 
second group including two repeats of the first verse.66 The effect of 
this change was to accentuate Schiller’s polarity between the earthly 
hierarchy, united in joy, and the mighty creator of the universe before 
whom the millions prostrate themselves—in short, to accentuate that 
contrast of height and depth, power and powerlessness, which is 
inherent in the aesthetic experience of sublimity. Beethoven, who can 
rarely resist the heroic mode, also brings in the chorus of verse four 
with its lines ‘Run, ye brothers, on your courses/ Joyful, as a conquering 
hero’ as a link between his two main sections, accompanying it with a 
triumphant march (marked alla marcia) as humanity proceeds towards 
its goal of joyful brotherhood.67 The concluding repeat of the first verse 
and its chorus rounds off Beethoven’s text as a more tightly unified 
entity than Schiller’s longer, enumerative poem, and the penultimate 
line of the first verse in its revised form, ‘Every man becomes a brother’, 
re-emphasises the ideal of human brotherhood. It is this central ideal of 
the Enlightenment, and its sublime representation in Schiller’s poem, 
that inspired the last movement of Beethoven’s symphony.
To do justice to Beethoven’s setting would require more space and 
greater competence than I can lay claim to. I shall simply conclude 
with a few comments on the reception of Schiller’s text in Beethoven’s 
setting and its residual significance today. In the years immediately 
before and after the revolution of 1848, the choral symphony was 
acclaimed by various liberal and radical voices, from Bruno Bauer to the 
young Richard Wagner.68 Surprisingly, it already possessed that strong 
association with the cause of liberty which it has never entirely lost,69 
despite the fact that Schiller’s overt allusions to liberty occur only in 
those verses of the poem which Beethoven left out. The symphony was 
adopted by socialist groups in the early decades of the twentieth century 
as an anthem of proletarian solidarity, and was regularly performed by 
workers’ choirs in the 1920s.70 In more recent times, its theme of fraternity 
has usually—and with more justification—been interpreted in terms 
of international rather than proletarian co-operation (‘Let all the world 
66  For a detailed account, see Eichhorn, pp. 230–35.
67  Ibid., p. 271.
68  Ibid., pp. 307–12.
69  Cf. Martin’s flawed attempt to renew this connection (note 48 above).
70  Eichhorn, Beethovens Neunte Symphonie, pp, 296 and 320–26.
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receive this kiss’); and Beethoven’s melody, with—and increasingly 
often without—Schiller’s text, has been adopted at various times as an 
anthem by the Council of Europe, by NATO, by the Olympic team of 
the two Germanies in the 1950s and 60s, and as the preferred choice 
of a sizeable minority of Germans in 1990 for a new national anthem.71 
Some of these associations are distinctly odd: universal brotherhood is 
not the most obvious aspiration of a military alliance, and the ‘Ode to 
Joy’ is not perhaps the most suitable anthem for the European Union, at 
least at the present moment—hence, no doubt, the current preference 
for instrumental renderings of Beethoven’s melody. But at a more 
fundamental level, this preference is probably motivated by a distrust 
of words and concepts which have become hackneyed by overuse and 
tainted by misuse. More disquietingly, indifference towards them can 
easily be bred once the ideals they represent—freedom from oppression, 
equality before the law, and international co-operation—have become 
realities, at least for the fortunate majority in the western world, or when 
they are enforced by the deadening discipline of political correctness, 
which devalues common sense and inhibits spontaneity. These ideals 
soon recover their life and emotional content, of course, when they 
are seriously challenged, or when they are rescued from grave danger, 
as happened at the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the liberation of 
Kosovo in 1999. But fortunately, there is another alternative: we can at 
any time re-experience something of their original power by enjoying 
the major works of art which they inspired, such as Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony—and also perhaps, with a little more effort of the historical 
imagination, the poem which inspired Beethoven to write it.
71  See Schiller-Handbuch, p. 181 and Eichhorn, Beethovens Neunte Symphonie, pp. 296f.
‘Laocoon and his sons’, also known as ‘the Laocoon Group’. Marble, copy after an 
Hellenistic original from ca. 200 BC. Found in the Baths of Trajan in 1506. Museo 
Pio Clementino, Octagon, Laocoon Hall, Vatican Museums. Photograph by Marie-
Lan Nguyen (2009), Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/1/17/Laocoon_Pio-Clementino_Inv1059-1064-1067.jpg
11. Laocoon in Germany:  
The Reception of the Group since 
Winckelmann1
The Laocoon group in the Vatican, reputedly the work of the three 
Rhodian sculptors Hagesandros, Athanodorus, and Polydorus, is one of 
the most famous sculptures to have come down to us from antiquity. It 
depicts the Trojan priest Laocoon and his sons being bitten and strangled 
to death by two enormous serpents. There are various versions of the 
legend, but the most familiar is that of Virgil, who, in the Aeneid, Book 
II, describes Laocoon’s fearful death as a punishment imposed on him 
by Minerva, the protectress of the Greeks, for his temerity in warning 
his fellow Trojans against bringing the Wooden Horse into Troy. Since its 
discovery in a vault on the Esquiline Hill in Rome on 14 January 1506, 
the Laocoon group has been the subject of controversy, probably more 
so than any other ancient sculpture.2 But it was in Germany, between 
the middle of the eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, that the controversy reached its height. After Winckelmann, in 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as ‘Laocoon in Germany. 
The Reception of the Group since Winckelmann’, in Oxford German Studies, 10 
(1979), 22–63. 
2  On the Laocoon debate in general, see Margarete Bieber, Laocoon. The Influence of 
the Group since its Rediscovery, rev. edn (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 
1967); Hellmut Sichtermann, Laokoon, Werkmonographien zur bildenden Kunst, 101 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1964); Horst Althaus, Laokoon. Stoff und Form (Berne: Francke, 
1968); William Guild Howard, Laokoon. Lessing, Herder, Goethe. Selections (New York, 
NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1910); and Carl Justi, Winckelmann und seine Zeitgenossen, 3rd 
edn, 3 vols (Leipzig: F. C. W. Vogel, 1923), I, 474–98. I have not attempted to discuss 
all the German writers who took part in the debate after 1800; other contributions, 
mainly by art historians of the nineteenth century, are listed in Hugo Blümner’s 
edition of Lessings Laokoon, 2nd edn (Berlin: Weidmann, 1880), pp. 722–74. 
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1755, proclaimed it an exemplary instance of that Greek beauty which 
he urged his contemporaries to emulate, it played a central part in the 
rise of the neo-classical movement; and for over fifty years, many of 
the foremost intellects in Germany contributed to the debate over its 
significance and its relationship to their own aesthetic and philosophical 
principles. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the controversy is 
the diversity of opinion which the statue generated. Indeed, it is not too 
much to say that, during this period, it became a touchstone of taste. But 
in one respect, nearly all the participants were united: they regarded this 
sculpture as of paradigmatic value in art and aesthetic theory, and they 
spoke of it with reverence.
The object of this essay is not to provide a history of the neo-classical 
movement in Germany, a subject that has been amply treated in the 
past.3 Its aim is rather, by examining salient points in the reception of a 
particular work of art, to furnish a more concentrated, if more limited, 
perspective on some of the changes in attitude towards art and life which 
took place during the age of Goethe and its aftermath. I should add that 
I have chosen the Laocoon group rather than any other work not merely 
because so much was written about it at that time. It has for long struck 
me as strange that so drastic a spectacle as the group affords should 
have fascinated so rational an age as the eighteenth century, and that it 
was able to captivate such devotees of classical beauty and serenity as 
Winckelmann and the older Goethe. None of the explanations hitherto 
advanced for this phenomenon has impressed me as satisfactory, and it 
may be that, if we can discover why so many leading minds responded 
to the work’s challenge, we stand to learn something significant about 
their attitudes and the times they lived in, and perhaps also about the 
statue itself. Such problems as to when precisely the statue originated, 
and which version of the Laocoon myth it represents—problems about 
which art historians and archaeologists have continued to argue4—I 
3  See, for example, Walther Rehm, Griechentum und Goethezeit (Leipzig: Dieterichsche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936); the same author’s Götterstille und Göttertrauer (Berne: 
Francke, 1951); E. M. Butler, The Tyranny of Greece over Germany (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1935); and H. C. Hatfield, Winckelmann and his German 
Critics (New York, NY: King’s Crow Press, 1943).
4  On various stages of the debate see Gisela M. A. Richter, The Sculpture and Sculptors 
of the Greeks, 4th edn (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 
237ff.; Bieber, Laocoon, pp. 37–41; A. F. Stewart, ‘To Entertain an Emperor. Sperlonga, 
Laokoon and Tiberius at the Dinner Table’, Journal of Roman Studies, 76 (1977) 76–94.
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shall mention only in so far as they impinge upon the interpretations of 
the group by the writers in question.
The Laocoon debate in Germany begins with Winckelmann’s essay 
‘Thoughts on the Imitation of the Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture’ 
of 1755. It was this short essay, more than Winckelmann’s later History of 
the Art of Antiquity, which caught the imagination of his contemporaries, 
and expressed most strikingly his vision of the ancient Greeks as a 
happy and ideal race whose sculptures embodied consummate beauty, 
a beauty to which artists of every period should look as an unsurpassed 
model. The first such masterpiece which Winckelmann mentions, and 
the main example of the qualities he admires, is the Laocoon group. The 
group remains today what it was in antiquity, he says, ‘a perfect rule of 
art’.5 And in his celebrated lines on the excellence of the ancient statues, 
it is again the Laocoon which serves as his example:6
Finally, the universal and predominant characteristic of the Greek 
masterpieces is a noble simplicity and quiet greatness, both in posture 
and expression. Just as the depths of the sea remain forever calm, 
however much the surface may rage, so does the expression of the Greek 
figures, however strong their passions, reveal a great and dignified soul. 
Such a soul is depicted in the face of Laocoon, and not only in his face, 
despite his most violent torments. The pain which is evident in his every 
muscle and sinew, and which, disregarding his face and other parts of 
his body, we can almost feel ourselves simply by looking at his painfully 
contracted abdomen—this pain, I maintain, nevertheless causes no 
violent distortion to his face or to his general posture. He raises no 
terrible clamour, as in Virgil’s poetic account of his fate. His mouth is 
not wide enough open to allow this, and he emits instead an anxious 
and oppressed sigh [...]. The physical pain and spiritual greatness are 
diffused with equal intensity throughout his entire frame, and held, as 
it were, in balance. Laocoon suffers, but he suffers like the Philoctetes of 
Sophocles: his misery touches us to the heart, but we envy the fortitude 
with which this great man endures it.
‘A noble simplicity and quiet greatness’—these are the qualities which 
Winckelmann glorifies in the statues of the Greeks and which became 
5  Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Sämtliche Werke (subsequent references to this 
edition are identified by the abbreviation WW), ed. by Joseph Eiselein, 12 vols 
(Donaueschingen: Verlag Deutscher Klassiker, 1825–29), I, 9. 
6  WW I, 30f.
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the ideals of the neo-classical movement in Germany. He holds them 
up in opposition to the Baroque art of the preceding century with its 
movement, passion, and extravagance—the art of Bernini, whom he 
explicitly attacks in the essay.7 For the state in which ‘noble simplicity 
and quiet greatness’ are seen to their best advantage is not that of 
motion, but of rest.
On the face of it, the Laocoon group is scarcely the most obvious 
instance Winckelmann could have chosen to demonstrate his thesis. 
Numerous other Greek sculptures were known, even then, which display 
the simplicity and tranquillity he admires in a far higher degree than the 
complex and contorted Laocoon—the Belvedere Apollo, for example, to 
which he refers briefly, or the so-called Antinous, both of which Hogarth 
had praised two years before as models of classical perfection.8 As one 
critic remarks, ‘why he should have chosen this particular group as an 
example of the very qualities it lacks, is no easy question to answer’.9 
It is simply not enough to say, as some scholars have done, that 
the Laocoon group seemed moderate to Winckelmann in comparison 
with the excesses of Bernini, Puget, Falconet, and other sculptors of the 
Baroque and Rococo eras.10 This may well be true, but it does not alter 
the fact that more moderate examples still were available, to which the 
terms Winckelmann uses would have been much more appropriate. 
And as for E. M. Butler’s explanation that, ‘dazzled by a flash of a 
great revelation’, Winckelmann ‘was in fact in a trance; and like many 
another clairvoyant, he was uttering truths which did not apply to the 
object before him, but were associated with it in his mind’, this does 
not answer the problem at all, but simply evades it. By such reasoning, 
Winckelmann might just as well have chosen one of the ecstatic figures 
of Bernini as his example.
The true explanation is that Winckelmann had no choice but to show 
that his thesis applied to the Laocoon; and the reason for this lies in 
the work’s earlier reception. For it was realised, from the moment of 
its discovery in 1506, that this was the very work which Pliny, in his 
7  WW I, 20.
8  William Hogarth, The Analysis of Beauty (London: J. Reeves, 1753), pp. 66, 86, 128, 
etc.
9  Butler, The Tyranny, p. 47.
10  See, for example, Justi, Winckelmann und seine Zeitgenossen, I, 484 and 496; see also 
Bieber, Laocoon, p. 33.
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Natural History, had described as opus omnibus et picturae et statuariae artis 
praeponendum (‘the greatest of all works in painting and sculpture’);11 and 
for the Renaissance, Pliny’s judgement was axiomatically valid. When 
his praise was echoed by Michelangelo, who was present immediately 
after the discovery, the work’s reputation was further enhanced. Not 
only Michelangelo, however, but Titian, Rubens, and other great artists 
revered and copied the group,12 and the verdicts passed upon it down to 
the time of Winckelmann are one long succession of superlatives. Since 
it influenced the art of the late Renaissance and Baroque periods directly, 
its affinity with Baroque sculpture is a very real one—indeed, the 
period of Greek art from which it dates is often described as ‘Hellenistic 
Baroque’. The artists of the seventeenth century saw in it an example 
of extreme naturalism and unrestrained emotion,13 and it is not at all 
surprising that Bernini himself, no less than his detractor Winckelmann, 
regarded it as the greatest masterpiece of antiquity.14
Given the immense reputation of the Laocoon, Winckelmann had at 
least to accommodate the work to his thesis, if not to use it as his principal 
example. To ignore it would have been to lay himself open to immediate 
refutation. He opted for the bolder alternative, that of undermining his 
opponents’ case from within, and based his argument squarely upon 
the Laocoon. In order to succeed, however, he had to demonstrate that, 
for all its Baroque affinities, its greatness lay not in those aspects which 
Bernini and his successors admired, but in the precise opposite of these. 
And if he could persuade his readers that this extreme case was indeed 
characterised by ‘noble simplicity and quiet greatness’, his thesis would 
automatically be accepted for almost any other Greek work he cared to 
name. Just how successful his gamble was is shown by the subsequent 
history of neo-classicism in Germany.
Winckelmann could not deny the obvious, however. He readily 
admits that every muscle and sinew of Laocoon is racked by violent 
torment, and that his body is by no means at rest. But this physical 
upheaval is counterbalanced (abgewogen) by certain qualities of mind 
which counteract the pain and reduce its expression to the minimum 
11  Pliny, Natural History, XXXVI, 37.
12  Bieber, Laocoon, pp. 18f.
13  Bieber, Laocoon, p. 12.
14 See Max Pohlenz, ‘Laokoon’, in Die Antike, 9 (1953), 54.
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consistent with the priest’s predicament. This is the sense of his famous 
metaphor of the sea, so often repeated by later writers: what really 
matters is not the visible surface of the water, which may rage and 
boil as it will, but the unseen depths, which are forever calm. Not the 
superficial appearance of the group, but its spiritual significance, is what 
counts, and by implication, the Baroque artists who venerated the group 
were themselves of a superficial turn of mind. In short, the qualities 
which Winckelmann detects are moral rather than aesthetic, and the 
only tangible evidence he adduces for them is the fact that Laocoon 
does not cry out, and therefore appears to restrain his emotions. His 
argument transcends those of his adversaries because it accommodates 
their case, along with his own, in a series of antitheses: motion and 
rest, passion and composure, pain and nobility, body and soul, are the 
co-determinants of the sculpture. And in each case, the second is not 
only the more important of the two—its connotations are spiritual rather 
than physical, which makes it a relatively intangible quality.
The triumph of Winckelmann’s idealistic aesthetics was made 
possible, however, not just by his skill in dialectics, but also by the temper 
of his age, the age of the Enlightenment. By showing that the Laocoon 
group embodied an idea, a stoical ethos, he succeeded in rationalising 
a respected but disquieting work. This strongly recommended both his 
own cult of Hellenism, and the statue itself, to his countrymen. It has 
rightly been observed that his conception of the Greeks and their moral 
excellence is of literary, rather than artistic origin, and that he derived 
it rather from Plato and Sophocles than from the much later products 
of Hellenistic art.15 His fondness for allegorical art reflects the same 
didactic bias.
In his later History of the Art of Antiquity, Winckelmann discusses 
ancient art much more fully and empirically, and the work is rightly 
regarded as a milestone in art history.16 But although his analysis of the 
15  See Hatfield, Winckelmann and his German Critics, p. 9. Winckelmann suggests as 
much himself when he comments in his ‘Thoughts on the Imitation’: ‘The noble 
simplicity and quiet greatness of the Greek statues is also the true hallmark of the Greek 
writings of the best periods, the writings of the Socratic school’ (WW I, 34). 
16  So convinced was Winckelmann, however, that the values he discerned in the 
Laocoon group were identical with those of the Socratic age that he allowed this 
belief, rather than archaeological or epigraphical evidence, to determine its date. He 
placed it as far back in time as possible, in the age of Alexander the Great (WW VI, 
16).
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Laocoon group is more detailed, he again dwells on Laocoon’s facial 
expression. As in the earlier essay, the physical is significant only in so 
far as it reflects the spiritual conflict:17
The paternal heart reveals itself in the mournful eyes, and pity seems 
to swim on them in a dim vapour. His face is plaintive, but not clamorous, 
and his eyes turn upwards in search of higher help. His mouth is full of 
sadness, and his depressed lower lip is heavy with it; but in his raised 
upper lip, it is mixed with pain, which rises with a surge of vexation, as 
if at an undeserved and unworthy injury, into his nose, making it swell 
up and revealing itself in the dilated and upturned nostrils. In his lower 
brow the conflict between pain and resistance, as if united in a single 
point, is fashioned with great wisdom [...]. 
He does proceed to emphasise the statue’s ‘beauty’ soon afterwards,18 
but comes no nearer than in the previous essay to defining what 
constitutes it.19 This passage, in fact, is an exercise in physiognomy 
rather than objective description, and it was no doubt on such models as 
this that the physiognomist Lavater, in the 1770s, based his own fanciful 
interpretations of Greek and Roman countenances.20
The success of Winckelmann’s arguments began a fateful trend in 
German criticism of the Laocoon, and indeed of ancient art in general. 
His visionary approach encouraged his successors to speculate, to 
read their own ideas into the work, and his concern with its ethical 
significance and exemplary status as a product of Greek humanity 
aroused enthusiasms which bore little relation to historical fact. As the 
archaeologist Heyne ruefully commented in 1779 on Winckelmann’s 
description:21
It is not designed to provide a clear concept and representation of 
the group: and one must already know this figure precisely and have 
17  WW VI, 22.
18  WW VI, 23.
19  Cf. Blümner, Lessings Laokoon, p. 496: ‘For Winckelmann, beauty is a somewhat 
indefinable substance, of which it is easier to say what it is not than what it is.’
20  See Johann Caspar Lavater, Physiognomische Fragmente, 4 vols (Leipzig and 
Winterthur: Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1775–78), II, 254–59, ‘Helden der 
Vorzeit’; III, 48–57, ‘Ueber griechische Gesichter’; and IV, 169–75, annotated extracts 
from Winckelmann. 
21  Christoph Gottlob Heyne, ‘Examination of Some Reports and Assertions on the 
Belvedere Laocoon’, in Heyne, Sammlung antiquarischer Aufsätze, 2 vols (Leipzig: 
Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1778–79), II, 1–52 (p. 18).
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reflected on it before this description can produce its proper effect; 
otherwise, one risks falling into that state to which so many of our young 
compatriots succumbed a few years ago, by working themselves up, 
like the knight of La Mancha, into a transport of enthusiasm lacking in 
nothing except—a real, or at least a definite object. 
To Winckelmann’s immediate successor in the Laocoon debate, however, 
Heyne’s strictures do not apply. For Lessing’s Laocoon, or On the Limits 
of Painting and Poetry of 1766 is renowned for its precise reasoning, 
and what Lessing has to say on the beauty of Greek sculpture betrays 
nothing of Winckelmann’s Platonic enthusiasms.
Nevertheless, Lessing does adopt several of Winckelmann’s most 
important premises. Like his predecessor, he regards the Greeks as 
representatives of an ideal humanity, even if his opinion of them differs 
in some respects from Winckelmann’s; and he agrees with him that 
the Greek masterpieces provide a standard against which the art of 
all subsequent ages should be measured. For both writers, the highest 
beauty is that of the human form, and its supreme expression is found 
in the sculpture of the Greeks.
Lessing’s primary purpose in Laocoon, of course, is not to discuss 
the statue of that name, but to define the respective provinces of poetry 
and visual art. But in this enterprise, the Laocoon group serves as his 
main example in the visual arts, to which he contrasts Homer, and to 
a lesser extent Virgil, as his criteria in poetry. In placing the statue on 
a level with the greatest epics of antiquity, he implicitly acknowledges 
Winckelmann’s opinion of its merit. Indeed, the first works of art which 
the latter had named, in conjunction, in his essay of 1755, were the 
Laocoon group and the epics of Homer, and in his central passage on the 
group (already quoted above), the statue was compared with Virgil’s 
rendering of the Laocoon episode in the Aeneid. Lessing, then, respected 
Winckelmann as the foremost German authority on ancient art, and 
in choosing the title Laocoon for his treatise, he is both complimenting 
Winckelmann and endorsing his admiration of the statue.
Immediately after his preface, Lessing opens his treatise with 
Winckelmann’s words on the Laocoon group as an example of ‘noble 
simplicity and quiet greatness’.22 Winckelmann, it will be remembered, 
22  Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften (subsequent references to this edition 
are identified by the abbreviation of the editors’ initials LM), ed. by Karl Lachmann 
and Franz Muncker, 23 vols (Stuttgart, Leipzig and Berlin: Göschen, 1886–1924), IX, 
6.
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paid much attention to Laocoon’s face and had relatively little to say 
about the group as a whole. This followed from his interpretation of 
Laocoon as a paragon of fortitude, for which his face, more than his 
stricken body and struggling sons, furnished the main evidence. 
Lessing, however, is more specific still: the one feature which he stresses 
throughout the first thirty pages of his work is Laocoon’s mouth, and 
the fact that it is not wide open as if to emit a cry, despite his obvious 
anguish, but half closed, as if he were merely sighing. Here again, he 
concurs with Winckelmann—except that he rejects Winckelmann’s 
explanation of the half-closed mouth as a sign of noble simplicity and 
quiet greatness.
Lessing suggests another reason, or rather two reasons, for Laocoon’s 
apparent restraint; and both of them are aesthetic, rather than ethical, 
in character. Having cited examples from Homer and Sophocles of 
Greek heroes who did not hesitate to cry out in pain, he concludes 
that Laocoon’s heroic qualities cannot account for his suppressing his 
cries: and the first reason he advances is the law of beauty, by which, he 
argues, all Greek sculpture was governed. He explains this further in 
the following passage, which contains some of his central observations 
on the statue:23
The master worked towards the highest beauty, under the given 
circumstances of bodily pain. This, in all its disfiguring violence, could 
not be combined with the former. He therefore had to diminish it; he 
had to reduce crying to sighing; not because crying betrays an ignoble 
soul, but because it distorts the face in a repellent way. For just imagine 
Laocoon’s mouth forced open, and judge the effect. Let him cry out, and 
see the result. We had an image which aroused pity, because it combined 
beauty and pain; now, it has become an ugly and abhorrent image from 
which one would rather avert one’s gaze, because the spectacle of pain 
arouses displeasure without allowing the beauty of the suffering subject 
to transform our displeasure into the sweet feeling of pity.
The wide open mouth [...] is a blemish in painting and a hollow in 
sculpture, which produces the most adverse possible effect.
It could well be argued, however, that Lessing’s disagreement with 
Winckelmann is more apparent than real. For in his History of the Art 
of Antiquity of 1764, Winckelmann had himself declared that the visual 
artist, unlike the poet, is constrained by the imperative of beauty: ‘In 
23  LM IX, 17.
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the representation of the hero, the artist is allowed less freedom than 
the poet [...]. Since the former [...] must choose the most beautiful 
of beautiful forms, he is confined to a certain degree of expression of 
the passions which must not have an adverse formal effect.’24 And the 
examples he gives of such restraint actually include the Laocoon group. 
Lessing was undoubtedly aware of this, for he writes in one of the 
drafts of his Laocoon: ‘Besides, Winckelmann has supplied more detail 
on Laocoon’s state of rest, and he shares my opinion that beauty was 
the reason for it’.25 Despite this, he kept up the fiction that he had first 
encountered Winckelmann’s History only after his own treatise was 
virtually completed,26 and stuck to his original intention of refuting the 
argument in Winckelmann’s earlier essay of 1755 on Laocoon as a ‘great 
soul’. Various reasons have been given by critics for Lessing’s pretended 
ignorance of the History.27 Perhaps he merely wished to emphasise that 
he had discovered the law of beauty independently of Winckelmann. 
Or perhaps there was something about Winckelmann’s original moral 
interpretation which he wished at all costs to oppose.
Whatever the reasons for his subterfuge, the beauty which Lessing 
discerns in the Laocoon group is much more clearly defined than 
Winckelmann’s, although it is still of a very general nature. As he 
remarks in one of his drafts, Winckelmann’s beauty is a quality which 
he appears to have abstracted from the works he admired; Lessing, on 
the other hand, concludes by an a priori deduction that it is a necessary 
property of the visual arts, since they alone can render it: ‘For since the 
visual arts are alone capable of rendering the beauty of form; since they 
require the help of no other art in order to do so; and since other arts must 
dispense with it completely; it is surely indisputable that this beauty 
can be nothing other than their specific task.’28 Given that his treatise is 
built upon the antithesis between visual art and poetry, it is very much 
24  WW IV, 204f.
25  LM XIV, 380.
26  LM IX, 156.
27  See, for example, Elida Maria Szarota, Lessings Laokoon. Eine Kampfschrift für eine 
realistische Kunst und Poesie (Weimar: Arion Verlag, 1959), p. 11. Szarota’s reasons 
are that the Laocoon group is more central to Winckelmann’s earlier work, that 
Lessing wished to keep off technical matters he knew little of, that he wished to 
avoid a full-scale polemic against the respected Winckelmann, and that he may in 
any case have preferred Winckelmann’s earlier to his later work.
28  LM XIV, 411.
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in Lessing’s interest to account for Laocoon’s facial expression by the 
nature of the art in question; for Winckelmann’s moral argument, which 
could apply just as well to poetry, blurs the distinction which Lessing 
wishes to make. Furthermore, the explanation by the law of beauty has 
the virtue of economy. For although Winckelmann’s moral explanation 
is not necessarily incompatible with the argument from beauty, it is 
logically superfluous: principia praeter necessitatem non sunt muliplicanda. 
Finally, Winckelmann’s concept of beauty is empirically vague as well as 
logically imprecise, whereas Lessing, who declares that violent passions 
distort the body and ‘the beautiful lines which outline it in a state of 
rest’,29 has observable, linear properties in mind. And when he says later 
in his treatise that Virgil’s description of the serpents wound repeatedly 
round Laocoon’s neck would destroy ‘the pyramidal pointed shape 
of the group which is so agreeable to the eye’,30 it is obvious that his 
conception of beauty is close to that of Hogarth, for whom it is associated 
with serpentine lines and pyramidal figures. Hogarth, whose Analysis of 
Beauty Lessing had reviewed favourably in 1754,31 had in fact singled out 
the pyramidal shape of the Laocoon group for special praise.32
The second reason which Lessing suggests for Laocoon’s failure to cry 
out is again derived from the nature of the art in question. But although 
he does not say so, it is very much a secondary reason, for it is valid only 
for sculptures or paintings which, like the Laocoon group, represent an 
action in time in such a way as to create an illusion of reality.
Works which represent an action can represent only a single 
moment within it. This being so, the artist must select the most fruitful 
or ‘pregnant’ moment possible—that is, the moment which affords 
the greatest scope for the imagination, the moment ‘from which the 
preceding and subsequent actions become most intelligible’.33 And since 
it is to be given an unnatural permanence in the work of art, it must 
correspond to a state which is more than fleeting or instantaneous. For 
these reasons, the moment represented in Laocoon’s conflict with the 
serpents is not the climax of his agony, the final cry before his collapse, 
but a moment just before it, to which the imagination can readily add 
29  LM IX, 14.
30  LM IX, 41.
31  LM V, 405–07. 
32  Hogarth, Analysis of Beauty, p. 21.
33  LM IX, 19f. and 95.
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the climax, and in which Laocoon’s expression is more compatible with 
the permanence of statuary than a momentary shriek of pain would be.
Like Winckelmann, Lessing sees the group as governed by two 
opposing, but balancing principles. Since it depicts an action, it 
has motion as well as rest, ‘expression’ as well as beauty. And the 
expression—in this case, of pain—is tempered both in the interests of 
beauty, which is the overriding principle in all visual art, and because 
it must be appropriate to the most suggestive moment in the action 
depicted.
Lessing’s secondary argument concerning the ‘pregnant moment’, 
unlike his reflections on beauty, reveals a peculiarity of the group which 
neither he nor Winckelmann chose to acknowledge—namely that it 
is a thoroughly untypical sculpture. For it portrays a highly dramatic 
event which, as Lessing knew,34 had been the subject of a lost tragedy 
by Sophocles. This, far more than its abstract, linear beauty, is why it 
appealed so much to the dramatist Lessing. For him, it is a tragedy in 
nuce, which lends itself admirably to a literary approach. Accordingly, 
he even proceeds to apply his own neo-Aristotelian theory of tragedy 
to it. His concept of the ‘pregnant moment’, which suggests as much as 
possible of the preceding and succeeding action, and which in the case 
of Laocoon corresponds to the peripeteia of a tragedy, itself underlines 
the group’s dramatic qualities. And as the first quotation from his 
Laocoon above makes clear, the emotion which the statue arouses is 
that of pity. Here, perhaps, is the main reason why he decided to attack 
Winckelmann’s original interpretation of Laocoon’s restraint as a sign of 
stoic self-control,35 and to feign ignorance of his revised interpretation. 
Like Corneille’s theory of tragedy, Winckelmann’s picture of Laocoon 
as a stoic hero and ‘great soul’ demands admiration, not pity. And 
admiration is an unproductive emotion which cannot further the cause 
of human brotherhood:36
Everything stoical is untheatrical; and our pity is always proportionate 
to the suffering expressed by the object of our interest. If we see him 
34  See LM IX, 7f.
35  Cf. E. H. Gombrich, ‘Lessing. Lecture on a Master Mind’, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 43 (1957), 133–56, who sees Lessing’s opposition to Winckelmann as a 
veiled attack on the Cornelian theory of tragedy with its ideal of nobility as an 
object of admiration (pp. 143f.).
36  LM IX, 10.
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bearing his misery with a great soul, this great soul will indeed arouse 
our admiration, but admiration is a cold emotion whose inactive 
amazement excludes every other warmer passion as well as every other 
clear impression.
That Winckelmann had chosen the Laocoon group as his main example 
in 1755 was a godsend to Lessing, whose dramatic theory enabled 
him to rationalise the group even more fully than the law of beauty 
did. Winckelmann’s admiration lacked that ‘clear impression’ which 
Lessing was looking for, in visual art as well as in poetry. And the fact 
that the dramatic qualities which Lessing praised in this particular 
statue are purely contingent, and absent in countless other sculptures 
and paintings which must rely on beauty alone for their appeal, is one 
of the reasons why the visual arts come off so poorly in his treatise in 
comparison with poetry, which can represent actions much more fully 
and effectively.37
The only other aspect of the group which Lessing discusses in detail 
is the date of its origin, a question which he treats at considerable 
length. It is not so much the date itself which interests him, for he is 
no archaeologist. What interests him is whether the statue is earlier or 
later than Virgil’s Aeneid, and whether Virgil’s narration of this episode 
is influenced by the group or vice versa. Although he concedes that 
the two works may have been created independently, or derived from 
an earlier common source, he does everything he can to show that 
the statue is based on Virgil. His principal evidence, which is purely 
hypothetical, is that Virgil, had he followed the sculptors, would have 
had no need to diverge from them in the way he does, with Laocoon 
uttering terrible cries, the serpents wrapped round his body instead of 
his limbs, etc.; whereas the sculptors, had they followed Virgil, would 
have been compelled by the nature of their art to make precisely the 
kind of alterations they appear in fact to have made.38 But why does 
Lessing argue at such length in support of a theory to which, as he is 
aware, there are equally possible alternatives?
He admits, near the beginning of his work, that the first thing 
which provoked him to disagree with Winckelmann was the latter’s 
37  Gombrich, ‘Lessing’, p. 140, even declares: ‘The more one reads the Laocoon, the 
stronger becomes the impression that it is not so much a book about as against the 
visual arts.’
38  LM IX, 34–50 and 156–62
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condemnation of Virgil for allowing his Laocoon to cry out, instead of 
controlling his anguish like the Laocoon of the statue.39 The controversy 
began, then, as a defence of Virgil against Winckelmann, and of literature 
against visual art. It could well be that Lessing’s determination to 
establish the primacy of poetry in range of expression led him to argue 
in turn for its priority in time, and that the more limited he perceived 
the statue to be in its rendering of a temporal action, the more it came 
to look like a pale reflection of the poetic version which interested him 
more profoundly.
Lessing’s comments on the Laocoon group, despite his excessively 
literary approach and circumscribed view of the visual arts, had far-
reaching effects. For he is one of those writers who are often just as 
impressive when they are wrong as when they are right. His arguments 
on the date of the statue, for example, have the excitement of a detective 
story, and it is from them that the debate on this question, a debate which 
continues today, takes it proper beginning. Similarly, his theory of the 
‘pregnant moment’, which applied the criterion of verisimilitude to the 
sculpture with unprecedented rigour, started another controversy over 
precisely which moment in Laocoon’s death throes the work represents, 
and inaugurated a fashion for increasingly realistic interpretations of 
the group. (These, a few decades later, were taken to extremes which 
Lessing would never have dreamed of.) But the main effect of his 
comments on the statue, apart from enhancing its already immense 
prestige, was to reinforce Winckelmann’s cult of Greek beauty, while 
narrowing its already narrow scope still further. The Baroque view 
of the group was now completely refuted, and the other extreme of a 
restrained, and in the last resort empty beauty had been reached. No 
one before or since Lessing has rationalised this strange monument so 
ruthlessly or completely. With his law of beauty, ‘pregnant moment’, 
and tragic pity, Lessing pressed the statue, with its carefully balanced 
form and expression, into a logical system which fitted it as neatly as 
the pyramidal box into which Hogarth had said it could be packed. 
For Lessing, it held no further mystery. Gripped fast by the coils of the 
serpents and the straitjacket of Lessing’s system, Laocoon was bound 
as firmly as Prometheus. But just as surely, he was to show that he still 
had life in him, and the struggle he was soon to put up was the greatest 
39  LM IX, 7.
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in his career. The first, tentative stirrings are to be found in the writings 
of Herder.
Herder mentions the Laocoon group on several occasions. His first 
extended reference to it is the poem ‘Laocoon’s Head!’, written at some 
time before he left Riga in 1769.40 The following extracts should convey 
its temper: 
O thou, in a great sigh
soaring heavenwards! drawest from deepest heart’s abyss
the souls of thine on this sigh
heavenwards up with thee!
The serpent-bound earthly body, 
how venom-swollen it succumbs! [...]
O thou, of the high gods of heaven
a dumb image of compassion! amid all heavens 
abandoned!—of all poor humanity
the highest majesty
Of suffering! [...]
And all angels fetched thee in, 
And with open mouth, loud in voice, the angels thee, thy children
embraced! The serpents’ knot
of fate was shattered [...]
[...] Be, o head, my messenger
Of the deity!—Image of suffering!—like majesty of pain
on their soul of other soul
heavenwards draws and rests! 
The spirit of this poem is remote from Lessing’s cool deliberations. 
The style is exclamatory and incoherent—the young Herder cultivates 
the manner of Klopstock—and the emphasis is on the group’s pathos, 
to which Herder gives a religious slant which is totally absent from 
Lessing’s and Winckelmann’s descriptions. Laocoon here appears as an 
innocent sufferer on the point of death—a victim of cruel fate, or cruel 
gods, as in the classical myths; yet his passion, like that of Christ, is 
40  Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämtliche Werke (henceforth SW), ed. by Bernhard 
Suphan, 33 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877–1913), XXIX, 303f. See also the editor’s 
introduction to this volume on the date of the poem.
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somehow representative of suffering mankind. His soul, as he expires, is 
received by angelic embraces. In short, Herder’s poem is an incongruous 
mixture of classical and Christian elements, and its hero is a composite 
of Prometheus41 and Christ.
What Herder has done is to isolate and amplify the pathetic side of 
Winckelmann’s description of the statue. His references to Laocoon’s 
‘sigh’, which he emphasises nearly every time he mentions the group 
in his works,42 and to the effects of the poison, point to Winckelmann’s 
essay of 1755.43 In his critique of Lessing’s Laocoon in the first of his Critical 
Silvae of 1769, he in fact cites Winckelmann’s description (although he 
has surprisingly little to say on the statue itself); but significantly, he 
omits Winckelmann’s initial sentences on Greek self-control, and quotes 
only the passage on Laocoon’s suffering.44 For it is neither the hero’s 
supposed stoicism and restraint, nor the beauty, balance, and symmetry 
of the group which captivates the young Herder, but its emotional 
expressiveness. In his poem, Laocoon has become the pretext for a 
sentimental effusion at a time when literary Empfindsamkeit (sensibility) 
was at its height.
But Herder has discerned something else which Winckelmann was 
careful not to mention—namely the Christian associations which the 
group had acquired during the late Renaissance and Baroque eras, when 
artists had found in it a religious pathos akin to their own.45 Whether 
Herder knew it or not, theologians of the Counter-Reformation had 
commended Laocoon to painters as a model for the passion of Christ 
and the sufferings of saints and martyrs,46 and numerous examples of 
Christian art had been influenced by it: for instance, the figures of Christ 
and St Sebastian in Titian’s altarpiece of the Resurrection in the Church 
of SS Nazaro e Celso at Brescia reflect the artist’s studies of the group,47 
41  See Hatfield, Winckelmann and his German Critics, p. 91.
42  See, for example, SW VIII, 20; XVII, 351; XXVIII, 281; etc.
43  Winckelmann, WW I, 32, quotes Bernini’s theory that the effects of the venom can 
be detected in Laocoon’s thigh.
44  SW, III, 74.
45  See Bieber, p. 12.
46  See L. D. Ettlinger, ‘Exemplum Doloris. Reflections on the Laocoon Group’, in De 
Artibus Opuscula XL. Essays in Honor of Erwin Panofsky, ed. by Millard Meiss, 2 vols 
(New York, NY: New York University Press, 1961), I, 121–26 (p. 136).
47  See Bieber, p. 17; also Harold E. Wethey, The Paintings of Titian. Complete Edition. I: 
The Religious Paintings (London: Phaidon, 1969), p. 127.
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as does the Christ in Rubens’ ‘Elevation of the Cross’ in Antwerp 
Cathedral.48
In later discussions of the group, Herder again presents Laocoon 
in a pathetic light, as an anguished father and innocent martyr.49 But 
in his Letters on Humanity (Humanitäts-Briefe) of 1795, in keeping with 
his increasingly secular leanings in his later years, Laocoon is cited as 
an example of ‘pure forms of humanity’.50 On this occasion, Laocoon 
is explicitly likened to the Christian martyrs, but it is a further sign of 
Herder’s growing secularism that he now regards the statue as superior to 
its Christian counterparts: ‘It is scarcely possible to imagine a martyr as 
purer, more affecting, and at the same time more significantly beautiful 
in the sphere of art. The serpents disfigure nothing, and in their coils 
the dumb sigh of the sufferer creates an effect which Sts Sebastian, 
Laurence, and Bartholomew cannot produce’. In the commentary to 
his poem ‘Pygmalion’ of 1801, Herder again stresses the expressive 
qualities of the group—its movement and its pathos. By this time, 
however, the Promethean aspect has ousted the Christian associations 
completely. Laocoon, though close to death, is no longer so passive as 
before: he rightly resists the punishment of the gods—not in the cause of 
religion, of course, but of secular morality. He is a ‘martyr of patriotism 
and truth’.51 For Herder bases his interpretation on Virgil, but unlike 
Lessing, he considers that Virgil’s priest is in no sense a tragic hero. 
Laocoon’s sole offence is that he defended his country, and he dies as the 
innocent victim of a vengeful deity. By implication, the undeserved fate 
of this virtuous man is an indictment of the gods. In these last, moralistic 
observations on the group, Herder is in fact taking issue with Goethe, 
who interprets the work in purely aesthetic terms and dismisses the 
legend, with all the awkward questions it raises, as irrelevant (see p. 
273 below).
To sum up: with Herder, the reception of the Laocoon group in 
Germany enters a new phase. In his sentimental poem, the enthusiasm 
which Winckelmann had aroused becomes divorced from the statue as 
48  See Wolfgang Stechow, Rubens and the Classical Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), pp. 22ff.
49  Cf. SW VIII, 20 (1778).
50  SW XVII, 351.
51  SW XXVIII, 280f.; like so many of his contemporaries, Herder now emphasises 
Laocoon’s activity, expressed in his ‘posture of struggling activity’ (Herder’s italics).
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a work of art, and its emotional potential is cultivated for its own sake. 
The Christian pathos of the Baroque era is revived, and reinforced by the 
Empfindsamkeit of the 1760s. But along with this emotionalism, another 
characteristic begins to make itself felt. Herder’s Laocoon is the innocent, 
at first passive, victim of higher powers. But in the commentary of 1801 
he is less submissive, and ‘seems [...] to dispute with the gods’.52 He 
now dies fighting for values he holds dear, and those values are human 
rather than divine. This new, defiant quality of Laocoon comes truly into 
its own, however, with Wilhelm Heinse’s novel Ardinghello of 1787.
A device sometimes employed by those who have offered new 
interpretations of the sculpture has been to look to other versions of 
the myth. Winckelmann, Lessing, and Herder, although they were 
acquainted with other versions, followed that of Virgil, in which 
Laocoon dies as a valiant patriot who has unwittingly crossed the plans 
of Minerva. But Heinse, through the mouth of the artist-hero of his novel, 
turns first to that of the fabulist Hyginus, whose Laocoon is a priest of 
Apollo, punished for marrying and siring children against the wishes of 
the god.53 He at once rejects this version, however, in favour of the more 
colourful explanation of the grammarian Servius in his commentary to 
Virgil: ‘Servius, however, gives the better explanation and says that it 
happened because he [...] made love to his wife through incontinence in the 
temple of Apollo (p. 239; Heinse’s italics).
From this beginning, Heinse constructs a picture of Laocoon as an 
audacious opportunist who exploited his priestly office to increase his 
power, and to indulge his carnal pleasures:
His facial appearance with his fine curly beard is entirely Greek, 
and felt by a deeply perceptive man on the basis of everyday contact; it 
expresses an astute individual who respects little other authority than his 
own advantage and pleasure, and has duly chosen the best position in 
civil society for this purpose; full of energy and strength of body and soul.
In the statue, we see him punished for his final outrage, perpetrated 
within sight of the altar; and lest we forget the nature of his offence, 
52  SW XXVIII, 280.
53  Wilhelm Heinse, Ardinghello und die glückseligen Inseln, ed. by Max L. Baeumer 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1975), p. 237. All subsequent references to the novel are to this 
edition.
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Heinse, towards the end of his description, draws attention to the 
appropriate part of his anatomy (pp. 239f.): 
The whole of Laocoon shows a man who is punished and whom the 
arm of divine justice has at last reached; he sinks into the night of death 
under the terrible judgement, and round his lips the recognition of his 
sins is still visible [...].
Even the genitalia of the father are stretched upwards by the overall 
tension, with scrotum and member contracted [...].
Heinse’s Laocoon dies, then, as a Dionysian criminal and public enemy. 
But he is neither an object of pity, nor of condemnation. On the contrary, 
his death is a glorious one, which is described with unconcealed 
admiration: ‘There suffers here a mighty rebel against society and the 
gods, and one shudders with joyous sorrow at the terrible downfall of 
this splendid criminal’ (p. 240). 
It is hard to avoid the impression, however, that Heinse’s Laocoon 
is rebelling not against the majesty of Apollo, but against the moral 
idealism of Winckelmann.54 Admittedly, both the statue, as a work of art, 
and Laocoon, as a man, are just as much objects of admiration for Heinse 
as they were for Winckelmann. But they are admired for precisely the 
opposite reasons. The morality of Heinse’s priest—if morality it can 
be called—is one of unscrupulous and sensual egotism. In his coarse 
vitality and flouting of religion, he is as far removed from Winckelmann’s 
noble stoic as he is from Herder’s seraphic martyr, and his apotheosis 
foreshadows Nietzsche’s cult of the powerful and ruthless individual. 
Similarly, the aesthetic qualities which Heinse celebrates are the reverse 
of those praised by Winckelmann. The description of the statue, as of 
many other works of art analysed by the hero of Heinse’s novel, serves 
to illustrate the long dialogues on aesthetics which take up much of the 
work. And although it is set in Renaissance Italy, the problems it deals 
with and the terminology employed are those of Lessing, Winckelmann, 
and the eighteenth century. Movement, expression, sensuality, and 
individual character, not immobile serenity and idealised abstraction, 
are what Heinse values in the art of antiquity: ‘every form is individual, 
54  CF. Max L. Baeumer, ‘Heinse und Nietzsche. Anfang und Vollendung der 
dionysischen Ästhetik’, in Baeumer, Heinse-Studien (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1966), pp. 
116f. 
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and none is abstract; a purely ideal human figure, whether of a man or 
a woman or a child or an old man, is inconceivable’ (p. 12). Such are the 
qualities he discovers in the statue and holds up in conscious opposition 
to Winckelmann (pp. 239f.): 
His entire body trembles and shakes and burns, swelling up under 
the agonising deadly venom which spreads like a river [...].
The serpents carry out the orders from on high, solemn and naturally 
huge of their kind, like earthquakes devastating the lands.
The flesh is wonderfully alive and beautiful; all the muscles rise from 
within, like waves in a storm at sea. He has done with crying and is in 
the process of recovering his breath. The son on his right is gone, the one 
on his left is meanwhile held fast, and the dragons will soon make short 
work of him.
With its picture of unmitigated violence, its vigorous, colloquial 
language, its reversal of Winckelmann’s metaphor of the sea, and its 
mischievous suggestion that, although Laocoon is not crying out, 
he is merely drawing breath to renew his screams, this account is a 
counterblast to Winckelmann, and a parody of his image of classical 
restraint. As if to underline this, the last sentence on the main figure, ‘The 
left side may well belong to the highest achievement art has attained’, 
ironically affirms Winckelmann’s ‘this part of the body can be described 
as a miracle of art’.55
What is not apparent from the novel is that Heinse probably 
gave more thought to the group than any of his contemporaries. The 
commonplace books of his Italian journey, which were not published 
until the twentieth century, are full of conflicting interpretations of 
the group, in which he anticipates some of the main arguments of the 
nineteenth-century critics. For whereas most of Heinse’s contemporaries 
are content to admire Laocoon’s heroism in face of his punishment, 
regardless of what its cause may have been, or to feel secure in the 
knowledge that Sophocles had written a tragedy in which Laocoon’s fate 
would no doubt have been adequately explained, Heinse recognised that 
the statue posed essentially the same problem as the Lisbon earthquake, 
the problem of theodicy (his use of the metaphor of an earthquake 
underlines this connection): ‘If Laocoon is a criminal, why is he so 
beautiful in his physique, and so wise and intelligent in his features? 
55  WW VI, 23.
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And if he is virtuous, are the gods not then unjust?’56 Plagued by such 
doubts, Heinse concludes in turn that the group is an empty exercise in 
technical virtuosity,57 and, in another of his inimitable passages, that it is 
utterly contrived and devoid of beauty:58 
I do not know whether the Laocoon group is really as beautiful as is 
claimed; the more I look at it, the more artificial it seems to me, and like a 
dancing-master’s pose, as if the serpents were trained for one of them to 
descend through the arms and the other to ascend between the legs, so 
as to bind, as it were, the father and the two little sons into a marble fan; 
and to give it a handle, Papa must sit on the altar.
Set as it is amidst notes on Lessing’s Laocoon, this irreverent outburst is 
clearly directed as much at German neo-classicism as against the group 
itself, and Heinse decided not to publish it. He finally included in his 
novel the one interpretation which not only expressed the Dionysian 
philosophy of his hero Ardinghello, and at the same time struck out at 
Winckelmann, but seemed to do most justice to the problem of evil and 
providence. For as he writes in his notebooks:59
No evils give pleasure which do not belong to the best of a larger 
whole, even in imitation [...]. Laocoon can most kindly be interpreted 
as nothing more than the divine execution of an infamous voluptuary, 
along with the brats he sired in licentiousness in the temple of Apollo 
[...]. The Greeks never depicted an evil which did not contribute to the 
good of a whole; perhaps with the exception of their Oedipus.
Heinse’s rebellious Laocoon marks a further step away from neo-classical 
idealism towards a more naturalistic interpretation of the group. The 
graphic description of his physical torments foreshadows an increasing 
interest in the pathology of Laocoon’s death. And for all its exaggeration, 
this exuberant portrait cannot be dismissed as poetic fantasy. Laocoon’s 
aggressively virile nakedness, and its incongruity with his priestly 
function before the altar, has often proved an embarrassment, and one of 
the fullest archaeological accounts of the group in the twentieth century 
56  Wilhelm Heinse, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Carl Schüddekopf, 10 vols (Leipzig: Insel 
Verlag, 1903–25), VIII (1), 516. All subsequent references are to this volume, in 
which the main discussions of Laocoon occur on pp. 282ff., 295–301, 311–14, 433f., 
516f., 536 and 562f.
57  VIII (1), 516f.
58  VIII (1), 536.
59  VIII (1), 433f.
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suggests that the erotic version of the myth may well have influenced 
the statue.60 Moreover, several commentators mention other ancient 
representations of the legend in which Laocoon is accompanied by a 
winged Cupid.61 Be that as it may, Heinse’s discussion tells us as much 
about the author and his age as it does about the statue. His Laocoon is 
a Kraftgenie, like the hero of Ardinghello, a work which Goethe bracketed 
together with Schiller’s The Robbers.62 He represents a protest against 
the social and religious constraints of the times, and the rage of Apollo 
found a sympathetic echo in the reactions of many scandalised readers.63 
The Laocoon of Friedrich Schiller, however, is of a different stamp from 
Heinse’s irresponsible priest. For the Schiller who celebrates Laocoon’s 
heroism is no longer the dramatist of protest and author of The Robbers; 
he is the mature theorist of tragedy for whom greatness consists not in 
heroic deeds as such, but in the moral freedom which manifests itself 
in them. Apart from a short tribute to the statue in his Letter of a Danish 
Traveller of 1785, in which he praises it as a ‘model of the highest truth 
and beauty’,64 Schiller does not discuss the work at length until 1793, in 
his essay On the Pathetic. That he should select this work of sculpture, 
along with Virgil’s narrative of the legend, as his chief illustration in 
an essay on tragedy indicates just how immense the reputation of the 
group had become in Germany by the final years of the century.
Schiller’s Laocoon is conceived in the tradition of Winckelmann and 
Lessing rather than that of Herder or Heinse. Like Winckelmann’s hero, 
he is caught up in a conflict of mind and body, and it is his strength of will 
which transforms his physical defeat into a moral triumph; to reinforce 
this point, Schiller quotes the description from Winckelmann’s History 
of the Art of Antiquity in full.65 At the same time, his account resembles 
60  R. Foerster, ‘Laokoon’, Jahrbuch des Kaiserlichen Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 21 
(1906), 1–32 (p. 23).
61  See, for example, WW VI, 23; Heyne, ‘Examination’, II, 45; Blümner (ed.), Lessings 
Laokoon, p. 706; and Foerster, pp. 28f.
62  Goethes Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe (henceforth HA), ed. by Erich Trunz, 14 vols 
(Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag, 1948–69), X, 538.
63  See, for example, the comments on Heinse’s Ardinghello by Stolberg, F. L. W. Meyer, 
Herder, Jacobi and others in Baeumer’s edition of that novel, pp. 563–65, 573, etc.
64  Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Gerhard Fricke and Herbert G. Göpfert, 
7th edn, 5 vols (Munich: Hanser, 1984), V, 881. All subsequent references to Schiller 
are to this edition.
65  Schiller V, 251.
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that of Lessing, in that his Laocoon evokes a reaction comparable to 
that which we experience on witnessing a tragedy. Laocoon controls 
the effects of his suffering by a supreme effort of will, and according to 
Schiller, it is through overcoming his natural inclinations in this way that 
the hero rises to tragic stature: ‘to retain one’s freedom in a storm which 
agitates the whole of sensuous nature requires a capacity for resistance 
that is infinitely exalted [erhaben] above all the power of nature’.66
The word ‘erhaben’ (sublime) is fundamental to Schiller’s 
interpretation. The first ingredient of tragic art is suffering, and the 
greater the suffering, the greater the moral victory of the hero who 
resists it. In so doing, he attains sublimity.67 What Schiller admires in 
Winckelmann’s description is not the beauty found in the statue, but 
precisely this conflict of spiritual and physical principles: ‘How truly 
and finely the conflict between intelligence and the suffering of sensuous 
nature is developed in this description, and how aptly the phenomena 
are specified in which animality and humanity, natural coercion and 
rational freedom are revealed!’68 Schiller’s Laocoon is altogether a more 
exalted character than his predecessors: for he has passed through the 
school of Kant’s moral philosophy. By substituting Kant’s terminology 
for Winckelmann’s, Schiller assimilates him to his own theory of tragedy, 
which is based on Kantian premises; and he goes on to show, with 
reference to Virgil, how Laocoon evokes our pity by choosing to suffer 
in a virtuous cause—that is, by attempting to rescue his children.69 The 
sculptor, unfortunately, cannot render this active sublimity (das Erhabene 
der Handlung), as it is not in his power to indicate whether an action is 
freely chosen or not—in other words, the categorical imperative cannot 
be expressed in marble. He can only depict a more passive kind of 
sublimity, whereby the hero retains his moral freedom while submitting 
to his inevitable fate.70 Laocoon, then, is a close relative of Schiller’s 
Maria Stuart. Like her, he displays ‘das Erhabene der Fassung’.
Though an eminently virtuous character, Schiller’s Laocoon has at 
least one thing in common with Heinse’s defiant rebel: the accent lies 
more on his freedom than on his morality. As a true Schillerian hero, it 
66  Ibid., V, 412.
67  Ibid., V, 515 and 517.
68  Ibid., V, 521.
69  Ibid., V, 526.
70  Ibid., V, 527.
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is more important that he should be morally free than that he should 
be freely moral. But unlike Heinse, Schiller does not go into the rights 
and wrongs of Laocoon’s punishment. That he regards it as unmerited, 
however, is clear from his poem ‘Das Ideal und das Leben’ (‘The Ideal 
and Life’) of 1795:71
When the sufferings of man assail you
When Laocoon against the serpents
Defends himself with nameless agony, 
Let man be outraged! May his protest
Strike against the heavenly vault above
And tear the fabric of your feeling heart!
Like Herder a few years later. Schiller here suggest that Laocoon’s fate 
cannot be reconciled with divine providence. But he does not pursue 
the question further, and nothing more is heard of the Kantian Laocoon.
The best known contribution to the Laocoon debate in eighteenth-
century Germany, after those of Winckelmann and Lessing, is that of 
Goethe.72 It is not surprising that he was fascinated by the statue and 
followed with interest the controversy which Lessing’s Laocoon aroused 
over the limits of poetry and the visual arts.73 For as a young man, he 
had still not decided whether to devote his main energy to poetry or to 
painting. 
He first saw a plaster cast of the entire group in the collection of 
statuary at Mannheim in October 1769. In his letter to Langer of 30 
November 1769, he describes the visit, and tells how the Laocoon in 
particular aroused his enthusiasm: ‘Among lots of pretty things I 
71  Ibid., I, 204.
72  Since a good chronological survey of Goethe’s many utterances on the group is 
provided by Gottfried von Lücken, ‘Goethe und der Laokoon’, in Natalicium. 
Johannes Geffcken zum 70. Geburtstag (Heidelberg: [n.p.], 1931), pp. 85–99, I shall 
confine myself here to the principal ones. See also Ernst Grumach, Goethe und die 
Antike, 2 vols (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1949), II, 547ff. As for Heinrich Keller’s Goethe 
und das Laokoon-Problem (Frauenfeld and Leipzig: Huber & Co., 1935), it deals not 
with Goethe’s views on the statue, but with his attitude to the problem discussed in 
Lessing’s Laocoon, namely the distinction between poetry and visual art.
73  On Goethe’s enthusiastic reaction to Lessing’s Laocoon, and his interest in the ensuing 
debate, see HA IX, 316 (Dichtung und Wahrheit) and Goethes Briefe, Hamburg edition 
(henceforth HA Briefe), ed. by Karl Robert Mandelkow, 6 vols, 4th edn (Munich: 
C. H. Beck, 1988), I, 98, to Langer, 30 November 1769. See also Georg Rosenthal, 
‘Das Laokoonproblem in Goethes Dichtung und Wahrheit’, Neue Jahrbücher für das 
klassische Altertum, 23 (1920), 171–77 (p. 172). 
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encountered [...] nothing was able to attract my entire being so much 
as the Laocoon group [...]. I was entranced by it, so that I forgot all 
the other statues’.74 He has set down some reflections on the group, he 
informs Langer, which should throw new light on the controversy, and 
has communicated these discoveries to his teacher Oeser, with whom 
he studied art at Leipzig. He hopes to put the finishing touches to his 
essay (‘ce petit ouvrage’) in the following year. Unfortunately, this work 
is now lost.
Although Goethe may have visited Mannheim again in 1771, his 
remarks concerning that visit in his Dichtung und Wahrheit (Poetry 
and Truth), composed many years later, probably apply to the earlier 
occasion, which he had by that time forgotten.75 These remarks, at any 
rate, contain some clues as to what the discoveries he mentioned to 
Langer may have been:76
I resolved for myself the famous question as to why he [Laocoon] 
does not cry out by telling myself that he was unable to do so. All the 
actions and movements of the three figures were in my view derived 
from the initial conception of the group. The entire posture of the main 
body, as violent as artistically accomplished, was composed of two 
elements, namely the striving to resist the snakes and the recoil from 
the momentary bite. To reduce this pain, the abdomen had to be drawn 
inwards, making it impossible to cry out. Hence I also decided that the 
younger son had not been bitten [...]. 
He adds, however, that Oeser was not greatly impressed by his 
findings; and it is indeed understandable that this friend and teacher 
of Winckelmann should have looked askance at the young Goethe’s 
account, since it eschews Winckelmann’s moral interpretation 
completely in favour of a purely physical, anatomical explanation. For 
Goethe, the group is governed by a tension of opposites, just as it was 
for Winckelmann and Lessing. But the opposites he has in mind are not 
those of pain and a moral or aesthetic restraint upon its expression, but 
pain and physical resistance to its source. Undeterred by Oeser’s neo-
classical teachings, the young Goethe simply follows the evidence of his 
74  HA Briefe, I, 97f.; this letter is in French, translated here into English.
75  See the editor’s comments in HA XII, 584f. and Humphry Trevelyan, Goethe and the 
Greeks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941), pp. 38f. on the dates of the 
two visits.
76  HA IX, 502.
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senses. If he did indeed formulate these conclusions in 1769, he was the 
first to explain Laocoon’s contracted abdomen and consequent silence 
not as the result of a conscious effort, but as an involuntary reflex. This 
interpretation was to be widely accepted in the following century.
Goethe had now come to believe, as a gloss on Lessing’s Laocoon in 
his Ephemerides of 1770 confirms, that truth, rather than beauty, is the 
governing principle in ancient art: ‘The ancients [...] shunned not so 
much the ugly as the false, and understood how to transform even the 
most terrible distortions in beautiful faces into beauty’.77 He adds even 
more plainly a few lines further on ‘that the excellence of the ancients 
should be sought in something other than the formation of beauty’. 
The position he has now reached is the one he develops a few years 
later in the essays On German Architecture and After Falconet and on 
Falconet, where he rejects the cult of beauty (‘the soft doctrine of recent 
beautification’) altogether and glorifies realistic and ‘natural’ forms of 
art instead.78 To the ideal, the abstract, and the typical, the young Goethe 
opposes an art informed by individual character and expression, such 
as Gothic architecture and Dutch painting—an art which he describes 
as ‘characteristic’. ‘This characteristic art’, he declares, ‘is then the only 
true one’.79 
Given these sentiments, it is ironic that Goethe’s chief work on 
the Laocoon group, the essay On Laocoon of 1797, should have been 
written to refute a theorist who summed up the essence of the group 
as ‘characteristic’. The theorist in question was Aloys Hirt, the authority 
on ancient art who acted as Goethe’s guide to the antiquities of Rome 
during his Italian journey.
Goethe was not the first, as has been maintained, to apply the term 
‘characteristic’ to the visual arts.80 Hogarth, for example, speaks of the 
‘characteristic beauty’ of Glycon’s statue of Hercules, by which he means 
that its beauty is not that of a general ideal, but of an individual character, 
77  Der junge Goethe, ed. by Hanna Fischer-Lamberg, 6 vols (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963–
74), I, 431.
78  HA XII, 7–15 and 23–28.
79  HA XII, 13.
80  See E. C. Mason, ‘Schönheit, Ausdruck und Charakter im ästhetischen Denken des 
18. Jahrhunderts’, in Geschichte–Deutung–Kritik. Literaturwissenschaftliche Beiträge 
dargebracht zum 65. Geburtstag Werner Kohlschmidts, ed. by Maria Bindschedler and 
Paul Zinsli (Berne: Francke, 1969), pp. 91–108 (p. 97). 
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appropriate to the exceptional physique of Hercules.81 Christian Garve, 
in 1769, similarly declares: ‘Thus, when it was a question of making 
certain persons and beings recognisable, the artist often had to make 
exceptions to his supreme law and give the characteristic precedence 
over the beautiful.’82 And Herder also applies the term to sculpture in 
that same year.83 The significance of the word varies somewhat from one 
writer to the next, sometimes denoting a purely individual quality, and 
sometimes that of a particular type; but in all cases, it is distinct from, 
and often the antithesis of, the concept of beauty as a universal ideal. 
Fluctuations of this kind also occur in Goethe’s use of the term84—but 
‘the characteristic’ for him is always distinct from beauty in an ideal 
sense, and indeed is often synonymous with Winckelmann’s and 
Lessing’s term ‘Ausdruck’ (expression).85
For Aloys Hirt, truth and expression are the basis of all great art, 
particularly that of antiquity. Its excellence lies in its ability to express 
individual characters and emotions rather than abstract ideals:86
In all the works of the ancients without exception, both at rest, 
and in movement and expression, individuality of significance—the 
characteristic—is evident. All other laws were subordinate to this in 
every representation, in every figure [...]. Truth, as the first requirement 
of the characteristic, must therefore be predominant in every work of art. 
It remains, and is, the basic law of beauty and of goodness.
From these remarks, it is obvious that Hirt’s naturalistic aesthetic is akin 
to that of the young Goethe.87 What distinguishes it is not its conception, 
but the one-sided way in which Hirt applies it. For despite his premise 
81  Hogarth, Analysis of Beauty, p. 15.
82  Review of Lessing’s Laokoon, reprinted in Blümner (ed.), Lessings Laokoon, p. 691.
83  Herder, SW III, 90, Erstes Kritisches Wäldchen. Herder uses it in a rather different 
sense, however, to represent that which characterises a god as the god of war, love, 
or the like, rather than as an ordinary individual, so that the sculptor may have to 
represent such figures as ‘more characteristic than individual’. Once again, however, 
a particular rather than a general quality is envisaged. 
84  On Goethe’s use of the term, see Otto Harnack, ‘Goethes Kunstanschauung in ihrer 
Bedeutung für die Gegenwart’, Goethe-Jahrbuch, 15 (1894), 187–205 (pp. 198f.) and 
Ferdinand Denk, ‘Ein Streit um Gehalt und Gestalt des Kunstwerks in der deutschen 
Klassik’, Germanisch-Romanische Monatshefte, 18 (1930), 427–42 (p. 435).
85  See Mason, ‘Schönheit, Ausdruck und Charakter’, p. 98.
86  ‘Über Laokoon’, in Die Horen, XII, 10. Stück (1797), 1–26 (pp. 12 and 23f.). On Hirt’s 
definition of ‘Karakteristik’ see also his earlier essay ‘Versuch über das Kunstschöne’, 
in Die Horen, XI, 7. Stück (1797), 1–37 (esp. pp. 34–36). 
87  See Lücken, ‘Goethe und der Laokoon’, p. 92.
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of the ‘characteristic’, Hirt is no Stürmer und Dränger, but a literal-
minded rationalist who pursues his theory to whatever extremes it may 
lead. Humourless and lacking in elegance—‘He is a pedant, but knows 
a lot’, was Goethe’s succinct judgement88—he is inflexibly opposed to 
Winckelmann and Lessing, and determined to banish the last vestige 
of ideal beauty from the ancient statues. The ‘characteristic’ is to take 
its place. His main example, needless to say, is the Laocoon, which is 
the subject of one of his two essays published by Schiller in 1797 in his 
journal Die Horen: ‘But what—if Laocoon’s expression were neither that 
of sighing nor of crying? if the artist gave no thought either to reflection 
on quiet greatness or to a beauty which moderated expression, but fixed 
his choice rather on the moment of the highest degree of expression?’89 
By arguing against Winckelmann that pain, and pain alone, determines 
the expression and attitude of the main figure, and against Lessing that 
the moment represented is the climax of Laocoon’s agony, immediately 
before his collapse, Hirt draws a horrifying picture which outdoes even 
Heinse’s in violence,90 and from which all heroic elements, even those 
of the rebel, are lacking. What we have here is not so much an aesthetic 
analysis as a pathologist’s report, in which, for good measure, not one 
but multiple causes of death are enumerated:91
Laocoon does not cry out, because he is no longer able to cry [...]. 
The paroxysm, the highest tension, the raging convulsions are visible 
in all his limbs [...]. The blood, which rushes in complete turmoil into 
the outermost parts and makes all the vessels swell up, disrupts the 
circulation and prevents inhalation: the lungs, through the compression 
and impeded circulation of the blood, are progressively distended; the 
corrosive venom from the serpent’s bite helps to accelerate the violent 
88  Ludwig Geiger, ‘Briefe von Goethe und Hirt’, Goethe-Jahrbuch, 15 (1894), 68–81 and 
96–108 (p. 97). Compare Schiller’s comment to Goethe on one of Hirt’s essays he 
had accepted for Die Horen: ‘We must indeed set something up to counteract the 
dreadful ponderousness of Hirt’s essay’: 25 October 1796, in Briefwechsel zwischen 
Schiller und Goethe, ed. by Franz Muncker, 4 vols (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1892), II, 21.
89  Hirt, ‘Über Laokoon’, p. 7.
90  Although I have no positive evidence, I strongly suspect that Hirt’s account is 
influenced by Heinse’s. For example, Hirt’s comment on ‘the greatest possible 
contraction of his abdomen, which causes even his genitals to project’ (‘Über 
Laokoon’, p. 8), is all too reminiscent of his predecessor. Hirt may have read 
Ardinghello, or he may have met Heinse in Rome, where Hirt was in residence from 
September 1782 and which Heinse left in July 1783.
91  ‘Über Laokoon’, p. 8.
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fermentation; a stifling pressure stupefies the brain, and an apoplexy 
seems to effect a sudden death [...]. 
After continuing for several paragraphs in this vein, Hirt concludes, with 
disarming modesty, ‘I believe I have shown that the masters represented 
the most strenuous degree of expression’.92
Writing such as this, of course, lent itself to satire. In his novella 
‘The Collector and his Circle’ of 1799, Goethe puts Hirt’s arguments 
into the mouth of the boorish and dogmatic guest, who is dubbed ‘the 
characteristician’,93 and against whom the mild and civilised collector 
vainly defends the beauty of ancient art. And although the guest is 
eventually worsted in argument by another visitor, ‘the philosopher’ 
(whose views are modelled on those of Schiller),94 his thesis is refuted 
less by logic than by ridicule. His following remarks are a pastiche of 
Hirt’s description: ‘Step before the Laocoon, and see nature in complete 
upheaval and despair, the final stifling pain, convulsive tension, 
raging spasms, the effects of a corrosive venom, violent fermentation, 
impeded circulation, stifling pressure and paralytic death.’95 To this, the 
philosopher caustically replies that, if Laocoon really were as the guest 
describes him, he would deserve to be smashed to pieces on the spot.
The unfortunate Hirt was further satirised on two occasions by 
August Wilhelm Schlegel,96 who labelled his method ‘the surgical 
approach’, and took the only step which remained to be taken beyond 
his diagnosis of apoplexy: is it not possible that Laocoon is already 
dead?97 After repeating Winckelmann’s and Lessing’s contention that 
Laocoon’s condition is tempered by nobility of expression and beauty of 
execution, Schlegel concludes: ‘Of course he cannot cry out, otherwise 
he would raise his voice against so disfiguring a description and failure 
to recognise his heroic greatness’.98 And although Hirt attempted to 
92  Ibid.
93  HA XII, 78. 
94  Compare, for example, the views of ‘the philosopher’ on the treatment of horrific 
subjects in poetry (HA XII, 80f.) with those of Schiller in his letter to Goethe of 7 
July 1797 (Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, II, 122f.).
95  HA XII, 76.
96  Athenaeum, ed. by A. W. and F. Schlegel, 1798–1800 (reprinted Stuttgart, 1960), 
I, 2. Stück, 261ff. (Athenaeumsfragment No. 310) and II, 2. Stück, 226f. (‘Über 
Zeichnungen zu Gedichten und John Flaxmans Umrisse’).
97  Ibid., I, 2, p. 261.
98  Ibid., I, 2, p. 263.
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refute these accusations,99 Schlegel offered only mockery in reply: ‘Since 
I then indicated that I did not consider Laocoon’s condition as yet quite 
so desperate, he [Hirt] made such an immoderate fuss in reply that he 
almost changed places with his hero.’100
Hirt’s views were completely at odds with those of Goethe, who had 
long since outgrown his youthful love of ‘the characteristic’, and whose 
classical ideals, since his Italian journey, had filled him with a new 
respect for Winckelmann. Why then, one may ask, did he and Schiller 
go out of their way to publish Hirt’s essay in the journal Die Horen, of 
which Schiller was the editor?
Schiller welcomed the essay, for he believed the time was ripe for the 
‘characteristic’—that is, expressive and realistic—elements of Greek art 
to be brought to the fore:101
for in general, Winckelmann’s and Lessing’s conception is still 
prevalent, and our most recent aestheticians, on both poetry and 
sculpture, are at great pains to free the beauty of the Greeks from all 
characteristic elements and to make these a hallmark of modernity. It 
seems to me that the more recent analysts, in their efforts to isolate the 
concept of the beautiful and to set it up in a certain purity, have almost 
emptied it of content and turned it into an empty sound [...].
He is thinking above all of Friedrich Schlegel, whose eulogies of Goethe 
and high-handed criticisms of Schiller had irritated them both, and who, 
in his pre-Romantic years, was outdoing even the Weimar Classicists 
in his cult of Greek beauty. In his On the Study of Greek Poetry of 1797, 
Schlegel described the state of modern poetry, whose hallmark is ‘the 
characteristic’, as anarchic and decadent. The only way to salvation was 
to follow the beginnings Goethe had made, and to cultivate ‘the highest 
beauty’, devoid of individual expression, as found in Greek poetry 
and art.102 To this extreme classicism, Hirt’s essay offered the perfect 
antidote: the two extremes would cancel each other out. Besides, Schiller 
must have found Hirt’s arguments a good deal more sympathetic than 
99  In Berlinisches Archiv der Zeit und ihres Geschmacks (1798), 11. Stück, 439.
100  Athenaeum, II, 2. Stück, 227.
101  Schiller to Goethe, 7 July 1797, in Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, II, 122.
102  Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie, in Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Schriften, ed. 
by Wolfdietrich Rasch (Munich: Hanser, 1964), pp. 126, 148, and 154. On this whole 
episode see also Mason, ‘Schönheit, Ausdruck und Charakter’, pp. 100–04 and 
John William Scholl, ‘Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe, 1790–1802’, PMLA, 21 (1906), 
40–192 (pp. 106–18).
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those of Schlegel, for as we have seen, he had himself stressed not the 
beauty of the group, but its sublimity and the extreme suffering which 
Laocoon has to endure. Goethe readily agreed that Hirt’s essay should 
be published,103 not least because he saw the benefits which he stood to 
reap: as Schiller pointed out, the way would be open for Goethe and his 
ally Heinrich Meyer104 to carry the day with their more balanced views, 
before a public already disposed in their favour.105
Provoked by Hirt’s ideas, Goethe had by now almost completed his 
own essay On Laocoon, reviving his plans of almost thirty years before. 
He published it in the first number of his periodical Propyläen in the 
following year. Since Goethe avoided naming him, Hirt could only reply 
in the most general and indirect terms. Completely outmanoeuvred, he 
had only time to defend himself in a feeble postscript to his own essay 
in Die Horen,106 before August Wilhelm Schlegel’s ridicule and the satire 
of Goethe’s ‘The Collector and his Circle’ descended on him in turn. His 
more detailed reply, in which he conceded many of Goethe’s points but 
stuck firmly to his own theory of ‘Karakteristik’, remained unpublished.107
Like most of the previous theorists, Goethe was interested in the 
Laocoon group for its exemplary qualities, and as a means of illustrating 
his own aesthetic principles. The way in which he and Schiller treated 
Hirt was far from admirable, but for the classicist Goethe, his theories 
posed a greater threat than Friedrich Schlegel’s insipid cult of beauty, 
for they implied that the group had no exemplary status whatsoever, 
and reduced it to an interesting, but purely individual case—a study of 
extreme physical pain. Such heresies could not be left unchecked. And 
the method Goethe chose was the same as that which Winckelmann had 
successfully employed before him: he would transcend his opponent’s 
views by incorporating them into his own, broader thesis, for Hirt had 
failed to realise ‘that only Lessing’s, Winckelmann’s and his, and indeed 
103  To Schiller, 8 July 1797, Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, II, 124. 
104  Heinrich Meyer’s ‘Einige Bemerkungen über die Gruppe Laokoons und seiner 
Söhne’, in Propyläen, I, 1. Stück (1799), 175f. was written, however, in 1796 and 
does not take issue with Hirt. In his much later Geschichte der bildenden Künste 
bei den Griechen, 4 vols (Dresden: Waltersche Buchhandlung, 1824–36), Meyer 
dismisses Hirt, without naming him, as a past writer whose exaggerated notion of 
‘das Charakteristische’ has now disappeared without trace (I, 206), but does not 
mention him in his discussion of the Laocoon (III, 65–79).
105  See Schiller to Goethe, 7 July 1797, in Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, II, 123.
106  ‘Nachtrag über Laokoon’, in Die Horen, XII, 12. Stück (1797), 19–28.
107  Hirt’s remarks were first published in Denk, Das Kunstschöne, pp. 110–16.
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several further pronouncements, together exhaust this work of art’.108 
Heinrich Meyer understood Goethe’s tactic precisely when he wrote 
of his essay: ‘It stands so well in the middle between the two extremes 
which have in turn been asserted, namely beauty without sympathy 
and passion as the supreme purpose and goal of art, and truth which 
was meant to be represented’.109 Goethe’s essay is open to fundamental 
objections, but as one might expect, it is masterfully written, and contains 
many original observations on the group. As so often, he has learnt from 
the limitations of his predecessors, and at the same time availed himself 
of their positive achievements. One of the main insights he brings to 
his study, and with which he introduces the work, is an awareness of 
how limited the rational understanding is in face of a complex work of 
art, whose significance is not finite, but inexhaustible.110 Accordingly, 
he does not apply a rigid conceptual framework to it, as Lessing had 
done. The concepts he does employ are not narrow or restrictive, but 
of a general kind, and he uses several of them, not just one or two as 
others had done—knowledge of anatomy, individual character, degree 
of movement, idealisation, and appeal to the senses (Anmut) are 
among the qualities he looks for, as well as the traditional Schönheit.111 
And aware of the excesses to which Winckelmann’s physiognomical 
approach had led, he refuses to speculate on Laocoon’s spiritual state, 
and warns against reading our own reactions into the work itself. In 
these, and in other respects, he has benefited from the work of the 
Göttingen archaeologist Heyne, whose essay of 1779 on the group is 
distinguished by its common sense, its careful scrutiny of the evidence, 
and its refusal to speculate.112
108  To Schiller, 5 July 1797, in Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, II, 121. Precisely 
the same point is made by Carl Ludwig Fernow, another neo-classicist, in his 
remarks on the Laocoon in his essay ‘Über das Kunstschöne’, in Fernow, Römische 
Studien, 3 vols (Zurich: H. Gessner, 1806–08), I, 291–450. Winckelmann, Lessing, 
and Hirt discern ‘Idealität’, Schönheit’, and ‘Karakter’ respectively in the statue: in 
fact, all three are present (p. 430). This essay was no doubt intended to support 
Goethe.
109  To Goethe, 26 July 1797, in Goethes Briefwechsel mit Heinrich Meyer, ed. by Max 
Hecker, Schriften der Goethe-Gesellschaft, 34 (1919), 15.
110  HA XII, 56.
111  Ibid.
112  For example, Heyne argues that the struggle is at its height, not at its end, and that 
the ways in which the group can be interpreted are infinite. He also applies the 
formula of unity in variety to it: ‘Just think of the different postures of the three 
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Goethe is also the first to consider the statue almost exclusively in 
aesthetic terms as a work of sculpture. For even Lessing, although his 
analysis is primarily aesthetic, supplemented it with long historical 
reflections and an elaborate philological apparatus, and his poetic 
interests influenced his interpretation considerably. As on his first visit 
to Mannheim, Goethe is guided above all by his senses. And unlike 
most of his predecessors, he treats the group throughout as an organic 
whole, instead of concentrating his attention on the main figure. The 
properties he is most concerned with are formal ones—symmetry, 
balance, gradation, co-ordination, and unity in variety—and it is in this 
emphasis on form that the classical values he has espoused since his 
journey to Italy, as well as the limitations of his aesthetics, become most 
apparent.
Goethe’s interpretation resembles those of Winckelmann and Lessing 
in that he sees the statue as governed by a tension of opposites, the main 
ones being beauty on the one hand, and passion and expression on the 
other. But since the latter qualities had been given so much prominence 
by Hirt, Goethe takes more account of them than the other neo-classicists 
had done, and, doubtless as a concession to Hirt, even refers to them 
as ‘das Charakteristische’. The counterbalancing ‘Schönheit’ is not, 
however, a distinct quality of attractiveness existing side-by-side with 
the group’s expressive qualities—Goethe reserves the separate term 
‘Anmut’ (grace) for that which is visually agreeable. It consists rather 
in the restraint or moderation with which the—inherently violent—
expression of the group is executed. But he realises that the group is 
far too complex to be comprehended by a simple antithesis such as that 
of beauty and expression. This is merely the dominant polarity within 
which a whole series of subordinate contrasts can be discerned, and 
these in turn call forth contrasting emotional reactions in the beholder:113 
I therefore venture to repeat once again that the group of Laocoon, 
along with all its other acknowledged merits, is also a model of symmetry 
and diversity, of rest and movement, of contrasts and gradations, which 
individuals, their different emotions, their different ages, their different expressions, 
their contrast and yet union through their entrapment by the snakes. What variety, 
and yet how many points of unity!’ (Heyne, Sammlung antiquarischer Aufsätze, 
II, 20 and 27f. Otto Harnack, ’Zu Goethes Laokoonaufsatz’, Vierteljahrsschrift für 
Litteraturgeschichte, 6 (1893) 156–58, also notices Heyne’s influence on Goethe.
113  HA XII, 58.
274 On the Literature and Thought of the German Classical Era
present themselves to the viewer in part sensuously, in part spiritually, 
and together with the high pathos of the spectacle excite an agreeable 
sensation and moderate the storm of suffering and passion through 
grace and beauty. 
There is a similar conflict of opposites in the actions of all three figures. 
Each of them performs not one, but two separate actions. The elder son 
attempts to extricate himself from the coils, while reacting in horror to 
his father’s plight; the younger son fights for air with one hand, and 
fends off the serpent with the other; and Laocoon himself struggles 
actively with his arms, while his body reacts convulsively as he is 
bitten in the loins. ‘There thus arises a combined effect of striving and 
yielding, of action and passivity, of effort and surrender, which would 
perhaps be impossible under any other circumstances’.114 This theory 
that everything is determined by the bite, which is administered at the 
very centre of the group, is of course the one that Goethe had framed on 
his visit to Mannheim almost thirty years earlier.
In analysing the temporal dimension of the group, Goethe is able to 
reformulate Lessing’s idea of the ‘pregnant moment’. Like Lessing, he 
believed that the moment represented is not the climax of Laocoon’s 
agony, as Hirt had maintained, but the moment preceding it. Yet unlike 
Lessing, he argues that this moment is both fleeting and climactic—the 
statue resembles ‘a fixed stroke of lightning’,115 and what we see is ‘the 
climax of the moment represented’.116 But the climax Goethe has in mind 
is not the climax which Hirt spoke of: it is the climax of the action, not 
of the agony; and like Lessing’s ‘pregnant moment’, it is a transitional 
phase between two separate actions—the struggle against the serpents, 
and the reaction to the bite.
In Laocoon himself, therefore, two successive actions are represented 
simultaneously. And as Goethe points out, the three figures have 
succumbed in varying degrees to the serpents’ attack, from the peripheral 
involvement of the elder son to the fatal wound of the father. The group 
thus conveys an extended temporal sequence, and Goethe, like Lessing 
and Schiller, is aware of its dramatic qualities. The elder son, the father, 
and the younger son evoke fear, terror, and pity respectively,117 and the 
114  HA XII, 61.
115  HA XII, 60.
116  HA XII, 63.
117  HA XII, 65.
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elder son is not only a participant in the action, but also a spectator.118 
The group as a whole can be likened to a tragedy: it is in fact ‘a tragic 
idyll’.
It is at this point that the limitations of Goethe’s classicism become 
most obvious. Despite his concessions to Hirt, he cannot bring himself 
to admit that the group has anything remotely horrific about it—he 
therefore denies that the younger son has been bitten at all,119 although 
it has always been accepted that he has, and he denies that any effect of 
the venom can be seen in the father’s body.120 Similarly, his convictions 
demand that the statue, like all great works of art, should represent a 
universally intelligible condition—in short, that it should be ideal rather 
than ‘characteristic’. It accordingly depicts not a specific event which 
can be understood only by those who know the myth of Laocoon, but a 
scene of universal human relevance:121
of his priesthood, of his Trojan-national and all poetic and 
mythological accretions, the artists have divested him [...] It is a father 
with two sons, in danger of succumbing to two dangerous animals. 
Thus there are also no divinely sent serpents, but purely natural ones 
[…] A father was asleep with his two sons, they were enwrapped by two 
serpents and now struggle, as they awake, to tear themselves out of the 
living net.
Here, for once, Goethe is demonstrably wrong. Apart from the fact that 
the block on which Laocoon sits is plainly an altar, it was known before 
Goethe’s essay was written that he originally wore a laurel wreath, as a 
groove around his head testifies;122 this at once identifies him as a priest 
of Apollo. And as for the serpents, they are zoological monstrosities, 
being too thin for constrictors, and too long to be venomous.123 As 
Herder drily observed, ‘an ordinary snake event does not explain this 
representation’;124 to understand its significance, we have to know the 
legend—and even then, we have to decide which version of it to follow.
118  HA XII, 64.
119  HA XII, 60.
120  HA XII, 61.
121  HA XII, 59.
122  See Ennius Quirinus Visconti, Œuvres: Musée Pie-Clémentin, 7 vols (Milan: J. P. 
Giegler, 1818–22), II, 277. The volume in question first appeared in 1792.
123  See A. W. Lawrence, Greek and Roman Sculpture (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), p. 
250. 
124  Herder, SW XXVIII, 281.
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Despite all Goethe’s efforts, an unexplained residue remains. This 
late attempt, at the end of the eighteenth century, to restore Laocoon to 
the neo-classical niche which Winckelmann had created for him did not 
succeed. It was to no avail that C. L. Fernow, in his Roman Studies of 1806, 
tried to defend the neo-classical interpretation against the doubts which 
Hirt had disseminated,125 because the tide of opinion on the statue had 
already begun to turn. One of the first signs of this change came, in 
fact, from within the neo-classical camp itself: as early as 1787, F. W. B. 
Ramdohr, after reiterating the verdict of Winckelmann and his followers 
that the statue displays unity in variety and expression tempered by 
beauty, confessed, after many apologies and hesitations, ‘that this 
group, despite all its undoubted advantages, has not awakened in me 
the pleasant impression which I have experienced at the beauty of other 
statues’.126 Try as he might, Ramdohr could not discover in the Laocoon 
that beauty and restraint which he recognised in the Antinous and the 
Belvedere Apollo. And though the Schlegels joined Goethe in opposing 
the views of Hirt, they were allies whose services he could well have 
done without. For Friedrich Schlegel, who had defined the essence of 
modern art as ‘the characteristic’ and condemned it as inferior to ‘the 
highest beauty’ of Greek art, soon reversed his position entirely and held 
up ‘the characteristic’, for which he now preferred the near-synonym of 
‘the Romantic’, as the ideal to which modern art should aspire. In other 
words, Schlegel’s aesthetic values were by this time close to those of 
Hirt, who must therefore be regarded as a forerunner of Romanticism;127 
the main difference was that Hirt saw these values as fulfilled in ancient 
art, and Schlegel in modern art. In short, the Romantic era had begun, 
and it faced the task of explaining those aspects of the group which 
Goethe’s elegant analysis had failed to account for.
In the nineteenth century, more interpretations of the group than ever 
before appeared, but few of them were as independent or original as those 
of the previous century. They began as reactions to, or developments of, 
earlier points of view, and thenceforth, a few themes were enlarged upon 
with a remarkable degree of continuity. Instead of analysing individual 
125  Fernow, II, 415–50.
126  F. W. B. Ramdohr, Ueber Mahlerei und Bildhauerkunst in Rom, 3 vols (Leipzig: 
Weidmann, 1787), I, 56–68 (p. 64).
127  See Denk, Das Kunstschöne…, p. 108.
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contributions separately, in chronological sequence, it will therefore 
be more convenient to follow each of the main tendencies within the 
nineteenth century debate to the point where they converge; that is, the 
point where the Laocoon debate ceased to be an issue of importance in 
Germany.
One of the few facts of the Laocoon myth on which everyone agreed 
was that his death was divinely ordained. Yet apart from Herder and 
Heinse, none of the writers hitherto discussed had seriously considered 
the religious implications of the statue. Goethe had, indeed, flatly 
denied that it had any. They seem not to have been unduly troubled that 
the divine wrath may have struck down an innocent victim.128 But in the 
nineteenth century, two questions of a religious nature were discussed 
again and again: is Laocoon’s punishment justified? and does his death, 
as represented in the statue, have any religious or spiritual significance?
For the classical scholar F. G. Welcker, whose study of the group 
first appeared in 1827, Laocoon is above all a man of religion: his 
expression has ‘something priestly and pious’ about it.129 To justify 
Laocoon’s punishment, Welcker argues that the statue is based on the 
lost tragedy of Sophocles, in which Laocoon doubtless died for an 
erotic misdemeanour such as that reported by Hyginus and Servius. 
But Welcker does not try, as Heinse had done, to endow the death itself 
with any positive significance—it is not the apotheosis of a Dionysian 
hero, but merely ‘affecting, exciting pity, and hopeless’.130 Like Herder, 
he makes much of ‘the pathetic quality of the scene’,131 and does his 
best to arouse compassion in us for the dying priest. Indeed his efforts 
to extenuate Laocoon’s transgression, which he describes as ‘a youthful 
precipitation’,132 are so successful that we are left with the impression 
that the punishment, after all, scarcely fits the crime. Welcker is 
therefore aware of the problem which had troubled Heinse, but he does 
not solve it satisfactorily. The same applies to the art historian Heinrich 
128  Compare Visconti, II, 268, for whom Laocoon is satisfied with the knowledge 
that he is innocent: ‘He does not repent […] for his zeal [in attacking the Wooden 
Horse], and he prefers the evidence of his conscience to the anger of the gods and 
the opinion of men.’
129  F. G. Welcker, Alte Denkmäler, 5 vols (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1849–64), I, 322–51 (p. 
326). An earlier version of his remarks appeared in 1827.
130  Ibid., I, 325.
131  Ibid., I, 326
132  Ibid., I, 346.
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Brunn, who interprets the group in a similar way in his Geschichte der 
griechischen Künstler, and cites Welcker in support.133 
Needless to say, later writers were not convinced by such 
explanations. Adolf Stahr, in 1855, discerns ‘a lack of reconciliation 
[...], something oppressive, frightening, agonising’ in the group, and 
calls Laocoon’s death a ‘hopeless martyrdom’.134 And three years 
later, Johannes Overbeck, while acknowledging that the serpents are 
unmistakably divine emissaries, denies that any moral idea whatsoever 
can be gleaned from the statue; for even if some versions of the myth 
attempt to justify Laocoon’s death on ethical grounds, none of this can 
be perceived from the group itself.135 In short, Welcker, Brunn and other 
religious apologists do not carry conviction, because the statue depicts 
only the terrible punishment, but gives us no means of telling whether it 
is merited or not. Furthermore, the best known version of the myth, that 
of Virgil, portrays Laocoon as entirely innocent. This, perhaps, is why 
Novalis had declared: ‘it is an immoral work of art.’136
But there is a further reason why many nineteenth-century writers 
saw Laocoon’s death in a negative light. As Walther Rehm has shown, 
after Fritz Stolberg visited Italy in 1791–92 and judged the ancient 
statues unfavourably from a Christian point of view,137 the opinion 
steadily gained ground that even the most serene sculptures of gods 
and goddesses were spiritually empty. It is unfortunate that Novalis’s 
comments on the group, jotted down after a reading of Goethe’s essay, 
remained fragmentary. From what he does say, however, it appears that, 
at a time when Friedrich Schlegel was still paying homage to Greek 
beauty and defending Winckelmann’s views, Novalis had already found 
the group spiritually deficient; not only does he describe it as immoral, 
he also feels that Laocoon is not passive enough in his suffering: ‘Is not 
a more comprehensive, in short more exalted moment in the Laocoon 
133  2 vols (Stuttgart: Ebner & Seubert, 1857–59), I, 494.
134  Adolf Stahr, Torso, Kunst, Künstler und Kunstwerke des griechischen und römischen 
Alterthums, 2nd edn, 2 vols (Brunswick: Vieweg, 1878), II, 83–95 (p. 93). The first 
edition appeared in 1855. 
135  Johannes Overbeck, Geschichte der griechischen Plastik, 4th edn, 2 vols, (Leipzig: J. 
C. Hinrichssche Buchhandlung, 1893–94), II, 296–336 (pp. 318–22); the work first 
appeared in 1857–58. 
136  Novalis, Schriften, ed. by Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel, 2nd edn, 4 vols 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960–75), III, 412.
137  Rehm, Götterstille, p. 141.
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drama conceivable—perhaps that in which the highest pain turns into 
rapture—resistance into surrender—the highest life into stone’.138
Friedrich Thiersch, whose history of Greek art was published in 1825, 
goes even further. He sees Laocoon’s death not as a moral victory, but as 
a spiritual failure, and says that the statue reveals ‘a mind succumbing 
in the grimmest struggle, already close, indeed surrendering, to the 
terror of despair’.139 But once again, it was one of the greatest intellects of 
the age who expressed the new attitude most memorably. Hegel, in his 
Lectures on Aesthetics (1818–28), contends that Christian art is superior 
to that of antiquity because it offers a hope of liberation and redemption 
through love, even in suffering and death:140
In the ideals of the ancients, on the other hand, we [...] may well see 
only the expression of pain in nobler natures such as Niobe and Laocoon; 
they do not dissolve in laments and despair, but preserve their great 
and high minded nature in this state; but this self-preservation remains 
empty, for the suffering and pain are as it were the final state, and in place 
of reconciliation and satisfaction there is a cold resignation, in which the 
individual, without breaking down, gives up what it had held on to [...]. 
Only Romantic religious love attains the expression of bliss and freedom. 
It is ironic that the philosopher Hegel, rather than the Schlegels or 
Novalis, pronounced the most characteristically Romantic verdict on the 
group. He also declares that, in the works of the Italian masters, Christ’s 
spiritual, as distinct from physical suffering, shows itself in a facial 
expression of gravity—not, as in the figure of Laocoon, in a contraction 
of the muscles which could be interpreted as a cry.141
For Winckelmann, Lessing, and Schiller, Laocoon’s death was 
a triumph of the spirit over matter. For Hegel, almost the reverse is 
true. Just as Laocoon had been pressed a few decades earlier into the 
service of Kantian idealism, so now is he made to typify a phase in 
Hegel’s world-historical process. For as Hegel remarks elsewhere in 
138  Novalis, Schriften, III, 412f.
139  Friedrich Thiersch, Ueber die Epochen der bildenden Kunst unter den Griechen, 2nd edn 
(Munich: Literarisch-Artistische Anstalt, 1829); the first edition appeared in 1825.
140  G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, ed. by H. G. Hotho, 2nd edn, 3 vols 
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1842–43), III, 35f. For other negative judgements on 
Greek art during the Romantic era see Rehm, Götterstille, pp. 151–67. Most of these 
writers criticise the Ancients’ view of death as inadequate in comparison with that 
of Christianity. 
141  Ibid., II, 43.
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his lectures,142 the statue is the product of ‘a late period’, so that the 
death of Laocoon represents the downfall of an era before a new age of 
the World Spirit dawns.
As a corollary to this belief that the group is devoid of spiritual 
significance, the critics shifted their attention more and more to 
Laocoon’s physical state. Hirt’s opinions were reiterated and confirmed: 
the group is nothing more than a study in extreme physical pain, in 
which the involuntary reflexes of the main figure show little or no trace 
of heroic restraint.143 Hebbel, in his poem ‘Before the Laocoon’, is clearly 
of this opinion. He blames Michelangelo for having praised the group 
excessively, and sees the fact that Laocoon rebelled against Apollo as 
symbolic: not beauty, but truth is the criterion which the artists followed, 
and the group is criticised by implication as a piece of unvarnished 
naturalism:144
Michelangelo as a wonder of art bid you welcome
Since you served to counterbalance the beauteous Apollo
Who bore Raphael aloft and denied Michelangelo’s merit; 
Some repeated his praise, but they protested too much.
What truth can accomplish you show all too clearly, o Group
Even more clearly you show that it cannot achieve everything!
At around the same time, the argument as to whether or not Laocoon 
is crying out was renewed, and it seemed to some writers that physical 
agony such as Laocoon’s must be matched by the loudest possible 
clamour. This was denied, however, in 1862, when P. J. W. Henke, on 
the strength of a medical diagnosis of the stricken priest, concluded that 
the moment represented is that between inhalation and exhalation.145 
The criteria of nineteenth-century realism were applied to the group 
so uncompromisingly that it began to seem as if it were made not of 
marble, but of flesh and blood, despite the fact that Schopenhauer had 
already supplied the necessary reductio ad absurdum:146
142  Ibid., II, 439.
143  See Thiersch, Ueber die Epochen, p. 375; Brunn, Geschichte, I, 488; Overbeck, Geschichte, 
II, 312; etc.
144  Friedrich Hebbel, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Richard Maria Werner, 12 vols (Berlin: 
Behr, 1901–03), VI, 334. On the influence of the group on Michelangelo, see Arnold 
von Salis, Antike und Renaissance (Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch, 1947), pp. 143ff. 
145  P. J. W. Henke, Die Gruppe des Laokoon (Leipzig and Heidelberg: Winter, 1862), pp. 
20–25.
146  Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1818), in Schopenhauer, 
Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Wolfgang von Löhneysen, 5 vols (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1960–65), 
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One could not produce a crying Laocoon in marble, but only an open-
mouthed Laocoon fruitlessly attempting to cry out, with his voice stuck 
in his throat [...]; this would result in the invariably ridiculous spectacle 
of an effort with no result, exactly parallel to that which a practical joker 
produced when he plugged with wax the horn of a sleeping night-
watchman whom he then awoke with cries of ‘fire!’, only to enjoy the 
latter’s fruitless efforts to sound the alarm. 
The realistic evaluations continued, and brought down new censures on 
the group in 1876, when the anatomist Friedrich Merkel, after minute 
measurements of the group, discovered that many of its proportions are 
wrong: by their stature, the two sons should be around seven to eight 
and four to six years old, yet their proportions resemble those of a man 
and a youth respectively; besides, the necks of all three figures are too 
long. Merkel may, however, have hit upon the true reason why Laocoon 
failed to escape from the serpents: he had a severe limp, for his right leg 
is at least seven centimetres shorter than his left.147
By the end of the century, the excesses of realism were over. But it 
was now widely accepted that the sculptors set out to express physical 
anguish by every means at their disposal, and that they selected the 
moment of maximum muscular tension in Laocoon’s body in order to 
display their virtuosity.148 This conviction that the physical aspects of the 
group are all-important could only further diminish the work’s already 
diminished reputation.
Another factor which helped to bring Laocoon down from his 
eminence was the increase in knowledge of Greek art. When the 
Parthenon sculptures were brought to England and purchased for the 
nation in 1816,149 art historians began to realise that the restraint and 
serenity which Winckelmann had admired are more evident in the 
works of the Periclean age than in the much later and more exaggerated 
sculptures of the Hellenistic era. It could no longer be doubted that 
most of the works from the Roman collections, including the Laocoon, 
I, 320f. Cf. Gombrich, ‘Lessing. Lecture on a Master Mind’, p. 140: ‘To ask […] what 
noise the poor priest emits is as useless as to ask after the colour of his hair.’
147  Friedrich Merkel, ‘Bemerkungen eines Anatomen über die Gruppe des Laokoon’, 
Zeitschrift für bildende Kunst II (1876), 353–62 (pp. 355 and 358). 
148  See Foerster, ‘Laokoon’, p. 32 and Wilhelm Klein, Geschichte der griechischen Kunst, 3 
vols (Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1904–07), III, 315.
149  See William St Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles (London: Oxford University Press, 
1967), pp. 250–62.
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were of a much later date than the masterpieces of Phidias and his 
contemporaries; and although some writers tried for a time to place 
the familiar works on the same level as the newly discovered older 
sculptures,150 their efforts were fruitless. It was not that the Aegina 
marbles or the Parthenon frieze received the same kind of adulation 
with which Winckelmann had greeted the later sculptures: Theseus and 
Poseidon did not replace Laocoon, they merely reduced and diluted his 
appeal.
As the nineteenth century progressed, more and more was written 
on the Laocoon, as on other ancient sculptures, but fewer and fewer of 
the writers were anything other than art historians and archaeologists. 
The fragmentation of knowledge into specialised disciplines is, of 
course, one of the main reasons why Laocoon was left at the mercy 
of the specialists. Few now dared to indulge in the dilettantism of the 
previous century, when everyone of classical education—and that 
meant practically every scholar—felt entitled to pronounce on works of 
art which, more often than not, they knew only from engravings. Hegel 
ridicules the armchair scholars (‘Stubengelehrte’) of that era who had 
taken part in the debate without ever having set eyes on the sculptures 
they held forth upon. Besides, the growth of science and positivism 
left little room for physiognomical speculation in classical archaeology, 
and the literary associations which had made the statue so attractive to 
philological critics such as Lessing served only to alienate those who 
valued art for art’s sake.151 All these advances entailed losses as well 
as gains, for the literary quality of what was written on the statue was 
never again to reach its former standards, or the symbolic potentialities 
of the statue to be explored so profoundly.
Spiritually empty, of doubtful morality, anatomically inaccurate, 
contrived, calculated, and inferior to earlier Greek art, the Laocoon 
group was now reviled on every side. The standard verdict around 
the turn of the century was that it was ‘an outstanding work of Greek 
150  Thiersch, Ueber die Epochen, p. 384, following Visconti, admits that the Laocoon and 
other Hellenistic works are much later than those of the Periclean era, but maintains 
that they are of no less merit.
151  Overbeck, Geschichte der griechischen Plastik, II, 320ff., for example, sees it as one of 
the group’s major faults that it is not fully intelligible as a work of art in its own 
right.
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decadence’,152 mannered and sensational, lacking depth of feeling,153 
and even sinister and brutal, displaying ‘a wily cruelty of taste’.154 The 
neo-classicists of Victorian times condemned it as alien to true Greek 
values, and the painter Karl Stauffer-Bern blamed Laocoon, rather 
than Michelangelo, for all the extravagances of Baroque art since the 
group’s discovery: ‘It seems to me as if no work of art has caused so 
much damage in the world as the Laocoon group; I can virtually see 
Baroque art asleep in it [...]. From this point onwards, people began to 
sculpt potato sacks and pass them off as heroes [...].’155 As the reverence 
with which the group had once been held evaporated, it became an 
object not just of abuse, but of caricature.156 One of the earliest of 
these (Titian’s famous parody, with apes instead of human figures, 
was aimed not at the group itself, but at Bandinelli’s imitation)157 is a 
characteristic poem of Heine, in which his mistress takes the place of 
the serpents:158
You ought with love to embrace me,
Beloved, beautiful girl!
Embrace me with arms and with feet then, 
And with your flexible shape.
Vigorously she has enlaced me,
Entwined me and wrapped me around,
The sweetest of all the serpents,
The happiest Laocoon. 
Such dignity as the group still possessed in Germany it owed mainly 
to Lessing’s Laocoon, which was a standard work for senior pupils at 
152  Karl Stauffer-Bern to Lydia Escher, 29 August 1889, in Otto Brahm, Karl Stauffer-Bern. 
Sein Leben, seine Briefe, seine Gedichte, 12th edn (Berlin: Meyer & Jessen, 1912), p. 293.
153  Heinrich Bulle, Der schöne Mensch im Altertum, 2nd edn (Munich and Leipzig: G. 
Hirth, 1912), p. 503. 
154  August Schmarsow, Erläuterungen und Kommentar zu Lessings Laokoon (Leipzig: 
Quelle & Meyer, 1907), p. 38. Compare the negative judgements of English-speaking 
writers such as Lucy M. Mitchell, A History of Ancient Sculpture (London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench & Co., 1883), p. 605, who speaks of ‘the revolting scene’ the group 
affords, and Fred O. Nolte, Lessing’s Laokoon (Lancaster, PA: Lancaster Press, 1940), 
p. 34, who says that the merit of the snakes is ‘about equal to dislocated plumbing’.
155  Brahm, Karl Stauffer-Bern, pp. 293f.
156  See Klein, Geschichte, III, 315.
157  See Heyne, Sammlung antiquarischer Aufsätze, II, 41.
158  Heinrich Heine, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke, ed. by Manfred 
Windfuhr, 16 vols (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1973–97), I/1, 461. 
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the classically oriented Gymnasien in the later nineteenth century and 
helped to keep the earlier neo-classical values alive.159
By the early twentieth century, however, occasional voices were 
already protesting that the group was not decadent at all,160 and 
that it might well now be underrated.161 But by this time, one can no 
longer speak of the reception of the work in Germany in isolation, 
for the German writers were now reacting not so much to the earlier 
Laocoon cult in their own country as to current opinions in European 
archaeology at large. Negative judgements continue to be heard down 
to recent times,162 but the critics are now on the whole more charitable. 
As one authority says—and the first three words are significant—‘we 
must admit that it is a magnificent creation’.163 
The group is now rarely mentioned outside the world of classical 
studies. Nevertheless, there is evidence that its symbolic potential is 
not yet exhausted, and that even the creative writer may still find a use 
for it. Peter Weiss, in his address of 1965 ‘Laocoon, or On the Limits of 
Language’, discovers a new antithesis within the group: the father and 
the younger son have lost all ability to communicate, but the elder son, 
who will perhaps escape to tell of what he has seen, may symbolise our 
hopeless yet hopeful attempts to transcend the limitations of language:164
In this sculpture, the dichotomy is expressed between that which 
is dumb and static, and that which turns towards the outside world 
and attracts its attention through movement. Laocoon and his younger 
son no longer presuppose any onlooker. They now merely constitute a 
monument to their own destruction. They will never again utter a sound. 
But the older son still belongs to an animated world, and he breaks out 
of the statuesque realm to give a report to those who will perhaps come 
to his aid. 
159  A work written for this school public is Julius Ziehen, Kunstgeschichtliches 
Anschaungsmaterial zu Lessings Laokoon, 2nd edn (Bielefeld and Leipzig: Velhagen & 
Klasing, 1905), first published in 1899. Ziehen lists other works on Laokoon useful to 
schoolteachers.
160  See Klein, Geschichte, III, 315.
161  See Foerster, ‘Laokoon’, p. 1.
162  See, for example, Walter Herwig Schuchardt, Die Epochen der griechischen Plastik 
(Baden-Baden: Bruno Grimm Verlag, 1959), p. 126, who sees the work as ‘in its 
contrived and elaborated quality lacking in full and genuine life’.
163  Richter, The Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks, p. 236.
164  Peter Weiss, Rapporte (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1968), pp. 170–87 (pp. 180f.); 
note also Zoltan Imre’s ballet ‘Laocoon’, written for the Ballet Rambert and first 
performed on 14 February 1978. 
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Such was the reception of the Laocoon group in Germany since 
Winckelmann. We have seen how, during the nineteenth century, it fell 
completely from its former eminence. What still has to be considered is 
why, apart from the fact that it was championed by Winckelmann, it had 
been held in such esteem during the previous century. The Renaissance 
and Counter-Reformation, of course, had little difficulty in assimilating 
it to their own scheme of values, both because of its provenance and its 
subject matter. It was a genuine relic of antiquity, authenticated by Pliny 
himself. And its subject was congenial to those already accustomed to 
the martyrdoms and crucifixions of Christian art, of which it could be 
seen as a typological forerunner. To the eighteenth century, however, 
it presented more of a challenge. The authority of antiquity was as 
binding as ever, and in some ways even more so than before. But the 
subject of the group, as traditionally understood, made it less tractable 
to a rationalistic and increasingly secular age. One of the problems the 
eighteenth century faced was that of making sense of an extreme case of 
suffering, with strong religious overtones, but without invoking religion 
to explain it. Only the young Herder resorted to Christian analogies, 
but he later abandoned them. It is more symptomatic of the times that 
Winckelmann, in his essay of 1755, warned artists against depicting saints, 
and recommended the classical—that is, heathen—myths instead.165 
Laocoon appealed to the eighteenth century as a representative figure 
of human suffering—but unlike its Christian equivalents, the suffering 
of Laocoon could no longer be given any transcendental significance.
With the exception of Hirt, all of the eighteenth-century writers 
discussed here, even those who, like Lessing and Goethe, stuck mainly 
to aesthetic questions, regarded Laocoon as a hero and exemplary 
figure. They saw in him a victory of the human spirit, whether over 
bodily weakness, an unjust fate, or the restraints of moral convention. 
According to the Aeneid, he defied the gods by hurling his spear at the 
Wooden Horse, which he refused to accept on trust, and he questioned 
the arguments of those who were prepared to do so. For Laocoon was 
a sceptic, and this assuredly helped to endear him to the century of 
the Enlightenment. But it was in his death that he seemed to display 
his greatest strength: for the main difference between Laocoon and the 
Christian martyrs—and, I would submit, the secret of his appeal to the 
165  WW, I, 50.
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eighteenth century—is that he does not accept his suffering, any more 
than he did the Wooden Horse, with resignation. His face, in which the 
Greek artists have combined all the traditional signs of pain, admittedly 
has much in common with the Christian art of the Baroque. But he is 
no St Sebastian, immobile and submissive, for his body is still full of 
resistance. Lessing took great trouble to show that the moment depicted 
is that before Laocoon succumbs to his torment, as did Goethe when 
Hirt dared to suggest that Laocoon has already succumbed. Heyne, 
too, stressed that he is struggling with all his might.166 And we must 
not forget that, in Montorsoli’s restoration by which the group was 
known until the original right arm, bent back behind Laocoon’s head, 
was discovered in 1906, Laocoon held the serpent high above him, in 
what might be interpreted as a last, self-assertive gesture of defiance.167 
For most writers of the eighteenth century, then, the group was a 
glorification of the human spirit and its essential freedom, even in the 
direst of predicaments, and it was in this freedom that they found a 
sense in Laocoon’s terrible fate.
The other main reason why the group was so greatly revered was 
that, from Winckelmann onwards, it was associated with those values 
which the neo-classicists claimed to have found in ancient Greece. 
Despite the terror of the scene, balance and restraint were preserved. 
Reason—whether moral or artistic—presided over the catastrophe, and 
conferred a unity and harmony on the whole. But it was possible to 
discover other, opposing principles in the work, just as the Baroque era 
had done, and, in Hegelian fashion, the antithesis was soon to claim its 
rights. For Heinse already, it represented not harmony and restraint, but 
violent and uncontrolled expression.
Once it had been identified with neo-classicism, however, it had to 
be defended, and the conflict of Goethe, Schiller, and their allies with 
Hirt was a campaign against a threat to their classicistic principles. 
But on several counts, the position they held was untenable. Apart 
from the reasons already given, the fact that people ceased to require 
the sanction of antiquity to justify their aspirations rendered Laocoon 
superfluous in aesthetic theory. It is appropriate that nearly all of the 
166  Heyne, Sammlung antiquarischer Aufsätze, II, 20.
167  See Wolfgang Helbig, Führer durch die öffentlichen Sammlungen klassischer Altertümer 
in Rom, 4th edn, 4 vols (Tübingen: E. Wasmuth, 1963–72), I, 164.
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eighteenth-century commentators emphasise how precarious the 
group’s situation is. The balance cannot for long be maintained, and 
destruction must shortly supervene. The group may therefore stand as a 
symbol of neo-classicism itself,168 as an interlude, a ‘pregnant moment’, 
between Baroque extravagance and Romantic self-abandon.
One of the most remarkable things about the Laocoon debate is the 
number of different interpretations it has generated. And another is 
the extreme way in which they diverge, and the vehemence with which 
they have been defended. The debate, in fact, has been conducted in 
superlatives, with very few signs of compromise. The group has been 
pronounced both the greatest and the most pernicious work of art of all 
time. Part of the reason for this is that the spectacle it affords is itself an 
extreme and dire eventuality, which is bound to evoke a forceful reaction. 
The bizarre and horrible death of a father and one or both of his sons, of 
whose agony their violent reactions can leave us in no doubt, produces 
a powerful initial shock. As Winckelmann said, we can almost feel the 
pain of the bite ourselves, accentuated as it is by Laocoon’s complete 
nudity and the sensitivity of the area affected. To this shock, we can 
either respond with revulsion, or master it by finding some aesthetic or 
moral justification for the work.
If we analyse the spectacle further, we see that, as Goethe realised, 
it was full of paradoxes and antitheses. Here is life at its most intense at 
the moment of death. Here, with grim irony, a priest is immolated upon 
his own altar. The three figures themselves are full of contrasts: youth 
contrasts with age, the younger son is dying, the elder is almost free: 
the right hands are expressive and gesturing, the left hands are active in 
defence. There are movements throughout, voluntary and involuntary, 
human and animal, and yet all the participants are bound together and 
rooted to the spot. In the organisation of the group, we find variety and 
unity, dissonance and harmony, expression and formal control. And 
in this fearful conflict of man against nature, of mind against matter, 
there are signs both of resistance and capitulation, of defiance and 
resignation. To this, we ourselves react with admiration and revulsion, 
pity and horror, hope and fear, so that a series of conflicts is set up 
within us in turn.
168  Cf. Butler, The Tyranny of Greece over Germany, p. 81.
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In order to resolve these, we must decide which of our emotions have 
priority, or—and this amounts to the same thing—which poles of which 
antitheses within the group are more important than their opposites. 
This task is made no easier by the fact that the group has undergone 
numerous alterations and restorations since it was discovered, and that 
we do not even know for what purpose it was originally created. In 
short, we have to interpret the work’s significance, and since the event 
it depicts is intelligible only in terms of the myth it is based on, we have 
to decide which version of the myth to follow. And it is here that our 
troubles really begin, because the different versions are diametrically 
opposed or internally contradictory. In some, Laocoon is an innocent 
hero, punished only for defending his fatherland; in others, he is first 
and foremost a reprobate who desecrated the temple of the god he 
served; and in others again, he is both a patriot and a criminal. We turn 
once more to the group to measure the conflicting versions against it, 
and we are confronted with the same ambiguities as before. Is Laocoon 
a rebel or a martyr, a hero or a criminal? Is his punishment just or unjust? 
does he bear it with fortitude or despair, with indignation or remorse? 
does he indeed display any conscious emotion at all, or is he even in a 
position to do so? Some have contended that he is not, and yet others 
have read almost every kind of expression, short of hilarity, into his face.
In the last resort, our interpretation will be guided by yet another set 
of variables, those of our own predispositions and background. Indeed, 
when we evaluate the interpretations of past critics, it is usually possible 
to relate them to the background and outlook of the writers concerned. 
But we must be wary of reducing what they say to straightforward 
social determinants—for example, Winckelmann’s interpretation to his 
discontent with Germany, his penurious circumstances, and his need 
for a heroic ideal; Lessing’s to his revolt against the French influence, 
typified by rigid Cornelian heroism; and so on. For although these were 
no doubt contributory factors, the case of Heinse provides a salutary 
warning against such simplifications: as we have seen, Heinse came up 
with several variant interpretations of the group within a short space of 
time, some of which later reappeared in the works of others of completely 
different backgrounds and attitudes. The reception of the Laocoon 
group in Germany has been a complex process, in which the ambiguous 
evidence of the group itself, the various versions of the myth, and the 
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personalities of the critics, along with their individual circumstances, 
the ideological influences to which they were subject, and the general 
state of learning at the time at which they wrote, have interacted with 
one another—and with a further factor of even greater significance than 
the rest: the reception of the group by their predecessors. In almost every 
case, the critics were replying to earlier critics, and the most important 
factor within the debate has been the debate itself.169
Given the nature of the group, it is not surprising that the debate 
consisted of a movement between extremes, the chief of which were the 
idealistic and naturalistic modes of interpretation. Both could point to 
evidence in support of their case, but it was the failure of the former 
to give a morally convincing account of the work which helped to tip 
the balance in favour of the latter. Many writers from the nineteenth 
century onwards have felt that the myth, as here depicted, is ethically 
incommensurable, and that technical virtuosity was therefore the 
artists’ principal consideration. But the conclusion does not necessarily 
follow from the premise: perhaps it was the power, rather than the 
justice, of the gods which the sculptors wished to commemorate. 
Be that as it may, critics of the group are still wary of interpreting its 
content, and they usually have more to say on its style and its place 
in the history of art. This is certainly not because the earlier enigmas 
have been disposed of. It is because writers are more conscious than 
before of the complexity of the issues, the number of variables involved, 
and the failure of their predecessors to produce an interpretation which 
might comprehend them all without leaving an intractable residue. 
One twentieth-century writer refuses to reopen the questions of which 
moment is depicted, what feelings are expressed, and which version of 
the legend is followed, and decides instead that all past interpretations 
are justified.170 For those who constructed them, they of course were. 
But in that case, any other interpretation, however arbitrary, must be 
equally justified, and we are left with a complete relativism which must 
169  Compare Karl Robert Mandelkow, ‘Probleme der Wirkungsgeschichte’, in 
Mandelkow, Orpheus und Maschine. Acht literaturgeschichtliche Arbeiten (Heidelberg: 
Stiehm, 1976), pp. 103–17 (p. 113): ‘The reception history of a work or author is 
always from the start the reception history of the reception history […] One’s 
own horizon of expectation is modified by one’s reaction to other horizons of 
expectation.’ 
170  Sichtermann, Laokoon, p. 23.
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inhibit all further initiatives. In short, critics now hesitate to interpret 
the group not because the problems have been solved, but because they 
have despaired of conclusively solving them.171
The Laocoon group is in this respect a paradigmatic case—not of the 
limits of poetry and visual art, but of the limits of interpretation. For if no 
comprehensive interpretation can be found, there are two equally good, 
but incompatible reasons why this must be so: either the work itself 
may have no coherent conception which can be reduced to a unitary 
explanation; or we, through lack of evidence or perspicacity, have failed 
to discover one. And even if we do succeed to our own satisfaction, the 
former possibility can never be completely eliminated.
When all is said and done, we may well ask why so much intellectual 
effort has been expended on what now seems to many so undeserving 
an object. The villain of the piece, if there is a villain, is surely Pliny, who 
convinced at least three centuries that this was the greatest sculpture 
of all time. And the hero, if there is a hero, is perhaps the sceptical 
archaeologist Heyne, whose words of warning, like those of the Trojan 
priest Laocoon, went unheeded by his countrymen: ‘It is very much to 
be doubted that the Greek artists ever had in mind the thousandth part 
of all the fine aesthetic reasonings on quiet grandeur with which they 
are credited.’172
171  The fullest and most impressive account to date of the current impasse in Laocoon 
studies is Richard Brilliant’s book My Laocoon (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2000).
172  Heyne, Sammlung antiquarischer Aufsätze, II, 22 (1779).
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